# Tawose

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · July 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414296

## Case

- **Full name:** Adewale Eniola Tawose v. Matthew L. Winton, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** July 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ADEWALE ENIOLA TAWOSE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1421-R
)
MATTHEW L. WINTON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Before the Court are the following Motions, each of which is now at issue:
(1) Defendant Andrew Welch’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38],
(2) Defendant Welch’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 44], to which
Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 46] and Welch replied [Doc. No. 49],
(3) the Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No.
43] filed by Defendants Matthew L. Winton PLLC, Matt Adams Thomas,
and Matthew L. Winton, to which Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 47] and the
Winton Defendants did not reply,
(4) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Denver Acosta, Brian Phillip
Bowman, Aaron Ellis, Mark Richard Grant, Amanda Lunsford, Bhupender
Pal, and Silverhawk Homeowners Association [Doc. No. 45], to which
Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 50] and Defendants replied [Doc. No. 55],
(5) the Winton Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 51], to which
Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 54] and Defendants replied [Doc. No. 56],
(6) Plaintiff’s Motions to Authorize Alternative Service and to Extend the
Time for Service on Defendant Denver Acosta [Doc. Nos. 53, 57], and
(7) the Winton Defendants’ Objection to and Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 67]
Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Evidence [Doc. No. 58], to which Plaintiff
responded [Doc. No. 68].
BACKGROUND
This is the fourth action1 arising from the following factual background: Plaintiff
owns a home in the Silverhawk Neighborhood in Oklahoma City [Am. Compl., Doc. No.
42, at p. 1 & ¶ 12]. Board Members of Silverhawk Homeowners’ Association include or

included Defendants Mark Grant, Brian Bowman, Aaron Ellis, Denver Acosta, Bhupender
Pal, Amanda Lunsford, and Andrew Welch (“the Silverhawk Defendants”). Id. ¶ 2.
Defendants Matthew L. Winton and Matt Adam Thomas are attorneys at Matthew L.
Winton, PLLC (“the Winton Defendants”), which represented Silverhawk HOA in the
below-detailed enforcement and litigation actions against Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.

In or around 2019, Plaintiff asked the Silverhawk Board whether Silverhawk
residents were permitted to use their homes for short-term rentals. Id. ¶ 12. Lunsford
allegedly told Plaintiff rentals were not restricted in the Silverhawk Neighborhood. Id. ¶ 13.
In 2020, Grant informed Plaintiff that rentals were prohibited and threatened legal action.
Id. ¶ 15. In or around February of 2021, Plaintiff received a violation notice imposing fines

1 “[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other
courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a
direct relation to matters at issue.” St. Louis Baptist Temple v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1172
(10th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946 (10th
Cir. 2001). Because of the direct relation of the three prior actions to matters currently at
issue, the Court properly takes judicial notice of the following proceedings: Silverhawk
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Adewale Eniola Tawose, Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., Okla.,
Case No. CJ-2021-4778, Adewale Eniola Tawose v. Silverhawk Homeowners Association,
Inc., et al., Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., Okla., Case No. CJ-2024-3118, and Adewale Eniola
Tawose v. Silverhawk Homeowners Association, Inc., U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Fort
Worth Div., Case No. 25-04043-elm. The Court will also take judicial notice of the related
proceedings in In re Adewale Eniola Tawose, U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Case No. 24-
43275-elm13.
for using his property for rentals and informing him he had received a warning in June of
2020 for such activity. Id. ¶ 16. After requesting a hearing on the issue on March 3, 2021,
but receiving no response, Plaintiff attended a March 9, 2021, board meeting, where he

renewed his request for a formal hearing. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that despite Welch’s
assurance that a hearing would be scheduled, Grant instructed Bowman to rescind the
hearing. Id. ¶ 19. A new hearing occurred on July 6, 2021, but the Board failed to provide
the results or to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to appeal its decision. Id. ¶¶ 22-24.
In November of 2021, Silverhawk filed a breach of contract action against Plaintiff

(“Tawose I”). Silverhawk Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Tawose, Dist. Ct. of Okla.
Cnty., Okla., Case No. CJ-2021-4778; Am. Compl. ¶ 24. According to Plaintiff, during the
discovery phase of Tawose I, the Winton Defendants and some of the Silverhawk
Defendants informed him there was no evidence related to Silverhawk’s claim that the use
of Plaintiff’s property was a nuisance. Id. ¶ 26. But at a bench trial conducted from January

29th to February 2nd, 2024, Defendants presented Lunsford’s “surprise testimony” that
Plaintiff’s use of his property violated Silverhawk’s governing documents. Id. ¶¶ 26, 34,
36. Silverhawk prevailed after the state court found Plaintiff’s property use was both a
nuisance and a violation of the HOA’s rules. Id. ¶ 36. The Tawose I Court entered its
Journal Entry of Judgment [“Judgment I”] for Silverhawk on April 1, 2024, awarding

$8,258 in assessments. Id. ¶ 37. Silverhawk, through the Winton Defendants, thereafter
recorded the judgment in violation of, according to Plaintiff, Oklahoma statutory law’s ten-
day stay on such filings. Id. ¶ 38.
Plaintiff also alleges that in June of 2023, Bowman filed a complaint with the City
of Oklahoma City Board of Adjustment alleging Plaintiff lacked a rental license. Id. ¶ 27.
The city later concluded Plaintiff had an active rental license. Id. Bowman and the Winton

Defendants sent more letters to the Board in September of 2023 seeking the denial of
Plaintiff’s rental license, complete with affidavits from Bowman and Ellis claiming
Plaintiff’s rental was a nuisance. Id. ¶ 30. The Board nevertheless granted Plaintiff’s
license. Id. ¶ 32.
In May of 2024, Plaintiff filed an action in state court against Silverhawk, its Board

Members, and the Winton Defendants (“Tawose II”). Tawose v. Silverhawk Homeowners
Association, et al., Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., Okla., Case No. CJ-2024-3118. Plaintiff
asserted claims such as constructive fraud, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty
against the Tawose II Defendants, all related to the underlying dispute over the use of his
Silverhawk Property for short-term rentals.

