# Farahani

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · August 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412566

## Case

- **Full name:** Ghodrat Farahani v. Verizon Wireless Services, LLC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** August 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

____________________________________
)
GHODRAT FARAHANI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No.
) 25-cv-13285-FDS
VERIZON WIRELESS )
SERVICES, LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION OF DEFENDANT MCCARTHY,
BURGESS & WOLFF, INC. FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

SAYLOR, J.
This is a lawsuit filed by a consumer against a cellphone provider and various related
entities. Plaintiff Ghodrat Farahani alleges that defendants Cellular Sales of Massachusetts, LLC
and Verizon Wireless Services, LLC fraudulently obtained his signature on multiple agreements
concerning a cellphone installment plan. He further alleges that defendants Jefferson Capital
Systems, LLC; McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. (“MB&W”); and Credit Control, LLC then
unlawfully attempted to collect on that invalid debt. He is proceeding pro se.
Defendant MB&W has moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all claims against it.
For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
The following facts are set forth as alleged in the amended complaint.
A. Parties
Ghodrat Farahani is an individual who resided in Rehoboth, Massachusetts, during the
relevant time in 2021. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11, Dkt. No. 10).
Verizon Wireless Services, LLC is a limited liability company that sells cellular services
nationwide. (Id. ¶ 13).
Cellular Sales of Massachusetts, LLC is a limited liability company that operates a retail
electronics store in Swansea, Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 12). Cellular Sales is a Verizon retailer.

(Id.).
Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC is a limited liability company that collects consumer
debt. (Id. ¶ 14). It allegedly purchased and attempted to collect Farahani’s debt to Verizon.
(Id.).
McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. is a corporation that at some point held Farahani’s debt.
(Id. ¶ 15; MB&W Answer ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 19).1 The complaint alleges that MB&W is a law firm
that acted as a debt collector for Jefferson Capital. (Id.). MB&W denies that it is a law firm and
that it acted on behalf of Jefferson Capital. (MB&W Answer ¶ 15).
Credit Control, LLC is a limited liability company that collects debts in Massachusetts.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 16). The complaint alleges that Credit Control acted as a debt collector for

Jefferson Capital. (Id.).
B. Allegations of the Complaint
According to the complaint, on June 11, 2021, Ghodrat Farahani went to a store in
Swansea, Massachusetts, to address ongoing problems with cellular service at his home. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 17, 32). The store was operated by Cellular Sales, although it displayed Verizon
branding and retailed Verizon products. (Id. ¶ 17). Farahani told a salesperson in the store that
he was interested in trying Verizon service. (Id. ¶ 22). He intended to purchase a new service

1 The complaint incorrectly identifies that defendant as “McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff” rather than
“McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc.” (MB&W Answer 1).
plan to use with his current Samsung phone. (Id.). The salesperson allegedly told Farahani that
his current phone was not compatible with Verizon but that he was eligible for a “free phone”
promotion as long as he signed up for Verizon that day. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24).
The salesperson then presented Farahani with an electronic tablet and asked him to sign.

(Id. ¶ 26). The tablet allegedly displayed a blank screen. (Id.). According to the complaint, the
salesperson told Farahani that he needed to sign to authorize the Verizon service and that a copy
of the contract would be sent to him by email. (Id. ¶ 27). The complaint alleges that Farahani
signed the blank screen not knowing that he was in fact signing four agreements: an installment
loan agreement with Verizon with a total obligation of $565; a Verizon customer agreement with
a mandatory arbitration provision; a Cellular Sales dispute resolution agreement with a
mandatory arbitration provision; and a Cellular Sales bill of sale. (Id. ¶ 29).
Following the transaction, Farahani returned to his home with his new phone. (Id. ¶ 32).
According to the complaint, he then discovered that Verizon cellular service did not cover
Rehoboth. (Id. ¶¶ 32-34). In the subsequent days, Farahani contacted Verizon support several

times to attempt to fix the service issue. (Id. ¶ 36).
Farahani received his first billing statement from Verizon on June 21, 2021. (Id. ¶ 37).
The billing statement included a line item for “device payment (1 of 24)” costing $23.58.
(Verizon Bill, Dkt. No. 10-1).
Farahani then attempted to call Verizon to cancel the service. (Am. Compl. ¶ 40). At
some point between June 25 and June 28, Farahani returned to the Cellular Sales store to cancel
the service and return the phone. (Id. ¶¶ 41-44). Cellular Sales declined to do so, citing the
expiration of the 14-day return/cancellation period. (Id. ¶ 45).
In the following weeks, Verizon canceled Farahani’s cellular service. (Id. ¶ 48). He
continued to receive bills for the device payment over the following years, however. (Id. ¶¶ 48-
49). Farahani did not pay those bills. (Id.).
The complaint alleges that at some point Verizon placed the device-payment debt with
Jefferson Capital, MB&W, and Credit Control. (Id. ¶ 50). Those entities then allegedly engaged

