# Hobson

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · August 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414164

## Case

- **Full name:** John Hobson v. Donald Valenza, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** August 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN HOBSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 1:24-cv-667-ECM
) [WO]
DONALD VALENZA, et al., )

)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
John Hobson (“Hobson”) alleges that on February 14, 2024, while he was a pretrial
detainee in the custody of the Houston County Jail (the “Jail”) , he was attacked by other
detainees. According to Hobson, the other detainees were able to attack him because of
Houston County Sheriff Donald Valenza’s (“Valenza”) and the Houston County
Commission’s (the “Commission”) deliberate indifference to the risks posed by the
condition of the locks at the Jail, which Hobson claims amounts to violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
Hobson, Valenza, and the Commission have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on those claims. (Docs. 52, 61, 64).2 All three of the motions are fully briefed

1 Hobson also sued David Asbill and Kelita Moore under § 1983 for deliberate indifference by failure to
protect (Counts II & III). (See doc. 33 at 11–14). He likewise sued James Brazier under a similar theory
for inadequate supervision of Asbill, Moore, and other staff (Count IV). (See id. at 15–16). Further, Hobson
sued his alleged assailants, Vazarius Tyrell James and James Maurice Tanner for battery (Count VI). (See
id. at 18–19). Hobson filed notices of voluntary dismissal as to these defendants, (docs. 38, 41, 67), and
the Court acknowledged their dismissal by operation of Rule 41, (docs. 42 & 70).

2 For clarity, the Court refers to the document and page numbers generated by CM/ECF (including on
deposition transcripts).
and ripe for review. Based on a thorough review of the record, briefs, and applicable law,
and for the following reasons, the Court finds Hobson’s motion is due to be DENIED,

Valenza’s motion is due to be GRANTED, and the Commission’s motion is due to be
DENIED.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court
concludes that venue properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a)). “[A] court generally must ‘view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.’” Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla.
Nat’l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp.,
229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). Where there are cross-motions for summary
judgment, “the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party on

each motion.” Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A., 701 F.3d 896, 899 (11th Cir.
2012) (citing Am. Bankers Ins. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005)).
However, “‘conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative
value.’” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)). If the record, taken as
a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); accord
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986) (holding that the inquiry at
summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law”).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and must identify the portions of the record that support this
proposition. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The movant may carry this burden “by demonstrating that the
nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element

of the case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party “to establish, by going beyond the
pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. at 1311–12 (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324). The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Nonmovants

must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). Nonetheless,

even where a non-movant fails to submit any alleged material facts in dispute, a court must
still be satisfied that the evidence in the record supports the uncontroverted material facts
proposed by the movant before granting summary judgment. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d
1253, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. 5800 S.W. 74th Ave., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103
n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not affect the applicable Rule 56 standard.

See, e.g., Am. Bankers, 408 F.3d at 1331; Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Gallagher,
267 F.3d 1228, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2001). “‘Cross-motions . . . will not, in themselves,
warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed . . . .’” United States
v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (quoting Bricklayers Int’l

Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1975)). “‘When
both parties move for summary judgment, the court must evaluate each motion on its own
merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under
consideration.’” Muzzy Prods., Corp. v. Sullivan Indus., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1378
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (quoting Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir.

2001)).3

3 Here, and elsewhere in this Opinion, the Court cites nonbinding authority. While the Court acknowledges
these cases are nonprecedential, the Court finds them persuasive.
B. Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Because inmates are deprived of liberty and the ability to
provide for themselves, the Eighth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty upon the state
to ensure prisoners are “furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable
safety’” from themselves and others. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)); see
Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The Eighth

Amendment ‘imposes a duty on prison officials’ to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates.’” (alterations adopted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994))); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (“[I]t is cruel and
unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions . . . .”). An obvious
danger against which prison officials must guarantee safety by reasonable measures is

attack by other incarcerated individuals. Est. of Owens v. GEO Grp., Inc., 660 F. App’x
763, 767 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[I]t has long been recognized that ‘prison officials have a duty
to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 833)).
“In the case of a pre-trial detainee[,] . . . ‘the Eighth Amendment prohibitions against

cruel and unusual punishment do not apply.’” Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of
Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Belcher v. City of Foley, 30
F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994)). “[U]nder the Supreme Court’s current
framework, . . . the Eighth Amendment covers prisoners, and the Fourteenth Amendment
covers . . . pretrial detainees.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th

Cir. 2019)). Nonetheless, “‘the minimum standard allowed by the [Fourteenth
Amendment’s] due process clause is the same as that allowed by the [E]ighth [A]mendment
for convicted persons.’” Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Belcher, 30 F.3d at 1396). Thus,
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees are
analyzed under the same law as Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims brought
by convicted prisoners. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)

(citing Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115).
To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part
test:
1. First . . . the plaintiff must demonstrate, as a threshold
matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively,
‘sufficiently serious.’”

2. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal
law,” and to do so he must show that the defendant was
actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a
substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the
caveat . . . that even if the defendant “actually knew of a
substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found
liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if he
“responded reasonably to the risk.”

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 839, 844–45). A plaintiff must also produce
sufficient evidence of “causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.”
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Goebert, 510 F.3d
at 1326). Accordingly, the plaintiff must satisfy (1) the objective inquiry, (2) the subjective
inquiry, and (3) causation.

To satisfy the objective inquiry, a plaintiff must show a condition “so extreme that
it poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner’s health or safety.”
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). To satisfy the
subjective inquiry, a plaintiff must show that the defendant: “(1) had subjective knowledge
of a risk of serious harm, (2) disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts
to subjective recklessness.” Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024)

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–40). To demonstrate subjective knowledge of a risk of
serious harm, it is not enough to show that a defendant “should have known” of a substantial
risk of serious harm—it must be shown the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk
of serious harm.” See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1257 (emphases in original). Further, subjective
recklessness is demonstrated “only if the plaintiff shows ‘that the defendant actually knew

that his conduct—his own acts or omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious
harm.’” Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1283 (emphasis added) (quoting Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253).
Even so, “a defendant who ‘responds reasonably’ to a risk, even a known risk, ‘cannot be
found liable’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844)).

C. Government Entity Liability
“A local government”—including a county—“can be directly responsible for
[deliberate indifference] due to its acts or omissions.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d
1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)), abrogated on other grounds
by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007).4 But a local government

“will be liable . . . only for acts [or omissions] for which [it] is actually responsible.”
Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1027 (citation omitted). For that reason, “[s]ection 1983 will not
support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.” Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (emphasis in original) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694. Municipal, or county, liability imposes a “very
high” bar. Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1169 (11th Cir. 2018).
A county may be liable “for a single decision by its properly constituted legislative
body—whether or not that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in

the future—because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an
act of official government policy.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480; cf. Vineyard v. County of
Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[A] single constitutional violation may

4 Valenza appears to suggest that Marsh v. Butler County was meaningfully abrogated. (See doc. 71 at 9
n.2). But Marsh was only abrogated by Twombly insofar as Marsh cited the old “no set of facts” pleading
standard—indeed, the case Valenza cites to note Marsh’s abrogation makes this point. See Aguirre v.
Seminole County, 158 F.4th 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2025).

Similarly, Valenza suggests that Marsh is inapposite because it concerned a “claim that the defendant-
sheriff failed to respond reasonably to his serious medical needs by instituting a ‘policy of releasing sick or
injured inmates.’” (Doc. 71 at 9 n.2 (quoting Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1035)). But Marsh also addressed prison
conditions claims involving “the risk of inmate-on-inmate attacks.” See Marsh, 268 at 1028–34. So
Valenza’s arguments that Marsh has been substantively abrogated and is otherwise inapposite are
unavailing.
result in municipal liability when there is sufficient independent proof that the moving
force of the violation was a municipal policy or custom.” (quotation omitted)); Gilmere v.

City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1504 n.10 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“‘A § 1983 cause of
action is as available for the first victim of a policy or custom that would foreseeably and
avoidably cause an individual to be subjected to deprivation of a constitutional right as it
is for the second and subsequent victims.’” (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 832 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring))), abrogated on other grounds by Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Accordingly, to establish liability for deliberate

indifference against a county, a plaintiff “must show ‘(1) that [his] constitutional rights
were violated; (2) that [the county] had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate
indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the
violation.’” Smothers v. Childers, 159 F.4th 922, 931 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting McDowell
v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).

D. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit when they perform
“discretionary functions” and “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Where a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the

public official [must] first show[] that []he was acting within the scope of h[is]
discretionary authority.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). If the
public official makes that showing, the burden then falls on the plaintiff “to show that
qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002). To do so, a plaintiff must show a violation of clearly established rights. Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

“A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three
ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right;
(2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly
establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was
clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144
F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Courts are instructed “not [to] define clearly

established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
“‘[I]f the evidence at the summary judgment stage, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, shows there are facts that are inconsistent with qualified
immunity being granted, the case and the qualified immunity issue along with it will
proceed to trial.’” Bailey v. Swindell, 89 F.4th 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002)).
III. FACTS5
A. Background
Since August 18, 2014, Valenza has been Sheriff of Houston County. (Doc. 56-1 at
11:8–11). He is responsible for managing and policing the Jail, which includes establishing

and enforcing its protocols and policies. (See id. at 11:15–17, 12:2–5; doc. 56-7 at 12:15–

5 As to each motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, and draws all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;
Chavez, 701 F.3d at 899.
16, 12:23–13:1; see also doc. 52-4 at 6, paras. 8–9). Valenza also testified that his duties
include protecting both the correctional officers and detainees. (See doc. 56-1 at 42:13–15

(“We try to protect the inmates and the corrections officers. Our job is to protect them,
keep them healthy, and get them to trial.”)).
While Valenza runs the Jail’s day-to-day operations, the Commission is responsible
for its “maintenance and repairs.” (Doc. 56-3 at 29:9–21; doc. 52-4 at 6, para. 7). The
Commission comprises four members (the “Commissioners”) and a chairman (the
“Chairman”), who only votes if the Commissioners are deadlocked. (Doc. 64-1 at 6–7,

paras. 21, 24). The Chairman sets the agenda for each administrative meeting and drafts
the annual county budget, including the Jail’s funding. (Id. at 5–6, paras. 20–21).
Nevertheless, a majority of the Commissioners at an administrative meeting may add any
item to the agenda for official meetings. (Id. at 7, para. 25). Moreover, the Commission’s
policy allows it to add “[i]tems of an emergency nature . . . at any commissioner’s request

after an attempt to notify commissioners and there is a unanimous consent to add the item
to the agenda.” (Doc. 64-15 at 1).
The Jail has two segregation dormitories for inmates on disciplinary lockdown, “I”
and “J.” (Doc. 62-1 at 2, para. 7). If an inmate is considered a continuing “assault risk” to
others after his time in disciplinary lockdown, he is placed in “M” dormitory. (See doc. 56-

9 at 24:20–23, 32:1–19). For an inmate to end up in one of these dormitories, he would
have to “violate[] one of the major jail rules, including assault on another inmate, disrespect
towards an officer, [or] hoarding medication.” (Doc. 62-1 at 2, para. 8). In these
dormitories, detainees are allowed one hour a day outside their cell—a period the Jail staff
refer to as “rollout.” (See doc. 62-2 at 190:19–91:21).

Monitoring each of the dormitories is a deputy in a control booth. (Doc. 56-7 at
55:21–56:20). In the booth, there is a monitor that is intended to show which cell doors
are locked. (Id. at 56:2–8). However, the indicators have the potential to malfunction
because doors could incorrectly appear locked. (Id. at 56:9–17). David Asbill (“Asbill”),
the Jail Commander under Valenza, testified that it is common knowledge that prisoners
routinely attempt to manipulate locks. (Id. at 69:13–16; see id. at 69:17–19 (“Q: And that’s

an issue that happens [at] every jail in the country; correct? A: Yes, sir.”)). This practice
is commonly referred to as lock “popping.” (See id. at 69:20–22).
James Brazier (“Brazier”), the former Jail Commander and Administrator, recalled
that “inmates [were] able to start popping out of the[ir] cells” around his start at the Jail in
2009.6 (Doc. 56-2 at 17:15–18:10). Indeed, he recalled that inmates did so “constantly.”

(Id. at 32:2). Checking locks was ineffective, as “[e]ven if [they] tried to lock people down,
[the inmates] could still get out.” (Id. at 23:18–23).
During his tenure, Brazier only remembered “maybe one” lock being rebuilt. (Id. at
30:17–20). He opined that the inmates’ ability to pop the locks created a dangerous
condition at the Jail for detainees and staff and was “a source of major concern for the [J]ail

employees.” (Id. at 31:1–17, 35:22–36:2). During his tenure, he recalled that detainees
who popped the locks “periodically” attacked other detainees. (Id. at 35:11–17). Brazier

6 Sergeant Tony Murphy (“Murphy”) recalled the issue with the locks beginning around 2020. (Doc. 56-9
at 16:7–16). In any event, this issue was old news when Hobson was attacked in 2024.
retired in April 2023, in part “because the[ Commission] would not fix the locks.” (Doc.
56-2 at 41:13–18, 43:5–11).

The Jail could not afford to replace the locks without funding from the Commission.
(See doc. 56-3 at 23:12–24:4, 49:4–11). Major Bill Rafferty (“Rafferty”) testified
regarding the Jail’s finances. (See generally id.). He explained that some of the Jail’s
funding comes from accounts operated by the Sheriff, which includes funds from the sale
of pistol permits and money spent by prisoners at the commissary. (Id. at 17:20–18:7). But
the lion’s share—“[ninety]-plus percent”—comes from funding approved by the

Commission. (Id. at 23:21–24:4). Because Rafferty is largely responsible for developing
the Jail’s budget, he is intimately familiar with the Jail’s requests to the Commission for
funding. (See id. at 11:14–12:18, 26:10–20).
Rafferty was uncertain when he first requested funding to replace the locks at the
Jail; he stated that he began attempting to address the issue in 2014 but did not know about

the locks specifically prior to 2021.7 (See id. at 32:12–33:2, 33:20–36:9, 39:12–17). He
clarified that the locks “became a more frequent part of [the Jail’s] issues in the last several
years compared to 2014.” (Id. at 43:20–22). He stated that even when “deputies were going
back in [the dormitories] and being sure . . . the door was shut and locked . . . inmates
[were] still getting out.” (Id. at 35:6–9). Rafferty recalled that as a result, in 2022 or 2023,

“one of [the] corrections deputies . . . was beat down and it took several minutes” to rescue

7 Looking to the record, it is not clear when the Jail first made a formal request to the Commission regarding
the locks. In the special budget requests for fiscal years 2021–22 and 2023–24, locks do not appear as a
line item. (See docs. 56-12 & 56-13).
him.8 (Id. at 44:9–45:20). Rafferty also stated that for two or three years prior to submitting
a formal request to the Commission, the maintenance department was attempting to rebuild

locks. (Id. at 41:11–23). He asserted that “inmates getting out of the cell is definitely a
concern. Safety for the inmates, . . . staff, . . . correction deputies. . . . We bring it to the
attention of the [Commission].” (Id. at 44:21–45:3). Brendon Shoupe, who became the
Chairman in November 2022 (“Shoupe” or “Chairman Shoupe”),9 stated that the
Commission has “[n]ever turned a blind-eye towards any funding request made by the
Sheriff.” (Doc. 64-1 at 6, para. 23).

Valenza was first made aware on January 7, 2021, of the need to repair a lock on a
cell door that would not work.10 (Doc. 52-5 at 7, para. 13). The cell door locks throughout
the Jail were ineffective such that “[t]here was no way for staff to track which locks might
be subject to jimmying.” (Doc. 62-1 at 4, para. 16; see doc. 56-7 at 26:6–15 (Asbill stating,
“[i]n the housing units themselves it’s just a general assumption that half of them worked

and half of them didn’t”); doc. 56-3 at 73:3–74:12 (Rafferty explaining lights that were
intended to indicate whether cell doors would lock were not working properly); doc. 56-9
at 17:22–18:17, 34:8–11, 35:7–15). As a result, on at least thirty-five occasions prior to
Hobson’s assault, prisoners unlocked their cell doors.11 (Doc. 52-5 at 7–8, para. 14). And

8 Rafferty stated that he showed a video of this incident to the commissioners. (Doc. 56-3 at 45:2–21).

9 Shoupe had also served as a commissioner since 2014. (Doc. 64-1 at 1, para. 2).

10 The record is unclear regarding where this nonfunctioning lock was located.

11 Rafferty testified that the maintenance records, which tracked requests to fix specific locks, only go back
to January 2021 because of software issues. (Doc. 56-3 at 31:16–22).
“all staff employed at the . . . Jail . . . were aware of the potential for inmates to ‘jimmy’
locks to unlock themselves.” (Id. at 9, para. 16). Valenza recalled that as a result, at least

two corrections officers who came from other facilities “quit and said, ‘this is not a safe
place to work.’” (See doc. 56-1 at 65:13–23; see also doc. 56-9 at 17:9–14 (Murphy
recalling conversations between Sheriff’s deputies about “how unsafe it is for inmates [to
be] able to manipulate the locks.”)). Valenza further noted that as of January 2022, the
locks “were probably worn out” after twenty years and “ha[d] been tampered with” to such
an extent that “the inmates figured out how to beat” them. (Doc. 56-1 at 44:15–45:5).

Prior to February 14, 2024, Valenza was personally “aware that prisoners
at . . . [the] Jail were able to unlock their own cell doors.” (Doc. 52-4 at 6, para. 11). He
likewise admitted that he was “aware of the safety risk created by prisoners at . . . [the] Jail
being able to unlock their own cell doors,” but nevertheless denied awareness that this
“subjected [Hobson] to an unreasonabl[y] dangerous hazard that exposed him [to] serious

personal injury.” (Id. at 6, paras. 12–13). At the same time, he considered the ineffective
locks “a serious concern” “[b]ecause [he] [has] jailers that get assaulted,” and it was his
“job to protect them” along with the “other inmates.” (Doc. 56-1 at 54:18–55:5). He
likewise acknowledged that the situation posed a substantial hazard to staff and inmates,
and that he believed there was a “strong likelihood that someone would get seriously

injured,” “whether it[ was] one of [his] jailers or another inmate.” (Id. at 55:14–20).
Q: [I]f you have a population that comprises Houston
County Jail and their access is not restricted, that—would you
agree that’s a recipe for disaster?

. . . .
A: Yeah. Anytime you have the—the cell doors are there
for a reason, and it’s to keep control of our facility. And when
they’re breaching these locks, that’s not . . . very safe being in
there, no.

