# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Florida · August 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11413189

## Case

- **Full name:** Jose Ramon Lopez Regueiro v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division
Case Number: 25-25575-CIV-MORENO
JOSE RAMON LOPEZ REGUEIRO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DELTA AIRLINES, INC,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Delta Air Lines’ Motion to Dismiss
and Claim of Unconstitutionality (D.E. 16), filed on April 28, 2026. THE COURT having
considered the motion, the response in opposition, the reply, oral arguments from both parties,
pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is
ADJUDGED that the Motion is DENIED. As explained below, Plaintiff Jose Ramon Lopez
Regueiro sufficiently alleged ownership of a claim to the José Marti International Airport and
trafficking by Defendant Delta Airlines since before December 1961, which is sufficient to state a
claim. Plaintiff asserts this claim pursuant to Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, in which Congress
created a private cause of action. The Court declines Delta’s invitation to find the Act
unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jose Ram6én Lopez Regueiro filed this suit against Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.
pursuant to Title II of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (the “Helms-Burton Act”
or the “Act”), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6081-6085. The Helms-Burton Act provides United States

nationals who hold a claim to property that was confiscated by the communist Cuban government
with a private cause of action against persons who have “trafficked” in such property. 22 U.S.C. §
6082(a). Plaintiff is a U.S. national who claims ownership of the José Marti International Airport,
the property that was confiscated by the Cuban government in or around May 1959. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant violated the Helms-Burton Act when it trafficked in the property by using
the Airport to transport passengers. Plaintiffs allegations are summarized as follows.
Plaintiff's father, Jose Lopez Vilaboy, owned a company—Compafiia de Aeropuertos
Internacionales, S.A. (““CAISA”)—which purchased the José Marti Airport from Pan American
Airways on November 14, 1952. Compl. at § 21; 435. After the purchase, Plaintiff alleges that his
father modernized the airport, built it out, and named it the José Marti Airport. Jd. Then, in or
around May 1959, the Cuban regime confiscated the Airport and CAISA, thus stealing the airport
from his father—Vilaboy—who was its rightful owner. Jd. at § 22. His father then fled Cuba. Jd.
To this day, the Cuban government maintains possession and control of the Airport. Jd. at § 24.
Jose Lopez Vilaboy, Plaintiff's father, died intestate in Miami Beach, Florida on March 2,
1989. Compl. at { 27. According to Plaintiff, when his father died, ownership of CAISA and the
Airport passed to him through intestate succession. Jd. A Florida probate court declared Plaintiff
the heir of one-half of his father’s estate in an order on November 30, 2010. Id. at J 27, n.9; see
also Plaintiff's Response at 10. Plaintiff also alleges that he owns 100% interest in CAISA and the
Airport, and he has been in possession of all CAISA’s paper shares since his father left Cuba.
Compl. at J 26, § 28.
Defendant Delta has transported passengers to and from the José Marti International
Airport since before December 1, 1961, and continues to do so today. Compl. at 35. Therefore,
Plaintiff alleges Defendant has known that his father, through CAISA, was the Airport’s owner

and that the Cuban government confiscated the Airport in 1959. And since the Helms-Burton Act

was passed in 1996, Defendant has been on notice that trafficking in the Airport would subject it
to liability. Id. at Plaintiff also alleges that he put Defendant on notice on July 22, 2019, when
he informed Defendant of his intent to commence an action unless it immediately ceased
trafficking at the Airport. Jd. at § 37. But Defendant has continued to use the Airport, allegedly,
without authorization. Jd, 9 39. And Defendant allegedly injured Plaintiff because it has never
paid any compensation or indemnification to Plaintiff for its allegedly unlawful trafficking at the
Airport. Id. at { 40.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant a motion to dismiss a pleading if the pleading fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be
granted only when the pleading fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The pleading must contain more than labels, conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action, and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Jd. The
“(factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that the plausibility
standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).
A court ruling on a motion to dismiss must accept the well-pled factual allegations as true
and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850
(11th Cir. 2017). But the court need not accept as true allegations upon information and belief that

