# Sage

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414064

## Case

- **Full name:** Isaias Castelan Lozano v. Jessica Sage, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ISAIAS CASTELAN LOZANO,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-01800
v.
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
JESSICA SAGE, et al.,

Respondents.
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Isaias Castelan Lozano (“Lozano”) brings this petition for writ of habeas
corpus. (Doc. 1). On June 29, 2026, Lozano filed the instant petition, requesting that
Respondents Jessica Sage, John Rife, Markwayne Mullin, Todd Lyons, and Todd Blanche1
release him from custody at the Federal Correctional Institution Lewisburg (“FCI
Lewisburg”) or provide him with an immediate bond hearing. (Doc. 1, at 2). On July 10,
2026, Sage filed a response to Lozano’s petition. (Doc. 6). On July 17, 2026, Lozano filed a

1 Pursuant to the “immediate custodian rule,” the only proper Respondent in this case is
Jessica Sage (“Sage”), Warden of FCI Lewisburg. “The federal habeas statute
straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who
has custody over [the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the
person having custody of the person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17
F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021) (“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate
custodian rule, then the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Lozano
is detained at FCI Lewisburg, Sage is the proper Respondent. (Doc. 1, at 2); see Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. at 434. As such, all Respondents other than Sage are DISMISSED. However, the
government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because Sage is acting as an agent of the
federal government by detaining Lozano on behalf of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL 10602037, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28,
2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE regional director when ICE makes initial
custody determinations including setting of a bond and review of conditions of release);
Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, 3:25-cv-01896, 2025 WL 3522932, at *8
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2025 WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec.
8, 2025) (finding same).
timely traverse. (Doc. 7). For the following reasons, Lozano’s petition (Doc. 1) is
GRANTED, and Sage is ORDERED to release Lozano from custody.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following background is derived from Lozano’s petition, Sage’s response, and the

exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 6). Lozano is a citizen of Mexico, who entered the United
States on March 13, 2004, without inspection. (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 6, at 4). Lozano has lived
in the United States for twenty-two years, and Lozano has four United States citizen children.
(Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 7, at 2). On October 10, 2025, Lozano pled guilty to Recklessly
Endangering Another Person (“REAP”), and a Philadelphia court sentenced Lozado to
twelve months of probation. (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 6, at 5).
On October 16, 2025, ICE encountered and arrested Lozano while conducting a
surveillance operation. (Doc. 6, at 5). ICE then issued Lozano a notice to appear and placed
him in removal proceedings in the Elizabeth Immigration Court. (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 6, at 5).

On October 24, 2025, Lozano filed a 42B cancellation of removal and adjustment of status
application based on the hardship his removal would have on his United States citizen
children. (Doc. 1, at 5). On December 16, 2025, an immigration judge denied Lozano’s 42B
application and found Lozano removable pursuant to Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 6, at 5). On January 14, 2026,
Lozano appealed his removal order and the denial of his 42B application to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 6, at 5). Lozano’s appeal remains pending.
(Doc. 1, at 5).
On February 3, 2026, Lozano filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Western District of Pennsylvania on similar grounds as the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1,
at 5). At the time Lozano filed his first habeas petition, he was detained at the Moshannon
Valley Processing Center in the Western District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 5). On May 1,
2026, the Honorable Stephanie L. Haines denied Lozano’s first habeas petition without
prejudice, stating that Lozano should first request a Joseph hearing before an immigration
judge to determine whether he is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).2 (Doc. 1, at 6).