On June 13, 2024, the Tawose I court announced an attorney-fee award of over
$152,000 in favor of Silverhawk, and an Amended Statement of Judgment [“Judgment II”]
was entered. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Silverhawk, through the Winton Defendants, recorded the
amended judgment. Id. Plaintiff asserts this occurred in violation of various Oklahoma laws
because it was done without a signature and in violation of the ten-day stay. Id. He also

asserts the recording of the judgments immediately impaired his ability to refinance, sell,
or bond the property. Id. n.5.
In September of 2024, Plaintiff filed a bankruptcy proceeding in Texas, triggering
an automatic stay of the enforcement of judgments obtained prior to the commencement of
that case. Id. ¶ 43; In re Adewale Eniola Tawose, U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Fort Worth
Div., Case No. 24-43275-elm13. Plaintiff alleges that despite this stay, Silverhawk
continued to take enforcement actions pursuant to the Judgments. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-47.

The Bankruptcy Court later sustained Plaintiff’s objection to Silverhawk’s Proof of Claim
related to those Judgments. Id. ¶ 48.
Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding (“Tawose III”) in his bankruptcy action
against the Silverhawk and Winton Defendants. Adewale Eniola Tawose v. Silverhawk
Homeowners Association, Inc., U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Fort Worth Div., Case No. 25-

04043-elm. In April of 2025, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Tawose
II Defendants. See Tawose, No. CJ-2024-3118. In October of 2025, Tawose III was
dismissed on abstention grounds. Am. Compl. ¶ 54.
Plaintiff commenced this action (“Tawose IV”) in November of 2025, asserting
claims against the Defendants related to the underlying HOA dispute and subsequent

litigation. In February of 2026, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Winton
Defendants [Doc. No. 36], but gave Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings, which
Plaintiff did. A deluge of motions followed, and the Court will take each in turn.
I. The Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
Defendants ask this Court to strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(f), arguing Plaintiff has merely repleaded claims
this Court previously dismissed. They rely heavily upon this Court’s February Dismissal
Order, in which it stated it would not tolerate a mere restatement of Plaintiff’s claims.
Defendants further assert Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is much more than the “short and
plain statement” contemplated by Rule 8.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This requirement “establishes a ceiling (the
complaint must be no more than ‘a short and plain statement’) and not a floor (the
complaint must at least be a ‘short and plain statement’).” Toevs v. Reid, 267 F. App’x 817,
818-19 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary

detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for
what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.” Mann v. Boatright,
477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In a motion to strike “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).

The motion’s purpose is to “save the time and money that would be spent litigating issues
that will not affect the outcome of the case.” Purzel Video GmbH v. Smoak, No. 13-cv-
001167-WYD-MEH, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1029 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2014) (quotation
omitted). “[M]otions to strike are generally a disfavored, drastic remedy and are rarely
granted.” Knighten v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-683-D, 2018 WL 718533, at *2 (W.D.

Okla. Feb. 5, 2018) (citing United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 463-64 (W.D. Okla.
1987)); see also Tavasci v. Cambron, No. CIV-16-0461 JB/LF, 2016 WL 6405896, at *7
(D.N.M. Oct. 25, 2016) (quotation omitted) (noting motions to strike “tend to be busywork,
and crowd the docket”); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 587, 599 (D.N.M. 2011)
(quotations omitted) (citing courts that describe the motion to strike as “a dilatory tactic,”
“purely cosmetic,” and a “time waster[ ]”). Moreover, the Court “possesses considerable
discretion in disposing of a Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike . . . .” SFF–TIR, LLC v. Stephenson,

250 F. Supp. 3d 856, 978 (N.D. Okla. 2017) (quotation omitted).
The Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of the Amended Complaint
as a mere restatement of Plaintiff’s previously dismissed claims. Plaintiff has made a
meaningful effort to amend his pleadings; he shortened the Complaint by seventy pages,
arranged it in a much more straightforward and concise manner, and added factual

allegations in an attempt to correct the deficiencies in his previous Complaint.2
Accordingly, and taking into account Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court declines to strike
his Amended Complaint.
Defendants perfunctorily argue that this Court’s previous Order has a “preclusive
effect” on the Amended Complaint, and because the claims in Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint all arise from the same events of the previous Complaint, those claims are
barred. See Watkins v. Genesh, Inc., 135 F.4th 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation
omitted) (“[A] party cannot avoid preclusion by repackaging precluded claims under the
rubric of slightly different legal theories where the ‘new’ and precluded claims stem from
the same transaction or occurrence.”). But “for claim preclusion to attach,” there must be

a “final judgment on the merits in a prior action.” Id. at 1229. As the “proponent[s] of
preclusion,” Defendants “bear[] the burden to show” its satisfaction. Id. at 1230. But

2 It is another matter entirely whether Plaintiff’s attempts to correct such deficiencies are
successful such that his claims have any merit.
Defendants do not meaningfully argue that this Court’s prior dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
constitutes a final judgment on the merits. The Tenth Circuit has stated that dismissals
without prejudice can sometimes constitute final judgments because “no ‘further

proceedings’ in the case are anticipated.” Hogan v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 73 F.4th 1150,
1159 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th
Cir. 2001)). But “‘[w]hen the dismissal order expressly grants the plaintiff leave to amend,
that conclusively shows that the district court intended only to dismiss the complaint [rather
than the action]; the dismissal is thus not a final decision.’” Id. at 1160 (quoting Moya v.

Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 2006)). This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
claims against the Winton Defendants and indeed warned Plaintiff of the consequences of
a mere restatement of such claims. But the Court clearly anticipated further proceedings in
the case, giving Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and declining to preclude him from
amending his claims against the Winton Defendants. The Winton Defendants have failed

to meet their burden of establishing claim preclusion. In the absence of persuasive
argument or authority to the contrary from the Winton Defendants, their Motion to Strike
[Doc. No. 43] Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DENIED.
II. The Winton Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions
The Winton Defendants have also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11(b)(1)-(3) states:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—
whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and] (3) the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.

The “central purpose of Rule 11[,]” which applies to attorneys and pro se litigants
alike, “is to deter baseless filings in district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “In order to comply with Rule 11 and avoid sanctions thereunder, a
pro se party’s actions must be objectively reasonable.” Clements v. Chapman, 189 F. App’x
688, 692-93 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). However, “[a] litigant’s pro se status may
certainly be considered when determining whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions.”
McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 218 F.R.D. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 2003).
Defendants assert sanctions are warranted because the legal defects of Plaintiff’s
previously dismissed claims have not been rectified by Plaintiff’s mere re-packaging of
them in his Amended Complaint. But this Court’s examination of the Amended Complaint,
as well as a review of the arguments Plaintiff has presented in support of his amended
claims, leads it to conclude that Plaintiff has made a meaningful effort to fix the
deficiencies, both factual and in some cases legal, which led to the previous dismissal. The
Court is also hesitant to address the parties’ arguments regarding the viability of Plaintiff’s
amended claims as they pertain to the Winton Defendants in the context of either a Motion
for Sanctions or Motion to Strike, particularly with the limited briefing on the issues
currently before it.
“Courts are typically inclined to sanction pro se litigants under Rule 11 only when
the litigant has been repeatedly warned that his or her legal theories are meritless or his or
her improper purpose is clear from the record.” Rasmussen v. Burnett, No. 24-CV-01727-

SKC-KAS, 2025 WL 808364, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 12, 2025). Plaintiff’s conduct, at least
at this point, has not risen to that level. Although the Court reminds Plaintiff (now for the
second time) that he must comply with Rule 11 and all other procedural and local rules,
sanctions are not appropriate at this time. The Court simply cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is “baseless”—just as it cannot conclude, with the briefing now before

it, whether Plaintiff’s amended claims against the Winton Defendants are viable.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 51] is DENIED without
prejudice to resubmission, if appropriate.
III. Defendant Welch’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint
The filing of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “supersedes the original and renders it

of no legal effect.” Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation omitted). Because Welch’s first Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38] was
filed prior to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, it is DENIED AS MOOT.
IV. Defendant Welch’s Amended Motion and the Other Silverhawk Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint3
Both Defendant Welch and the other Silverhawk Defendants seek dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act, OKLA. STAT. tit.

3 Plaintiff asserts the Silverhawk Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was improperly served
via email and seeks to have the Motion stricken. Counsel has represented this mistake was
inadvertent and promised to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 moving
12, § 1430, et seq., which is “designed to reduce the frequency of what are called SLAPP
[Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation] lawsuits.” Barnett v. Hall, Estill,
Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2020). “The

stated purpose of the act is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons
to ‘petition, speak freely, associate freely and otherwise participate in government to the
maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to
file a meritorious lawsuit for a demonstrable injury.’” Anagnost v. Tomecek, 390 P.3d 707,
709-10 (Okla. 2017) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1430).

In an OCPA proceeding, the initial burden is on the defendant seeking
dismissal to show that the plaintiff’s claim “is based on, relates to, or is in
response to the [defendant’s] exercise of the right of free speech, the right to
petition, or the right of association.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1434(B). The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show “by clear and specific evidence a
prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.”
§ 1434(C). If § 1434(C) is satisfied, the burden shifts back to the defendant
to show “by a preponderance of the evidence” a defense to the plaintiff’s
claims. § 1434(D). If the plaintiff’s prima facie case fails, or the defendant
shows a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the suit is dismissed.

Krimbill v. Talarico, 417 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) (citations modified).

Welch argues the OCPA applies because Plaintiff’s claims arise from Welch’s role
as a Board Member in connection with Silverhawk HOA’s resort to judicial processes to

forward. Given that Plaintiff had actual notice of the Motion, responded to it in a timely
manner, and does not represent that he has been prejudiced by Defendants’ failing in any
way, Plaintiff’s request that this Court strike the Motion is DENIED. See Hanson v. Fenn,
No. 1:19-cv-1124-WJ/KK, 2020 WL 3083985, at *3 (D.N.M. June 10, 2020) (“[E]ven to
the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that although he received the filings electronically, he
was entitled to copies via U.S. Mail, he does not explain what possible prejudice he could
have suffered.”). See also LCvR7.1(c) (“A response to a motion may not also include a
motion or a cross-motion made by the responding party.”). The Court will, however, warn
Defendants against any future failings of this kind.
enforce its governing documents, thus implicating Welch’s rights both to association and
to petition. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1431(2), (4).4 The other Silverhawk Defendants argue
similarly, though they assert Plaintiff’s claims implicate only their rights to petition.

