# Reyes

> District Court, D. Maryland · July 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412104

## Case

- **Full name:** Joseph Johnson v. Warden, Officer Miguel Reyes, Officer Harry Carr, and Officer Brandon Reed
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** July 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JOSEPH JOHNSON, ) "26 JUL 23 rHdi3e
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No, 1:24-cv-3354-LKG
v. )
) Dated: July 23, 2026
WARDEN, )
OFFICER MIGUEL REYES, )
OFFICER HARRY CARR, and )
OFFICER BRANDON REED, )
)
Defendants. )
)
oo)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-represented Plaintiff Joseph Johnson filed an Amended Complaint, at this Court’s
direction, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated at Western Correctional Institution
(“WCI”’)when Defendants, Officers Miguel Reyes, Harry Carr, and Brandon Reed, pepper
sprayed and assaulted him inside his cell. ECF No. 7. In response to the Amended Complaint,
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, which is
ripe for this Court’s review.'! ECF No. 23.
Also pending are Johnson’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 27) and Motion for
Injunction (ECF No. 29). Johnson also supplemented his Amended Complaint. ECF No. 31.
Defendants moved to strike the motion for preliminary injunction and the supplement. ECF Nos.
30 and 32. Upon review of the pleadings filed, this Court finds no need for a hearing. See D.
Md. Local R. 105.6 (2025). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or
for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part and Johnson’s Motion to
Appoint Counsel will be granted; all remaining motions will be denied.

' On February 10, 2026, this Court issued an Order granting Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Physical Exhibit
Under Seal (ECF No. 21) with the proviso that the digital recording that had been filed with the Court would be
replaced within 10 days of the date of the Order. ECF No. 28. The Court notified Defendants that the exhibit filed
contained no recording. /d. Defendants have not filed a corrected version of the recording and the time for doing so
has long since passed. The Court will therefore not consider video footage.

I. Background
A. Amended Complaint
All events described by Johnson took place at WCI; when he filed his Amended
Complaint, he had been transferred to Roxbury Correctional Institution (“RCI”). Johnson, who
uses a wheelchair, alleges that on June 30, 2024, Officer Reyes pushed him in his wheelchair
back to his cell after he was denied medical attention. ECF No. 7 at 4. He claims that once he
was placed in the cell, the pain in his stomach he had sought medical attention for had reached a
ten and he asked for a supervisor. /d. While he was sitting in a chair inside the cell, he states
that Reyes called for the cell door to be opened. /d. Once the door was opened, Reyes called for
Officers Reed and Carr to come to the cell to assault Johnson. /d. According to Johnson, Reed
and Carr came into his cell and began kicking him in his ribs as Reyes held Johnson’s arms over
his head, while he was still handcuffed. /d. Johnson recalls screaming out that he was in pain
and asking the officers what they were doing. He claims he was begging them to stop because
his stomach hurt. Johnson also states that he told the officers he needed medical attention. /d.
Reyes told Johnson it was too late and then told Carr to “spray him.” /d. Johnson recalls closing
his eyes in an attempt to keep the mace out. /d. He states that when he was sprayed with mace,
Reyes continued to hold his hands and arms over his head, and that he remained handcuffed. /d.
Johnson recalls that, despite the use of the chemical agent, Defendants continued to beat
him, hitting him in the ribs and stomach. ECF No. 7 at 5. Johnson states that he was maced a
second time while Reyes held his face. /d. Johnson states that he attempted to fall to the ground
in pain so he could protect himself, but instead he was picked up and slammed down into the
cell. /d. He claims he was picked up a second time by his hair, and he was slammed into the
doorway between the cell and the tier. /d. Johnson recalls being yanked off the floor while
being yelled at and put into the wheelchair before he was pushed to the property room, put in
“the cage,” and left for approximately one-hour in “burning pain.” /d. He adds that he believes
these acts were committed to retaliate against him. /d.
Johnson seeks damages of one-billion dollars for cruel and unusual punishment, and
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. ECF No. 7 at 5. In addition, he asks that all
officers be “equally sanctioned or terminated,” to be reassigned to a single cell, for the officers to
be enjoined from further retaliation against him, and to be released from prison. /d. Johnson