(Id. at 55:21–56:7).
And Valenza acknowledged five separate occasions between June 3, 2023, and
February 4, 2024, where detainees had opened their locked cells and assaulted others.12
On June 3, 2023, where inmate Henderson Miller, Jr.
manipulated his cell door to open it then began to assault
inmate Tommy Jones and inmate James Tanner manipulated
his cell door to open it and began fighting inmate Tommy Jones
as well (no medical treatment was needed);

On June 27, 2023, where inmate Deh’Juan Sanders
manipulated his cell door to open it and assault inmate Dmitri
Wright (no medical treatment needed);

On July 15, 2023, where inmate Dmitri Wright manipulated his
cell door to open it, opening inmate Samuel Wilson’s cell door,
then became aggressive with jail staff who were attempting to
discipline him (only medical treatment required was for
decontamination following issuance of [pepper] spray) (4
officers involved);

On December 19, 2023, where inmate Dmitri Wright
manipulated his cell door to open it and became aggressive
with jail staff who were attempting to discipline him (only
medical treatment required was for decontamination following
issuance of [pepper] spray) (1 officer involved); and

On February 4, 2024, where inmate Henderson Miller, Jr.
manipulated his cell door to open it then became aggressive
with jail staff (only medical treatment required was for
decontamination following issuance of [pepper] spray) (5
officers involved).

12 Asbill stated that as a general matter at the Jail, assaults between detainees “come[] and go[] in spurts”
of varying severity. (Doc. 56-7 at 33:8–18).
(Doc. 52-5 at 9–10, para. 17).

Before his retirement, Brazier informed Captain James Ivey of the Commission
about the issues with the locks. (See doc. 56-2 at 21:15–22 (“[I] kept telling him ‘We need
to get these locks fixed . . . as soon as you can’ because, . . . things are going to start
failing.”)). Valenza admitted that prior to February 14, 2024, he informed the Commission
that the locks in the Jail “were not functioning properly and need[ed] to be replaced and/or
repaired.” (Doc. 52-4 at 5, para. 4). He testified that he had “requested [the Commission]
to have the[] locks changed” for two years prior to the assault on Hobson. (Doc. 56-1 at

63:3–20). He also notified the Commission, prior to February 14, 2024, that the ineffective
locks in the Jail “created an unreasonably dangerous situation for the inmates and staff of
the . . . Jail.” (Doc. 52-4 at 5, para. 5). He specifically communicated the situation to
Shoupe and two Sheriff’s deputies who were on the Commission, (see doc. 56-1 at 64:7–
16), and stated that Rafferty showed Shoupe the videos of detainees popping their locks,

(see doc. 56-1 at 65:5–8). As a result, Valenza opined that the Commission “knew it was
a serious situation.” (Id. at 65:13–23; see doc. 52-4 at 5–6, para. 6 (Valenza asserting that
prior to February 14, 2024, the Commission “was aware the defective locks created an
unreasonably dangerous hazard for the inmates and staff of the . . . Jail”). He likewise
indicated that the Commission’s decision not the fund the replacement was made despite

awareness of the condition of the locks and the specific danger they created. (See id. at
65:24–66:6 (“Q: So that decision was not based on the lack of not appreciating the
hazard? . . . . A: This is a serious issue we addressed during this time. Q: And that was
communicated[?] A: That was communicated—yes, that was passed on and [we] showed
videos.”)).

Rafferty stated that the budgetary process begins with the Chairman and the chief
financial officer of Houston County, Peter Covert (“Covert”). (Doc. 56-3 at 13:17–14:17).
Rafferty testified that the Sheriff’s Office had addressed the issues with the locks by
notifying the Commission: “[W]e’ve been trying to get it fixed. [We] . . . went to the
[C]ommission, the [C]hairman, the chief financial officer . . . and it had been being
addressed with the boards over a period of time.” (See doc. 56-3 at 48:17–49:15; see also

id. at 49:12–50:11 (Rafferty’s testimony that he communicated the urgency of the issue to
the Commission, that it was “a major concern . . . [for] the safety of [the] inmates,” and
that “[p]otentially somebody could get hurt badly”); accord id. at 55:18–57:5).
Shoupe acknowledged that on July 25, 2023, Rafferty sent two emails to the
Commissioners and Covert. (Doc. 64-1 at 3, para. 9). The first, forwarded from Asbill,

noted that an inmate or inmates had popped the locks on their doors “at night after roll in,”
placing the patrolling deputy “at risk.” (Doc. 64-2 at 1). Rafferty added that “[i]t is believed
d[ue] to no inmates being out of the cells during this time[,] the inmates were setting up
and waiting for a Corrections Deputy to enter the pod and attack.” (Id.). The second
included a video of “inmates . . . popp[ing] the cell door locks and attack[ing] other

inmates.” (Doc. 64-3 at 1). Rafferty also testified that he was eventually “banned” from
unmediated communication with the Commission and began to have to obtain permission
from the Chairman to share “concerns about [the] corrections deputies being in danger.”
(See doc. 56-3 at 45:2–18). Rafferty opined that Chairman Shoupe did not act because
“[h]e’s a politician, and he cares about a vote and not where the money needs to go.” (Id.
at 57:17–23). He likewise opined that the Commission was concerned with Houston

County’s “bottom line as opposed to anything else.” (See id. at 62:5–15).
At some point, Valenza realized that the Commission was not going to provide
money for the locks. (Doc. 56-1 at 72:20–22). Valenza indicated that despite that
realization, he did not direct anyone to investigate any interim measures to address the lock
issues. (Id. at 72:23–73:18). Indeed, he stated that the Jail did “not have a specific, formal
procedure” to implement “after being notified that a prisoner is able to unlock his own cell

door.” (Doc. 52-5 at 11, para. 22). Existing measures at the time included removing
inmates from cells where a “lock [wa]s physically broken and c[ould]n’t be secured” and
disciplining inmates who unlocked their cells. (Id.). Jail staff would report broken locks to
the Houston County Maintenance Department (“Maintenance”), which was run by the
Commission. (Doc. 56-3 at 41:11–23; doc. 56-2 at 24:11–14).

Maintenance had been managed by Tommy Dixon (“Dixon”) since April 2023.
(Doc. 64-16 at 1, para. 2). Dixon’s “recollection [was] that this was not a widespread
problem with a large number of inmates. Instead, just a few inmates were the ones
manipulating the locks.” (Id. at 2, para. 5). On July 10, 2023, Covert requested Dixon
perform a walkthrough of the Jail with a private contractor, Willo Products, to “give an

estimate to update and repair the locking system.” (Id. at 2, para. 6). After the walkthrough,
on January 14, 2023, Willo Products proposed a system similar to that already used at the
Jail, and Chairman Shoupe was “concerned the Commission might spend roughly a million
dollars . . . but still have the same problem.”13 (Id. at 3, paras. 7–8). Chairman Shoupe
directed Dixon to “replac[e] some of the locks . . . to see if that would fix the problem.”

(Id. at 3, para. 8). Because most of the problems with locks occurred in A and M
dormitories, Maintenance’s plan was to replace or rebuild the locks in those two
dormitories. (Id. at 4, paras. 10–13).
On December 20, 2023, Houston County, through administrative assistant
Samantha Butler (“Butler”), submitted an order to RR Brink Locking Systems for
replacement of the locks in M dormitory. (Doc. 64-5 at 1). After no response, Butler

followed up on January 8, 2024, (see id.), and received information that RR Brink Locking
Systems had been acquired by Southern Folger Detention Equipment Company and thus
any further orders would have to be placed through that firm, (see doc. 64-6 at 1). A
representative of Southern Folger Detention Equipment Company followed up shortly
thereafter, requesting that Houston County complete a customer information form for an

account. (See doc. 64-7). On January 30, 2024, another representative emailed Houston
County requesting contact information. (Doc. 64-8).
For the Jail’s part, Assistant Commander Kelita Moore (“Moore”) instructed staff
to pay special attention to the issue with the locks in M dormitory on October 5, 2022:
When rolling out a cell in M-pod you are to go into the pod and
roll the inmate out. . . . After rolling the inmate out you are to
check the locking mechanism to make sure nothing is in it and
secure the door. . . . During your cell searches you need to
look for any strings or torn items and confiscate them. We have

13 In the four or five months after Willo Products’ walkthrough, Asbill communicated with three other
companies about replacing the locks, though none of those inquiries panned out. (See doc. 56-7 at 66:8–
67:18–69:12).
had too many problems with inmates tricking the doors and
coming out of their cells. This is a safety risk for not only other
inmates but also you all. To ensure this procedure is followed
by all deputies it will be closely monitored.

I want to address another problem. Anytime you feel like you
need assistance in a pod do not hesitate to call for assistance or
contact your supervisors for them to come and give you
assistance. In some instances you can back away from the
situation until you can get assistance on the floor. Never feel
bad for wanting or needing assistance no matter how small the
situation may appear to others. You all have got to be
eachothers back up [sic] and work together. Deputies in the
booths please keep your eyes on the Deputies in the pods.
Please be safe and use good judgement when dealing with
these inmates.
(Doc. 56-11). And on May 31, 2023:
When rolling inmates out in M-pod, you are physically to go
into M-pod and roll the inmate out and secure the door. When
rolling an inmate in you also need to physically go in and
secure the door. While doing this you are to check the lock to
make sure there is no paper or anything else in the locking
mechanism. If you need assistance rolling in or rolling out an
inmate you are to contact your supervisor. . . . No inmates are
to pass anything under any cell doors. It is important that you
all follow these directions for the safety of your coworkers and
the inmates. Supervisors follow up with your deputies and
monitor M-pod to ensure this is being done.
(Doc. 56-10). Moore stated that it was the general practice throughout the entire Jail to
“inspect[] cell doors for obstructions[] and confirm[] that each cell door was secure after
closure.” (Doc. 62-1 at 5, para. 25). Again, however, even if there were no obstructions,
“[t]here was no way for staff to track which locks might be subject to jimmying.” (Id. at 4,
para. 16).
B. The Incident
Hobson was arrested on February 9, 2024, and held at the Jail as a pretrial detainee.