;

lack sufficient facts to make the allegations plausible. Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2013) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551, 557). The court also need not accept legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations. Diverse Power, Inc. v. City of LaGrange, Ga., 934 F.3d 1270, 1273
(11th Cir. 2019). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when, on the basis of a dispositive
issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Allen v.
USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act creates a private cause of action. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1).
It states: “any person that ... traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government
on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to
such property.” Id. § 6082(a)(1)(A). A person “traffics” in confiscated property” if, among other
things knowingly and intentionally “engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise
benefiting from confiscated property,” or “participates in, or profits from, trafficking . .. by another
person, or through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who
holds a claim to the property.” Jd. § 6023(13)(A). To result in liability, the trafficking must have
taken place after November 1, 1996 (three months after the effective date of the Act, which was
August 1, 1996). See id. § 6085(a).
In this case, to state a claim, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege: (1) the property at issue—
the José Marti International Airport—was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after January
1, 1959; (2) Plaintiff Lépez Regueiro was a U.S. national when he commenced this action; (3)
Plaintiff owns a claim to the airport; (4) Plaintiff acquired his interest in the airport before March
12, 1996; and (5) Defendant Delta Airlines trafficked in the property after November 1, 1996.

Defendant Delta argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged ownership of a claim to
the confiscated property, that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged trafficking, and that the Act’s
creation of a private cause of action is unconstitutional. The Court addresses each argument in
turn.

I. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleged Ownership of a Claim to the José Marti
International Airport
a. Plaintiff acquired his claim in time
To bring suit, Plaintiff must have acquired his claim to the airport before March 12, 1996.
22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B). That provision includes acquiring the claim by inheritance. Garcia-
Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 57 F.4th 916, 931 (11th Cir. 2023). The Eleventh Circuit also
clarified in Garcia-Bengochea that to “acquire” means to “gain possession or control of; to get or
obtain.” Jd. at 930. Plaintiff advances two alternative theories of acquisition. The Court determines
that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged acquisition of a claim based on possession of paper shares.
i. Possession of CAISA shares
Plaintiff argues that since his father left Cuba, Plaintiff □□□ owned a claim to the airport via
possession of paper shares of CAISA. Plaintiff alleges that his father’s company, CAISA, owned
the Airport at the time of confiscation, and that Plaintiff has been in possession of all CAISA’s
shares since his father left Cuba. He also alleges that he is the owner of 100% interest in CAISA
and the airport.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s possession of CAISA shares is irrelevant because he did
not plead that possession of the shares conferred ownership. In fact, Defendant submits that he
pleaded the opposite: that ownership did not pass to Plaintiff until his father’s death in 1989.
Further, Defendant argues that when the Cuban government confiscated the airport and the
company from Vilaboy, the paper shares became “meaningless” because Vilaboy no longer

possessed ownership of the company or the Airport. Defendant posits that Vilaboy only retained a
claim for compensation, which he did not relinquish or transfer to Plaintiff.
The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that even without direct ownership, shareholders at
the time of confiscation can assert claims based on confiscation of the corporate property.
Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine, LTD., 135 F 4th 939, 949-50 (11th Cir. 2025). The court reasoned
that the Helms-Burton Act protects those who had an interest in the confiscated property, even if
they did not own the property itself. Jd. In turn, this Court finds that even if possession of the shares
did not confer ownership to Plaintiff, as an alleged shareholder of the company Plaintiff may have
a claim under the Act.
While recognizing the Cuban regime’s confiscations were wrongful, the Helms-Burton Act
acknowledges the confiscations were effective and terminated property ownership. Those that had
property interests at the time of confiscation did not retain ownership of the property but only a □
claim to the confiscated property under Title III of the Act. Glen v. Club Mediterranee, S_A., 450
F. 3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). Defendant argues that when ownership of CAISA was
confiscated from Vilaboy, the shareholder interests were also terminated. Therefore, the alleged
transfer of the paper shares from Vilaboy to Plaintiff was ineffective because they belonged to the
Cuban government. Defendant’s argument assumes that Plaintiff obtained the paper shares after
confiscation, which has not yet been determined. Viewing the alleged facts in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, if Plaintiff possessed the paper shares at the time of confiscation, then as
an alleged shareholder of the company Plaintiff may retain a claim under the act. This is a factual
issue that cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.
Even if Plaintiff obtained the paper shares after confiscation, this Court finds that the
possession of the shares themselves may provide Plaintiff with a claim under the Act, so long as