also references the relief he sought in his ARP complaint but does not specify details of the
complaint or the relief sought. /d.
B. Defendants’ Response
On June 30, 2024, Lt. Benjamin Wagner was assigned to investigate the incident
involving Johnson, ECF No, 23-3 at 8. In his report, Wagner states that Johnson was assigned to
administrative segregation and Officer Miguel Reyes was assigned to take Johnson to the
medical room in Housing Unit (“HU”) 4 to be evaluated by NP Burnice Mace for stomach pains.
Id. Because Johnson uses a wheelchair, Reyes restrained Johnson’s hands in front of him. /d.
According to Wagner’s report, once Johnson was inside the medical room, he “became
agitated and started yelling at NP Mace and refused his evaluation.” /d. Johnson was then
escorted back to his cell. /d. Once inside the cell, Johnson refused to permit the escorting
officer, Officer Reyes, to remove his handcuffs by coming to the pass-through. Jd. Reyes
radioed for assistance; Officers Harry Carr and Brandon Reed responded. /d. Reyes called for
the cell door to be opened. /d. Reyes claims his plan was to remove Johnson from the cell and
place him in the HU #4 strip cage for a “cool down period” so that the “Officer in Charge” could
speak with Johnson. /d. Once Reyes was inside the cell, Johnson stood up from the plastic chair
he was seated in and grabbed Reyes by the front of his shirt. /d. Reed immediately deployed
pepper spray and gave loud verbal commands for Johnson to cease his assault on Reyes. /d. A
brief struggle ensued, and Johnson was taken to the floor inside the cell. /d. Reyes and Reed
dragged Johnson from the cell and put him in a wheelchair located outside of the cell. /d.
Carr escorted Johnson to the HU #4 medical room where he was evaluated by RN
Flanagan. /d. The June 30, 2024, report from Flanagan describes Johnson as ‘“‘calm and
cooperative.” ECF No. 23-9 at 6. The evaluation took place after Johnson was pepper sprayed.
Id. The medical records provided do not include a record of the appointment with NP Mace.
After Johnson was assessed by the nurse, Officer Ronald Conner escorted him to C-wing
where he received a decontamination shower. ECF No. 23-3 at 8. Photographs were taken by
Officer Joshua Henry of Johnson and each of the officers involved. /d., see also 25-29. Johnson
was placed on Staff Alert status in Administrative Segregation pending adjustment. /d. at 8.
Wagner concluded that all “staff acted appropriately and within the scope of their authority
as described in the Use of Force Manual.” /d. at 9.

