# Jones

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · July 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11413058

## Case

- **Full name:** Laveal David Jones v. United States of America
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** July 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

LAVEAL DAVID JONES, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-00648-SRC
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
Respondent. )

Memorandum and Order
Laveal David Jones asks the Court to set aside, correct, or vacate his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. He argues that his counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations in two
different ways. First, he claims that counsel failed to challenge the lack of evidence supporting
his carjacking conviction. And second, he claims that counsel failed to challenge his conviction
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j) on double-jeopardy grounds. Having carefully reviewed
the record, the Court holds that Jones has not shown entitlement to relief or an evidentiary
hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
I. Background
A. Factual background
On February 6, 2024, Jones pled guilty to (1) carjacking resulting in death, (2) discharge
of a firearm causing death in furtherance of a crime of violence, and (3) being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Guilty Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Jones, No. 4:22-cr-00594-
SRC-1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2024), doc. 66 (“Crim. doc.”). The facts, as detailed in Jones’s guilty
plea agreement, are as follows:
Prior to October 2022, Defendant had been convicted of second-degree robbery in
violation of Missouri Rev. Stat. § 569.030 in 2019 in 21st Judicial Circuit of
Missouri case number 17SLCR5877-01. As a result of that conviction, Defendant
had actually served a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Consequently,
Defendant, throughout October 2022, knew that he was a convicted felon prohibited
from possessing firearms.

At approximately 1:33 a.m. on October 1, 2022, Defendant, Victim D.J., and
Witness A.S. traveled together to the Oz Night Club in Sauget, Illinois. Security
camera footage depicted the three individuals walking in with one another.
Furthermore, Victim D.J.’s cellular phone data and Defendant’s cellular phone data
corroborate their trip to Oz Night Club.

At approximately 4:10 a.m., Defendant, Victim D.J., and Witness A.S. left Oz
Night Club.

The three traveled in Victim D.J.’s car, which was a 2015 Kia K900 sedan. Based
upon the VIN number, investigators determined that the vehicle was manufactured
in South Korea. Consequently, Victim D.J.’s Kia K900 had been transported in
interstate commerce prior to October 1, 2022.

By approximately 4:21 a.m., Victim D.J.’s cellular phone was near the 4600 block
of Labadie Avenue in St. Louis, Missouri. There, Victim D.J., who was driving his
2015 Kia, let out Witness A.S. Thereafter, only Defendant and Victim D.J.
remained in the Kia.

After letting off Witness A.S., Victim D.J. and Defendant drove approximately 0.5
miles from where they let out Witness A.S. to park in the area of 3015 Walton Place
in St. Louis, Missouri, which is within the Eastern District of Missouri. At some
time while Defendant is in Victim D.J.’s Kia, Defendant confronted Victim D.J.
about money Defendant believed Victim D.J. owed. That confrontation turned into
a physical fight that caused blood from Defendant’s bloody nose to stain Victim
D.J.’s clothing. Defendant then used a firearm belonging to Victim D.J. to fire the
handgun twice. Both shots struck Victim D.J., killing him.

After shooting Victim D.J., Defendant stripped Victim D.J. so that Defendant’s
blood could not be recovered from Victim D.J.’s clothing. Defendant left Victim
D.J.’s unclothed body on the ground outside of the car on Walton Place. Defendant
drove Victim D.J.’s 2015 Kia K900 sedan away, along with Victim D.J.’s clothing.

ShotSpotter, a system that detects the location of gun shots, recorded two gunshots
fired at 4:26 a.m. within an approximate 82-foot radius from 3013 Walton Place,
which encompassed the approximate location of where Victim D.J.’s body was later
found in the street near 3015 Walton Place. Victim D.J.’s cellular phone’s historic
location information revealed that, Victim D.J.’s cellular phone traveled from the
area of the 4600 block of Labadie Avenue at approximately 4:21 a.m. to the area of
3015 Walton Place in St. Louis, Missouri, at approximately 4:24 a.m.
Surveillance video from the area captured a vehicle that stopped in the vicinity of
where Victim D.J. was found, an interior light turned on inside the vehicle, and then
the vehicle left the area. The headlights from another vehicle illuminated the same
spot on the street and a body was seen laying on the street. Thereafter, police were
contacted at 5:46 a.m. to respond to the report of the body lying naked in the street.