he acquired shareholder status prior to March 12, 1996. The Eleventh Circuit has concluded that a
claim to the confiscated property can be effectively transferred through intestate succession from
a former owner. Garcia-Bengochea, 57 F Ath at 931. This Court has no reason to think the same
is not true for former shareholders. In other words, if a claim can be transferred from a former
owner, so too can a claim be transferred from a former shareholder. Therefore, this Court
concludes that like prior owners of the confiscated property, prior shareholders retain a claim under
Title [JI that can be transferred by possession of paper shares. Accordingly, by pleading possession
of CAISA’s paper shares, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he acquired a claim to the airport
before March 12, 1996.
Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges pre-1996 ownership of a claim to the airport based on his
inheritance of the claim through intestate succession upon the death of his father in 1989. Because
Plaintiffs shares-based theory of acquisition under the Act is sufficient to state a claim, this Court
declines to decide the inheritance issue at this stage in the proceedings.

b. Defendant’s claim to the property does not bar Plaintiff's suit
The Helms-Burton Act recognizes certified and uncertified claims. Certified claims are
those recognized by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission; uncertified claims are not
recognized by the Commission. 22 U.S.C. § 6083(a). This case allegedly involves a plaintiff with
an uncertified claim and a defendant with a certified claim to the same property. Plaintiff disputes
that Defendant owns a certified claim to the airport or any portion of it. Defendant asks this Court
to take judicial notice of a Foreign Claims Settlement Commission decision that Defendant argues
confirms it has a certified claim to the airport. If Defendant has a certified claim, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff's suit is barred under sections 6082 and 6023 of the Act. Similarly, Defendant submits
that Plaintiff's suit is barred under section 6082 because of other certified claims to the Airport.

Preliminarily, the Court must determine whether Defendant has a certified claim to the
property at issue in this suit—the José Marti International Airport. At Defendant’s request, the
Court takes judicial notice of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission decision relating to Delta
under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Defendant argues that because the decision indicates that
Delta maintained an office at the airport, Delta owns a certified claim to at least a portion of the
Airport. Defendant’s Motion at 9. Plaintiff counters that Delta only has a certified claim to the
personal property and funds specifically listed in the decision. Plaintiff's Response at 3. The Court
finds that Delta owns a certified claim to “[p]ersonal property, furniture, etc.,” “[b]ank accounts,”
“Tcjash in several offices,” “[d]eposits with utility companies,” and a “[s]ecurity deposit on a lease”
for an office in Havana worth “$212,396.08.” Defendant’s Motion (Exhibit B). However, it is not
clear to the Court that Delta retains a certified claim to any portion of the Airport itself. That
question remains unresolved and requires further development of the record. Accordingly, the
Court declines to resolve Defendant’s legal arguments regarding §§ 6082 and 6023 of the Act until
a later stage in the proceedings. That said, the Court advises the parties that based on the record as
it stands, the Court is inclined to conclude that Delta does not have a certified claim to the Airport
or any portion of it.
At Defendant’s request, the Court also takes judicial notice of the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission decision related to Starwood Hotels. The Court finds that Starwood Hotels
owns a certified claim to three tracts of land and a bank account. This includes a tract that is
“425,000 square meters of land adjacent to the airport” that the Cuban government seized “for
extension of the airport runway.” Defendant’s Motion (Exhibit C). This suggests that Starwood
Hotels has a certified claim to land that was adjacent to the Airport. But again, it is not clear

whether Starwood Hotels owns a certified claim to any portion of the property at issue in this suit.
That question remains unresolved and requires further development of the record.

II. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleged Trafficking
To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege that Defendant trafficked
in the confiscated property. A person “traffics in confiscated property” if, among other things, that
person knowingly and intentionally “engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise
benefiting from confiscated property,” or “participates in, or profits from, trafficking . . . by another
person, or through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who
holds a claim to the property.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13).
a. Scienter: “Knowingly and Intentionally”
Preliminarily, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that Defendant “engage[d] in a commercial
activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property.” Plaintiff alleges that since the
airport was confiscated, Defendant has used the airport for “daily business dealings” between Delta
and the Cuban government without authorization. Compl. § 24. Specifically, Delta has allegedly
“solicited and sold reservations and operated passenger flights to and from the [aJirport” and
provided services for Floridians to “travel and send mail, excess baggage and cargo to the
[ajirport.” Jd. at J] 25, 31-32, 36-41.
Plaintiff also sufficiently pleads that Defendant’s conduct was “knowing and intentional.”
Plaintiff allegés that his father’s ownership, through CAISA, of the airport prior to its confiscation
is “well-known and widely publicized, particularly within the airline industry.” Compl. § 35. And
Delta has known as much, because of its “long history of flight operations in Cuba, including to
and from the [a]irport now and before December 1, 1961. Jd. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant has “been on notice” that flying to and from the Airport would result in liability since