(See doc. 62-2 at 177:20–23). On February 12, 2024, an officer at the Jail gave Hobson’s
lunch tray to another detainee, Tyshawn Bryant (“Bryant”). (Id. at 184:2–9). Hobson
demanded the tray, prompting Bryant to spit in the food. (Id. at 184:10–18). Hobson hit
Bryant and was placed in disciplinary lockdown in J dormitory. (Id. at 184:19–186:17).
On February 14, 2024, while still on disciplinary lockdown, Hobson left his cell
during his allotted hour rollout. (Doc. 62-2 at 191:5–14; doc. 56-4 at 1). Another detainee,

Vazarius James (“James”), called him over to his cell to talk. (Doc. 62-2 at 193:22–195:14).
Hobson went over to James’s cell and squatted to talk to him through the hole used for
inserting food into detainees’ cells. (Id.) Then a second detainee, James Tanner (“Tanner”),
popped his cell door’s lock and attacked Hobson from behind. (See id. at 92:20–23,
101:15–17, 109:15–22). James then exited his own cell and began to attack Hobson. (See

id. at 109:15–22, 192:16–193:1; doc. 56-4 at 1).14
From the control booth, Sergeant Morris (“Morris”) noted that two cell doors in J
dormitory were “showing open.” (Doc. 56-4 at 1). Morris asked Corporal Kennedy
(“Kennedy”) to check on the doors. (Id. at 2). Kennedy went to J dormitory, where she
recalled seeing “Tanner and James in the dayroom wrestling with Hobson . . . . James was

14 Neither Tanner’s nor James’ J dormitory cell doors had a documented history of maintenance issues. (See
doc. 56-5; doc. 56-6; doc. 62-1 at 3, para. 13). Valenza testified that Tanner had a history of opening locks
and attacking other inmates. (See doc. 56-1 at 78:1–17; see also 56-9 at 23:3–20 (Murphy stating that
Tanner previously manipulated the lock of his cell, then similarly manipulated the lock of another cell to
attack an inmate therein)). Notably, Tanner’s previous assaults were not among the five cited by Valenza
in his interrogatory response. (See doc. 52-5 at 9–10, para. 17); see also discussion supra page 16.
kicking Hobson. . . . Tanner picked up Hobson and threw him to the ground on the cement
floor head fist. When [she] approached Hobson, his face was full of blood.” (Id. at 1).

Hobson was diagnosed with “multiple open fractures” to his facial bones. (See doc. 62-2
at 131:12–18).
C. Aftermath15
According to Hobson, after he returned to the Jail, Moore and other staff encouraged
him to sue the Commission. (See doc. 62-2 at 120:13–20, 202:13–204:13). He testified
that Moore said she “would sue, because they know that them lock mechanisms [were]

supposed to [have] been fixed a long time ago.” (Id. at 120:13–19). He also claimed that
a “Mr. Roberts,” who worked at the commissary, told him, “if I was you, I wouldn’t let
them get away with it,” and likewise suggested he should sue. (Id. at 202:11–203:14). For
his part, Valenza opined that “if the locks were properly working” on February 14, 2024,
Hobson would not have been injured. (Doc. 56-1 at 71:8–13). Valenza also told a news

outlet that he had been requesting new locks for the Jail for years. (See doc. 56-20 at 1).
After learning of the attack on Hobson, Chairman Shoupe directed Butler to cancel
the order for the locks from Southern Folger Detention Equipment Company. (Doc. 64-1
at 3, para. 13). On March 14, 2024, the Commission, through Chairman Shoupe, solicited
bids for contractors to replace all the locks in the Jail. (See id. at 3–4, paras. 14–15; doc.

64-10 at 1, 11–17). On May 28, 2024, the Commission awarded the lock project to

15 Evidence of the Commission’s subsequent remedial measures is “not admissible to prove . . . culpable
conduct.” FED. R. EVID. 407. The Court does not consider these measures for that purpose; instead, the
Court recounts them here only to provide context for the statements of Valenza and Chairman Shoupe in
the wake of the purchasing of new locks. At trial, however, such measures are otherwise admissible for
impeachment, “or—if disputed—proving . . . the feasibility of precautionary measures.” Id.
Montgomery Technology Systems. (Doc. 64-1 at 4–5, paras. 17–18; doc. 64-12 at 3–4).
Installation of new locks was completed in July 2025. (Doc. 56-7 at 56:23–57:8).

On May 23, 2024, after the Commission received a grant to partially cover the cost
of the new locks, Chairman Shoupe publicly stated that “the [J]ail is not something that
any elected official wants to spend money on” and that he would rather have put the money
“into asphalt quite honestly.” (Doc. 56-20 at 1). At the same time, he also reported that the
Commission had “serious ongoing safety concerns, not only for our inmates but for our
jailers that work in the [J]ail, so we have to do something,” explicitly acknowledging

“[w]e’ve known about this for a long time.” (Doc. 52-7).
IV. ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that Hobson purports to accept the undisputed facts as
set forth by the opposing party. (Doc. 68 at 2 (“Plaintiff admits the numbered factual
statements set forth by [Valenza] for purposes of summary judgment only.”)). However,

Hobson also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to his claims against
Valenza and the Commission. (Id. at 2 (“Th[e undisputed] facts, however, support
Plaintiff’s claims . . . .”)). Valenza and the Commission do the same. (See docs. 55 & 67).
Accordingly, the Court simply views “the facts . . . in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party on each motion,” as it must when presented with cross-motions for summary

judgment. Chavez, 701 F.3d at 899. Similarly, with regard to qualified immunity, the Court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to Hobson. See Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1317.
For the reasons articulated below, the Court determines that Valenza’s motion for
summary judgment is due to be granted, and that Hobson’s and the Commission’s motions
are due to be denied. This reflects the result of several determinations made by the Court
in resolving the pending motions. With respect to Valenza, Hobson has not shown that the

constitutional violation he alleges was clearly established. But with respect to the
Commission, Hobson has adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
Commission’s decision not to replace the locks was tantamount to a policy decision that
constituted deliberate indifference. At the same time, there is record evidence that would
permit a reasonable jury to find in the Commission’s favor. Accordingly, summary
judgment will be granted as to Hobson’s claim against Valenza, but his claim against the

Commission will go to a jury.
A. Sheriff Valenza
Valenza does not dispute that Hobson’s injuries, as alleged, resulted from Valenza’s
performance of discretionary acts under color of state law. Given Valenza’s description of
his role, and the duties vested in him by Alabama law, see ALA. CODE § 14-6-1 (entrusting

sheriffs with “legal custody and charge of the jail in his or her county and all prisoners
committed thereto”), the Court agrees that Valenza’s decisions regarding the cell door
security issues fell squarely within his discretionary authority. See Cagle v. Sutherland,
334 F.3d 980, 989 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the only question is whether the
evidence establishes a constitutional violation that was clearly established.

1. Deliberate Indifference
At this stage, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hobson, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Valenza was deliberately indifferent. First, Hobson
suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’” by his “incarcerat[ion]
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262;
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

There is conflict in the record as to the extent and seriousness of the issues with the
locks. For instance, Brazier stated detainees were able to begin escaping their cells as early
as 2009. Rafferty stated that the problem was comparatively more significant than it had
been in 2014, and that the Commission began rebuilding some of the locks two to three
years prior to his making any formal requests for funding. Valenza testified that the issues
began in 2021. Meanwhile, though some testimony suggests the issues affected about half

of the locks, other testimony supports the inference that all the locks were manipulable.
What is undisputed, however, is that an unknown number of cells throughout the Jail were
defective such that it was unpredictable which could be opened, even in cell blocks
designated to house those with disciplinary infractions—including for popping locks. On
at least five occasions prior to Hobson’s assault,16 inmates had popped locks and assaulted

others. As these prior occasions had shown, it could take several minutes for staff to
respond to an assault or to discover that a detainee had escaped their cell. A reasonable
jury could find that Hobson’s assault was a direct result of his being incarcerated in this
environment.
The testimony of numerous members of the Jail staff supports a reasonable

inference that these conditions were objectively, sufficiently serious. The testimony from