By approximately 4:31 a.m., after ShotSpotter detected the two gunshots, Victim
D.J.’s cellular phone locations indicated that it began traveling south from 3015
Walton Place. The cellular phone appeared to stop for several minutes in a
residential area north of Dr. Martin Luther King Drive.

After shooting Victim D.J., Defendant drove Victim D.J.’s Kia to a residence on
St. Ferdinand Avenue in St. Louis, Missouri. There, Defendant gathered a change
of clothes. While in that residence, Defendant requested that one of the occupants
give him lighter fluid. That occupant complied and gave Defendant a plastic bottle
of lighter fluid. After being at the St. Ferdinand residence for a few minutes,
Defendant again left driving Victim D.J.’s Kia.

Shortly after 5:00 a.m. on October 1, 2022, Victim D.J.’s cellular phone location
information indicated that the phone began to travel north and then east ultimately
coming to rest around West Missouri Avenue and North B Street in East Saint
Louis, Illinois. The City of St. Louis License Plate Reader System captured Victim
D.J.’s Kia driving along a route consistent with the location information provided
by Victim D.J.’s cellular phone.

Once Victim D.J.’s cellular phone reached the vicinity of West Missouri Avenue
and North B Street in East Saint Louis, Illinois, Victim D.J.’s cellular phone
remained in this area for several minutes and eventually lost signal at approximately
5:49 a.m.

When Defendant arrived in Victim D.J.’s Kia in the area of West Missouri Avenue
and North B Street in East Saint Louis, Illinois, Defendant doused the Kia with the
lighter fluid he took from the St. Ferdinand residence. Defendant ignited the Kia
before walking back toward the road.

At approximately 6:00 a.m. on October 1, 2022, Defendant contacted an
acquaintance in St. Louis to request a ride. That acquaintance traveled to the
location provided by Defendant in East St. Louis, Illinois. Upon arrival, Defendant
entered the acquaintance’s vehicle wearing blood-stained clothing. The
acquaintance drove Defendant back to St. Louis and parted company with
Defendant later on October 1, 2022.

At approximately 5:51 a.m., the East Saint Louis Fire Department responded to a
car fire on the north side of West Missouri Avenue approximately one hundred
yards past North B Street, the same approximately location where Victim D.J.’s
cellular device last connected to the cellular network. Despite the heavy fire
damage, investigators determined that the vehicle was Victim D.J.’s 2015 KIA
K900.

While law enforcement investigated Victim D.J.’s death, Defendant Jones came to
the attention of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) officers for an
unrelated incident on October 17, 2022.

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on October 17, 2022, Defendant was the driver and sole
occupant of a stolen, gray Kia traveling through St. Louis, Missouri, within the
Eastern District of Missouri. A patrol officer with the SLMPD observed Defendant
violate several traffic signals. After the officers followed Defendant, the officers
saw Defendant wreck the car onto the west curb and then flee on foot towards the
wooded area.

As officers searched for Defendant, the officers observed Defendant exit the
wooded area. After the officers were able to take Defendant into custody for fleeing
a traffic accident, the officers canvased the area where Defendant was seen running.
In the same area where Defendant ran, the officers located a black Smith & Wesson
Shield, which is a firearm that was manufactured outside the State of Missouri.

Crim. doc. 66 at 3–7. (The Court cites to page numbers as assigned by CM/ECF.).
B. Procedural background
1. Criminal proceedings
In October 2022, the FBI filed a criminal complaint against Jones and alleged that he had
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2119 by committing a carjacking. Crim. docs. 1–2. Later that month, a
federal grand jury charged Jones with one count of carjacking resulting in death, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2119; one count of discharge of a firearm causing death in furtherance of a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 924(j); and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Crim. doc. 20. Sixteen months
later, Jones pleaded guilty to all three counts. Crim. docs. 65, 66. He admitted to knowingly
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2119, admitted there was a factual basis for his plea as to that count, and
confirmed that he fully understood the elements of his crime—namely:
1. That he took a motor vehicle from a person;
2. That he did so by means of force and violence;
3. That the motor vehicle had been transported in interstate commerce; and
4. That at the time he took the motor vehicle, he intended to cause death.
Crim. doc. 66 at 2.

