# Payne

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · August 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11413204

## Case

- **Full name:** Lynn Sentelle Payne v. Joseph P. Lopinto, III, ET AL.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LYNN SENTELLE PAYNE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2732

JOSEPH P. LOPINTO, III, ET AL. DIVISIONS “5”
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56 filed by
Defendants, Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III; Deputy Chief Sue Ellen Monfra; Jefferson Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) Sergeant Christian Silbernagel; JPSO Captain Bryan Bordelon; JPSO
Major Edward Olsen; and JPSO Lieutenant Chris Morris (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff
Lynn Sentelle Payne filed an opposition to the motion (rec. doc. 48) and Defendants filed a
reply. (Rec. doc. 49). Also before the Court are the Motion for Appointment of Counsel (rec.
doc. 50) and the Motion to Stay Consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
or Alternatively for Relief Under Rule 56(d), Extension of Time, and Reconsideration of
Appointment of Counsel (rec. doc. 51) filed by Plaintiff. Having reviewed the pleadings and
Ith. e appBliaccakblger loauwn, dth e Court rules as follows.
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on
November 20, 2024. (Rec. doc. 1). In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “[he] was
REFUSED the privilege and opportunity to be assigned to General Population because of the
fact that I’m (Transgender). Not neither time did I request to be placed in Protective Custody,
or on Administrative Segregation, so I should be given the same equal opportunityI da.s ALL
other inmates and allowed into general population (per my request and consent).” ( at 6).
On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (with leave of Court). (Rec.
1
doc. 27). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[b]etween September 27, 2024,
and February 11, 2025, [he] experienced numeIrdo.us instances of cruel, discriminatory, and
abusive treatment while housed at JPCC . . . .” ( at 1). Plaintiff alleges that he was placed
in “[s]egregation due toId [.his] sexual orientation – as a transgender male beginning on
September 27, 2024.” ( ). Plaintiff avers that he suffered “[c]hronic neuropatIhd.y in [his]
hands and feet – attributed to extreme isolation . . . without medical attention.” ( ).
Plaintiff maintains that he was subjected to targeted assaults by another inmate, Isaac
Williams, who threw urine into his cell on January 3, 20Id2.5, and thereafter doused him and
his cell with human feces and urine on January 5, 2025. ( ). SurveillancIed f.ootage reportedly
captured both incidents, and “criminal charges were filed as a result.” ( ). PlaintiIfdf .alleges

that becBa. use oPf ltahienstei fefv’se Cntlas,s hseif iwcaasti doina gannods ethde w Iinthci PdTeSnDts o ant FJPebCrCuary 11, 2025. ( ).

On September 27, 2024, Defendant Silbernagel (as the Commander of the
Classification Division for the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”)) informed
Plaintiff that he was being referred to administrative segregation “[f]or your safety as well
as the safe and orderly operation of this facility. You are a homosexual male inmate that has
breast implants. Therefore, for your safety as well as the safe operation of this facility I am

1
Although Plaintiff did not adopt the allegations of his original Complaint in his Amended Complaint, the
allegations overlap between the two pleadings.
recommending you to administrative segregation.” (Rec. doc. 45-4 at 3). The claIsds.ification
packet also includes an interview with Plaintiff from September 27, 2024. In that
interview, a form was completed Iind. which Plaintiff responded to the sexual preference
question thaIdt .he was homosexual. ( at 6). The inmate profile for Plaintiff indicates that he
is male. ( at 5). Plaintiff requested administrative review of his classification on