Lozano has been in immigration detention for over nine months. (Doc. 1, at 5).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for
an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge
immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus

2 Lozano’s first habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed in the Western District
of Pennsylvania, does not bar the Court from reviewing Lozano’s instant habeas petition. The
prohibition against successive petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does
not apply to petitions for habeas corpus filed in the immigration context under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. Zayas v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 247, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2002); Abdel-Whab v. Secretary of Dept. of
Homeland Sec., 132 F. App’x 988, 989-90 (3d Cir. 2005). The abuse of writ doctrine may apply
to bar successive immigration habeas petitions when a successive petition raises grounds
identical to those previously raised and rejected on the merits. Esogbue v. Holmes, 142 F. App’x
98, 100 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)); Zayas, 311 F.3d
at 255-56; Abdel-Whab, 132 F. App’x at 989-90. However, Judge Haines did not decide
Lozano’s first immigration habeas petition on the merits but instead denied Lozano’s petition
without prejudice to reopening once he exhausted a further administrative remedy. Castelan
Lozano v. Oddo, 3:26-CV-00144, Dkt. No. 10. Specifically, Judge Haines directed Lozano to
request a Joseph hearing with the immigration court to determine whether his conviction was
one that would subject him to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Castelan Lozano
v. Oddo, 3:26-CV-00144, Dkt. No. 10. The government no longer avers that Lozano should
be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (See Doc. 6, at 16-17). As Judge Haines did not
reject Lozano’s first habeas petition on the merits, the Court is not barred from reviewing
Lozano’s instant habeas petition. See Esogbue, 142 F. App’x at 100; Zayas, 311 F.3d at 255-56;
Abdel-Whab, 132 F. App’x at 989-90.
and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting
Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in
only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a
noncitizen’s habeas petition, courts evaluate whether the government complied with

regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,
385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and
constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the
petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing or release if the Court
determines that a noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to such relief under relevant
constitutional or statutory protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa.
2025) (finding that a noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025
WL 3171639, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding a habeas petitioner was entitled to a

bond hearing under relevant statutory protections); see also Alexey Kashranov v. J.L. Jamison, et
al., No. 2:25-CV-05555, 2025 WL 3188399 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that the
appropriate remedy when the government detains a petitioner under an inapplicable statute,
violating due process, is release from custody).
III. JURISDICTION
“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.
Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus

where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),
(3). In Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third Circuit
determined that the INA strips district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims
arising from removal actions or proceedings, when the claims could be addressed on a petition

for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”). However, the Third Circuit clarified that
district courts retain jurisdiction over habeas petitions presenting “now or never” questions of
law, that cannot be meaningfully reviewed later on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 273-74.
Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is detained pursuant to the appropriate
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and is entitled to a bond hearing are “now
or never” legal questions that remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th
at 274-77; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
does not present a jurisdictional bar to challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal,
the government’s decision to detain in the first place, and the process by which removability

will be determined). A determination of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to a petitioner
also determines whether that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. See Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 126 (BIA 2025) (holding immigration judges lack authority to hear
bond requests for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399 at
*5 (citing § 1226(a)) (finding § 1226(a) allows for detainees to be released on conditional parole
or bond). Such claims do not arise from removal proceedings, they arise “now.” If left to be
raised on a PFR, the petitioner will never get the opportunity for an immigration judge to
determine their eligibility for bond during removal proceedings. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-
77 (“when [noncitizens] raise claims that courts cannot ‘meaningfully’ review through the

PFR process, those claims do not ‘aris[e] from’ the ‘action[s] taken’ or ‘proceeding[s] brought’
to remove them”). Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction over Lozano’s habeas petition because
the legal questions of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to Lozano and whether Lozano
is entitled to a bond hearing are wholly collateral to his removal proceedings and cannot be
meaningfully reviewed on a PFR. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-79.

IV. DISCUSSION
Lozano contends that Sage improperly detained him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A), in violation of the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(Doc. 1, at 14-15). Lozano avers that he should be properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1226 because Lozano lived in the United States for twenty-two years before ICE apprehended
Lozano and placed him in removal proceedings. (Doc. 1, at 9-10). Lozano also avers that he
should be detained pursuant to § 1226(a), not § 1226(c), because his REAP conviction does
not trigger mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), as REAP is not a crime of
moral turpitude. (Doc. 1, at 6).