Johnson was charged with violating Rules 100 (disruptive act), 101 (assault on staff), 312
(interference of duties), 316 (disobey an order), and 410 (failure to obey specifically cited facility
rule), in a Notice of Inmate Rule Violation issued June 30, 2024. ECF No. 23-3 at 20-21. He
pleaded guilty to Rules 316 and 410 on July 19, 2024, in exchange for 15 days of segregation, 0
days loss of good conduct credit, and having the other more serious rule violations dropped. /d.
at 32 -44.
An Internal Investigation Division (“IID”) IID investigation was opened due to the
assault on Officer Miguel Reyes. ECF No. 23-5 at 4. Reyes, however, did not want to press
charges. /d. at 5. The investigating officer closed the investigation on or about August 21, 2024,
after confirming that Reyes did not want to press charges and noted that the ‘‘administrative
charge for assault on staff was dismissed.” /d. at 5.
The June 30, 2024, record of Johnson’s examination by Nurse Flanagan describes him as
calm and cooperative, complaining of abdominal pain for which he had seen a provider three
days prior. ECF No. 23-9 at 6. At the time she saw Johnson he was confined to the strip cage
after being sprayed with pepper spray. /d. Flanagan was instructed by a provider to give
Johnson a dose of Pepto Bismol with a plan for him to be reevaluated by a provider. /d. at 5.
On July 1, 2024, Johnson was seen by RN Kimberly K. Sanderlin for ongoing abdominal
pain that had not improved with Pepto bismuth and it was noted that he had “labs drawn on
6/27/24.” ECF No. 23-9 at 3-4. She wrote that his lungs were clear, his abdomen was soft with
bowel sounds in all four quadrants, and that he had a normal bowel movement. /d. at 3. A plan
was made for him to follow up with a provider and he was sent back to his cell in stable
condition. /d.
On July 27, 2024, filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure complaint (“ARP”) stating
that Reyes, Carr, and Reed committed assault and battery against him on June 30, 2024. ECF
No. 23-6 at 8-9 (ARP-RCI-0939-24). He claimed he was dealing with bad stomach pain and that
he was denied medical care by Nurse Bernice. /d. at 8. He described how he doubled over in
pain when he got to his cell because he had a sudden sharp pain in his stomach and theorized that
perhaps he was not moving fast enough for Officer Reyes. /d. at 8-9. He stated that Reyes
ordered Carr and Reed to punch him in the stomach and ribs and later ordered them to pepper
spray him. /d. at 9. He goes on to point out that multiple policies were violated and asks for an
investigation into those violations as well as damages, and a return of his property. /d. at 9. On

July 31, 2024, this ARP was procedurally dismissed pending resubmission because it contained
“multiple unrelated issues.” /d. at 8. Johnson was instructed to resubmit his ARP by August 15,
2024, and to address one issue or ‘ta reasonable number of closely related issues.” /d.
On September 15, 2024, Johnson appealed his ARP to the Commissioner. ECF No. 23-7
at 2-3. On January 7, 2025, this appeal was dismissed as accepted in error because there was a
pending IID investigation. /d. at 1.
Johnson filed a grievance regarding the dismissal of his ARP with the Inmate Grievance
Office (“IGO”) on November 19, 2024. ECF No. 23-8 at 4. Ina letter dated January 17, 2025,
Sandra Holmes, Administrative Officer III of the IGO, sent a letter to Johnson advising that the
IGO would defer consideration of his grievance because the allegations were “presently under
investigation by the Internal Investigative Division.” /d.
On April 17, 2025, Ms. Holmes sent a letter to Johnson on behalf of the IGO stating that
a preliminary review of his grievance had been conducted and the grievance was being
dismissed. ECF No. 23-8 at 1-2. The rationale for the dismissal was as follows:
I have considered the issues you raised and decided that you have failed to
state a claim upon which administrative relief can and should be granted, your
allegations do not meet the requirements of Section 10-207 (c) of the
Correctional Services and is dismissed. I note that you were charged and
found guilty of violating inmate rules 316 (disobey an order) and 410
(demonstrate; disrespect; insolence; or use of vulgar language after the
institution submitted a signed Inmate Waiver of Appearance with a Plea
Agreement form indicating that you was [sic] voluntarily waiving your right to
appear before the hearing officer on July 19, 2024, and declining to pursue
violations of inmate rules 100 (engage in a disruptive act), 101 (commit assault
or battery on staff), and 312 (interfere with or resist a search of a person, item,
area, or location; cause the early return of a community detail due to a
violation of the rules; or Commit any inmate rule violation outside of the
confinement of a secure facility). His decision also noted that you also
indicated that you wished to accept the plea agreement offered by the
Institution. He accepted the agreement negotiated between you and the
Institution and imposed the sanctions. COMAR 12.07.01.07(B)(4) provides
that a grievance “shall be dismissed on preliminary review as wholly lacking in
merit if ... [t]he grievant has failed to exhaust remedies available under the ...
disciplinary proceeding in a timely manner, and has not shown good cause for
the failure to do so.” I note that COMAR 12.03.01.20 provides that a plea of
guilty constitutes a waiver of hearing rights and an admission that you
committed the inmate rule violation(s). | conclude, therefore, that by pleading
guilty to violating the above indicated inmate rules, you waived your right to a
hearing and failed to exhaust remedies available under the disciplinary process.