September 28, 2024. (Rec. doc. 45-5). On October 2, 2024, at the administrative hearing,
the Administrative Review Board (“the Board”) agreed with Silbernagel’s determination to
keep Plaintiff on administrative segregation. (Rec. doc. 45-6).
On October 2, 2024, Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Board and their decision to
keep him on administrative segregation. (Rec. doc. 45-7). A hearing of Plaintiff’s appeal was
held on November 4, 2024. (Rec. doc. 45-8). The Board again heldId .that Plaintiff would
remain on administrative segregation, to be reviewed in 30 days. ( ). On November 4,
2024, Plaintiff submitted a grievance, complaining that he was placed on administrative

segregation against his own consent because he is homosexual with breast implants. (Rec.
dIodc.. 45-9). He also complained that he hadn’t appeared before the Board for seven days.
( ). In response to this grievance, Silbernagel again stated that he was placed in
administrative segregation for the safety and security of the facility, as well as his personal
wellbeing. Silbernagel wrote: “At this time, the facility does not have a housing area for
homosexual inmates.” (Rec. doc. 45-7). On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff again appealed the
decision of the Board. (Rec. doc. 45-11). On December 27, 2024, the Board again agreed
with Silbernagel’s determination to keep Plaintiff on administrative segregation. (Rec. doc.
45-12). On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff again appealed the decision of the Board. (Rec. doc.
45-13).
An administrative hearing on the appeal was held on January 27, 2025. (Rec. doc. 45-
14). Again, the Board agreed with Silbernagel’s detIedr.mination to keep Plaintiff on
administrative segregation, with a review set in 30 days. ( ). On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff

appealed that decision of the Board. (Rec. doc. 45-15). However, on February 11, 2025, a
transfer authorization was executed, sending Plaintiff to Raymond Laborde Correctional into
DOC custody. (Rec. doc. 45-16).
Before the transfer, however, on January 2, 2025, Sergeant Yakaba Williams was
notified that a battery had been committed in Pod 4DR. (Rec. doc. 45-17). Deputy James
Mauk notified Central Control that Lynn IPda.yne reported that inmate Isaac Williams threw
urine on him from the toilet into his cell. ( ). Surveillance video was reviewed anIdd .revealed
Williams throwing liquid from his toilet into Payne’s cell more than four times. ( ). Payne

advised that he wished to pursue criminal charges against WilIldia.ms, and Williams was
charged with Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:35, Simple Battery. ( ).
On January 14, 2025, Deputy Hewitt received a call from Deputy Alexander Godinez,
who stated that an inmate in Pod 4D was throwing feces on another inmate (Plaintiff). (Rec.
doc. 45-18). Deputy Hewitt arrived on scene anIdd. located brown liquid substances on the
floor in front of Cell 5 and on the wall inside. ( ). Officer Godinez informed Hewitt that
while out at his one-hour shower, inmate IIsda.ac Williams was seen by officer Godinez
throwing feces into the cell of Inmate Payne. ( ). Video surveillance captured the incident.
Id.
( ). Payne wishIedd. to pursue charges, and Williams was again charged with Section 14:35,
simple Cb.a tteryT. h(e A)f. f idavit of Sgt. Silbernagel

Attached to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is the Affidavit of Sgt.
Silbernagel, one of the named Defendants in this lawsuit. Silbernagel affirms in his affidavit

that Plaintiff was not referred to administrative segregation based solely on the fact that he
identifies as transgender. (Rec. doc. 45-19 at ¶ 5). Rather, Silbernagel maintains that
Plaintiff was referred to adminiIsdtr.ative segregation for his safety as well as the safe and
orderly operation of the JPCC. ( at ¶ 6). Silbernagel also affirms thaItd t.he JPCC does not
have a separate housing wing for inmates who identify as transgender. ( at ¶ 7). The JPCC
has limited space and resourceIds .and cannot support a separate housing wing for inmates
who identify as transgender. ( at ¶ 8). More importantly, it is crucial to recognize that it
is the Parish of Jefferson, and not the JPSO – neither of which are defendaIdn.ts in this lawsuit

–II . that iSsu rmesmpoanrsyi bJuled fgomr tehnet c Sotnasntdruacrtdion and maintenance of the JPCC. ( at ¶ 9).