16 There is evidence in the record of specific, additional assaults that occurred which do not appear to have
been documented by the Jail. (See, e.g., doc. 56-1 at 78:1–17 (discussing prior assaults by Tanner); doc.
56-9 at 23:3–20 (same); doc. 56-3 at 44:9–45:20 (discussing an incident where an inmate attacked an officer
and it took several minutes to rescue him)).
individuals who worked at the Jail suggests that the conditions were dangerous for both
inmates and staff—indeed, Brazier testified that multiple staff members quit because they

felt unsafe. When Rafferty sent videos to the Commission, he specifically noted that even
where detainees were not out of their cells, they might be lying in wait to attack any guard
that passed—implying that, as far as they knew, any detainee could exit their cell at any
time, and that the detainees had a potential for violence. Moreover, reasonable jurors could
infer from Brazier’s and Rafferty’s testimony that this issue predates the extant
maintenance records. A reasonable jury could therefore conclude that due to the condition

of the locks, “a generalized, substantial risk of serious harm from inmate violence” existed
at the Jail, including J dormitory—where, again, inmates with disciplinary infractions,
including for popping locks, were held. See Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583
(11th Cir. 1995); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not matter whether the risk
comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner

faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his
situation face such a risk.”).
Nevertheless, reasonable jurors could also believe Dixon’s testimony indicating that
the issue was not widespread and that the documented assaults in 2023 and 2024
represented the full extent of the harms resulting from the locks. Accordingly, there are

genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment in either direction on
the objective prong.
Second, a reasonable jury crediting Hobson’s version of events could conclude that
Valenza was subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious
harm to Hobson. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. Hobson has presented evidence that
Valenza was aware of the risk. Valenza acknowledged he was personally made aware of

the need to repair a lock on a cell door on January 7, 2021. He also recalled officers quitting
due to the safety hazard created by the locks. In fact, Valenza acknowledged that the
situation posed a substantial hazard to staff and inmates, and that he felt like there was a
strong likelihood that someone would get seriously injured. (See doc. 56-1 at 55:5–13 (“Q:
[I]f the inmates in the [J]ail can get out of their cell, does that pose a substantial hazard to
staff and inmates? A: Absolutely.”). He stated that the situation was a “recipe for disaster,”

(id. at 55:21–56:7), and conceded that he was aware of the safety risk created by detainees
being able to open their own cells and was aware of the specific kind of harm posed, (id.
at 54:18–55:5 (Valenza’s testimony that the lockers were “a serious concern” for him
because he had “jailers that g[o]t assaulted” and it was his duty to “protect [the
detainees]”)). He also admitted that prior to February 14, 2024, the Commission “was

aware the defective locks created an unreasonably dangerous hazard for the inmates and
staff of the . . . Jail,” which suggests that he also knew that “the defective locks created an
unreasonably dangerous hazard” for the detainees. (Doc. 52-4 at 5–6, para. 6). And, if a
jury were to find that the issue had existed from the beginning of Valenza’s tenure, it would
support a finding of the requisite intent. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)

(“The long duration of a cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge
and hence some form of intent . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (citing City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1030 (indicating that “longstanding
and pervasive” conditions supported a showing of subjective awareness).
To be sure, Valenza has denied that he was aware that the defective locks “subjected
[Hobson] to an unreasonabl[y] dangerous hazard that exposed him [to] serious personal
injury.”17 (Id. at 6, paras. 12–13). But at summary judgment, it is not the Court’s role to

weigh the evidence or conclusively draw inferences. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. If jurors
were to believe Valenza’s version of events, they might reasonably conclude that Valenza
lacked the requisite subjective awareness. Yet, for the purposes of the summary judgment
analysis, reasonable jurors viewing all the evidence and crediting Hobson’s version could
conclude that Valenza was subjectively aware that his own conduct created a substantial

risk of serious harm. But because the outcome on this element depends on a jury’s finding,
summary judgment in favor of Hobson is, again, not appropriate.
Finally, looking at the record at this stage in the light most favorable to Hobson, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Valenza failed to respond reasonably. Valenza realized
that the Commission was not going to provide money for the locks prior to Hobson’s injury.

(Doc. 56-1 at 72:20–7:22). Despite that realization, Valenza testified that he did not direct
anyone to investigate any interim measures to address the lock issues.
Q: At some point in time you realize you’re not getting the
money. Is that fair?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. What else do you think you could have . . .
done—understanding that you don’t get the money to fix the
locks, is there—did you investigate and, okay, is there
something else we could do to try to reduce the hazard?

17 To the extent Valenza’s admission, harmonized with his other admissions, implies that he was
subjectively aware of a general danger to all inmates but not Hobson particularly, such inference is
insufficient by itself to defeat the subjective prong. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (stating that knowledge
that harm would befall a specific inmate is not required for deliberate indifference).
. . . .

A: Mine is to fix the locks. That’s a safety issue. They
needed to be fixed, not denied.

Q: Did you do any type of investigation, did you have
anybody to investigate, okay, we’re not getting the money, is
there some other way we can—that doesn’t cost as much or
something we could do to mitigate this hazard?

. . . .

A: Before the incident, no.
(Id. at 72:23–73:18). Instead, Valenza continued to rely on existing measures under which
the issue persisted, like removing inmates from cells where a lock was broken beyond
repair, disciplining detainees who exploited the locks, and reporting the cells with issues
to Maintenance. (Doc. 56-3 at 41:11–23; doc. 56-2 at 24:11–14; doc. 52-5 at 11, para. 22).
At the same time, he testified that the Jail lacked a “specific, formal procedure” after staff
were “notified that a prisoner [wa]s able to unlock his own cell door.” (Doc. 52-5 at 11,
para. 22). Nevertheless, Valenza himself recognized “a substantial hazard to staff and
inmates” existed even with these interim measures. (See, e.g., doc. 56-1 at 55:5–13).
Valenza’s position is similar to that of the sheriff in Hale v. Tallapoosa County.
There, the sheriff argued that he responded reasonably because “he worked toward
construction of a new jail,” which he believed “was the only way to reduce the risk of
violence.” 50 F.3d at 1584. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed:
While any such efforts by [the sheriff] would appropriately be
considered by a jury determining whether [the sheriff] was
deliberately indifferent, such efforts would not necessarily
absolve him . . . of liability. A jury could find that despite any
efforts he made toward construction of the new jail, [the
sheriff] was deliberately indifferent by disregarding
“alternative means” or interim measures for reducing the risk
of violence such as those advanced by [the plaintiff]. While
consideration of alternatives available to [the sheriff] “comes
perilously close to second-guessing the difficult choices that
prison officials must face,” such consideration “directly
addresses the question of whether monetary restraints
frustrated [the sheriff’s] good faith efforts, or whether he
knowingly or recklessly disregarded solutions within his
means.” We conclude that [the plaintiff] produced sufficient
evidence to go to a jury . . . .
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1536, 1538
(11th Cir. 1993)).
So too here. A reasonable jury, resolving the factual disputes in Hobson’s favor,
could find that Valenza’s failure to investigate interim measures under the existing
conditions at the Jail (which he knew were not being remedied by the Commission) was
not a reasonable response. See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“[A]n Eighth Amendment
claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm
actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite
his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” (citations omitted)); Marsh, 268 F.3d
at 1027 (“[I]t is an unreasonable response for an official to do nothing when confronted
with prison conditions . . . that pose a risk of serious physical harm to inmates.”). Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit has expressly stated that a reasonable response generally includes
“taking the time to investigate the threat and look into different options all while making
sure the prisoners are being supervised.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Thus, the evidence Hobson proffers is sufficient, if credited
by a jury, to establish deliberate indifference.18

2. Clearly Established Law
As stated above, “[a] right may be clearly established for qualified immunity
purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing
the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute,
or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a
constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Gilmore,

144 F.4th at 1258. Whatever method Hobson relies upon, “existing precedent must have
placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
Hobson appears to argue there exists a broad statement of principle within the
Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right. (See, e.g.,
doc. 53 at 16; doc. 60 at 5; doc. 68 at 3); Gilmore, 144 F.4th at 1258. “[I]t is very difficult

to demonstrate” a violation of clearly established law in this way. Corbitt v. Vickers, 929
F.3d 1304, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019). And at bottom, the Court finds that, on this record,

18 Ordinarily, “a plaintiff demonstrates the ‘necessary causal link’ in this context where he is able to show
that the prison official (1) ‘had the means substantially to improve’ the inmate’s safety, (2) ‘knew that the
actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide the inmate with reasonable protection from violence,’
and (3) had ‘other means available to him which he nevertheless disregarded.’” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t
of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 622 (11th Cir. 2007) (alterations adopted) (quoting LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539).
Here, however, Valenza acknowledged that if the locks had been working, Hobson’s injury would not have
occurred and that he failed to investigate any alternative measures to abate the risk despite realizing that
funding would not occur. Under these circumstances, the failure to act altogether or to investigate
alternatives clearly satisfies causation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584; Marsh, 268
F.3d at 1027; Mosley, 966 F.3d at 1268.
Hobson has not satisfied his burden of “show[ing] a violation of clearly established rights.”
Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.

To be sure, “it has long been recognized that ‘prison officials have a duty to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Est. of Owens, 660 F. App’x at
767 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not
‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
Indeed, courts have repeatedly determined that prison conditions that encourage

violence can support a finding of deliberate indifference. In Farmer, the Supreme Court
considered a deliberate indifference claim raised by a biologically male prisoner who
presented as female but was housed in the general population of a male prison despite
officials’ “knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of
inmate assaults, and despite knowledge that petitioner, as a transsexual . . . , would be

particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by [other] inmates.” 511 U.S. at 829–31. Notably,
the Court did not require, as Valenza suggests, previous bloodshed to state a claim. (See
doc. 63 at 35). Instead, the Court held that a plaintiff could simply allege “a sufficiently
substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health.’” Id. at 843 (emphasis added)
(quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 35); accord id. at 845 (“[A] subjective approach to deliberate

indifference does not require a prisoner seeking ‘a remedy for unsafe conditions to await a
tragic event such as an actual assault before obtaining relief.’” (quoting Helling, 509 U.S.
at 33–34)); see also Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (indicating it is
sufficient for a plaintiff to allege prison “conditions that [a]re extreme and pose[] an
unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety” (emphasis added)).