He also admitted to knowingly violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 924(j), admitted that
there was a factual basis for his plea as to that count, and confirmed that he fully understood the
elements of his crime—namely:
1. That he committed the crime of carjacking resulting in death as charged in Count
One;

2. That he knowingly discharged a firearm during and in relation to that crime; and
3. That he used the firearm to cause the death of Victim D.J.
Id. Finally, Jones admitted to knowingly violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), admitted that there
was a factual basis for the plea, and confirmed that he fully understood the elements of his
crime—namely:
1. That he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one
year;

2. That, after being released from prison, he knowingly possessed a firearm;
3. That, at the time he knowingly possessed the firearm, he knew he had been convicted
of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year; and
4. That the firearm was transported across a state line at some point during or before his
possession of it.
Id. at 3. Jones also agreed to waive many of his rights. For instance, he agreed to
“waive all rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional, non-sentencing issues, including, but not
limited to, any issues relating to pretrial motions, discovery and the guilty plea, the
constitutionality of the statute(s) to which defendant is pleading guilty and whether defendant’s
conduct falls within the scope of the statute(s).” Id. at 12. Further, he agreed to “waive the right
to appeal all sentencing issues, provided that the Court sentence[d] Defendant to the parties’ joint
recommendation of between 240 and 360 months’ imprisonment.” Id. Finally, Jones agreed to

“waive all rights to contest the conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding,
including one pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, except for claims of
prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.
The United States Probation Officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR).
Crim. doc. 78. The PSR calculated Jones’s total offense level as 40 and his criminal history
category as II. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 57. Based upon that total offense level and criminal history
category, the imprisonment range that the federal guidelines provided was 324 months to 405
months. See id. at ¶ 80.
In February 2024, the district court (the Honorable Ronnie L. White, then a judge of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, now retired) held a plea hearing

at which Jones pleaded guilty to all three counts. Crim. docs. 65–66; crim. doc. 90, Plea Hr’g Tr.
at 23:14–23:17. Jones confirmed that he understood the elements of his crimes:
THE COURT: As to Count One, the elements of the crime are: First,
Defendant took a motor vehicle from a person; Second, the
Defendant did so by means of force and violence; Third, the
motor vehicle had been transported in interstate commerce;
and, Fourth, at the time Defendant took the motor vehicle,
he intended to cause death.

Count Two. The elements of the crime are: First, Defendant
committed the crime of Carjacking Resulting in Death, as
charged in Count One; Second, Defendant knowingly
discharged a firearm in relation to that crime; and, Third,
Defendant used the firearm to cause the death of victim D.J.
As to Count Three, the elements of the crime are: First,
Defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than one year; Second, after that, the
Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; Third, at the time
the Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, he knew he
had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment
of more than one year; and, Fourth, the firearm was
transported across a state line at some point during or before
the Defendant's possession of it.

Do you understand the elements of the charges against you?

[JONES]: Yes, sir.

Crim. doc. 90, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 9:22–10:19.

Jones also confirmed that he committed the actions that the United States laid out in the
guilty plea agreement and during the plea hearing:
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, did you go over those facts carefully with your
lawyers?

[JONES]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is there any disagreement about them?

[JONES]: No, sir.

THE COURT: Did you do those things that were just stated for the record
by Mr. Finlen?

[JONES]: Yes, sir.

Id. at 15:23–16:5.
Finally, Jones affirmed that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorneys, Julie
Clark and Stephanie Zipfel:
THE COURT: You’re here this afternoon with your attorneys, Ms. Clark
and Ms. Zipfel. Have you had enough time to discuss your
case with them?

[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with their representation of you in this
case?

[JONES]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is there anything you felt your attorneys should have done
but did not do in representing you?

[JONES]: No, sir.

Id. at 5:16–5:25.
Three months later, in May 2024, Judge White sentenced Jones to a within-the-guidelines-
range sentence of 360 months on Counts One and Two, and 180 months on Count Three, with all
counts to run concurrently. Crim. doc. 84 at 2. Jones is currently serving his sentence at USP
Beaumont in Texas with a projected release date of October 31, 2048. See Find an inmate, Bureau
of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited July 30, 2026).
2. Civil proceedings
In May 2025, Jones timely filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to section 2255.
See Jones v. United States, No. 4:25-cv-00648-SRC (E.D. Mo. May 6, 2025), doc. 1 (“Civ.
doc.”). He makes two arguments: (1) that his counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the
lack of evidence supporting his carjacking conviction, and (2) that his counsel was ineffective by
failing to challenge his conviction under sections 924(c)(1) and 924(j) as double jeopardy. Civ.
doc. 1 at 4–5. The United States timely filed its response, civ. doc. 3, and Jones failed to file a
reply brief by his original deadline of August 25, 2025, see civ. doc. 2. The Court then granted
Jones an extension of time to file his reply by September 24, 2025. See civ. docs. 4, 6. To date,
however, Jones has not filed his reply in this case. Jones’s motion, civ. doc. 1, is therefore ripe
for the Court’s review.
II. Standard
A. Section 2255
Under section 2255, a federal prisoner “may move the court which imposed [his]
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on the grounds that the court imposed “the