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as toC ealnotye mx Caoterrpi.a vl .f aCcatt raentdt that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)). “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party
Id.
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” A party moving for summary judgment bears the
initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those
portions of the record, discovery, Iadn. d any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is
no genuine issue of material fact. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden, then the
nonmoving party must use evidencIed c. ognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact. at 324.
A genuine issue oSfe em Aantedreiraslo fna cvt. eLxiibsetrst iyf aL orbebays,o Innacb.le jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Id. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
substantive law identifies which facts are material. Material facts are not genuinely
disputed when a rational trier ofS feaec Mt caotusuldsh nitoat Efilnedc. fIonrd tuhse. Cnoo. nvm. Zoevniinthg Rpaadrtiyo uCporopn. a review
of the record takenE qausa al wEmhopl'et . O pportunity Comm'n v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986); , 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th
Cir. 2014). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions,” “conclusory allegations,” andS meee Arenldye crsoolonrable

factual bases areH ionpspuefrfi cvi.e Fnrta tnok defeat a motion for summary judgment. , 477
U.S. at 249-50; , 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on aS eseu Dmemltaar &y
jPuidneg mLeanntd mCoot. iov.n ,N aa ctioounrwt imdea yA ngoritb ruessionlevses cIrnesd. iCboi.lity issues or weigh evidence.
, 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
Further, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate
inferences bSeaes eTdo loann t vh. eC eovttiodnence in the light most favoraDbalen tieol st hve. Cpiatyr toyf oAprplinogsitnogn summary
judgment. , 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); , 246 F.3d
500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmovant “when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted
Little v. Liquid Air Corp.
evidencLeu ojafn c ovn. Ntraatd'li cWtoilrdyl iffaec Ftse.d” ' n , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citing , 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute, the nonmovant
must articulate specific facts and pointS teoe Lsuynpcpho rPtrinopgs, .,c Ionmc.p ve. tPeontto emvaidc eInncse. Ctoh. aotf mIlla.y be
presented in a form admissible at trial. , 140

F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(M2)a.t s Suushchit afacts must create
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” , 475 U.S. at 586.
When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the
moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essenStieael
eCleelmoteenxt of the nonmovant's claim in order to satisfy its summary judgment burden.
, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial
that couldSe seu Lpitptolert a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be
gIIrIa. ntedL. a w and An, 3a7ly Fs.i3sd at 1075-76.

There are numerous reasons why Defendants should be granted summary judgment,
2
w hich aAr.e outlPinlaedin btieflfo Fwa.il s to Assert Specific Claims Against Individual Defendants

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege any facts specific to any Defendant in
support of any of his claims. It is well established that “plaintiffs may not lump Defendants

pro se
2 Estelle
Throughout this Order and Reasons, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended
Complaint liberally. “A docume inbti dfi.led pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ Ericks,o 4n2 v9. UPa.Sr.,d auts 106, 97 S.Ct. 285,
and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ (internal quotation marks omitted).” , 551 U.S. 89, 94,
127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007).
together, without specifying separate factual allegations specific to each Defendant, as
‘referring to the Defendants collectively prevents the Court from drawing the inference that
[one individual Defendant] personallMy i(xoorn avn. yP oohtlhmear ninndividual Defendant) acted with
subjective deliberate indifference.’” , Civ. A. No. 20-1216, 2021 WL
6072501, at *9 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 2021). For this reason alone, the Court can render summary

judgmeBn.t in faPvloari noft iDffe’sfe Dndisasnattsi. sfaction With his Classification Is Not a Complaint of
Constitutional Dimension