Of course, previous bloodshed is not irrelevant. See, e.g., Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307–
08; Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583; LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1532–33; Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d
1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1308–10 (5th Cir. 1974).19
And claims reliant on a generalized risk of inmate-on-inmate violence without evidence of
previous, serious assaults have failed. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1299–1300
(11th Cir. 2014); Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1317–

18, 1320–23 (11th Cir. 2005).
But though previous, serious assaults are a fair proxy for risk, the Eleventh Circuit
has explicitly held that they are not required.20 In Marsh v. Butler County, the Eleventh
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the failure to allege that the prison “had a history of inmate
assaults with serious injuries” was not dispositive, and that “no reasonable sheriff could

have concluded that the alleged conditions at the Jail failed to pose a substantial risk of
serous harm, although no serious injury was alleged to have occurred at the Jail before the

19 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of
business on September 30, 1981.

20 Valenza and the Commission attempt to mold the deliberate indifference inquiry to require Hobson to
show the Jail was a place “where violence and terror reign.” (See, e.g., doc. 55 at 21; doc. 57 at 10, 15; doc.
63 at 32; doc. 65 at 4, 18; doc. 71 at 5). But that heuristic does not control where the plaintiff points to
“specific features of a facility” that pose a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners. See Marbury v.
Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2019); Dickinson v. Cochran, 833 F. App’x 268, 274–75 (11th
Cir. 2020); Brown v. Dunn, 760 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1340 (M.D. Ala. 2024). Indeed, even before Wade
(which was decided in July 2024 and so cannot be considered for purposes of clearly established law here),
Eleventh Circuit precedent discussed in this section permitted plaintiffs in Hobson’s predicament to bring
deliberate indifference cases on unsafe facility conditions which also involved inmate-on-inmate violence.
injuries suffered by Plaintiffs.” 268 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis added). In that case, the
conditions that constituted a substantial risk of serious harm were summarized as follows:

1) there was no segregation of nonviolent inmates from violent
inmates, pretrial detainees from convicted criminals, juveniles
from adults, or inmates with mental disorders from those
without mental disorders, 2) at times the Jail housed more
prisoners than the cells could accommodate, 3) the Jail was
routinely understaffed, 4) no head counts of prisoners were
made to make sure they were all accounted for, 5) locks on cell
doors were not functional, allowing inmates to roam freely at
all hours of the day, 6) homemade weapons were readily
available by fashioning weapons from material torn from the
dilapidated structure of the Jail, 7) no lock down of prisoners
in their cells occurred at any point during the day or night, 8)
cells were not visually inspected, 9) no jailer was assigned to
maintain prisoners’ security on the second floor where most of
the inmates were housed, 10) the Jail was not operated in
accordance with written policies, 11) inmates were not
screened for mental health, medical conditions or conflicts
with other prisoners before entering the Jail, and 12) prisoners
were not disciplined or segregated when they attempted to
escape, threatened jailers, destroyed property or assaulted other
inmates.
Id. at 1029.21

21 Marsh also summarized the facts in Hale sufficient to constitute a substantial risk of serious harm as: “1)
prisoners were not segregated based on their proclivity for violence, 2) there was only one jailer on duty,
3) the jailer’s quarters were out of earshot and eyesight of the prisoners’ cell, and 4) fights occurred between
inmates on a regular basis resulting in injuries requiring medical attention and hospitalization.” 268 F.3d at
1033 n.12.

It did the same of Williams: “1) widespread possession of weapons, 2) no confiscation of weapons, 3) no
segregation of violent from nonviolent inmates, 4) previous assaults, 5) overcrowding, 6) too few guards to
supervise properly inmates, and 7) multiple reports of stabbing, some resulting in death.” Id.

And of Collier: “1) possession of weapons by prisoners, 2) no established procedure for confiscating
weapons, 3) lack of classification according to severity of offense, 4) no procedure for reporting previous
assaults, 5) overcrowding, 6) lack of supervision by guards, 7) custodial responsibility assigned to
incompetent and untrained inmates, and 8) at least 27 reported instances of armed assaults by inmates on
other inmates.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has since decided Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs
County, where the plaintiff argued a substantial risk of serious harm arose from “inmates

[being] allowed to keep money in their cells; inmates [being] allowed to play cards and
gamble; the physical layout of the Jail hindered guards from preventing inmate-on-inmate
attacks; and a history of inmate-on-inmate fights.” 400 F.3d at 1320.
Inmates at Toombs County Jail were segregated based on a
number of particularized factors, including the kind of crime
committed and an inmate’s potential personal conflicts with
others. Moreover, the Jail was not understaffed on the night of
the attack: five officers were on duty, which is typical for
Toombs County. Jail officials had a history of punishing
inmate violence, rather than looking the other way to preserve
the status quo. And while inmate fighting does happen in
Toombs County, the record is insufficient to show that serious
inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something close to
it. Also, the fights that did occur were linked to no recurring
specific cause: causes ran the gamut from disagreements over
television channels, to retaliation for pre-incarceration street
activity, to card games, to food.

Purcell has produced evidence . . . that a few serious fights
occurred (severe enough to result in a trip to the hospital) at the
Jail before Matthew Morgan’s attack. No record evidence,
however, shows that those incidents related to money. . . .

The record evidence, at worst, shows that the physical layout
of the Jail presented the jailers with difficulty in seeing into
certain inmate cells, during the night, from the control tower.
Guards also testified that they could not hear as well from
inside the tower as they could when standing outside it. But in
practice, the guards left the tower and walked around the
cellblock area to conduct periodic checks; nothing suggests
difficulty in seeing into the cells or hearing cell activity when
walking around.
Id. at 1321–23. The court found no substantial risk of serious harm but explained that it
did “not, by today’s conclusion, establish . . . Marsh or Hale as the proverbial ‘floor’ of
liability for Eighth Amendment purposes. We only decide that the conditions evidenced
by the record here were not sufficiently grave to violate the Constitution.” Id. at 1324.

The instant action exists in the twilight between these lines of cases. The record
indicates the conditions, detailed in the light most favorable to Hobson supra Part
IV(A)(1)—while undeniably undesirable—were better than the conditions in Marsh but
worse than those in Purcell. Mindful that “[i]n deliberate-indifference cases, . . . context
matters,” Mosley, 966 F.3d at 1272 (citations omitted), and that “the threshold of deliberate
indifference is connected to combinations of diverse interdependent factual elements,”

Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010), the Court cannot find the
conditions at the Jail satisfy the objective prong of deliberate indifference under clearly
established law in this context. A reasonable official looking at the case law would not be
able to say conclusively that “the unlawfulness” of the conditions at the Jail was “apparent”
when the conditions there fell between22 those giving rise to liability (Marsh, Lane, Hale,

LaMarca, Williams, and Collier) and those which do not (Purcell and Harrison). Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Necessarily then, existing precedent would not
have placed the constitutional question of whether such conditions were objectively,
sufficiently serious “beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 536 U.S. at 741, and Hobson has thus not
established Valenza’s conduct violated clearly established law.

22 Or perhaps “among,” as the cases in this area are fairly characterizable as “a dog’s breakfast of divided,
conflicting, and ever-changing analyses.” See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 267 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Oral Argument at 24:23–49, Marbury v. Estes, No. 24-13513 (11th Cir. Mar.
5, 2026), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_argument_recordings/24-13513_0505202
6.mp3 (Newsom, J., speaking) (“We’ve got this . . . dog’s breakfast of cases, . . . Marsh, Lane, and Purcell
. . . . And it just seems like an odd thing to say that . . . there’s much we can take from it one way or the
other.”).
Because Hobson has failed to show that Valenza violated his clearly established
constitutional rights, Valenza is entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, Valenza’s

motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. Because Valenza is entitled to qualified
immunity—and therefore summary judgment—when viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Hobson, it follows that Hobson’s motion for summary judgment is due
to be denied as against Valenza.
B. The Commission
Because the Commission must itself be responsible for particular acts or omissions

for liability to attach under §1983, the Court proceeds by examining the Commission’s
responsibilities before examining whether its acts or omissions constituted official policy.
The Court then evaluates whether there are genuine disputes of material fact pertinent to
Hobson’s claim of deliberate indifference against the Commission.
1. The Commission’s Responsibilities