the Act’s passage in 1996 and President Clinton’s statements saying so. Jd. at { 36. Plaintiff also
alleges that Plaintiff “informed [Delta] of his intent to commence an action unless they
immediately ceased to traffic in the [a]irport” on July 22, 2019. Id. at ¢ 37. And Defendant’s
conduct was not authorized by Plaintiff or any other U.S. national, who may have a claim to the
airport. Id. at ¢ 39. The Court acknowledges that some of Plaintiffs allegations regarding
knowledge and intent are conclusory. However, the Plaintiff has provided a sufficient factual basis
to support a reasonable inference that Delta’s conduct was knowing and intentional, at least since
July 22, 2019. Accepting the Complaint as true and viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, this Court concludes that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged trafficking under the Act.

b. Lawful-travel Exception
Defendant argues that it cannot be liable for trafficking under the Act because it had
authorization to fly to the airport. Defendant asks this Court to apply the lawful-travel exception—
a specific carve out from the definition of “trafficking” for “transactions and uses of property
incident to lawful travel to Cuba.” 22 U.S.C. §6023(13)(B). Defendant posits that the Complaint
only pleads lawful travel and therefore Delta’s activity clearly falls within the exception. To
support this point, Defendant relies on United States Department of Transportation Orders
authorizing Delta flights to the airport. Defendant’s Motion at 15-16. At Defendant’s request, the
Court takes judicial notice of the Department’s Orders under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. In so
doing, the Court finds that in 2016 the Department gave Delta authorization to fly three times per
day to the José Marti International Airport, then added an additional flight, and confirmed the
authorization for all four flights in 2018. Defendant’s Motion (Exhibits A, E, & F).
Both parties agree that the lawful-travel exception is an affirmative defense. This Court has
previously indicated that as such, the defendant bears the burden of proving the lawful-travel

“10

exception and the plaintiff need not “plead around” it. Rivero v. Expedia Group, Inc., No. 19-
22629-CIV, 2023 WL 12039284, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2023). Because Defendant bears the
burden of proof, a motion to dismiss cannot be granted based on an affirmative defense unless the
defense is apparent on the face of the Complaint. Defendant’s Motion at 15 (citing Wells v. Brown,
58 F.4th 1347, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)). Defendant suggests that is the case here, and
to permit the case to proceed would raise due process concerns and entitle every plaintiff to a
fishing expedition. Defendant’s Reply at 8-9. That is not so.
This Court finds that a decision regarding the lawful-travel exception is premature on the
instant motion to dismiss. Defendant has not proven that the lawful-travel exception is apparent
from the record before the Court. Even considering the Department of Transportation’s Orders,
that question remains unresolved.
I. The Helms-Burton Act is Constitutional
Defendant argues that the Helms-Burton Act is unconstitutional because Congress
delegated legislative powers to the President, thus undermining separation of powers, a
fundamental constitutional principle. Defendant’s Motion at 17; Defendant’s Reply at 9 (citing
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). Title HI of the Act created a private
cause of action. Congress included a suspension provision that gives the President authority to
suspend and reinstate the private cause of action without approval from Congress. 22. U.S.C. §
6085. Defendant submits that suspension or reinstatement of the private cause of action amounts
to an amendment to the Act and creation of a private cause of action. But creating a private cause
of action is a uniquely legislative act. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (“the
Supreme Court has long-recognized that ‘private rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress’”). So, Defendant’s argument is that because the suspension provision allows