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a claim that he was misclassified and housed
improperly in administrative segregation as opposed to general population due to his
gender, Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under the Constitution.
“Classification of inmates in Louisiana is a dWutoyo odfs tvh. eE d[jwaialerdr]s and an inmate has no
right to a particular classification under state law.” , 51 F.3d 577, 581-582
(5th Cir. 1995). "Inmates have no protectable property or liberty interest in custodial
classification. The classification of prisoners is a matter within the discretion of prison
officials. Absent an abuse of discretion, federal Wcohuirttles ya rve. Hlouantthe to interfere with custodial
classifications established abbyr opgraistoend oonff ioctihaelsr. "g r ounds by Booth ,v 1. C5h8u Fr.n3edr 882, 889 (5th Cir.
1998) (caitcactoiornd sJ oonmeist tve.d R),o ach , 532 U.S. 732, 735
(2001);W ilkerson v. Stalder , No. 05-60530, 2006 WL 2474746, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 28,
2006); , 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not sufficient for Plaintiff
to claim that he was not classified in the group of his choice. Custodial classification is not a
constitutional right.
It is also uncontested in this case that Plaintiff was referred to administrative
segregation for his safety as well as the safe and orderly operation of the JPCC. (Rec. doc. 45-
19 at ¶ 6). Silbernagel was within his rights to make the classification decision he made and
this CouCr. t willP nloati ndtisiftfu’sr bF aiti.l ure-to-Protect Claim Also Fails

“[T]he State owes the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmatHeas rwe ivt.h C ibtya soifc Chourmintahn,
nMeiessd.s, including . . . protection from harm, during their confinement.”
, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th 1996). Thus, regardless of whether the inmate is a pretrial
detainee or a convicted prisoner, the standard of liability is the same for episodic acts or
omissions of jail officials that expose aHna imnmiltaotne vto. L byeoinnsg harmed by another inmate, such as
tHhaorsee alleged by Plaintiff in this case. , 74 F.3d 99, 104 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996);
, 74 F.3d at 650.

In this case, what is at issue is PlaiSnetei fLf’esa Cl ovn. sWtiitluetsional right to be protected from
violence at theF haarnmdesr ovf. aBnroetnhnear ninmate. , 734 F. App'x 905, 909 (5th Cir.
2018) (citing , 511 U.S. 825, H8a3r3e-34 (1994)) (discussing the prison
officials' duty to protect inmates and detainees); , 74 F.3d at 650. To state a Section
1983 failure-to-protect claim, Plaintiff must allege that “he was incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious Johnaersm v. Garnedn inthgeart prison officials were
deliberately indiffereNnte wtot ohnis vn.e Bedla fcokr protection.” , 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th
Cir. 1999) (quoting , 133 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 1998)). To satisfy the

deliberate indifference element, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants “(1) were aware
of facts from which an inference of an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety could
bReo gderrasw vn. B aonadt r(i2g)h tthat they actually drew an inference that such potential for harm existed.”
, 709 F.3d 403, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, Plaintiff must allege that the
official not only knew of and dFiasrremgearrded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety but that
he also drew that inference. Brewst,e 5r1 v1. DUr.Se.t kaet 837. The risk of assault cannot be just any

risk but must be “excessive.” , 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009). This is
Abedcaamuesse v“.[ Ppe]rrieszon officials are not . . . expected to prevent all inmate-on-inmate violence.”
, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003).
An inmate pursuing a claim for failure to protect may prove it by showing that the
defFeanrdmanetrs knew of a specific threat to him but failed to take measures to protect him from
it. , 511 U.S. at 843. In the absence of a specific threat, an inmate may prove a claim
of failureJ oton epsr ov.t eDcita imf hoen dcan show that he was placed in a porviesrornu leendv oirno ontmheern gt r“owuhnedrse b tye rIrnot’rl
rWeiogondsw.”o rkers of Am., AFL-,C 6IO36 a nFd.2 idts 1 L3o6c4a l( N5toh. 5 C-i3r7. 61 9v8. C1h)a, mpion Intern. Carp.