in “aggressive” debt collection, including repeated calls and notices. (Id. ¶ 51). Jefferson
Capital, MB&W, and Credit Control also allegedly reported the debt to credit-reporting agencies.
(Id. ¶ 52). The debt allegedly remained reflected on Farahani’s credit reports from 2021 through
August 2025. (Id. ¶ 55). During that time, Farahani’s credit score fell to 606. (Id. ¶ 54). The
complaint alleges that the damage to Farahani’s credit score resulted in twice having an
application for an Amazon Visa credit card denied, losing housing opportunities, and having to
obtain a limited credit card with a 30% interest rate. (Id. ¶ 65).
On January 16, 2023, Farahani sent a demand letter under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A to
Verizon, Cellular Sales, MB&W, and Credit Control disputing the debt and requesting
settlement. (Jan. 2023 Letter, Dkt. No. 10-2). According to the complaint, collection attempts

and reporting to credit agencies nonetheless continued. (Am. Compl. ¶ 80). On December 1,
2024, Farahani sent a Chapter 93A demand letter to Jefferson Capital. (Dec. 2024 Letter, Dkt.
No. 10-3). On August 14, 2025, Farahani sent Jefferson Capital a dispute and demand letter
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the Fair Debt Collections Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. (Aug. 14, 2025 Letter, Dkt. No.
10-4). The next day, he sent another demand letter to Jefferson Capital, Verizon, and Cellular
Sales. (Aug. 15, 2025 Letter, Dkt. No. 10-5). The debt collection efforts and adverse credit
reporting did not cease until Farahani brought this action. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-61).
C. Procedural Background
On August 25, 2025, plaintiff filed this action against all defendants in Massachusetts
Superior Court. Defendants then removed the case to this court on the basis of the federal-law
claims.
The amended complaint asserts thirteen counts: (1) a claim for declaratory judgment that
the arbitration clause is unenforceable against Verizon and Cellular Sales; (2) unfair or deceptive

practices in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A against all defendants; (3) unfair debt-
collection practices in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 49 against Jefferson Capital,
MB&W, and Credit Control; (4) fraud and intentional misrepresentation against Verizon and
Cellular Sales; (5) negligent misrepresentation against Verizon and Cellular Sales; (6) slander of
credit and defamation against all defendants; (7) negligence against all defendants; (8) breach of
contract against Verizon and Cellular Sales; (9) tortious interference with prospective business
relations against all defendants; (10) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
against all defendants; (11) violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.,
against Verizon and Cellular Sales; (12) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., against Jefferson Capital, MB&W, and Credit Control; and (13) violation

of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., against Jefferson Capital. Defendants
Credit Control, MB&W, and Jefferson Capital filed answers to the amended complaint.
Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment on Count 1. He seeks a declaratory
judgment that no valid arbitration agreement exists between himself and Cellular Sales and
Verizon. Cellular Sales and Verizon then filed a motion to compel arbitration or, alternatively,
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.2

2 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the motion of defendants Cellular Sales and Verizon to
compel arbitration will be addressed in a separate memorandum and order.
On January 30, 2026, MB&W filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c) as to all counts against it.
II. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “is treated much like a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.” Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008). It differs

from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion primarily because it is filed after the close of pleadings and
“implicates the pleadings as a whole,” including any answer filed by a defendant. Aponte-Torres
v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2006). A court may enter a judgment on the
pleadings “only if the uncontested and properly considered facts conclusively establish the
movant’s entitlement to a favorable judgment.” Id. at 54.
In determining whether a complaint satisfies that standard, a court must assume the truth
of all well-pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See R.G.
Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). Dismissal is appropriate if the
complaint fails to set forth “factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each
material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v.

Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano
de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).
A document filed by a pro se party “is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). However, while pro se
complaints are “accorded an extra degree of solicitude,” they nevertheless must satisfy the
pleading standard. See Wright v. Town of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan.
15, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adams v. Stephenson, 1997 WL 351633, at
*1 (1st Cir. June 23, 1997)).
III. Analysis
Defendant MB&W has moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as to all
counts against it. The amended complaint asserts a violation of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count 12), as well as various state-law
claims (Counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10) against MB&W related to its alleged attempts to collect
plaintiff’s Verizon debt and its reporting of the debt to consumer reporting agencies. The Court
will first address statutory preemption and then discuss the remaining claims.
A. Preemption Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
The complaint asserts a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 et seq., against defendant Jefferson Capital alone. Although not asserted as a claim
against MB&W, the complaint alleges that MB&W engaged in credit-reporting activities
prohibited by the FCRA. The complaint then uses those allegations as the basis for several state-
law claims.