sentence . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). If a
petitioner claims his sentence violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, the petitioner
must establish that the violation constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2003)
(first quoting United States v. Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989); and then citing
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments). Generally, to obtain
section 2255 relief based on a claim, a petitioner must have raised the underlying error on direct
appeal. See Roundtree v. United States, 885 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 2018). If a petitioner

failed to do so, the Court considers the claim procedurally defaulted, rendering it ineffective in
establishing a right to section 2255 relief. See id.
Three exceptions to this general rule exist. First, “if the error is jurisdictional, the error
may be raised on collateral review without being subjected to procedural default analysis.”
United States v. Mooring, 287 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2002). Second, if a petitioner raises a
constitutional claim, the Court does not consider the claim procedurally defaulted if the
petitioner shows cause for the default and actual prejudice. See Anderson v. United States, 25
F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994); Reid v. United States, 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992). This
“cause and prejudice exception does not apply to nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional claims
that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal.” Anderson, 25 F.3d at 706 (first citing
Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1989); and then citing Bontkowski v. United
States, 850 F.2d 306, 313 (7th Cir. 1988)). Finally, the Court “will consider a claimed error that
could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal if the alleged error was a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citing Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam)). This exception, however, “applies only when a petitioner shows by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for an alleged constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have
found the petitioner guilty,” id. at 706–07 (citing Wallace v. Lockhart, 12 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir.
1994)), and extends only to claims of factual innocence, id. at 707 (first citing Narcisse v. Dahm,
9 F.3d 38, 40 (8th Cir. 1993); and then citing Ramey, 8 F.3d at 1314).
If the petitioner’s claims are not procedurally barred, the Court must hold an evidentiary
hearing to consider the claims “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also Shaw
v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing “when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief.” Payne v. United
States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wade v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 306 (8th
Cir. 1986)). However, a court may dismiss a claim without a hearing “if the claim is inadequate
on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.”
Shaw, 24 F.3d at 1043 (citing Larson v. United States, 905 F.2d 218, 220–21 (8th Cir. 1990)).
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
A petitioner may raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for the first time in a
section 2255 motion, even if he could have raised the same claim on direct appeal. Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
petitioner “faces a heavy burden.” DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996)). He must show both that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his case.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United States v. Sera, 267 F.3d 872, 874

(8th Cir. 2001). An attorney’s performance is deficient only if it falls “below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; see also Sera, 267 F.3d at 874.
Two substantial impediments exist to making such a showing. First, “a ‘strong presumption’”
exists “that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Second, “[s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice element in the context of plea negotiations, the
petitioner must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Covington v. United

States, 739 F.3d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
But importantly, “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a
defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Thompson v.
United States, 872 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357,
369 (2017)). Instead, courts should “look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a
defendant’s expressed preferences.” Id. (quoting Lee, 582 U.S. at 369).
III. Discussion
As part of Jones’s guilty plea agreement, he “agree[d] to waive all rights to contest the
conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including one pursuant to . . . Section
2255, except for claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.” Crim.
doc. 66 at 12. Jones raises two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
A. Failing to challenge the lack of evidence supporting the carjacking conviction
Jones argues that his counsel was deficient because she “failed to challenge the
[evidence]”—or rather, the lack thereof—supporting his carjacking conviction. Civ. doc. 1 at 4.