, 790 F.2d 1174
(5th Cir. 1986). This situation arises in a jail or prison where officials alloSwto k“ae sp ve.r Dvealsciavme rbirsek
of harm” and “fail[ ] to take reasonable steps to prevent the known risk.” ,
710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding liability when the sheriff housed college students
arrested on a non-violent misdemeanor charge with a dozen inmates charged with violent
felonies – leading to the students' severe beating and rape). “[I]t does not matter whether
the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a
prisoner faces excessive risk of atFtaarcmk eforr reasons personal to him or because all prisoners

in his situation face such a risk.” , 511 U.S. at 843. Negligence, however, on the part
of the prison officials does not rise to the level of a Section 1983 claim for deliberate
indifference; nor does aSnee o Tffhicoimalp'ss ofani lvu. rUep tsoh uarl lCenvtiayt.,e T ae xs.ignificant risk that he should have
Dpeormceinivoe vd., Tbeuxt. dDide pn'ot to. f Crim. Just. , 245 F.3d 447,J 4yn5e9s ( v5.t hO rCliera. n2s0 0P1a)r;.
Sheriff's Off. , 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001); report and
recommenda, tNioon. CadVo 2p5te-d1062, 2026 WL 790897, at *7-8 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2026),

, No. CV 25-1062, 2026 WL 194103 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2026)
In this lawsuit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet this stringent burden
of proof. There are no facts pleaded, nor any evidence adduced, from which the Court could
draw an inference that any Defendant was aware of and deliberately disregarded a
substantial risk of serious harm. The opposite is true. Plaintiff was referred to administrative
segregation to specifically protect him from potential harm. (Rec. doc. 45-19 at ¶ 6). In fact,
in both instances in which Plaintiff complained about harassment by another inmate, JPCC
immediately investigated Plaintiff’s claims and charged the perpetrator with simple battery.

As outlined above, on January 2, 2025, Yakaba Williams was notified that a battery had been
committed in Pod 4DR. (Rec. doc. 45-17). Deputy James Mauk notified Central Control that
Lynn PIda.yne reported that inmate Isaac Williams threw urine on him from the toilet into his
cell. ( ). Surveillance video was reviewed anIdd .showed Williams throwing liquid from his
toilet into Payne’s cell, more than four times. ( ). Payne advised that he wished to pursue
criminal cIhda.rges against Williams, and Williams was charged with Section14:35, Simple
Battery. ( ).
And then, on January 14, 2025, Deputy Hewitt received a call from Deputy Alexander

Godinez, who stated that an inmate on 4D was throwing feces on another inmate (Plaintiff).
(Rec. doc. 45-18). Deputy Hewitt arrived on scenIed a.nd located brown liquid substances on
the floor in front of Cell 5 and on the wall inside. ( ). Officer Godinez informed Hewitt that
while out on his one-hour shower, inmate IIsda.ac Williams was seen by officer Godinez
thIdr.owing feces into the cell of Inmate Payne. ( ). Video surveillance captured the incident.
( ). PaynIed w. ished to pursue charges and Williams was charged with Section 14:35, simple

battery. ( ). The officers responded appropriately to Plaintiff’s concerns and charged
William with a state crime. That is far from deliberate indifference. Moreover, there is no
allegation that Plaintiff suffered any injury due to these two incidents. Absent a “physical
injury resulJtoinnge sf rvo. Gmr etnhien gperrison officials' purported failure to psreoet eJycnt,e” sa failure to protect
claim fails. , 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999); , 2026 WL 790897,
at *10. D P.l aintiPffl’sa ifnaitliufrf’es- tEoq-upraol tPercot tcelacitmio mn uCslat ifmail.

It also appears that Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Equal Protection Clause because

he is transgender. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “commands
that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
wDuhaicrhte i vs . eCsistye notfi Lalelwy ias vdililree, cTteioxn. that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
Wood v,. C8o5l8li eFr.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); , 836 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2016).
To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrDautae rttheat “two or
more classifications of similarly situated persons were treated differently.” , 858 F.3d
at 353 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If a suspect class (such Iads. race or

religion) or a fundamental right is implicated, the courts apply “strict scrutiny.” at 353-
54. If not, the courts apply “rational basis review” and will uIpd.hold the classification if it bears
a “rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.” at 354. To establish a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff also must prove “purposBeufuttls dvi. s Mcraimrtiinnation
resulting in a discriminatory effect among persons similarly situated.” Baranow,s 8ki7 v7.
FH.a3rdt 571, 590 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

