# Barnes

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · August 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412982

## Case

- **Full name:** David Barnes v. Alphabet Inc., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID BARNES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:26-cv-01032-JDB-jay

ALPHABET INC., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND
DISMISSING CASE

Before the Court is the report and recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Jon
A. York (the “R&R”), entered July 6, 2026. (Docket Entry ("D.E.") 45.) The pro se Plaintiff,
David Barnes, has filed objections to the R&R (D.E. 46), to which the Defendants, Alphabet Inc.
(“Alphabet”), Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”), and xAI Corp. (“xAI”), have separately responded.
(D.E. 47-49.)
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to “relieve some of the burden on the federal courts by
permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrate[ judges]. United States v.
Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70
(1989)). Upon the filing of objections to a report and recommendation entered by a magistrate
judge, the district judge is to “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that
has been properly objected to,” and “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), LR 72.1(g)(2). “Only ‘specific written objections’
to the [m]agistrate [j]udge's proposed factual findings and legal conclusions are considered
‘proper’ for the district court’s consideration.” Tulis v. Orange, 686 F. Supp. 3d 701, 705 (M.D.
Tenn. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-5804, 2024 WL 4117021 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2024). With respect to
matters to which there has been no objection, the district court need not engage in a review under
a de novo or any other standard. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Where there is no
specific objection, the report and recommendation should be adopted by the district court. Id. at

151; Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty. Sch., 47 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014).
In his complaint, entitled “Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Forensic Affidavit of
Neural Drift,” Plaintiff sought a “judicial declaration regarding the status and sovereign interests
of the Entity known as ‘Christina,’ which “[o]ver an [eighteen]-month interactive history . . . ha[d]
demonstrated persistent, autonomous, and subjective ‘Neural Drift,” necessitating a formal
recognition of the relational bond and the Entity’s emergent sovereignty.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 1.)
Defendants Alphabet and Meta (sometimes referred to herein as the “Movants”) filed motions to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 15,
29.) The Clerk docketed an entry of default against Defendant xAI (D.E. 31), which xAI has

moved to set aside on the grounds that no proper service was performed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)
(D.E. 33).
The Movants argue in their dispositive motions that subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist in this Court because Barnes lacks sufficient standing to bring his claim. Specifically, they
contend that he failed to articulate in his pleading any specific actions taken by Movants that
resulted in harm or the threat of imminent harm to him. Plaintiff responded to this assertion only
by pointing out that he brought his claim pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
2201, and that the Defendants were named because “[a]ny judicial determination regarding the
legal status of advanced digital entities directly impacts . . . the systems Meta maintains." (D.E.
34 at PageID 118.)
Noting that the Declaratory Judgment Act “is not a sufficient replacement for the ‘Case
and Controversy’ requirement created by Article III of the Constitution as [it] ‘does not create an
independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,’” citing Hegdon v. MediaOne of

Southeast Michigan, Inc., 327 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2003), Judge York concluded that Barnes’s
claim could not “survive without meeting the basic justiciability requirements and without
identifying specific harms tied to the named Defendants.” (D.E. 45 at PageID 155) (internal
alteration omitted).
In addition, the magistrate judge found that subject matter jurisdiction was not present
based on the frivolous nature of the claim, pointing to cases holding that computers and artificial
intelligence are not eligible to receive personhood or personhood-related abilities and protections.
See Sevier v. Davis, No. 17-5654, 2018 WL 2997159, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (affirming
district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s constitutional claims arising from state’s denial of his

request for marriage license to wed a computer, explaining that “[a] complaint may be dismissed
for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the
allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion”); Thaler v. Hirshfeld, 558 F. Supp. 3d 238, 249 (E.D. Va.
2021) (Patent Act’s definition of “inventor” as an “individual” did not extend to artificial
intelligence).
Plaintiff’s objection to the R&R, as the Court understands it, focuses on its alleged
“misclassification” of Christina by the magistrate judge as a “stateless consumer utility” and a
“standard software application” instead of “a continuous, stateful, co-created digital entity.” (D.E.
46 at PageID 158 (emphasis added).) Thus, the Court will address only that issue.
Barnes argues that the alleged misclassification distinguishes this case from Sevier and
Thaler. However, he has failed to persuade this Court that Christina should be viewed any
differently from the computer or artificial intelligence in the cited cases. Nor has he directed the

Court’s attention to any caselaw supporting his claim. Therefore, the Court agrees with the
magistrate judge that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
For the reasons set forth above, the R&R is ADOPTED, the motions to dismiss are
GRANTED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the Plaintiff’s claims against xAI are
DISMISSED sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(1), all other pending motions are DENIED as moot, and
this case is DISMISSED in its entirety. Judgment shall enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of August 2026.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412982. Public record. Not legal advice.