According to Jones, his attorney “erroneously advised [him] to enter a guilty plea,” because “the
nature of the crime [he] committed was not a carjacking,” and there was “no [evidence] in . . .
discovery that support[ed] a carjacking.” Id. At most, Jones posits, “[t]he [evidence] in the
discovery only supports that the [vehicle] was used as a getaway car.” Id.
Although styled as an ineffective-assistance claim, the Court notes that Jones’s argument
also sounds in actual innocence, as he argues that he did not commit a carjacking. See id. The
Court therefore considers both the actual-innocence and ineffective-assistance aspects of Jones’s
first claim.
1. Actual innocence
To establish actual innocence, a petitioner must demonstrate that “in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Bousley
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citation modified). In this regard, “‘actual
innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Id.
The Court finds that, to the extent Jones argues that he is actually innocent of the
carjacking offense, his argument fails. The federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119,
proscribes the taking of a motor vehicle “that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or
by intimidation.” The statute therefore requires the United States to prove that “(1) the defendant
took or attempted to take a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation; (2) the defendant acted with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm; and (3) the motor vehicle involved has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v. Wright, 246 F.3d 1123, 1126 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1998)). And, when “death results”

from the carjacking, the United States must prove this additional element. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119(3) ; cf. United States v. Long Pumpkin, 56 F.4th 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2022) (noting that,
when defendants were charged with carjacking under section 2119(2), “the government was . . .
required to prove an additional element that ‘serious bodily injury’ resulted from the
carjacking”).
At his change-of-plea hearing, Jones agreed under oath that he understood the elements
of the crime of carjacking. See crim. doc. 90, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 9:22–10:19. He also agreed under
oath to the facts as laid out in the plea agreement—namely, that (1) he shot victim D.J. while in
D.J.’s vehicle; (2) after shooting D.J., Jones drove D.J.’s vehicle away; (3) D.J.’s car had
previously been transported in interstate commerce; and (4) D.J. died from the gunshot wounds.

Crim. doc. 66 at 3–7; crim. doc. 90, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 11:7–16:5.
Jones’s argument that he merely used D.J.’s vehicle as a getaway car fails. The Eighth
Circuit has upheld carjacking convictions where a jury could reasonably find that the use of force
preceded the defendant’s complete taking of the vehicle. See Wright, 246 F.3d at 1126–27; Long
Pumpkin, 56 F.4th at 610–12; United States v. Clark, 115 F.4th 895, 898–900 (8th Cir. 2024);
United States v. Myore, 142 F.4th 606, 611–12 (8th Cir. 2025). Here, Jones agreed that he used
physical force and violence on D.J. before driving away with D.J.’s vehicle. See crim. doc. 66 at
4–5; crim. doc. 90, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 12:12–12:17, 13:15–13:17. Jones therefore cannot show
that, “in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (citation modified). Thus, his actual innocence claim
fails.
2. Ineffective assistance
The Court turns now to the ineffective-assistance aspect of Jones’s claim. To establish

ineffective assistance in the context of a guilty plea, Jones must first show that his counsel’s
performance was deficient—i.e., that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Then, Jones must show that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced him—i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Covington, 739 F.3d
at 1090 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
Turning first to the deficient-performance prong, the record belies Jones’s claim that he
was dissatisfied with his counsel in any way. At Jones’s change-of-plea hearing, the Court asked
Jones if he was satisfied with counsel’s representation, to which Jones responded, “Yes, sir.”
Crim. doc. 90, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 5:20–5:22. The Court further asked, “[i]s there anything you felt

your attorneys should have done but did not do in representing you?” Id. at 5:23–5:24. “No,
sir,” Jones replied. Id. at 5:25.
In any event, the Court finds that Jones’s counsel did not fall below an objective standard
of reasonableness. As previously explained, Jones’s admitted conduct satisfies the elements of
the federal carjacking statute. That Jones’s counsel did not object to the lack of evidence
supporting a carjacking conviction was therefore not deficient performance, as this argument
would have been meritless. See Rodriguez v. United States, 17 F.3d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam) (stating that “counsel’s failure to advance a meritless argument cannot constitute
ineffective assistance”).
And, even if Jones’s counsel did fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in not
objecting to the evidence, Jones does not satisfy the prejudice prong. In his motion, he merely
argues that his attorney “erroneously advised [him] to enter a guilty plea.” Civ. doc. 1 at 4. But
nowhere does Jones argue that, but for counsel’s deficiency, he would have insisted on going to

trial. See Covington, 739 F.3d at 1090. Thus, Jones’s first ineffective-assistance claim fails.
B. Failing to challenge the conviction under section 924(c)(1) and 924(j) as
double jeopardy
Second, Jones argues that his counsel “failed to challenge [his] 924(c)(1) conviction and
[his] 924(j) conviction as double jeopardy.” Civ. doc. 1 at 5. This argument fails.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . .
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const.
amend. V. As relevant here, the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against multiple punishments
for the same offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Carrillo, 982 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (8th Cir. 2020).
Jones appears to argue that he received separate convictions (and therefore separate
punishments) under section 924(c) and section 924(j). See civ. doc. 1 at 5. But the record
demonstrates otherwise. The United States charged Jones with a single count (Count Two)
referencing both section 924(c) and 924(j). See crim. doc. 20 at 1–2. The citation to both
provisions within Count Two makes sense, as “subsection (j) references subsection (c) . . . with
respect to offense elements.” Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453, 458 (2023) (emphasis