Plaintiff argues that because the OCPA answers the same question as Federal Rule
of Procedure 12(b)(6)—the standard for pre-trial dismissal—application of the OCPA in
federal court violates the Erie doctrine. Under the OCPA, the showing required is indeed
“somewhat more specific than that required to resist a traditional motion to dismiss, in that
something more than formulaic recitals of elements and a simple claim of damages is

necessary.” Candler v. James, 588 P.3d 933, 937 (Okla. Civ. App. 2026). But whether the
OCPA applies or not, Plaintiff’s claims do not rise even to the level of 12(b)(6) plausibility,
much less to what the OCPA may require. Thus, because the Court finds Plaintiff has failed
to state any plausible claims, it need not address the parties’ OCPA arguments.5

4 Plaintiff argues Defendant Welch’s Motion to Dismiss is unresponsive to his Second
Amended Complaint because it is a cut-and-paste of his previous Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant Welch filed a new Motion to Dismiss after the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint. The Court will consider Welch’s arguments as they pertain to the Second
Amended Complaint and declines to deny the Motion on these grounds.
5 See Westwin Elements, Inc. v. CVMR Corp., No. CIV-25-19-D, 2025 WL 3473300, at *3
n.3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2025) (declining to address the parties’ OCPA argument where
the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for abuse of process). The Court notes another
court in this district has indicated that even where a complaint fails pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), it does not moot the OCPA arguments because the OCPA provides for relief such
as the recovery of attorney’s fees where dismissal occurs. KLX Energy Servs., LLC v.
Magnesium Mach., LLC, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1130 n.4 (W.D. Okla. 2021) (citations
omitted). But even after the KLX Energy Court determined the OCPA applied in both
federal court and that particular case, it denied “an award because the OCPA motion was
only successful in part . . . and because the motion achieved nothing beyond what was
achieved under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 1134. Given that Defendants’ OCPA Motions here
also achieve nothing beyond what is achieved under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court would
decline to award fees and costs at this juncture anyway. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
a. Plaintiff’s Slander of Title Claims Against Silverhawk, Bowman, Ellis, and Pal
and his Quiet Title Claim Against Silverhawk

To state a claim for slander of title, Plaintiff must allege: “1) [the] publication of a
statement; 2) the published statement was false; 3) the publication was maliciously made;
4) the publication caused [him] to incur special damages resulting therefrom; and 5) [he]
owns or possesses an interest in the subject property.” Bays Expl., Inc. v. PenSa, Inc., No.
CIV-07-754-D, 2012 WL 4128120, at *19 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 18, 2012) (citing Zehner v.
Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991, 994 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981)). Plaintiff claims the
Defendants knowingly published false claims against his title by recording Judgments I
and II earlier than permitted by law. He claims Judgment II is void for several reasons. He
further argues Defendants slandered his title by failing to release either judgment after they

were (1) satisfied by Plaintiff, (2) disallowed by the Bankruptcy Court, or (3) reversed by
the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals in Tawose I.
Plaintiff also brings a quiet title claim against Silverhawk, asserting that although
Judgments I and II are invalid and/or have been eliminated by other judicial determinations,
Silverhawk has refused to release either Judgment, thus impairing the marketability of

Plaintiff’s title.
Plaintiff’s slander of title and quiet title claims both hinge on whether the Tawose I
Judgments are valid and enforceable. At this time, however, there is an appeal of Tawose

§ 1438(A)(1) (“If the court orders dismissal . . . under the [OCPA], the court shall award
to the moving party[ ] [c]ourt costs, reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred
in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require.”) (emphasis added).
I pending before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Silverhawk Homeowners Ass’n, Inc.
v. Adewale Eniola Tawose, No. DF-122129 (Okla. Apr. 1, 2024).
The Rooker-Feldman6 doctrine prevents federal district courts from entertaining

actions brought by “‘state-court losers’” challenging “‘state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460
(2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
To determine if Rooker-Feldman applies, courts consider whether “the state court
judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal court plaintiff

seeks redress.” Kanth v. Lubeck, 123 F. App’x 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished)
(quotation and emphases omitted). “If it did, Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal court of
jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies both to
“claims actually decided by a state court, and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior
state-court judgment.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and

alterations omitted). At bottom, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs that “errors in state
cases should be reviewed and settled through the state appellate process.” Id. at 1256 n.11.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit after the state court judgments were rendered. For Plaintiff
to succeed on his slander of title claim, this Court would have to determine whether the
Judgments filed and maintained by Defendants were “false.” To do so, even while the

6 Though Defendants do not explicitly raise Rooker-Feldman as a reason for dismissal,
“because the issue is jurisdictional, [the Court] may address it sua sponte.” Cory v.
Fahlstrom, 143 F. App’x 84, 87 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
underlying state court action is still pending,7 would require this Court to “review, reverse,
or invalidate a [] state-court decision”—something it cannot do. Burr v. Robinson, 162 F.3d
1172 (Table), at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). The same can be said for Plaintiff’s

quiet title claim, which asks this Court to declare Judgments I and II void and of no force
or effect and to quiet title in Plaintiff’s favor.
Rooker-Feldman operates to prevent parties from seeking to have state-court
judgments declared void on the basis of alleged errors or mistakes. Even if the state-court
erred “that [does] not make the judgment void, but merely [leaves] it open to reversal or

modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding.” Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923)). This Court will not interfere with the validity of the state court
judgments. It thus declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s slander of title and quiet
title claims.8

7 “[A]llowing federal district courts to review state-court judgments while they are on
appeal in the state-court system would undermine the ‘[c]ooperation and comity’ on which
our federal system is built.” T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1751
(2026) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil. Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999)) (rejecting
the theory that Rooker-Feldman bars only those federal suits which seek review of final
judgments of the state’s highest court). “Federalism principles are thus best served by
continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal cases in which plaintiffs seek review of
state-court judgments, regardless of whether those judgments are final trial-court
judgments or those of a State’s highest court.” Id. at 1752.
8 Though Plaintiff’s claims are partially based on Defendants’ alleged failure to release the
judgments after they were satisfied, the Court finds it cannot rule on this issue either
without inappropriately stepping into the ongoing state proceedings. As the validity of the
judgments are still pending, the Court cannot issue a ruling upon whether those same
judgments were satisfied and/or should have been released. Furthermore, the Court doubts
the propriety of its becoming involved in the enforcement of the state court judgment. See,
e.g., Montgomery v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 10-CV-743-GKF-PJC,
2012 WL 826932, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2012) (“Issues of enforcement of the state
court’s order should be brought before the state courts.”). See also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
b. Plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claims Against Silverhawk

Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim asserts Defendant improperly filed a proof of claim in
Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case based on the underlying state court judgments. He argues that
each day Defendant refuses to release the Judgments, it engages in a new violation of the
FDCPA by falsely representing that Silverhawk holds a valid secured interest in Plaintiff’s
property. His FDCPA claims, like his slander of title and quiet title claims, would thus
require this Court to adjudicate whether the state court judgments are valid and
enforceable—something this Court cannot do without violating Rooker-Feldman.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims against Silverhawk fail for other reasons.
“The FDCPA regulates ‘debt collector[s],’ defined as persons who ‘regularly
collect[ ] or attempt[ ] to collect’ someone else’s debts.” Pinson v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1200, 1209 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). Given this statutory definition, the FDCPA typically
“does not apply to creditors trying to collect their own debt.” Id. There are,
however, “instances in which creditors collecting their own debt are deemed
debt collectors under the statute.” Id. In particular, “[t]he FDCPA applies to
‘any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name
other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or
attempting to collect such debts.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). This
is known “as the false-name exception.” Id.

The Tenth Circuit has not determined the controlling standard for when the
false-name exception applies. Some circuits “hold that the false-name
exception applies when the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ would believe a
third party was involved in collecting a debt.” Id. (citing cases). In other
FDCPA contexts, however, we have rejected the “least sophisticated
consumer” standard in favor of “the ‘reasonable consumer’ standard.”
Tavernaro v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 43 F.4th 1062, 1071-72 (10th
Cir. 2022) (discussing standard for assessing materiality of misleading,
deceptive, or false statements).

Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (indicating Younger abstention is appropriate in cases asking
federal courts to “interfere with the execution of state judgments”).
Heidelberger v. Ill. River Ranch Recreational Vehicle Park Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., No.
24-7056, 2025 WL 573824, at *3 (10th Cir. 2025) (unpublished).
But this Court need not determine which standard applies because Plaintiff’s

complaint is deficient under both. Id. Plaintiff does not allege that Silverhawk used a name
other than its own when collecting its debt. His theory is that Silverhawk’s reliance on the
Judgments, suggesting a judicial entity validated the debt, is a “classic example” of using
a name other than the creditor’s. Lacking from this theory is any allegation that relying on
the Judgments would lead a consumer to believe that a third person (here, it seems, the

state court) was collecting the debt rather than Silverhawk through its lawyers. Based on
the pleadings, “neither a sophisticated nor a reasonable consumer could have been confused
that it was [Silverhawk], and not any other entity, that was attempting to collect” on the
Tawose I judgments. Id.
c. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Welch for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay

Plaintiff asserts Welch violated the automatic stay imposed by virtue of the filing of
his bankruptcy action by continuing to seek enforcement of the Judgments against Plaintiff.
“In general, actions for violations of the automatic stay should be brought in the bankruptcy
court. The bankruptcy court is charged with enforcing the automatic stay.” In re Denton,
No. 23-80938-PRT, No. 24-8011-PRT, 2024 WL 5251904, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec.

30, 2024) (footnote omitted); World Enters. v. Aquila, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00021-DN, 2013
WL 4592204, at *9 (D. Utah Aug. 28, 2013) (“[O]ther courts have held that the proper
forum for a claim for damages arising out of an alleged breach of the automatic stay
provision is the bankruptcy court, not the district court.”) (quotation omitted). The
Bankruptcy Court is currently adjudicating Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendants violated
the automatic stay. In re Tawose, Case No. 24-43275-elm13, Doc. No. 259 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. July 24, 2026) (setting September 2026 evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff’s stay

violation motion). In the absence of persuasive argument or authority to the contrary from
Plaintiff, this Court concludes that it would be more appropriate for Plaintiff to pursue his
willful violation claim before the Bankruptcy Court—something Plaintiff is already doing.
d. Plaintiff’s Actual and/or Constructive Fraud Claims Against Silverhawk,
Lunsford, Grant, Bowman, Acosta, Welch, Ellis, and Pal

Plaintiff alleges that in 2019, Lunsford falsely represented that the Silverhawk HOA
permitted rental properties. Plaintiff also alleges that in 2021, Grant falsely informed him
that daycares were allowed in Silverhawk, and that Bowman represented the same at the
July 2021 hearing (at which Welch and Pal were present) and his August 2023 deposition.
There is a two-year statute of limitations in Oklahoma for tort claims such as fraud.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). Plaintiff first brought a claim for fraud against the
same Defendants in Tawose II in May of 2024—well over two years after his 2019 and
2021 fraud allegations. And Plaintiff’s arguments that the Oklahoma Savings Statute,

