# Moorefield

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · July 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414087

## Case

- **Full name:** Ricky Breeze Moorefield v. Dr. Mohammad Naji, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICKY BREEZE MOOREFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-266
)
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
DR. MOHAMMAD NAJI, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Ricky Breeze Moorefield, a prisoner
in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at SCI Houtzdale, brings
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Mohammed Naji (“Dr. Naji”),
asserting the violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment based on the medical treatment
he received/failed to receive at SCI Houtzdale for vasculitis. Pending before the Court is a Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Dr. Naji. (ECF No. 84.)
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff originated this case in October 2023 in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania (ECF No. 1) that was later transferred to this Court. After several
deficiencies were cured, the Complaint was filed on December 7, 2023. Plaintiff’s Complaint
asserted claims against Dr. Naji and SCI-Houtzdale Medical Department. (ECF Nos. 7, 17.) Dr.
Naji filed an Answer (ECF No. 40) and SCI-Houtzdale Medical Department filed a motion to
dismiss, which was granted. (ECF Nos. 25, 43.)

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to
have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final
judgment.
Plaintiff amended his complaint to assert claims against Dr. Naji and three Jane Does. (ECF
No. 44) to which Dr. Naji filed an Answer. (ECF No. 47.) Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended
Complaint against Dr. Naji and RN Kirk Rollan, no longer naming the Jane Does.2 (ECF No. 68)
Dr. Naji filed an Answer. (ECF No. 75.) RN Kirk Rollan’s motion to dismiss was granted. (ECF

Nos. 72, 82).
Dr. Naji’s Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on May 18, 2026 (ECF No. 84) and
has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 85, 86, 91, 92, 93.)
II. Factual Background
The relevant facts are undisputed. On Tuesday, February 8, 2022, Plaintiff walked to
medical with a steady gait, complaining of spot on his right leg that had occurred overnight. (ECF
No. 85 ¶ 2; ECF No. 93 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was examined by RN Courtny Lowery. (Id.) Plaintiff denied
experiencing pain but reported a burning sensation. (Id.) RN Lowery found the largest circular
raised ecchymosis area was 3mm x 2mm in diameter. (Id.) RN Lowery encouraged Plaintiff to
sign up for sick call to be examined by the physician’s assistant and advised him to return if the

areas broke open or increased in size. (Id.)
On Wednesday, February 9, 2022, PA Deanna Dellatorre saw Plaintiff at sick call. (ECF
No. 85 ¶ 3; ECF No. 93 ¶ 3.) PA Dellatorre observed scattered petechiae on the lower extremities
and black firm bullae ranging from the size of a quarter to a half-dollar with surrounding erythema.
(Id.) Her assessment included rash and cellulitis. (Id.) She planned to have the physician evaluate
Plaintiff. (Id.) She entered orders for Bactrim DC, twice daily for ten days. (Id.) She directed
Plaintiff to follow up on the PA line on Friday or sooner via emergency services if necessary. (Id.)

2 The Jane Does were terminated at that time.
RN Kirk Rollan3 noted that on February 9, 2022, that corrections officers contacted
medical about the same issues that were already addressed that day during a physician’s assistant
visit. Dr. Naji was called to see if any further treatment could be offered that night. Dr. Naji said
Mr. Moorefield would be reassessed on Friday as scheduled. (ECF No. 85 ¶ 4; ECF No. 93 ¶ 4;

ECF 84-2 at 172.)
On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff was assessed by RN Kenneth Dodson, Dr. Naji, and a PA.
(ECF No. 85 ¶ 5; ECF No. 93 ¶ 5). Dr. Naji directed that Plaintiff be sent to the UMPC Altoona
Emergency Room due to his complaints of pain with blisters and sores to his lower extremities.
(Id.) Plaintiff was evaluated and treated at UPMC Altoona from February 11, 2022, until February
15, 2022. (ECF No. 85 ¶ 6; ECF No. 93 ¶ 6.) He was discharged with a diagnosis of
leukocytoclastic vasculitis and ordered to continue Bactrim DC 800 mg twice daily. (Id.)
On or about March 4, 2022, Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 970599. In this grievance,
he stated that he was provided improper medical treatment for sores to his legs that developed on
or about February 8, 2022. (ECF No. 85 ¶ 21; ECF No. 93 ¶ 21; ECF No. 84-3 at 5-6.) In the

accompanying Initial Review Response, the Grievance Officer Radaker noted, “Dr. Naji was
interviewed and states that Moorefield was started on an antibiotic for treatment of cellulitis, and
it needed time to work. He states that on 2/11, the lesions had a different appearance, which
necessitated transfer to the ER.” (Id.) The final appeal decision upheld his grievance in part
because he experienced a delay in medical care following his initial evaluation. (ECF No. 84-3 at
1.) Plaintiff’s grievance was denied in part because of a finding that monetary compensation was
not warranted. (Id.)