removed); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (explaining penalties for one who “causes the death of a
person through the use of a firearm” “in the course of a violation of subsection (c)” (emphasis
added)). When Jones pleaded guilty to Count Two, see crim. doc. 66 at 2; crim. doc. 90, Plea
Hr’g Tr. at 23:14–23:23, he received only one conviction for the violations of section 924(c) and
924(j), see crim. doc. 84 at 1. He also received a singular sentence for this offense, as the Court
imposed a 360-month sentence for Counts One and Two combined. See crim. doc. 84 at 2
(imposing “a term of 360 months on count one and two . . . all counts to run concurrently”);
crim. doc. 92, Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 16:19–16:25 (same).

That the Court set Jones’s 360-month sentence for Counts One and Two to run
concurrently with his 180-month sentence for Count Three, see crim. doc. 84 at 2, further
undermines his double-jeopardy argument. A sentence imposed under section 924(c) cannot run
concurrently with another sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (“[N]o term of
imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed on the person . . . .”). But a sentence imposed under section
924(j) can. See Lora, 599 U.S. at 455 (holding that section 924(c)’s consecutive-sentence
mandate does not apply to section 924(j), so “[a] sentence for a § 924(j) conviction therefore can
run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence”). So, the Court’s imposing a
concurrent sentence means that the Court sentenced Jones only under section 924(j) for Count

Two. And “a defendant who is sentenced under subsection (j) does not receive ‘a term of
imprisonment imposed . . . under [subsection (c)].” Lora, 599 U.S. at 459. Thus, Jones’s case
does not implicate one of the double-jeopardy concerns raised in Barrett v. United States, 607
U.S. 128, 149 (2026) (holding that a defendant may not receive separate convictions under
section 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and section 924(j) for a single act that violates both provisions).
Finally, Jones does not challenge his section 924(j) conviction and his predicate
carjacking conviction under section 2119 on double-jeopardy grounds. His case therefore does
not implicate a second double-jeopardy concern alluded to in Barrett. See 607 U.S. at 142–43
(noting that, while a conviction under section 924(c)(1) “adds to the predicate conviction,”
“[n]owhere does the statute prescribe the same in relation to a subsection (j) conviction”).
Instead, Jones challenges what he perceives to be separate convictions under section 924(c) and
924(j). See civ. doc. 1 at 5 (“My attorney failed to challenge my 924(c)(1) conviction and my
924(j) conviction as double jeopardy.”). And, as explained above, this argument fails.

Accordingly, Jones’s counsel did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness
in failing to challenge Count Two on double-jeopardy grounds, as this argument would have
been meritless. See Rodriguez, 17 F.3d at 226. And even if Jones’s counsel were deficient under
Strickland, Jones does not satisfy the prejudice prong, because he again does not argue that,
absent counsel’s alleged error, he would have insisted on going to trial. See Covington, 739 F.3d
at 1090. Thus, Jones’s second ineffective-assistance claim fails.
IV. Supplemental motion
The Court also notes that Jones filed a document titled “Motion For Leave to Supplement
Claim(s) and Ground(s) In Light of U.S. - Supreme Court Decision(s) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 Motion Title to Vacate.” Civ. doc. 7. In this motion, Jones seeks leave to add an