, 486 F.3d 112, 123 (5th Cir. 2007). The Equal Protection Clause “does not require that
all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distiWncotoiodn made have some
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.” , 836 F.3d 538-39
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff
fails to provide specific allegations to indicate that JPCC officials subjected him to dSisepe aSroantge
av.n Ud nleksnso fwavno Mraebdliec atrle Aadtmmeinn.t due to his LGBTQ status, including his gender identity.
, No. SA-22-CV-01144-XR, 2023 WL 2386892, at *2 (W.D. Tex.

Mar. 6, 2023) (holding that detainee's general allegations that he was subjected to different
treatment based on his LGBTQ statusS oflaisil to indicate how he was treated differently or
otherwise show disparate treatment); , 2021 WL 3434991, at *7 (holding that “the Court
need not consider . . . for purposes of screening” conclusory allegations of discrimination
based on inmate's transgender status). Plaintiff otherwise fails to show that he waSso tnhge
victim of intentional and purposeful discrimination due to his LGBTQ or gender status. ,
3
2023 WL 2386892, at *4. Conclusory allegations do not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden here.

3
Because the Court dismissed any potential federal claims on the aforementioned grounds, it need not reach
Defendants’ additional argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
E. State-Law Claims

While it is unclear from both the Original and Amended Complaints, Plaintiff may also
seek to assert similar claims under state law. To the extent that he does, the Court will
address them below.
Under Louisiana law, “[a] penal institution is not an insurer of an inmSeaet eP aargkaeinr svt.

aSttatatceks by other inmates. The standard iWs itlhliaatm osf rve. aSstoantea bTlher ooru gohrd Dineapr’ty ocfa rCeo.”r r .
, 282 So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1973); , 351 So. 2d
1273, 1273-74 (La. Ct. App. 1977)). More specifically, “in order to hold the penal authorities
liable for an injury inflicted upon an inmate by another inmate, the authorities must know or
have reasonW tioll aianmtiscipate that harm will ensue and fail to use reasonable care in preventing
the harm.” , 351 So. 2d at 1274. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, “we must
determine whether the penal authorities . . . had reasonable cause to anticipate harSmta ttoe
epxla rienlt. iJfaf caknsdo,n if v s.o P, hwehlpesther they failed to use reasonable care in preventing such harm.”

, 672 So. 2d 665, 667 (La. 1996).
This standard is not met when the defendant was not aware of a rSistka tteh erxe arteel.n Jiancgk sthone
pv.l aPinhetilfpf sor someone closely associated with the plaintiff. For example, in
, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendants were not liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries because they “had no reasonable cause to anticipate harm to plaintiff.” 672
So. 2d 66 I5d., 667 (La. 1996). In that case, the plaintiff was attacked unexpectedly by a fellow
inmate. at 667. The court noted that the attack occurred without warning to the plaintiff
or to prison officials, that the plaintiff never notified the institution that he was afraid of

being attacked by his assailant, and that the evidence indicated that no one expected any
Id. see also Williams
hostility between the two inmates. ; , 351 So. 2d at 1273 (holding that
prison was not negligent when officials “had no forewarning of any danger to the plaintiff,
and no one anticipated or foresaw any difficulty between the plaintiff” and his assailant).
Here, the record reflects that no JPCC official knew of a specific risk of harm to Plaintiff other
than Plaintiff’s reports, which were addressed immediately and appropriately. (Rec. docs.

45-17, 45-18). Plaintiff never notified Defendants in advance that he feared that Williams
might throw feces or urine into his cell. There was simply no forewarning. Plaintiff’s state-
law claiFm. s fareP lnaoi nbteitftfe’sr Othpapno hsiist ifoenderal claims.