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100, which allows a party a one-year grace period for refiling a
timely-commenced action if it fails otherwise than on the merits, are unavailing here;
although Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his Tawose II claims in April of 2025 and brought
this action in November of 2025, it appears as though his tort claims were already barred
when he initiated Tawose II in 2024.
Plaintiff argues he did not discover the fraud until the Tawose I trial in January of
2024, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed their misrepresentations until then. “[I]n
suits based on fraud, the statute of limitations [ ] begins to run from the time of discovery

of the fraud or from such time as the victim by the exercise of ordinary diligence might
have discovered [the] same.” Baker v. Massey, 569 P.2d 987, 991 (Okla. 1977); see also
Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 02CV0944CVE-FHM, 2005 WL 3263377, at *8 (N.D.
Okla. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Tice v. Pennington, 30 P.3d 1164, 1171 (Okla. Civ. App.
2001)) (“[T]olling resulting from fraudulent concealment ends ‘when the plaintiff knows,

or reasonably should know, of enough critical facts about the injury and its cause to protect
himself or herself by seeking legal assistance.’”). Plaintiff admits he learned Lunsford’s
representations were false as early as June of 2020. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. He further states he
attempted to raise many of his current claims before the Tawose I Court in 2023. Indeed,
the Tawose I docket reveals Plaintiff sought leave to amend his counterclaim to bring a

claim for constructive fraud, and the docket reflects Plaintiff had access to the Silverhawk
covenants and restrictions (including the provisions related to in-home daycares) as early
as July 11, 2023, when he filed his motion. See Silverhawk v. Tawose, No. CJ-2021-4778,
Doc. No. 1056087656 (July 11, 2023). This completely undermines any of Plaintiff’s
assertions that he did not discover his fraud claims until January of 2024 or could not have

promptly discovered the truth by his own ordinary diligence.
With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations that Bowman made fraudulent representations
at his August 2023 deposition, Plaintiff is barred from recovery as a matter of law. There
is no civil remedy for litigation-related misconduct under Oklahoma law. Patel v. OMHS
Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1201-02 (Okla. 1999) (finding no civil remedy for
plaintiff’s allegations that opposing counsel committed fraud, deceit, perjury, and
spoliation of evidence during an earlier, separate trial). “Oklahoma offers ‘participants in

judicial proceedings an absolute immunity against later civil suits grounded in litigation
conduct.’” Tyler v. United States, No. CIV-19-01102-JD, 2024 WL 1862324, at *11 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 29, 2024) (quoting Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1185
(10th Cir. 2014)). “[R]emedies for ‘litigation-related misconduct’ are to be pursued in the
litigated case.” Id. (quoting Patel, 987 P.2d at 1202-03). See also Anderson v. Pollard, No.

21-5019, 2021 WL 3503418, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (citing Cooper v.
Parker-Hughey, 894 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Okla. 1995)) (“[N]o cause of action for perjury
exists under either federal or Oklahoma law.”). “Oklahoma also ‘recognize[s] an absolute
privilege for communications made preliminary to proposed judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings in favor of attorneys, parties and witnesses.’” Id. (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, this Court cannot provide Plaintiff a remedy for Bowman’s alleged
deposition misrepresentations.
e. Plaintiff’s Abuse of Process Claims Against Silverhawk, Bowman, Ellis, Acosta,
Pal, and Welch

Plaintiff argues Defendants abused multiple legal processes for the improper
purpose of coercing him from his home, extracting unwarranted payments, and punishing
him for exercising his rights. Those legal processes allegedly include (1) the municipal
complaints asserting Plaintiff lacked a rental license and seeking the denial of such a
license, (2) the premature recording of Judgment I, (3) the filing of and other enforcement
actions related to Judgment II, (4) the failure to release the Judgments after other judicial
determinations, and (5) multiple improper actions related to the bankruptcy case.
To state a claim for abuse of process, Plaintiff must plead “‘(1) the improper use of

the court’s process (2) primarily for an ulterior or improper purpose (3) with resulting
damage to the plaintiff asserting the misuse.’” Schlottman v. Unit Drilling Co., No. CIV-
08-1275-C, 2009 WL 1657988, at *2 (W.D. Okla. June 11, 2009) (quoting Greenberg v.
Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 905 (Okla. 1994)). “The key issue in any abuse of process claim
is whether a party has attempted to use the legal system ‘to obtain a result not lawfully

warranted or properly attainable.’” FLSmidth A/S v. Jeffco, LLC, No. 08-CV-0215-CVE-
SAJ, 2008 WL 4426992, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2008) (quoting Neil v. Penn. Life Ins.
Co., 474 P.2d 961, 965 (Okla. 1970)). Even if the predicate action was motivated by
malicious intentions, if the predicate action was used for an authorized purpose, there is no
abuse of process. Greenberg, 890 P.2d at 905. There “must be some ‘definite act or threat

not authorized by the process.’” Gore v. Taylor, 792 P.2d 432, 435 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990)
(quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 121 (4th ed. 1971)).
Even if the Defendants’ actions were motivated by the malicious intentions of
forcing Plaintiff out of his home, most of the actions taken by Defendants are all valid uses
of process in order to obtain the lawful outcome of enforcing the HOA’s covenants.

Moreover, to the extent Defendants took any improper actions, these actions are once again
litigation-related misconduct for which Oklahoma law provides no civil remedy. See Patel,
987 P.2d at 1201-02. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sanction the Defendants for their
alleged misconduct in any of the state or bankruptcy court forums, he should seek to do so
in those actions instead. Moreover, many of Plaintiff’s claims, were this Court to adjudicate
them, would require it to inquire into the validity of the state court judgments, something
it cannot do without violating Rooker-Feldman.

f. Plaintiff’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims against Lunsford, Grant, Ellis,
Bowman, Acosta, Welch, and Pal

Plaintiff argues Defendants breached their fiduciary duties when they (1)
represented rentals were permitted in 2019, (2) treated Plaintiff’s rental as prohibited while
permitting in-home daycares, (3) failed to provide written results of the July 2021 hearing
and denied Plaintiff an appeal, (4) approved litigation and concealed Lunsford as a witness,
(5) authorized unlawful collection actions in connection with the Judgments and
bankruptcy case, (6) failed to respond to accounting requests, (7) submitted false affidavits
to the Bankruptcy Court, (8) maintained the liens/Judgments despite having no lawful basis
for them, and (9) filed the municipal complaints against Plaintiff.
Once again: Plaintiff’s claims related to Lunsford and the 2021 hearing are time-
barred.9 Plaintiff’s arguments related to concealing witnesses, approving litigation, and
misconduct in the bankruptcy case are complaints of Defendants’ litigation-related

misconduct for which this Court can provide no remedy. And to the extent Plaintiff’s
claims rely on this Court to determine the enforceability of Judgments I and II, Rooker-
Feldman bars this Court from doing so.