“In Alabama, counties possess only those powers expressly delegated to them by
the legislature.” Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (Ala. 2006) (citing
Tuscaloosa County v. Ala. Great S. R.R., 150 So. 328 (Ala. 1933)). “Therefore, the
Alabama Code determines the role of counties in operating county jails.” Id. Alabama
Code § 11-14-10 states: “The county commission shall erect . . . , jails, . . . , and [the]

county commission shall have authority to levy a special tax for that purpose. Each county
within the state shall be required to maintain a jail within their county.” Cf. Marsh, 268
F.3d at 1027 (“Alabama counties have no responsibility for daily operation of county jails
and no authority to dictate how jails are run, but the County is charged with erecting and
maintaining jails.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Turquitt v. Jefferson
County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 1998)). The duty to maintain a jail “require[s]

the county commission to keep a jail and all equipment therein in a state of repair to
preserve it from failure or decline.” Keeton v. Fayette County, 558 So.2d 884, 886 (Ala.
1989). Jails must also “be of sufficient size and strength to contain and keep securely the
prisoners which may be confined therein.” ALA. CODE § 11-14-13.
Further, “[i]t is the duty of the county commission, if there is not a sufficient jail in
its county, to levy a county tax for the erection thereof and cause proposals to be issued

for . . . repairing the same within 12 months thereafter.” Id. § 11-14-14. Alabama takes
this duty seriously, and affirmatively criminalizes the failure to comply. Id. § 11-14-15 (“If
any county commission fails to levy a tax to erect or repair a county jail when necessary,
the persons composing such county commission are severally guilty of a misdemeanor and
must, on conviction, be fined not less than $50.00 . . . .”). Given the threat of criminal

liability, Alabama provides counties tools to address jail issues on an expedited basis. See
id. § 11-14-19 (imposing a duty on the chairman of the county commission to call
impromptu meetings “[i]f there is a necessity[] and delay until the regular meeting of the
county commission may be of injury to the health of the prisoners confined in the county
jail”). The chairman is also “authorized and empowered . . . to visit and examine the

condition of the jail[ and] to make a memorandum in writing of such examination”
“without informing the sheriff or jailer” in advance. Id. § 11-14-22.
In light of the foregoing, the responsibility of the Commission to maintain the Jail
(and, of course, its locks) is clear.
2. Funding Decisions as Policy
As stated above, the Commission can only be liable if its refusal to provide funding

to replace the locks at the Jail was a “policy,” which is “a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice
by a municipality.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 389; accord Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
61 (2011) (“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s
lawmakers . . . .”). Inaction, or a refusal to implement proper policy, can itself constitute
policy for purposes of § 1983. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (“[F]ailure to provide proper
training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible.”); Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011) (“The city’s policy of inaction in light of notice
that its program will cause constitutional violations is the functional equivalent of a
decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” (quotation omitted)). Here, liability
arises only when the “constitutional violation is a ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the
Commission’s failure to budget (and hence, adequately [maintain]) the [Jail].” McDowell,

392 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
409–10 (1997)).
The Commission argues that Hobson’s claim fails because he has not produced
evidence that anyone acted as an official policymaker for Houston County. (See doc. 65 at
22–23). But Hobson need not identify one specific person; the Commission itself can

satisfy that role. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (requiring
“ident[ification of] those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final
policymaking authority for the local governmental actor” (emphasis added)). Second, it is
the Court which is tasked with that question of law. See id. (“[T]he trial judge must identify
those officials or governmental bodies . . . .”). Third, Hobson in fact did correctly identify
the Commission as the body responsible for decisions related to Jail maintenance in his

amended complaint and briefing. (See doc. 33 at 17, paras. 77–78; doc. 53 at 20; doc. 59
at 8; doc. 69 at 6); see also discussion supra Part IV(B)(1).
On this record, the Commission’s decision not to fund the replacement of locks at
the Jail amounts to an official policy of the County. Therefore, the Court proceeds to the
deliberate indifference inquiry and examines whether there are genuine disputes of material
fact that preclude summary judgment for the Commission and Hobson on the

Commission’s liability.
3. Deliberate Indifference
“[T]he [Commission] will have violated [Hobson’s] [Fourteenth] Amendment
rights if its failure to maintain the Jail constituted deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of serious harm to the [pretrial detainees].” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1027. As discussed

above, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the objective prong of deliberate
indifference. See discussion supra Part IV(A)(1). Because the objective prong does not
change based on the defendant, the Court pretermits further discussion on the point and
proceeds to examine the subjective prong, the Commission’s response, and causation.
Ultimately, the Court determines that a genuine dispute exists as to these elements, too,

such that granting either party summary judgment is inappropriate.
The Commission argues that Hobson has—at most—only shown that Chairman
Shoupe knew of the issue with the locks—not the Commission itself.23 (See doc. 65 at 21–

23). Nevertheless, Alabama law vests the Chairman, not individual commissioners, with
the authority to examine the Jail, ALA. CODE § 11-14-22, and the duty to set special
Commission meetings where “delay until the regular meeting . . . may be of injury to the
health of the prisoners,” id. § 11-14-19. Alabama law renders Chairman Shoupe the eyes
and ears of the Commission for the purposes of monitoring the Jail, and the evidence
adduced at this stage shows that he, in fact, personally knew of the issues with the locks at

the Jail.
Aside from Shoupe, there is also evidence that the remainder of the Commission
had direct knowledge of this issue. Brazier told Captain Ivey, who sat on the Commission,
that there were issues with the locks. (See doc. 56-2 at 21:15–22 (“[I] kept telling him ‘We
need to get these locks fixed . . . as soon as you can’ because, . . . things are going to start

failing.”)). Valenza admitted that prior to Hobson’s injury he informed the Commission
that the locks in the Jail “were not functioning properly and need[ed] to be replaced and/or
repaired.” (Doc. 52-4 at 5, para. 4; see also id. (Valenza’s admission that he notified the
Commission prior to the assault on Hobson that the Jail’s locks “created an unreasonably
dangerous situation for the inmates and [Jail] staff”). Valenza also stated that for two years

23 The Commission tries to have it both ways on this point—stating that Chairman Shoupe’s knowledge of
issues with the Jail cannot be imputed to the Commission writ large while also attempting to adopt
Chairman Shoupe’s actions as a reasonable response by the Commission to any risk. (See doc. 65 at 25–
27). Recall also that the Chairman is intimately involved with the funding and maintenance of jails and
votes with the other Commissioners—acting as part of the decision-making body—when they are
deadlocked.
before the incident, “we requested [the Commission] to have th[e] locks changed.” (Doc.
56-1 at 63:3–20; see also id. at 64:14–16 (“Chairman Shoupe was brought aware of it. And

I have two deputies on the [C]ommission also.”); id. at 65:24–66:6 (Valenza’s testimony
that he communicated to the Commission the severity of the issue and “showed [the
Commission] videos” related to the problem)). Valenza’s testimony is that he specifically
told two members—if not all four—as well as the Chairman, who can cast a tie-breaking
vote. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude that a quorum of the Commission
required to pass funding measures was subjectively aware that the conditions at the Jail

posed a substantial risk of serious harm.
Rafferty likewise testified that the Sheriff’s Office had tried to address the issues
with the locks by notifying the Commission: “[W]e’ve been trying to get it fixed. [We]
. . . went to the [C]ommission, the chairman, the chief financial officer . . . and it had been
being addressed with the boards over a period of time.” (Doc. 56-3 at 48:17–49:15

(emphasis added)). Shoupe’s declaration confirms that every funding request related to the
issue—which Rafferty referenced as beginning potentially as far back as 2014—would
have been considered by the Commission. (See doc. 64-1 at 6, para. 23 (stating that “neither
[he] nor any member of the Commission ever turned a blind-eye towards any funding
request made by the Sheriff” and that in budgeting “the Commission relies upon all

information available, countywide” to decide funding).
For his part, Shoupe also acknowledged that on July 25, 2023, Rafferty sent two
emails to the Commissioners. (Doc. 64-1 at 3, para. 9). The first was of “an inmate(s)
popping a jail cell door lock,” with a message forwarded from Asbill that stated: “This was
done at night after roll in. A single deputy did patrol rounds later that evening placing them
at risk.” (Doc. 64-2 at 1). Rafferty opined to the Commission that “[i]t is believed d[ue] to

no inmates being out of the cells during this time [that] the inmates were setting up and
waiting for a Corrections Deputy to enter the pod and attack.” (Id.). The second email
contained a video of “inmates that popped the[ir] cell door locks and attacked other
inmates.” (Doc. 64-3). Accordingly, several months before the attack on Hobson, the
Commission itself was provided video evidence highlighting the danger posed by the
locks.24 Chairman Shoupe stated after Hobson’s attack, “[w]e do have serious ongoing

safety concerns, not only for our inmates but for our jailers that work in the [J]ail, so we
have to do something. We’ve known about this for a long time.” (Doc. 52-7 (emphases
added)). Additionally, testimony from Valenza and several Jail staff members also implies
that the issue had gone on for years. This evidence, if believed, further supports a finding
that the Commission had actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm posed to

inmates at the Jail by the nonfunctioning locks. (See, e.g., doc. 56-2 at 17:15–18:10; doc.
56-3 at 43:20–22; doc. 56-9 at 16:7–16; doc. 62-2 at 120:13–19); see Wilson, 501 U.S. at
300; Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1030. At the very least, a jury could draw the reasonable inference
that the Commission was subjectively aware of the issue with the locks. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255; Chavez, 701 F.3d at 899.