Plaintiff’s general overarching complaint in his opposition is that there are still
genuine issues of disputed fact in this lawsuit. This Court finds that that is not the case. When
the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do Mmaotrseu sthhiatna
sEilmecp. lIyn dshuos.w C oth. va.t Z tehneirteh iRs asdoimo eC omrpet.aphysical doubt as to the materialD feaLctusc. a S ve. eA tl. Refining

Co. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing
, 176 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1949)). In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must
come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Forsyth
v. BarrUnsubstantiated assertions are not competeCnetl ostuemx mCoarrpy. jvu. dCgamtreenttt evidence.
, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing , 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986)). “Summary judgment, to be sure, may be appropriate, even in cases where elusive
concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, . . . if the nonmoving party rests mereKlyr iump ovn.

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”
BancTexas Group, Inc.
, 989 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993). A nonmoving party “cannot
defeat summary judgmeHnat twhaitwh acyo vn.c Bluaszoarnyy allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, oTru ‘ornnelyr
av. scBianytillolra oRfi echviadrednsocen. ’”M ed. Ctr. , 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (additional citation
omitted)).

Plaintiff presents this Court with no evidence to support his claims. He only maintains
that there remain disputed issues of fact. Moreover, the Court finds that the facts that
Plaintiff believes are disputed are not so. Plaintiff states that one of the disputed facts is
whether correctional officials had actual knowledge of repeated feces and urine assaults. In
his Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff complains of only two such incidents, both
of which were viewed by correctional officers over the surveillance video, to both of which
the correctional officers acted efficiently and appropriately, and both of which resulted in a
charge of simple battery to the offending inmate. (Rec. docs. 45-17, 45-18). Plaintiff

complains of no other incident and provides this Court with no evidence to contradict
Defendants’ evidence. As another example, Plaintiff maintains that a disputed fact exists as
to whether officials failed to take reasonablIed m. easures to protect Plaintiff. But the same two
documents cited above prove otherwise. ( ). And, as noted above, there is no allegation –
indeed, no evidence – that Plaintiff forewarned Defendants of any imminent attack by a
fellow inmate. Plaintiff’s complaints are no more than conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation that cannot defeat Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
G. Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Motions

Also before the Court is the Motion for Appointment of Counsel (rec. doc. 50) and the
Motion to Stay Consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively
for Relief Under Rule 56(d), Extension of Time, and Reconsideration of Appointment of
4
Counsel (rec. doc. 51), both of which were filed by Plaintiff.
As to the Motion to Defer, pursuant to Rule 56(d), if a party served with a motion for
summary judgment shows, by affidavit or declaration, that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may (1) defer considering the
motion or deny it, (2) allow the non-moving party time to obtain affidavits or declarations
or to take discovery, or (3) issue any other appropriate order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). To obtain
the protections afforded by Rule 56(d), the party must state specific reasons why it is unable,
wIdi.thout discovery, to present facts necessary to oppose the motion for summary judgment.

In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that he had
requested surveillance footage and reports but appears to imply that he never received
them. The Court finds that that is not the case. Indeed, on March 4, 2026, Plaintiff was
provided with a copy of both the police reports in question for the incidents of which Plaintiff
complains. (Rec. doc. 49-1).
Further, on March 27, 2026, a Dropbox link containing the relevant video footage was
sent to Plaintiff via the Ward en’s Office at Dixon Correctional Institute. (Rec. doc. 49-2). On
4
Plaintiff also filed a second opposition to the motion for summary judgment (rec. doc. 52) – far beyond the
deadline to do so. While the Court – giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt – reviewed the opposition, it does
not change the Court’s conclusion that summary judgment is warranted here.
Monday April 13, 2026, Molly Maxwell with the Office of the Warden at Dixon Correctional
Institute confirmed via email that Plaintiff had viewed the video and was asking if the videos
had been provided to the clerk’s office. (Rec. doc. 49-3).
Moreover, Plaintiff has never served Defendants with formal discovery and does not
allege that he has. Yet Defendants provided the video and the reports. Plaintiff was provided