9 In the absence of persuasive argument or authority to the contrary, it appears that the
statute of limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims is also two years. See FDIC
v. UMIC, Inc., 136 F.3d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Oklahoma law to a breach
of fiduciary duty claim).
g. Plaintiff’s Claims for Gross Negligence Against Lunsford, Grant, Ellis,
Bowman, Acosta, Welch, Pal, and Silverhawk

Plaintiff raises essentially the same factual allegations as those previously
mentioned in asserting that Defendants breached duties owed to Plaintiff and acted with
gross negligence: (1) Lunsford lying in 2019, (2) denying Plaintiff a hearing in March of
2021, (3) depriving Plaintiff of results or an appeal of his July 2021 hearing before filing
suit, (4) concealing Lunsford as a witness during discovery, (5) collecting and recording
the Judgments, and (6) misconduct related to the bankruptcy proceeding. Once again—
these claims are either time-barred and/or for litigation-related misconduct for which this
Court provides no remedy. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that many of
these actions, taken pursuant to normal litigation and enforcement procedures, amount to

gross negligence or indeed negligence at all.
h. Plaintiff’s Civil Conspiracy Claims Against All Defendants

Plaintiff asserts multiple civil conspiracy claims against the Silverhawk Defendants,
asserting they were in conspiracy with each other and/or the Winton Defendants. The first
conspiracy claim asserts Defendants conspired to enforce the void and unauthorized
Judgement II against Plaintiff’s property through unlawful means. Rooker-Feldman bars
this Court’s review of such a claim because it would require this Court to determine the
validity of the underlying state court Judgments. Furthermore, much of this claim reiterates
Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendants’ litigation-related misconduct, for which this Court
cannot provide a remedy.
The second conspiracy claim asserts Defendants conspired to violate the automatic
stay imposed by virtue of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy action. The third conspiracy claim
regurgitates the same allegations related to the 2021 hearings, enforcement of covenants

against Plaintiff, concealment of Lunsford, discovery-related misconduct, bankruptcy case
misconduct, and maintenance of the liens. Both claims fail for the same reasons as many
of Plaintiff’s others—they are either time-barred and/or seek relief for litigation-related
misconduct. Furthermore, the Court has already found the Bankruptcy Court is the more
appropriate forum for Plaintiff to present allegations related to Defendants’ alleged

violation of the automatic stay.
i. Plaintiff’s Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against the
Silverhawk Defendants

Plaintiff asserts Defendants committed IIED by failing to accord him the proper
process during pre-litigation enforcement of the HOA’s covenants, filing municipal
complaints against him, enforcing and/or failing to release the Judgments, violating the
automatic stay, and committing other misconduct in the bankruptcy action. Once again—
many of these claims are time-barred and most are for litigation-related misconduct for
which this Court cannot provide a remedy. Moreover, as this Court stated in its February
Order, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is largely based on Defendants’ conduct related to exercising
their legal rights through litigation and enforcement activities. To establish an IIED claim,
Plaintiff must plead (1) that Defendants’ conduct was “so outrageous in character and so
extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and that such conduct

is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” and (2) that the
resulting emotional distress was “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it.” Comput. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 735-36 (Okla. 2002) (citations
and quotations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants’ conduct

was either outrageous and extreme and/or that it caused him the type of emotional distress
contemplated by an IIED claim.
j. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim Against Silverhawk

Plaintiff asserts Silverhawk breached its governing documents by denying Plaintiff
a hearing, failing to provide written results of a hearing once he received one, filing suit
prior to completing the required hearing process, levying fines on Plaintiff without proper
notice and a hearing, failing to provide an accounting upon Plaintiff’s written requests,
refusing access to books and records, and breaching the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing by, among other actions, selectively enforcing covenants, concealing a material
witness, recording a defective lien, etc., etc. This claim is another regurgitation of the

factual allegations and arguments which this Court has already found (1) seek review of
the state-court Judgments, something the Court cannot do under Rooker-Feldman and/or
(2) complain of litigation-related misconduct, for which this Court cannot provide a
remedy.
The only allegations potentially not barred by either of the above doctrines are

Plaintiff’s claims that Silverhawk failed to provide him with an accounting and access to
corporate books and records. These allegations are largely duplicative of his claim for
denial of access to books and records, which this Court more properly discusses below.
k. Plaintiff’s Claim for Denial of Access to Books and Records Against
Silverhawk

Defendants largely ignore Plaintiff’s allegations that he has both statutory and
contractual rights to inspect the books and records of the HOA.10 See Am. Compl. ¶ 11
(quoting from Section 6.4(l) of the HOA’s governing document: the Board “shall” make
available the books of account and financial records “at any reasonable time and for a
purpose reasonably related to [the Member’s] interest in a Lot”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 1065 (“Any shareholder . . . upon written demand . . . shall have the right . . . to inspect
for any proper purpose . . . [t]he corporation’s stock ledger, . . . and its other books and
records.”). Plaintiff asserts he has requested access to the corporation’s records for a
reasonable purpose but has been denied by Silverhawk. Silverhawk argues Plaintiff is

improperly substituting a limited statutory inspection right as a substitute for discovery in
ongoing litigation. But Plaintiff asserts the denial of access to the books and records
occurred in 2025, after both Tawose I and Tawose II had terminated—though Tawose I is
still pending appeal and Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case is ongoing.
“The proper purpose required by [§ 1065 ] . . . is one wherein a stockholder seeks

information bearing upon the protection of his interest and that of other stockholders in the