3 Rollan was previously dismissed as a defendant in this action (ECF No 82.)
III. Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment

may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any
element essential to that party’s case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of
showing the absence of a genuine, material dispute and an entitlement to judgment. Id. at 323. This
showing does not necessarily require the moving party to disprove the opponent’s claims. Instead,
this burden may often be discharged simply by pointing out for the court an absence of evidence
in support of the non-moving party’s claims. Id.
Once the moving party has met their initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to demonstrate, by affidavit or other evidence, “specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and

judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and show
probative evidence creating a triable controversy. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. An issue is genuine
only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In following this directive, a court must
take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable
inferences and resolve all doubts in that party’s favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d
265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
Although courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at the summary
judgment stage a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative
evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g.,

Barnett v. NJ Transit Corp., 573 Fed. Appx. 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the pro se
plaintiff was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions,
or answers to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the
elements of her prima facie case”) (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk v. Beard, 395 Fed. Appx.
817, 820 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from
compliance with relevant rules of procedural law.”); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (pro se plaintiffs “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the
same rules that apply to all other litigants.”)
IV. Analysis
Plaintiff claims that Dr. Naji was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs

because he failed to reevaluate Plaintiff’s condition between February 9, 2022, and February 11,
2022, despite communications from corrections officers to the medical department about the
progression of Plaintiff’s condition. (ECF No. 91 at 8.)
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate two things. First, he must make an objective showing that his medical needs were
serious. See, e.g., Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). A medical need is
also serious where the denial of treatment would result in the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, or a “life-long handicap or
permanent loss,” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347.
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2003) (parallel citations omitted).
Defendants do not address this issue, but based on the record, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff had a serious medical need.
Second, Plaintiff must make a subjective showing that the defendant at issue was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. See, e.g., Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. The Supreme
Court has described the state of mind that deliberate indifference requires:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knowns of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must be both
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he also must draw that inference.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added).
“[D]eliberate indifference is a subjective state of mind that can, like any other form of
scienter, be proven through circumstantial evidence and witness testimony.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at
535. It has been found “in a variety of circumstances,” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197, including where a
prison official “knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to
provide it[,]” or “prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.”
Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), which cited
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Since a defendant’s state of mind, like other facts, can be proved by circumstantial evidence, the
Farmer standard does not require a defendant to admit his consciousness of the risk of serious
harm before liability can be imposed. But even gross errors of judgment are not constitutional
violations: liability requires subjective, not objective, culpability. 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.
Importantly, the subjective inquiry that must be made in determining whether deliberate
indifference exists is meant “to prevent the constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims;
thus, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must show more than negligence or misdiagnosis
of an ailment.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court of Appeals

has explained:
It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some
more culpable state of mind, do not constitute “deliberate indifference.” As the
Estelle Court noted: “[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 105;
see also Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he law is clear
that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional
violation.”); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[C]ertainly no
claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another
doctor. There may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat an illness.”)
(emphasis omitted). “Deliberate indifference,” therefore, requires “obduracy and
wantonness,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986), which has been likened
to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (stating that “it is enough that the
official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm”).
Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (parallel citations omitted); see, e.g., Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[a]llegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional
violation.”). Thus, “the mere receipt of inadequate medical care does not itself amount to deliberate
indifference—the defendant must also act with the requisite state of mind when providing that
inadequate care.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535.
Moreover, when it comes to claims of deliberate indifference, there is a “critical
distinction” between allegations of a delay or denial of a recognized need for medical care and
allegations of inadequate medical treatment. Id. (citation omitted).
Because “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not “support
a claim of an eighth amendment violation,” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. v. Lanzaro,
834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. Cir. 1987), when medical care is provided, we presume that
the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional
standards of care. See Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a physician exercises professional
judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights”).
Id.
That said, the fact that prison medical personnel have provided some medical care to an
inmate does not preclude a finding of deliberate indifference. Even so, the court “must examine
the totality of an inmate’s care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir. 1997).
As courts have concluded, isolated delays or incidents of neglect will not support a finding of
deliberate indifference if the record evidences that the prison otherwise has been treating an
inmate’s painful condition. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff saw a nurse on February 8, 2022 based on his complaint
of a spot on his leg. He was advised to sign up for sick call and was seen by a physician’s assistant
the next day. The PA planned to have a physician evaluate Plaintiff and prescribed Bactrim DC
twice daily for ten days. She directed Plaintiff to follow up on February 11, 2022, or sooner if
necessary. Dr. Naji was contacted on the evening of February 9 by Nurse Rollan based on

communications from correctional officers about Plaintiff’s complaints that his condition appeared
to be worsening. Based on the information provided, Dr. Naji determined that no further treatment
was necessary before Plaintiff’s scheduled assessment on February 11, 2022. On February 11,
2022, Dr. Naji examined Plaintiff and determined that his condition required hospitalization.
Reviewing the totality of the evidence, the Court finds no evidence of Dr. Naji’s deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. While the DOC concluded that there was a delay in
Plaintiff’s medical care, the facts here do not support a claim that the delay was occasioned by
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Dr. Naji knew Plaintiff had been seen by the
medical department on February 9, 2022, that medication was prescribed that day to treat his
condition, and that Plaintiff was scheduled to be seen again on February 11, 2022. Based on the
information available to him, including the fact that Plaintiff had been examined earlier that day
and provided with medical treatment and medication, Dr. Naji concluded that no further medical
intervention was necessary before Plaintiff was scheduled to be examined on February 11th. There

is no record evidence, nor can an inference can be drawn, that Dr. Naji knew of an immediate need
for additional treatment and intentionally denied it. While Dr. Naji’s decision to forgo additional
medical treatment in the interim between medical visits could potentially be challenged, claims of
negligence or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference without some evidence
of a culpable state of mind.
Dr. Naji’s exercise of his professional medical judgment, without some more culpable state
of mind, does not constitute deliberate indifference. Dr. Naji’s motion for summary judgment will
be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.

Date: July 30, 2026 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414087. Public record. Not legal advice.