The FCRA imposes responsibilities on three types of entities: (1) users of consumer
reports, (2) consumer reporting agencies, and (3) furnishers of information. See Gibbs v. SLM
Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2004). According to the complaint, MB&W is a
furnisher of information. Its responsibilities in connection with providing information to
consumer reporting agencies is therefore governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2. See id. Section
1681s–2 imposes two duties upon such furnishers of information: “[T]he duty to provide
accurate information [§ 1681s–2(a)] and the duty to undertake an investigation upon receipt of
notice of dispute from a consumer reporting agency [§ 1681s–2(b)].” Id.
The FCRA contains two preemption provisions: § 1681t(b) and § 1681h(e). Although
there is some debate among the courts over the relationship of the provisions to each other, this
Court has previously found that § 1681h(e) only applies when “the cause of action is based on
information disclosed pursuant to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on
information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user

has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report.” Islam v. Option One Mortg.
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 181, 193-94 (D. Mass. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, when a defendant is solely a “furnisher of information,” only § 1681t(b) applies. Leet
v. Cellco P’ship, 480 F. Supp. 2d 422, 430 (D. Mass. 2007).
Section 1681t(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any
State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681s–2
of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to
consumer reporting agencies.
15 U.S.C § 1681t(b)(1)(F).
Because all of the state-law claims asserted here concerning credit reporting stem from,
or relate to, the subject matter of § 1681s (that is, the responsibilities of furnishers of information
to consumer reporting agencies), all of those claims fall squarely within the plain language of
§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) and are therefore preempted. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s–2, 1681t(b)(1)(F); see also
Islam, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (holding that a negligence claim was preempted by the FCRA to
the extent it relied on defendant’s alleged negligence in reporting information to credit agencies).
Accordingly, the state-law claims for slander of credit/defamation (Count 6), negligence
(Count 7), tortious interference with prospective business relations (Count 9), and negligent
infliction of emotional distress (Count 10) will be dismissed as to MB&W. The state-law claims
for violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Counts 2 and 3) and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count 10) are alleged as having some basis in collection activities, rather
than solely furnishing information, and will therefore be addressed separately.
B. Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Count 12)
Count 12 asserts a claim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The
FDCPA creates a private cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). In order to prevail on an
FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was the object of collection activity arising from

consumer debt, (2) defendants are “debt collectors” as defined by the FDCPA, and (3)
defendants have engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. See McCorriston v.
L.W.T., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2008). The statute of limitations for these
actions bars claims not brought within one year of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); Rotkiske
v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 10 (2019) (“[T]he statute of limitations [period] in § 1692k(d) begins to
run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date on which the
violation is discovered.”).
The complaint alleges that MB&W violated four provisions of the FDCPA: (1) a
violation of § 1692e, which prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations; (2) a
violation of § 1692g, which sets out various requirements for debt collectors when debts are

disputed; (3) a violation of § 1692f, which prohibits unfair or unconscionable means in debt
collection; and (4) a violation of § 1692d, which prohibits harassment or abuse of consumers by
debt collectors.
MB&W contends that the complaint does not sufficiently allege any violations of any
provisions of the FDCPA that occurred within the one-year statute of limitations period (that is,
after August 25, 2024). It is true that the only allegation in the complaint directed at MB&W
with any specific timeframe is an allegation that plaintiff sent several defendants, including
MB&W, a Chapter 93A demand letter on January 16, 2023. (Am. Compl. ¶ 56). That date is far
outside the limitations period.
In a separate section, titled “Systematic Concealment of the Arbitration Clause as
Predatory Design,” the complaint sets out a timeline that includes the allegation “January 2023-
August 2025 (Thirty Months) . . . [d]efendants placed debt with multiple collectors, reported to
CRAs, and pursued collection . . . .” (Id. ¶ 80). The complaint does not specify that any specific

defendant took any specific action during that period. That paragraph contains the only
allegation that suggests MB&W engaged in collection activities within the one-year statute of
limitations window.
Because the Court must view all factual allegations, and make all reasonable inferences,
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and because the complaint must be liberally
construed due to plaintiff’s pro se status, it will construe that paragraph as alleging that MB&W
improperly attempted to collect defendant’s debt, and improperly reported his debt to collection
agencies, as late as August 2025.
Viewed in that light, the complaint plausibly alleges that a violation of § 1692e occurred
within the one-year limitations period. That provision prohibits “false, deceptive, or misleading

representation . . . in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. In relevant
part, it proscribes “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit
information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to
communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” Id. § 1692e(8). Failing to disclose a known
dispute when reporting a debt to a credit reporting agency falls within the scope of § 1692e(8).
See Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1998); Evans v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., LLC, 889 F.3d 337, 348 (7th Cir. 2018).
Because all of the FDCPA claims are pleaded in a single count of the complaint, and
because the § 1692e claim will survive the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court will
deny MB&W’s motion as to Count 12. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th
Cir. 2015) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) doesn’t permit piecemeal dismissals of
parts of claims; the question at this stage is simply whether the complaint includes factual
allegations that state a plausible claim for relief.”); see also 5B Wright & Miller’s Federal