Since you pled guilty to violating Inmate Rules 316 and 410, the issue of who
assaulted whom was properly at issue in the disciplinary hearing, and should
not be countenance in this separate, distinct and collateral proceeding. I also
note that you failed to file an appeal to the warden. Since the exhaustion
requirement has not been waived for good cause shown, COMAR
12.07.01.06(B)(4) requires that this grievance be dismissed as wholly lacking
in merit.
Id. at 1-2.
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss
In reviewing the complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(b)(6) the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman vy, REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4" Cir.
1997).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
The complaint, however, does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to
dismiss. /d, at 555. Instead, “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” /d. at 563. To survive
a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).? “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” /qbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

* Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l
Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule
8(a)).

alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” /d. at 679 (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which provides in pertinent part:
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme
Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. “By
its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson y.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004). The court should “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to... the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the
evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr, Inc.,
290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002); see FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2013).
The district court’s “function” is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. Moreover, the trial court may not make credibility determinations on summary judgment.
Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4"" Cir. 2015); Mercantile
Peninsula Bank vy. French, 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007); Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis, 290 F.3d at 644-45. Therefore, in the face of
conflicting evidence, such as competing affidavits, summary judgment is generally not
appropriate, because it is the function of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including
matters of witness credibility.
Nevertheless, to defeat summary judgment, conflicting evidence, if any, must give rise to
a genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” then a dispute of material

fact precludes summary judgment. /d. at 248; see Libertarian Party of Va. V. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,
313 (4th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence “‘is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” /d. at 252. And, “the mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” /d.
Because Johnson is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That notwithstanding, the court must also abide the
‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses
from proceeding to trial.”” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Ce/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Ill. ANALYSIS
Defendants assert? that they are entitled to judgment in their favor because Johnson has
not stated a viable ADA claim; did not exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA;
has failed to include facts or allegations that implicate Warden Weber’s personal participation;
has failed to state a claim of retaliation; and any Eighth Amendment claims are unsupported by
the facts. ECF No. 23.
Johnson has filed supplemental pleadings consisting of additional ARP complaints that
concern his claims that the ‘medical department” is posing a continued threat to his health and
safety by failing to deliver his medication and a hernia belt, which were found meritorious. ECF
No, 29-1, Other matters raised in these ARPs concern allegations that he was assaulted by other
inmates and officers failed to protect him from the violence committed against him, which
occurred on December 12, 2025. /d. at 12 and 22.
He explains in another supplemental pleading that during the June 30, 2024 incident, the
Defendants came into his cell to beat him because he was dealing with a lot of pain from two

* In addition to the listed claims, Defendants claim they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on any
official capacity claims that may be implied by the content of Johnson’s amended complaint. Under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies and departments are immune from citizen suits in
federal court absent state consent or Congressional action. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims against state employees acting in their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh
Amendment immunity because a suit against the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself. Brandon
v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). The State of Maryland has not waived such immunity for claims brought
pursuant to § 1983, Accordingly, Defendants are immune from suit for actions taken in their official capacity and, to
the extent such claims are raised, they are dismissed.

hernias that required medical attention he was not being provided. ECF No. 31 at 1. The
officers did not believe he was in pain, but on April 8, 2026, he had required surgery to repair the
hernias, one in his stomach and the other in his groin,. /d. To the extent both supplements are
relevant to the claims raised in the amended complaint, the substance of the supplements will be
considered as opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants’ Motions to
Strike will be denied. ECF Nos. 30 and 32. Each of the parties’ claims are addressed below.
A. ADA Claim
The ADA was enacted in 1990 “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(1), and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” /d. § 12101(b)(2). Title II of the ADA,
which is at issue here, prohibits public entities, including “any State or local government” and
“any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or
local government,” id. § 12131(1), from discriminating ‘“‘by reason of” disability against a
“qualified individual with a disability.” Jd. § 12132.4
For purposes of Title II, a “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as an
individual with a disability “who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12131(2). State prisoners, such as plaintiffs, may qualify as “qualified individual[s]
with . . . disabilit[ies],” id., so as to come within the protection of Title II of the ADA. In Pa.
Dep t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998), a unanimous Supreme Court held that “the
plain text of Title I] of the ADA unambiguously extends to state prison inmates.” Although the
Fourth Circuit “has not squarely addressed the issue,” several circuits “have determined that §
12132’s words ‘or be subjected to discrimination by that entity’ are meant to be a ‘catch-all
phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context’”—in other
words, that Title I] of the ADA applies to “anything a public entity does.” Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty.