24 The Commission ignores this fact, claiming Hobson “didn’t depose a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of the
Commission[ or] any member of the Commission other than Chairman Shoupe . . . . He doesn’t offer any
minutes of the Commission to show knowledge. Instead, he simply argues that the Commission should
have known that prisoners could manipulate locks in the [J]ail.” (Doc. 72 at 5). In light of Rafferty’s
testimony about a video of inmates attacking a deputy, shown at an annual budget meeting with all the
commissioners, and the videos of inmates popping the locks to their cells, emailed to all members of the
Commission, a jury could reasonably infer knowledge on the part of the Commissioners.
The Commission argues that, even if it had subjective awareness of the issue, it
responded reasonably by investigating replacement of the locks in A and M dormitories,

(see doc. 65 at 27–28), citing evidence that the Jail lock issue predominantly plagued those
dormitories, (doc. 64-16 at 3, para. 9). But this evidence conflicts with evidence presented
by Hobson that the conditions at the Jail were pervasive and unpredictably affected cells
throughout. Regardless, it is undisputed that the Commission did nothing to address the
locks in J dormitory, an area used to hold detainees with disciplinary infractions, including
infractions for popping locks. Additionally, it is undisputed that the Commission knew of

the issue with the locks no later than July 24, 2023, when Rafferty put all Commissioners
on notice with video evidence of detainees popping their locks. Even still, the Commission
did not replace any locks by the time Hobson was attacked—almost seven months later.
Hobson has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the Commission
failed to respond reasonably to a substantial risk of serious harm posed by the

nonfunctioning locks. In particular, Hobson presented evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the Commission knew of—but disregarded—a reasonable
measure to abate the risk in J dormitory: replacing the locks. Cf. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584;
LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1536.25 On the other hand, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commission, a reasonable jury could find that the replacement of locks in

A and M dormitories was a step toward replacing the locks throughout the Jail, including
in J dormitory, and therefore that the Commission responded reasonably. For that reason,
a jury, not the Court, is the proper entity to determine whether the Commission complied
with the Fourteenth Amendment by “‘tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–
527 (1984)).

Finally, Hobson has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in
his favor on the issue of causation—that his injury was a “highly predictable” or “plainly

25 The Commission disputes Hobson’s reading of LaMarca as standing for the proposition that “maintaining
the status quo after learning existing measures are ineffective supports a finding of deliberate indifference.”
(Doc. 72 at 6 (quoting doc. 69 at 6) (quotation marks omitted)). The Court agrees with the Commission
that Hobson reads LaMarca too favorably to his position. LaMarca stands for the proposition that “if an
official attempts to remedy a constitutionally deficient prison condition, but fails in that endeavor, he cannot
be deliberately indifferent unless he knows of, but disregards, an appropriate and sufficient alternative.”
995 F.2d at 1536 (emphasis added). Far from penalizing mere continuance of the status quo, LaMarca
requires that a defendant have knowledge of and disregard an alternative remedy to the risk. The trouble
for the Commission is that Hobson has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to make that
finding, and so Hobson’s misreading of LaMarca is not fatal.
obvious consequence” of the Commission’s ongoing policy not to fund the replacement of
locks in J dormitory.26 McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1292; Brown, 520 U.S. at 411.

Asbill testified—and reason confirms—that detainees throughout the United States
will attempt to escape confinement, including their cells. (Doc. 56-7 at 69:13–19). In
carceral settings—“necessarily dangerous places[ that] house society’s most antisocial and
violent people in close proximity with one another,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)—one would have to shelve common sense to believe that those individuals
will not attempt to leave cells that lack functioning locks or that they will live peaceably

once beyond the confines of their cell. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty.
of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 336 (2012) (“Jails can be even more dangerous than prisons
because officials there know so little about the people they admit at the outset.” (citation
omitted)); United States v. Prevo, 435 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because of the
character of prisoners and the nature of imprisonment, corrections facilities are volatile

places, brimming with peril, places where security is not just an operational nicety but a
matter of life or death importance.”); Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1301 (11th Cir.)
(Abudu, J., concurring) (“Prisons and jails are widely known to be one of the most

26 The Commission argues that Hobson’s theory of policy fails as a matter of law because he fails to tie a
funding decision by the Commission to his injury. (See doc. 57 at 16; doc. 65 at 28–29); accord Denham v.
Corizon Health, Inc., 675 F. App’x 935, 944 (11th Cir. 2017) (“To survive summary judgment, [the
plaintiff] must produce sufficient evidence that a policymaker’s specific budget decision was highly likely,
and not simply more likely, to inflict a particular injury.”). The Court disagrees. Hobson ties the ongoing
decisions of the Commission not to fund the replacement of locks at the Jail to the particular, substantial
risk of serious injury—assault by another inmate. (See doc. 53 at 20 (citing evidence of, inter alia, “[y]ears
of malfunctioning cell-door locks,” “[r]epeated requests . . . to the . . . Commission for funding to repair or
replace the system,” “[p]rior . . . assaults resulting from lock failures,” and the Chairman’s “public
admission that the issue presented ‘serious ongoing safety concerns’”); doc. 59 at 8 (citing “[t]he
Commission’s failure to address known lock failures” as the direct cause of Hobson’s injury); doc. 69 at 6
(framing the issue as “the Commission’s failure to timely fund”)).
dangerous housing situations in the world.”), cert. denied sub nom. Sellers v. Nelson, 145
S. Ct. 178, (2024); id. at 1306 (Carnes, J., concurring) (“Prisons and jails are inherently

dangerous places.” (citation omitted)).
Again, J dormitory housed individuals with disciplinary infractions, including for
popping locks. Brazier, Rafferty, and Valenza testified that the Commission was made
aware that the locks throughout the Jail were not functioning as intended and that the issue
with the locks posed a substantial risk of serious harm to both jailers and detainees alike.
It was apparent, then, to those working at the Jail that if the current locks were not replaced,

there was a potential for serious injury.27
For at least seven months, and maybe more than a decade, the Commission
maintained a policy of not replacing the locks at the Jail. The situation was variously
described as: “a recipe for disaster” (Valenza); “a dangerous condition for the inmates”
(Brazier); a source of “too many problems” and “a safety risk for not only other inmates

but also [the Jail staff]” (Moore); “unsafe” (Murphy); or “a major concern . . . [for] the
safety of [the] inmates” (Rafferty). The Commission itself acknowledges that prisoner-on-
prisoner violence “arose” from the manipulation of the inadequate locks. (See doc. 65 at

27 The Commission argues that even if it “started the process to replace every lock in the Jail on [June 3,
2023—the first available recorded incident of detainee-on-detainee violence arising from the lock popping],
the repairs wouldn’t have been completed in time to prevent the attack on Hobson.” (See doc. 65 at 28–29).
This argument misses the mark. If the Commission had begun the process of replacing the locks prior to
Hobson’s attack, they might well have responded reasonably to the substantial risk of serious harm in their
limited role as maintainers of the Jail. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255. However, the Commission took no
steps to replace the locks in J dormitory prior to Hobson’s assault. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded
that the Commission did not “cause” the substantial risk of serious harm that ultimately befell Hobson
simply because they did not respond to the risk earlier.
29 (“The first incident of prisoner-on-prisoner violence [that] arose from manipulation of
cell locks occurred on June 3, 2023.”)).

What these general recognitions of incarceration in the United States and specific
characterizations of incarceration at the Jail indicate is that Hobson’s injury was a highly
predictable or plainly obvious consequence of the Commission’s consistent policy of not
funding the Jail’s replacement of the locks after learning of their deficiency. Hobson has
thus provided sufficient evidence that the Commission’s ongoing decisions not to fund the
replacement locks was the “moving force” behind his constitutional injury. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 694; cf. McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1291–92 (concluding that a county was not
liable under § 1983 based on the county’s budget decision, which caused understaffing,
because the county’s decision was not the “moving force” behind the detainee-plaintiff’s
injury).28
In sum, a reasonable jury crediting Hobson’s version of events could conclude that

the Commission was subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in

28 Briefly, the Commission also suggests that even if even if it was aware the situation created a substantial
risk of serious harm throughout the prison, its attempt to replace locks in some dormitories before replacing
all locks in the prison due to budgetary concerns was reasonable. (See doc. 65 at 7–8). But policy concerns
do not control the meaning of deliberate indifference:

The United States suggests that a state-of-mind inquiry might allow
officials to interpose the defense that, despite good-faith efforts to obtain
funding, fiscal constraints beyond their control prevent the elimination of
inhumane conditions. Even if that were so, it is hard to understand how it
could control the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments” in the
Eighth Amendment. An intent requirement is either implicit in the word
“punishment” or is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as
policy considerations might dictate.

501 U.S. at 301–02 (emphasis added). To the extent that the Commission’s argument concerns feasibility,
the Court observes that the Commission was in fact able to obtain money to pay for replacements throughout
the Jail when it finally determined to replace all the locks.
J dormitory caused by its decision not to fund replacement of the locks at the Jail, and that
the Commission failed to respond reasonably to that risk. Therefore, the Commission’s

motion for summary judgment is due to be denied. However, if a jury credits the
Commission’s version of events, said jury could reasonably conclude that the Commission
did respond reasonably to the risk.29 Consequently, Hobson’s motion for summary
judgment is also due to be denied as against the Commission.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, and for good cause, it is

ORDERED as follows:
1. Hobson’s motion for summary judgment, (doc. 52), is DENIED.
2. Valenza’s motion for summary judgment, (doc. 61), is GRANTED.
3. The Commission’s motion for summary judgment, (doc. 64), is DENIED.
DONE this 4th day of August, 2026.

/s/ Emily C. Marks
EMILY C. MARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29 Because a reasonable jury crediting the Commission’s version of events could find in the Commission’s
favor regarding the reasonableness of its response, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of
Hobson, the Court in its discretion pretermits discussion of whether a reasonable jury could also find in the
Commission’s favor on any other deliberate indifference elements.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414164. Public record. Not legal advice.