Practice & Procedure § 1358 (4th ed. 2026). Of course, any alleged violations by MB&W of the
FDCPA that fall outside the limitations period cannot give rise to recovery and may be dismissed
at summary judgment. Rotkiske, 589 U.S. at 10.3
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count 10)
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law,
the complaint must allege the following:
(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should
have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that
the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of
decency[,] and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) that the
actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the
emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe and of a nature that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45 (1976) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); accord Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1995); see also Borden v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1991).
The standard of proof for extreme and outrageous behavior is very high. “[L]iability has
been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and

3 To be sure, there is substantial doubt as to whether the complaint was timely filed. MB&W, in its answer,
asserts that plaintiff’s account was closed by MB&W in 2022 and that it never contacted any credit-reporting
agencies. (MB&W Answer ¶ 56). But because the Court cannot resolve factual disputes at this stage and must view
the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court cannot now decide whether plaintiff’s allegations of
MB&W’s continued involvement are accurate or not.
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99 (1986)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt.d (Am. L. Inst. 1965)).
Here, the complaint alleges that the extreme and outrageous conduct included
“aggressive[ly]” attempting to collect a fraudulent debt, reporting the false debt to credit-

reporting agencies, failing to note that the debt was disputed, and knowingly destroying
plaintiff’s credit score and housing opportunities. (Am. Compl. ¶ 150).
The allegations of the complaint fall well short of the high standard imposed by
Massachusetts law. First, and as noted, the allegations concerning reporting the debt to credit
agencies is preempted by the FCRA. Second, the complaint does not plead any specific factual
allegations supporting the conclusory statement that the collection efforts were “aggressive.” It
merely alleges repeated contacts, notices, and calls from the debt collectors. (Id. ¶ 51). It does
not allege any specific facts that might support a claim of extreme conduct. Without more, that
cannot be described as “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Foley, 400 Mass. at 99.
Accordingly, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will be dismissed.

D. Violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Count 2) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93,
§ 49 (Count 3)
In Count 2, the complaint alleges that MB&W engaged in unfair and deceptive actions in
violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 2, 9. In
Count 3, the complaint separately contends that MB&W violated Massachusetts debt-collection
statute, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93, § 49. Section 49 itself contains no private right of action.
O’Connor v. Nantucket Bank, 992 F. Supp. 2d 24, 33 (D. Mass. 2014). Instead, claims based on
the statute are “only cognizable insofar as they served a basis for derivative liability under Mass.
Gen. Laws. Ch. 93A.” Id. (citing Kassner v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2012 WL 260392, at *9 (D.
Mass. Jan. 27, 2012)). Accordingly, Count 3 will be dismissed, and the Court will consider the
alleged violations of § 49 as potentially relevant to a Chapter 93A claim.
Chapter 93A “is a ‘statute of broad impact,’ which forms a ‘comprehensive substantive
and procedural business and consumer protection package.’” Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151,

159 (1985) (quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 693 (1975)). “[A] violation
of the FDCPA constitutes a per se violation of ch. 93A.” French v. Corp. Receivables, Inc., 489
F.3d 402, 403 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Barnes v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 370 F.3d 164, 176 (1st Cir.
2004)).
To be valid, a Chapter 93A claim must allege that the plaintiff suffered an actual injury.
“A misrepresentation of legal rights in a consumer contract may indeed be per se ‘unfair’ or
‘deceptive’ under § 2 of G.L. c. 93A. But a plaintiff seeking a remedy under G.L. c. 93A, § 9,
must demonstrate that even a per se deception caused a loss.” Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent–A–
Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 798 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Such a loss may be
either economic or non-economic. Id. at 802.

Here, the complaint alleges that MB&W’s failure to report the dispute to credit-reporting
agencies caused harm to his credit score, which, in turn, caused him economic harm through
credit denials, higher interest rates on credit cards, and housing denials. That is sufficient to
allege a plausible economic loss under Chapter 93A. See e.g., Hanrahran v. Specialized Loan
Servicing, LLC, 54 F. Supp. 3d 149, 156 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding that an accumulation of
interest, damage to credit, and assessment of late payment charges was economic harm).
Accordingly, the Chapter 93A claim will not be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. for
judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to Counts 2 and 12 and otherwise GRANTED.
So Ordered.

/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV
F. Dennis Saylor IV
Dated: August 6, 2026 United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412566. Public record. Not legal advice.