4 Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in employment. See id. §
12111 et seg. Title II] applies to public accommodations. See id. § 12181 et seq.

Comm'rs of Frederick, 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing cases) (citations omitted); see
also Paulone v. Frederick, 787 F. Supp. 2d 360, 380-81 (D. Md. 2011) (collecting authority).
While it is true that Johnson, as a person who uses a wheelchair, fits the definition of an
individual with a disability, something much more is needed than a conclusory statement that the
ADA was violated to state a claim. Here, Johnson has failed to include factual allegations that
show that these Defendants discriminated against him based on his disability. This claim must
be dismissed.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants raise the affirmative defense that Johnson has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a),
which provides that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.
Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008); see Langford v.
Couch, 50 F.Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he ... PLRA amendment made clear that
exhaustion is now mandatory.”). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review
process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so
properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”” Woodford 548 U.S. at 93
(quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). But
the court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not
procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda vy. Terrell, 478 F.3d
1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).
In Maryland prisons, the Administrative Remedy Procedure is the administrative process
that must be exhausted. Md. Code Regs. § 12.02.28.02(B)(1), (D) (2018). First, a prisoner must
file an ARP with the warden within 30 days of the incident at issue. Md. Code Regs.
§ 12.02.28.05(D)(1) (requiring filing with the “managing official”); Md. Code Regs.
§ 12.02.28.02(B)(14) (defining “managing official” as “the warden or other individual
10

responsible for management of the correctional facility”); Md. Code Regs. § 12.02.28.09(B)
(setting the 30-day deadline). Second, if the ARP is denied, or the inmate does not receive a
timely response, a prisoner must file an appeal with the Commissioner of Correction within 30
days. Md. Code Regs. § 12.02.28.14(B)(5). Ifthe appeal is denied, the prisoner must appeal
within 30 days to the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”). See Md. Code. Ann., Corr. Servs.
§§ 10-206, 10-210; Md. Code Regs. § 12.07.01.05(B). Inmates may seek judicial review of the
IGO’s final determinations in a Maryland Circuit Court. See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 10-
210(a).
An inmate need only exhaust “available” remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In Ross v.
Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016), the Supreme Court rejected a “freewheeling approach to exhaustion
as inconsistent with the PLRA.” /d. at 635. In particular, it rejected a “special circumstances”
exception to the exhaustion requirement. /d. But, it reiterated that ‘‘[a] prisoner need not exhaust
remedies if they are not ‘available.’” /d. at 636. “[A]n administrative remedy is not considered
to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing
himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d at 725, see also Younger v. Crowder, 79 F.4th 373,
380 (4th Cir. 2023) (plaintiff did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies where none were
available to him due to ongoing IID investigation).
The Supreme Court stated in Ross that an administrative remedy is available if it is
“capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” 578 U.S. at 642 (quoting
Booth v, Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). Thus, an inmate must complete the prison’s
internal appeals process, if possible, before bringing suit. See Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d
523, 529-30 (D. Md. 2003). As a prisoner, plaintiff is subject to the strict requirements of the
exhaustion provisions. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (no distinction is made
with respect to exhaustion requirement between suits alleging unconstitutional conditions and
suits alleging unconstitutional conduct). Exhaustion is also required even though the relief
sought is not attainable through resort to the administrative remedy procedure. See Booth, 532
U.S. at 741.
The Ross Court outlined three circumstances when an administrative remedy is
unavailable and an inmate’s duty to exhaust available remedies ‘“‘does not come into play.” 578
U.S. at 643. First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or
guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or