10 Though Plaintiff asserts Silverhawk failed to provide him with an accounting and access
to the corporate books and records, the Amended Complaint indicates that what he seeks
is access to Silverhawk’s financial records. See Am. Compl. ¶ 45 (“On January 21, 2025,
Plaintiff demanded . . . an accounting . . . . Silverhawk did not respond. On February 18,
2025, Plaintiff again requested access to financial records under 18 O.S. § 1065.”)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court will examine this claim in the context of
Plaintiff’s claimed contractual and/or statutory right to access Silverhawk’s books and
records.
corporation.” Fears v. Cattlemen’s Inv. Co., 483 P.2d 724, 727 (Okla. 1971). A proper
purpose is a “purpose lawful in character, wherein a stockholder in good faith seeks
information . . . not contrary to the interests of the corporation, as distinguished from one

seeking to gratify his curiosity or proceeding for speculative or vexation purposes.”
Wolozyn v. Begarek, 378 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Okla. 1963). Proper purposes can, it seems,
include investigation of improper transactions or mismanagement and clarification of
unexplained discrepancies in a corporation’s financial statements. 5A Fletcher Cyclopedia
of the Law of Corporations § 2222 (2009).

Though the Court finds the issue is close, given the complete lack of authority or
persuasive argument from Defendant on this point it cannot conclude Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim (even under OCPA standards)11 for Silverhawk’s denial of his access to books
and records. Plaintiff asserts in his Amended Complaint that Silverhawk has failed to
release liens which he has allegedly satisfied. Taking into account his pro se status, the

Court can infer Plaintiff seeks to examine certain of Silverhawk’s books and records to
clarify any discrepancies in their financial records.

11 Even if the Court were to apply the OCPA in general, it remains unsure whether the
OCPA would apply to this particular claim by Plaintiff, as he is asserting a statutory and/or
contractual right to access corporate books and records. See Terry v. Ely, No. 19-CV-
00990-PRW, 2020 WL 9074888 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 8, 2020) (applying OCPA dismissal
standards to some of the plaintiff’s claims and not others). The Court is unconvinced such
a claim is in response to Silverhawk’s free speech, petitioning, or association rights. Under
plain 12(b)(6) standards, the Court is even more confident Plaintiff has stated a claim,
however tenuous, for violation of his rights to access Silverhawk’s books and records.
Whether such a claim will succeed at a later stage is, of course, another matter.
Perhaps the breadth of Plaintiff’s request is not reasonably related to his interest in
the Lot or Plaintiff seeks protected information Silverhawk cannot divulge. But the Court
finds Plaintiff has, at least at this stage, plausibly asserted that he attempted to exercise his

statutory and/or contractual right to access Silverhawk’s records and was entirely rebuffed.
Defendant’s cursory and overbroad arguments that Plaintiff’s purposes are improper do
little to convince this Court otherwise. Thus, in light of the total lack of persuasive
argument or authority to the contrary from Defendant, this claim will not be dismissed.
V. Plaintiff’s Motions to Authorize Alternative Service and Extend Time for
Service on Defendant Denver Acosta

Counsel has entered an appearance [Doc. No. 61] and filed a Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. No. 45] on behalf of Defendant Acosta. That Motion to Dismiss “does not raise the
defenses of insufficient process or insufficient service of process.” McGann v. Jagow, No.
1:24-cv-00727-SBP, 2024 WL 3340091, at *4 (D. Colo. June 20, 2025) (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(4) and (5)). “By doing so, Defendant[] [Acosta] waived service.” Id. (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)) (“‘A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by . . .
omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2)[.]’”). Rule

12(g)(2) states: “Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion
under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection
that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” See also Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp v. Oaklawn Apartments, 959 F.2d 170, 175 (10th Cir. 1992) (“If a party files a
pre-answer motion and fails to assert the defense[] of . . . insufficiency of service, he waives

these defenses.”). Furthermore, the instant Order dismisses Acosta from the case entirely.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motions to Authorize Alternative Service and Extend Time for
Service on Defendant Denver Acosta [Doc. Nos. 53, 57] are DENIED as moot.
VI. The Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Supplemental Evidence [Doc. No. 58], which he
indicates is directly relevant to the motions this Court ruled upon above. The Winton
Defendants ask the Court to either strike the Notice and its exhibits or decline to consider
them in deciding the pending motions [Doc. No. 67]. The Court has examined Plaintiff’s
Notice and the exhibits and finds that, whether it considered them or not, they would not

affect its above rulings. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 67]
Plaintiff’s Notice is DENIED AS MOOT.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 43] and the
Winton Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 51] are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion

to Authorize Alternative Service [Doc. No. 53] and Motion to Extend Time for Service
[Doc. No. 57], as well as Defendant Welch’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38] and the
Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 67] are DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant
Welch’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 44] is GRANTED. The other Silverhawk
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 45] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART; Claim XIV against Silverhawk alone survives. The rest of the claims, to the extent
they are asserted against the Silverhawk Defendants, including Defendant Welch, are
DISMISSED. Thus the only remaining Defendants in this action are (1) the Winton
Defendants and (2) Silverhawk.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29" day of July, 2026.

DAVID L. RUSSELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

30

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414296. Public record. Not legal advice.