11

the President to create a private cause of action, the Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to the President. In a footnote, Defendant also argues that the suspension
provision violates the Presentment Clause by “permitting the President to effectively amend the
Act without satisfying the Constitution’s ‘finely wrought’ procedures.” Defendant’s Motion at 18,
n.10 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524, U.S. 417, 439-40, 447 (1998)).
Further, Defendant argues that the suspension provision cannot be severed because there
is “strong evidence” that the Act would not have been enacted without it. Defendant’s Motion at
18 (citing Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 234 (2020) (“When
Congress has expressly provided a severability clause, [the Court] will “presume that Congress
did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally
offensive provision ... unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
In response, Plaintiff first defends the constitutionality of the Act by arguing that Congress
did not delegate legislative power at all. Plaintiff reasons that Congress created the private cause
of action and the President merely has authority to temporarily suspend enforcement of the statute,
which is clearly within the purview of the executive branch. Plaintiffs Response at 19 (citing
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. MoneyLion Techs. Inc.,799 F. Supp. 3d 152, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)).
Congress gave the President the power to implement a law, not enact it. Jd. at 20. Next, Plaintiff
submits that if the Court finds that Congress delegated legislative power to the President, the Court
should not find that the delegation violates the nondelegation doctrine because Congress supplied
a sufficient intelligible principle. Jd at 18-20; see also Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n v. Consumers’
Rsch., 606 U.S. 656, 672 (2025). Specifically, Congress provided the President with a “general
policy” to pursue—advancing national interests—and “boundar|ies]”—limiting suspension to six-

12

month periods, only upon specified finding�, and with advance written notice to Congress. Id. at
19-20.
This Court concludes that Congress did not delegate legislative power to the President. The

suspension provision gives the President authority to execute the law, which is a quintessentially
executive power. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (noting that authority to enforce the laws is
an executive function and distinguishable from legislative power). Finding no delegation of
legislative power, the Court need not address the nondelegation doctrine. Additionally, this Court
finds that the President's suspension and reinstatement of a private cause of action-that Congress
created-is merely an implementation of the law. It does not amount to repealing and amending a
law, which would implicate the Presentment Clause. To say otherwise, Defendant relies on the
Court's analysis in Clinton v. City ofN ew York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
In Clinton, the President had exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act to cancel

one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997. Clinton v. City ofN ew York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The issue before the Court was whether
the cancellation procedures set forth in the Line Item Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause.
Id. at 421. The Court held that the cancellations pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act violate the
Presentment Clause because they "are the functional equivalent of partial repeals of Acts of
Congress." Id. at 444. The Court declined to determine whether the Act violated separation of
powers principles. Id. at 447-48. ("the only issue we address concerns the 'finely wrought'
procedure commanded by the Constitution" (citation omitted)).
Clinton is distinguishable from the case before this Court for three reasons. First, in

Clinton, the President cancelled provisions in two bills based on authority given to him in a
separate legislative act. Here, the President suspends a cause of action based on authority given to
him in the same legislative act that created the cause of action. Second, in Clinton, the President
cancelled provisions in legislative spending bills. It is well-settled that the legislature retains the
power of the purse-the power to control budgets and funding. Here, the President has the

authority to suspend and reinstate a private cause of action. The presidential action here is
different in kind to that of the President in Clinton, it does not encroach on a uniquely legislative
power. In fact, it is a clear exercise of the executive's power of the sword-to enforce the laws
made by Congress. Third, in Clinton, the President cancelled provisions for good, without
limitation. Here, the President has limited authority to suspend the private cause of action for six
months at a time and only if the President gives Congress notice, determines that the suspension
is "necessary to the national interests of the United States, and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba." 22 U.S.C. § 6085. These guidelines affirm that the provision gave the
President the ability to execute the law in a manner consistent with Congressional intent.

Accordingly, this Court upholds the Helms-Burton Act as constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the elements of a Title III claim: (1)
the Cuban government confiscated the airport on or after January 1, 1959; (2) Plaintiff Regueira
was a United States national when he sued; (3) Plaintiff has a claim to the airport through his
possession of CAISA shares; (4) Plaintiff acquired his interest in the airport before March 12,
1996; and (5) Delta Airlines trafficked in the airport by transporting passengers to and from the
airport after November 1, 1996.
For the reasons explained above, it is
1. ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 16) is DENIED.

2. It is further a ADJUDGED that Defendant shall file an answer to Plaintiffs Complaint no
later than August 24, 2026.
ye
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 2 of August 2026.

ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11413189. Public record. Not legal advice.