11

consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” /d. Second, “an
administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of
use. In this situation, some mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can
discern or navigate it.” /d. at 643-44. The third circumstance arises when “prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Jd. at 644.
Defendants acknowledge that Younger is the applicable law in this case as Johnson’s
ARPs were dismissed because there was a pending IID investigation. ECF No. 23-1 at 19-20.
They nevertheless argue that because Johnson elevated his ARP complaint to the IGO when he
“could have abandoned his pursuit of administrative remedies without pursuing intermediate and
final administrative appeals” he failed to exhaust by filing his complaint before the IGO
dismissed his grievance on the merits. /d. at 20. They assert that Johnson should have waited to
again be refused any meaningful review before filing his complaint based on precedent holding
that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not offered through the administrative
procedure. /d. (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. at 740-41 (2001). This argument elevates
form over substance.
The plain fact of the matter is that Johnson’s ARP was dismissed due to a pending HD
investigation. This case not only falls within the facts outlined in Younger, but is also a case
where the administrative procedure amounts to a simple dead end as explained in Ross.
Accordingly, the merits of Johnson’s claims will be reached herein.
Cc, Personal Participation
Liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in the
constitutional violation. It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply in § 1983 claims. See Love-Lane y. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on
ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative
factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan vy. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.
1984)). To state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 based on a subordinate’s conduct,
the plaintiff must allege that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that

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subordinate’s conduct “posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintiff’ (2) the supervisor responded in a manner that was so inadequate that it
showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization” of the subordinate’s conduct; and
(3) there was “an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction” and the plaintiff’s
constitutional injury. 7impson by & through Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities & Special
Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,799 (4th Cir.
1994)).
Here, Johnson’s claim against the Warden is based on nothing more than the Warden’s
position as a supervisor. There are no specific allegations against him in the body of the
amended complaint and no facts implicating him in any wrongdoing. The claim against him
must be dismissed.
D. Retaliation
A retaliation claim is analyzed under the First Amendment right to petition for redress of
grievances. ‘‘The First Amendment right to free speech includes not only the affirmative right to
speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that
right.” Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000). To state a claim of
retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff
engaged in protected First Amendment activity; (2) the defendant took some action that
adversely affected the First Amendment rights; and (3) there was a causal relationship between
the protected activity and the defendant’s conduct. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of
George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005).
While “the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the
constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large,” “incarceration does not divest
prisoners of all constitutional protections.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228-29 (2001). “[A]
prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with the status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Specifically, the Fourth Circuit has held that an inmate’s
“right to file a prison grievance free from retaliation” is protected by the First Amendment.
Booker vy. §. Carolina Dep t of Corrections, 855 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2017).
Johnson’s retaliation claim does not specify what Officers Reyes, Carr, and Reed were
retaliating against him for; rather, he simply states they were retaliating against him. In his later

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opposition he alleges that the officers beat him because they did not believe that he needed
medical care for his hernias which were causing him pain. ECF No. 31 at 1. In Reyes’ report he
states that Johnson was brought back to his cell after he refused to cooperate with a medical
appointment he had with Nurse Mace. ECF No. 25-3 at 4. Johnson’s assertion that any of the
actions taken in connection with his initial removal from the medical room was retaliatory is
unsupported by the facts. Further, there is nothing on this record that suggests that these
defendants were motivated by some kind of a score they had to settle with Johnson. Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
E. Excessive Force
Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if “force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). This Court must look at the need
for application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the
extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as
reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the
response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
“An inmate’s claim of excessive force involves both an objective and a subjective
component.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. 2021). The objective component asks
whether the force applied was sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action. “This is not a
high bar; de minimis or trivial force is not enough, but anything more will suffice.” Brooks v.
Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019), see e.g. Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer, 150 F.4th 360,
373-74 (4th Cir. 2025) (finding bruised head, bleeding ear, and shoulder and back pain as
meeting objective component of more than de minimis). The absence of significant injury alone
is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). The
extent of injury incurred is one factor indicative of whether the force used was necessary in a
particular situation, but if force is applied maliciously and sadistically liability is not avoided
simply because the prisoner had the good fortune to escape serious harm. /d. at 38.
“The more demanding part of the test ... is the subjective component which asks a single
question: whether the officers acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Dean, 984 F.3d
at 302 (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). “[T]he state of mind
required here is wanton infliction of pain.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). Establishing