Sage counters that Lozano is properly detained without an opportunity for bond under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he is present in the United States without having been
lawfully admitted. (Doc. 6, at 18). Sage also contends that Lozano’s detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because
Lozano, a noncitizen without admission, is limited to the due process rights provided by the
INA. (Doc. 6, at 17). The Court will first address whether Lozano was properly detained
under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court will then address whether Lozano’s detention violates due
process.
A. SAGE IMPROPERLY DETAINED LOZANO UNDER 8 U.S.C. 1225(B)(2)(A).

Sage improperly detained Lozano under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), when Sage should
have detained Lozano under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Lozano avers that his prolonged mandatory
detention is unlawful because he has already been in the United States for several years and
is not presently seeking admission into the United States. (Doc. 1, at 12). Lozano also
provides that his prolonged mandatory detention is unlawful because ICE charged him as an
alien present without admission or parole and because he has never committed an aggravated
felony that would subject him to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
(Doc. 1, at 12). Sage counters that Lozano falls squarely under § 1225(b)(2)(A), which
mandates the detention of noncitizens who are present in the United States without lawful
admission. (Doc. 6, at 18).
The INA is a comprehensive statute regulating immigration, which Congress has
repeatedly reworked since its enactment in 1952. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. Before
1996, the INA provided that noncitizens who presented themselves at ports of entry were

subject to mandatory detention during exclusion proceedings, while noncitizens who evaded
inspection by entering elsewhere were afforded the opportunity to obtain release during
deportation proceedings. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025)
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a); 1251 (1994)). In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) amended the INA to include § 1225 and § 1226, in
part, to end the preferential treatment of noncitizens who evaded inspection when entering
the United States. OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997, PL
104–208, September 30, 1996, 110 Stat 3009; H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 225 (1996); see
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223. With the IIRIRA, Congress eliminated separate exclusion
and deportation hearings and combined them into a single removal proceeding, regardless of
where the noncitizen entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Since 1996, only
noncitizens who are admitted are subject to deportation, while noncitizens who have never
been formally admitted are deemed inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA provides that “in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained
[pending removal hearings].” Pursuant to this provision, noncitizens are subject to mandatory
detention while their removal proceedings are pending, but they may be released “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing §
1182(d)(5)(A)); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. To trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining
immigration officer must determine that an individual is (1) an applicant for admission, (2)
seeking admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Martinez v.

Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d, 211, 214 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025), Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at
*6. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to a noncitizen who is both an “applicant for
admission” and “seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Soto v. Soto, 807
F. Supp. 3d 397, 408 (D.N.J. 2025) (collecting cases).
The INA defines an applicant for admission as a noncitizen who is “present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” § 1225(a)(1);
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286. The phrase “alien seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, so
the Court must construe the phrase based upon its ordinary meaning and statutory context.
See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-cv-34 2 (DCL),

2025 WL 3050094, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025). District courts in the Third Circuit and
across the country have found that “seeking admission” describes active and ongoing
conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of
entry. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Del Cid v. Bondi, No 3:25-cv-00304, 2025 WL
2985150, at *16 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025); J.A.M., 2025 WL 3050094, at *3; Ochoa Ochoa

v. Noem, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); see Cantu-Cortes,
2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (quoting Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 25-cv-01542, 2025 WL2676082, at
*13 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025)) (finding a noncitizen who has already been residing in the
United States cannot be characterized as “seeking entry” consistent with the ordinary
meaning of that phrase). This reading comports with the Supreme Court’s finding in Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 583, U.S. 281, 285 (2018), that § 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking
entry into the United States,” those who are “seeking admission into the country.” See Soto,
807 F. Supp. 3d at 407. This reading also preserves a distinction between “seeking admission”
and the separate term “applicant for admission,” ensuring that each phrase carries

independent meaning.3 Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6.
Section 1226 of the INA applies to noncitizens who are not seeking admission but are
already present in the United States. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89. Section 1226(a) provides
that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The
Attorney General may release a noncitizen on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2). Pursuant to § 1226(a), “[i]mmigration authorities make an initial custody

3 The Court acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit recently issued
decisions in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2026) and Avila v. Bondi,
170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026) respectively, both holding that under the INA an
“applicant for admission” is necessarily someone who is “seeking admission.” However,
Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila are not binding on the Court.
determination, after which the noncitizen may request a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). At their
bond hearing, a noncitizen “may secure his release if he can convince the officer or
immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.” Nielsen v.

Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1.
Section 1226(c) of the INA provides for the mandatory detention of, among others,
noncitizens present in the United States, who were convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c). In 2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226(c) to add
new categories of noncitizens who are subject to mandatory detention. Lopez Cruz v. Jamison,
No. 26-2278, 2026 WL 1257329, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2026). Since the passage of the Laken
Riley Act, criminal aliens under § 1226(c) are any alien who,
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an
offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of at
least 1 year,
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable
under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, or
(E)(i) is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section
1182(a) of this title; and
(ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed,
or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any
burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer
offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another
person,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
Section 1226(c) “mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and
that detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is
released for witness-protection purposes.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 305. Under Pennsylvania law,
REAP is classified as a misdemeanor offense, and a REAP conviction alone “does not
establish that a [p]etitioner committed a crime that resulted in death of serious bodily injury
as defined by the Laken Riley Act.” Santos-Barahona v. Jamison, 2026 WL 1047056, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. April 17, 2026) (citing Lopez v. McShane, No. 26-CV-771, 2026 WL 767779 (E.D. Pa.

March 18, 2026)). The Third Circuit has also found that a conviction for REAP under
Pennsylvania law is not enough to establish that a crime was a crime of moral turpitude as
defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Mahn v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 767 F.3d 170, 174
(3d Cir. 2014).
On July 8, 2025, ICE and the Department of Justice announced a new practice, in
which all applicants for admission, regardless of when the noncitizens were apprehended, are
now subject to the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Interim Guidance
Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,
https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-

for-applications-for-admission (last visited July 21, 2026). On September 5, 2025, the BIA
adopted the DOJs new position, holding that immigration judges have no authority to
consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission,
finding all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
ineligible for release on bond. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. &N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Several
district courts across the country, including courts in the Third Circuit, reject this new policy
and the application of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens who have been residing in the United
States for a period of time before they are detained by ICE pending removal proceedings.
Cantu-Cortes, 2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (finding that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), is
applicable to a petitioner who resided in the United States for approximately 25 years before
ICE detained him); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only
applies for aliens who are “seeking admission,” and petitioner who lived in the United States
for almost two years was not seeking admission but was “already here”); Del Cid v. Bondi,
2025 WL 2985150 at *14-17 (finding noncitizens who had been in the United States for over

two years when arrested are subject to § 1226(a) not § 1225); Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 408
(collecting cases).
Section 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(c), applies to Lozano’s detention.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA does not apply to Lozano’s detention because Lozano is
not seeking admission into the United States. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens
who are applicants for admission and are seeking admission to the United States. See Martinez,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 214, see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d
397, at 400, 408 (collecting cases). Lozano is not actively attempting to come into the United
States. Lozano has lived in the United States since March 2004. (Doc. 1, at 5). Based on the

plain meaning of the phrase “seeking admission,” Lozano sought admission when he entered
the United States on March 13, 2004. (Doc. 1, at 5); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6
(“seeking admission describes active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come
into the United States, typically at a border or port of entry and presenting oneself for
inspection and authorization”).
Likewise, § 1226(c) does not apply to Lozano because his REAP conviction alone does
not establish that Lozano committed a crime that resulted in death or serious bodily injury or
a crime of moral turpitude. Santos-Barahona, 2026 WL 1047056, at * 2; Mahn, 767 F.3d at
174. Further, Sage presents no evidence or argument indicating that Lozano’s committed a

crime that puts him within the ambit of § 1226(c). (See Doc. 6). Instead, § 1226(a) applies to
applicants for admission, like Lozano, who are not actively seeking admission but who have
been residing in the United States for an extended period. See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399,
at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for aliens who are “seeking admission,” and
petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two years was not seeking admission but