additional claim of prosecutorial misconduct to his motion to vacate. See id. at 1, 7. Because
Jones filed this new motion while his original section 2255 motion was pending, the Court
construes this new motion as a motion for leave to amend. See United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d
927, 931–32 (8th Cir. 2014). The United States filed a motion to strike Jones’s motion to amend
(or, in the alternative, a response in opposition to the motion). See civ. doc. 8.
A. Timeliness
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), a petitioner must file a motion to vacate within one year of
the latest of the following:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,
if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental
action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
The Court sentenced Jones on May 7, 2024. Crim. docs. 83–84. Jones did not appeal, so
his conviction became final on May 21, 2024. See Anjulo-Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 814,
816 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Never Misses A Shot v. United States, 413 F.3d 781, 782 (8th Cir.
2005)); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (noting that a criminal defendant has fourteen days from
the entry of judgment to file a notice of appeal). Jones timely filed his original section 2255
motion on May 6, 2025. See civ. doc. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). But Jones filed his motion to
amend nearly a year later, on May 5, 2026, see civ. doc. 7, so he fails to comply with section
2255(f)(1). Jones also does not assert that his motion is timely under any other provision of
section 2255(f). See civ. doc. 7 at 6 (arguing for timeliness only under section 2255(f)(1)). The
Court therefore finds that Jones’s supplemental motion is untimely. See Taylor v. United States,
792 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding an amendment to a section 2255 motion untimely
when filed after the one-year period).
B. Relation back
“Claims made in an untimely filed motion under § 2255 may be deemed timely if they
relate back to a timely filed motion as allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).”
Taylor, 792 F.3d at 869 (quoting Dodd v. United States, 614 F.3d 512, 515 (8th Cir.2010)). “An

amendment to a pleading relates back to the original pleading when ‘the amendment asserts a
claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted
to be set out—in the original pleading.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)). “To arise out
of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, the claims must be tied to a common core of
operative facts.” Id. (citation modified). “New claims must arise out of the same set of facts as
the original claims, and the facts alleged must be specific enough to put the opposing party on
notice of the factual basis for the claim.” Id. (citation modified).
In his original section 2255 motion, Jones raises two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims. See civ. doc. 1 at 4–5. But in his motion to amend, Jones raises a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. See civ. doc. 7 at 1, 7, 12. This claim asserts “a new ground for relief supported by

facts that differ in both time and type” from those in the original motion to vacate. Mayle v.
Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005). Indeed, the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct—i.e., “avoid[ing]
required disclosure” and “persuad[ing] the jury to wrongly convict [Jones] or assess an
unjustified punishment [against him],” civ. doc. 7 at 7—involves conduct different from
counsel’s alleged failure to challenge Jones’s convictions on evidentiary and double-jeopardy
grounds, civ.doc. 1 at 4–5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Jones’s motion to amend therefore does
not relate back to his original motion, as the facts he alleges in his original motion are not
“specific enough to put the [United States] on notice of the factual basis for the [prosecutorial-
misconduct] claim.” Dodd, 614 F.3d at 515.
C. Equitable tolling
The Court must also consider whether equitable tolling applies to Jones’s motion to

amend. See United States v. Hernandez, 436 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling
applies “(1) if there are ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a movant’s control that would
keep him from filing in a timely fashion,” or “(2) if the government’s conduct ‘lulled’ the
movant into inaction through reliance on that conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). Importantly, the
circumstances causing the movant’s delay in filing must be “external to [him] and not
attributable to his actions.” Id.
Jones states in his motion that he “recently discovered that he was never informed to the
burden(s) [sic] of the charged offenses against him that the [scienter element] must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Civ. doc. 7 at 2. But “a pro se litigant’s misunderstanding of the
relevant law . . . does not justify equitable tolling.” United States v. Mendez, 860 F.3d 1147,

1151 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004)). And Jones
makes no other arguments showing “extraordinary circumstances” or government action that
kept him from filing his motion to amend within the limitations period. The Court thus finds that
Jones does not merit equitable tolling.
Having found that Jones’s motion to amend is untimely and does not relate back to his
original motion, the Court denies Jones leave to amend his motion to vacate. Civ. doc. 7. The
Court also denies as moot the United States’ motion to strike. Civ. doc. 8.
V. Certificate of appealability
For the Court to issue a certificate of appealability, Jones must make a substantial
showing that he suffered the denial of a constitutional right. See Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565,
569 (8th Cir. 1997). A substantial showing means one indicating that reasonable jurists could
debate the issues, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further
proceedings. /d. But as shown in the discussion above, Jones has not made such a showing.
Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability in this case.
VI. Conclusion
The Court finds that the record conclusively establishes that section 2255 does not entitle
Jones to relief or an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court denies Jones’s [1] Motion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal
Custody. The Court also denies as untimely Jones’s [7] motion for leave to amend and denies as
moot the United States’ [8] motion to strike. A separate judgment accompanies this
Memorandum and Order.
So ordered this 30th day of July 2026.
SLIP. Ce
STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11413058. Public record. Not legal advice.