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impermissible motive turns on whether “force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley
v, Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). “The question is not whether a reasonable officer could
have used force to maintain discipline, but whether these particular officers did use force for that
reason.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113. The factors this Court must consider are the need for
application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the
extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as
reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the
response. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. “Corrections officers act in a ‘good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline’ — that is, with a permissible motive — not only when they confront
immediate risks to physical safety, but also when they attempt to ‘preserve internal order’ by
compelling compliance with prison rules and procedures.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113 (quoting
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6).
Impermissible motive for the use of force by correctional officers, that is when it has
been used maliciously and for the “very purpose of causing harm” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21,
occurs when pain is inflicted “to punish an inmate for intransigence or to retaliate for
insubordination.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113, see also Boone v. Stallings, 583 F. App'x 174, 177
(4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not permit a correctional officer to respond to a
misbehaving inmate in kind.”). The use of force on an inmate who is “restrained and compliant
and posing no physical threat” raises the specter of an impermissible motive. Thompson v.
Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 102 (4th Cir. 2017). “Malice analysis interrogates the need for and
proportionality of force, which cannot be measured by observing physical injuries alone.”
Escobar-Salmeron, 150 F.4th at 374, (citing Dean, 984 F.3d at 304—06 (evaluating
proportionality of pepper spray usage based on circumstances of its use)).
Defendants rely on the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 295-
96 (4th Cir. 2022) proscribing damage claims in a 1983 suit when the claim would imply the
invalidity of a prison disciplinary proceeding that has not been overturned, as the basis for their
claim that Johnson’s excessive force claim is procedurally barred. ECF No. 23-1 at 24. They
reason that because he pleaded guilty to “disobeying orders and a related infraction for the events
at his cell on June 30, 2024,” and his disciplinary conviction has not been invalidated but “‘in fact
served as a basis for the I1GO’s dismissal of [Johnson’s ARP] appeal” he may not now claim that

15

the use of force was used for anything other than to maintain or restore order and discipline in
the prison. /d.
Johnson made a plea agreement with prison officials to plead guilty to violating Rule
316, disobeying an order, and Rule 410 demonstrate disrespect, insolence, or use of vulgar
language, in exchange for dismissal of remaining charges . ECF No. 23-3 at 33, 38. The charges
not pursued were violation of Rule 100, engage in a disruptive act; Rule 101, commit assault or
battery on staff; and Rule 312, interfere with or resist a search. /d. at 33. The narrative provided
in the serious incident report justifying the use of force against Johnson described Johnson
grabbing Reyes by the shirt, requiring Reed to spray Johnson with pepper spray while giving
loud verbal commands for Johnson to stop assaulting Reyes. /d. The assault charges against
Johnson were not pursued. Further, Johnson alleges that Defendants went beyond merely pepper
spraying him to gain his compliance; that allegation is not refuted by his guilty plea to
disobeying an order as it does not foreclose the possibility that Defendants used force beyond
what was required to restore discipline and order to the prison. Moreover, his 1983 claim does
not impugn his disciplinary conviction which did not result in the result in the loss of good
conduct credit. Johnson is not attempting to “avoid the requirements of habeas relief ‘by the
simple expedient of putting a different label on [his] pleadings’” by seeking damages for an
excessive force claim. Moskos, 24 F.4th at 295 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 489-90
(1973)).
Johnson’s description of the use of force that occurred inside his cell, outside the view of
any surveillance cameras, depicts a malicious attack that went beyond that which was required to
restore order and discipline to the prison, or in this case, to retrieve a pair of handcuffs. The two
versions of events represent a genuine dispute of material fact that require credibility
determinations not appropriate on summary judgment review. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
The motion for summary judgment is therefore denied on the Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim.
F. Medical Claim
Defendants address Johnson’s amended complaint as raising an Eighth Amendment
medical claim. ECF No. 23-1 at 27-28. They assert that the undisputed facts show that Johnson
refused medical attention from Nurse Practitioner Mace when he began yelling at her, but later
he was taken to see a different nurse for the same complaint of abdominal pain. /d. at 28.