“already here”); see also Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 400, 408 (collecting cases). Accordingly, after
the October 16, 2025 ICE arrest, Sage improperly detained Lozano under § 1225(b)(2)(A),
when she should have detained Lozano under § 1226(a).
B. SAGE VIOLATED LOZANO’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY IMPROPERLY SUBJECTING
HIM TO MANDATORY DETENTION.

Sage’s continued mandatory detention of Lozano under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates
Lozano’s procedural due process rights. Lozano avers that his prolonged mandatory
detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because DHS has not
provided him with any process or an opportunity to contest his mandatory detention. (Doc.
1, at 15-16). Sage counters that Lozano is only entitled to due process afforded to applicants
for admission by the INA. (Doc. 6, at 17). Sage also avers that Lozano has had ample
available process in his current removal proceedings. (Doc. 6, at 45).
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). To determine whether a government action violates due process,
courts apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The
Mathews balancing test weighs: (1) the private interest implicated by the government action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
(3) the government’s interest, including administrative burdens of additional procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
The first factor, private interest implicated by the government action, weighs heavily
in Lozano’s favor because Sage has deprived Lozano of his physical liberty with improper

detention without the possibility of bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A) for over nine months. (Doc.
7, at 5); Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty
interests [is] the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.”);
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody,
detention, or forms, of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process
Clause] protects); Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 409. Lozado’s prolonged mandatory detention also
prevented him from being present for the birth of his fourth child. (Doc. 7, at 3). The second
factor, risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, also weighs
heavily in Lozano’s favor because Lozano remains erroneously detained without the

possibility of release on bond pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 409
(citing Barrios v. Shepley, No. 1:25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2772579, at *11 (D. Me. Sept.
29, 2025); Zumba v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,
2025)) (finding the second Mathews factor weighs in petitioner’s favor when subject to
erroneous detention without a showing from the government that petitioner presented a
public safety or flight risk); see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *5 (finding the lack of
any individualized assessment creates a high risk of error). The third Mathews factor, the
government’s interest, also weighs in Lozano’s favor. Generally, the government’s interest in
detaining noncitizens is to ensure the appearance of noncitizens at future immigration

proceedings and to prevent danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Soto, 807 F.
Supp. 3d at 409-10. Lozano does not pose a risk to the government’s interest in detaining him.
Lozano has lived in the United States for twenty-two years with little issue. (Doc. 1, at 5). In
that time, Lozano’s only encounter with the law is his REAP conviction, a second-degree
misdemeanor, to which Lozado pled guilty and under which Lozano is subject to probation.
(Doc. 6, at 4-5). Further, Lozano has demonstrated compliance with the immigration process

by following the requirements of his ongoing removal proceedings. (Doc. 1, at 5). Lozano’s
application for adjustment of status and strong family ties to the United States also indicate
that Lozado is likely to appear in immigration court throughout proceedings. (Doc. 1, at 5).
As each Mathews factor weighs in Lozano’s favor, Sage’s mandatory detention of Lozano
under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Lozano’s procedural due process rights. Accordingly, Lozano’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED, and Sage is ORDERED to release Lozano
from custody.
V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lozano’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.
(Doc. 1). Sage is ORDERED to release Lozano from custody. Sage is barred from re-
detaining Lozano under § 1225(b)(2)(A) absent a material change in circumstances. Lozano
may move to reopen this matter if Sage seeks to detain him under § 1226(a) and fails to
schedule a timely bond hearing. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

Dated: July 24, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414064. Public record. Not legal advice.