with all the records attached to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which included
classification records, the only grievance filed during his period of incarceration, and all
appeal board decisions. Plaintiff’s motion is unwarranted and fails.
As to the motion to appoint counsel – and subsequent motion to reconsider that
5
appointment of counsel – the Court recognizes that its power to “appoint counsel” is derived
from 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), which provides that the “court may request an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel.” PlainSteieff Chaasst onne ivth. Seer aar sc,o Rnosetibtuuctiko n&a Cl on.or an
automatic right to appointed counsel in a civil case. , 556
F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977). Unlike a criminal defendant, an indigent civil rights litigant,
even if currently incarceratSeede, Ndoorteosn nv.o Et .Uh. aDviem aaz arniaght to appointed counsel absent
“Aekxacseikpeti vo.n Failt zcpiracturmickstances.” Vi,t 1u2g2 v .F M.3edr i2t8 S6y,s 2. P9r3o (t5etchti oCnir B. 1d9.97);
, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994); , Civ.
A. No. 01-3297, 2002 WL 1216023 (E.D. La. June 4, 2002). Indeed, the federal court has
cSoeen sSiadlemraobnl ev .d Cisocrrpeutsio Cnh irni sdtie tIenrdmepin. iSncgh owohl eDthisetr. to make such an appointment in a civil case.
, 911 F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1990). The

5
The Court cannot find evidence on the docket sheet that Plaintiff has ever sought counsel before the instant
pleading.
Court has discretion to appoSeinet Ucolmuenrs evl. iCnh sauncche lal ocrase if doing so would advance the proper
aSadlmmionnistration of justice. , 691 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1982);
, 911 F.2d at 116Se6e. CTahset opnlaintiff bears the burden of persuasion as to the necessity of
such an appointment. , 556 F.2d at 1310.
The evidence which must be adduced includes

(1) plaintiff's indigence and
(2) efforts made to secure counsel.
However, these are bare minimum threshold considerations. Additionally, the Court
should consider the following factors:
(a) the type and complexity of the case;
(b) whether the indigent is capable of presenting his case adequately;
(c) whether he is in a position to investigate his case adequately; and
(d) whether the evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony
so as to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross-
Parker v. Carpeexnatemrination. Ulmer

, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992); , 691 F.2d at 213. The Court
also considers whether appointment of counseIld w. ould be of service to the court and the
defendant by sharpening the issues in the case.
Having reviewed the pleadings related to the motion for summary judgment, this
Court has concluded that summary judgment should be granted to Defendants. Plaintiff has
demonstrated that he was able to enunciate the facts underlying his Section 1983 claim, and
the Court does not find that counsel would be of assistance to it at this stage of the
proceedings. Plaintiff has received discovery from Defendants – despite never formally
propounding discovery on them – and the Court does not find that an attorney would be able
to uncover any more discovery to further Plaintiff’s claims. There are no exceptional
circumstances here, and any appointment of counsel now is unwarranted.
IV. Conclusion

FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons,

that the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56 filed
by Defendants Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III, Deputy Chief Sue Ellen Monfra, Jefferson Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) Sergeant Christian Silbernagel, JPSGOR CAaNpTtaEinD Bryan Bordelon, JPSO
Major Edward Olsen, anDdI SJPMSIOS SLEieDu WtenITaHnt PCRhEriJsU MDoICrrEis is , and Plaintiff’s claims
againstI DTe IfSe FnUdaRnTtsH aErRe ORDERED .
that Motion for Appointment of Counsel (rec. doc. 50) and
the Motion to Stay Consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or
Alternatively for Relief Under Rule 56(dD)E, NEIxEtDension of Time, and Reconsideration of
Appointment of Counsel (rec. doc. 51)5 tahre . August

New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of______________________, 2026.

__________________________________________
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11413204. Public record. Not legal advice.