16

Johnson raises numerous seemingly unrelated claims regarding the quality of medical care he has
received but does not focus those claims on the June 30, 2024 incident when he was escorted
away from his evaluation with Mace. See e.g. ECF No. 31.
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the actions of the defendants, or their failure to act, amounted to deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also
Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2017). “A ‘serious medical need’ is ‘one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”” Hever v. U.S. Bureau
of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting /ko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir.
(2008)); see also Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 228 (4th Cir. 2016) (failure to provide
diabetic inmate with insulin where physician acknowledged it was required is evidence of
objectively serious medical need).
Assuming Johnson’s medical need was serious, there is no evidence that these
Defendants knew of a risk of harm to Johnson if he was not permitted to carry on with his
evaluation by Mace despite his behavior but disregarded that risk. To establish the subjective
component for this claim there must be some indication that the officers had actual knowledge of
the risk of harm to the inmate. Young v. Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001); see
also Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is not enough that the
officer [ ] should have recognized it.””). Beyond such knowledge, however, the officer must also
have “recognized that his actions were insufficient” to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate
arising from his medical needs. Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303; /ko, 535 F.3d at 241. The
reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged in light of the risk the defendant actually
knew at the time. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 2001). Here, Reyes
witnessed Johnson yelling at Mace, an allegation that Johnson does not deny. It is not
unreasonable for Reyes to assume that ending the appointment posed little to no risk to Johnson.
Defendants are granted summary judgment on this claim.
G. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity balances
two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when

17

they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “In
particular, . . . qualified immunity protects law officers from ‘bad guesses in gray areas’ and it
ensures that they may be held personally liable only ‘for transgressing bright lines.’” Gomez v.
Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th
Cir. 1992)). The defense provides protection for public officials for mistakes of law, mistakes of
fact, or a combination of the two. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Qualified immunity is a defense from suit, not simply liability, which is lost if a
matter is improperly permitted to go to trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Resolution of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity must be determined “‘at the
earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
In order to determine if a public official 1s entitled to the protections afforded by qualified
immunity, two inquiries must be addressed by this Court. The first prong is whether “[t]aken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, .. . the facts alleged show [that] the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right[.]’ Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If
the evidence establishes a violation of a constitutional right, the second prong is to assess
whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. /d. If the right was
not clearly established, the qualified immunity doctrine shields a defendant officer from liability.
The “answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for a plaintiff to defeat
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.” Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d
374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2003)).
‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was ‘sufficiently
clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful. Dist.
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018) citing Ashcroft v. al—Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The qualified immunity defense is unavailing in this both because the constitutional right
was well-established at the time of the incidents at issue and because there exists a material
dispute of fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly violative of plaintiff’s constitutional right
actually occurred. See Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005). While it is true
that qualified immunity is ordinarily determined at the summary judgment stage of litigation, see
Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003), the defense of “[q]ualified immunity does
not, however, override the ordinary rules applicable to summary judgment proceedings.”

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Willingham, 412 F.3d at 559, citing Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992). As
noted, there are material facts in dispute concerning whether Defendants’ use of force violated
Johnson’s constitutional rights. Such factual disputes preclude the application of qualified
immunity at this time. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
IV. CONCLUSION
By separate Order which follows, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment, is granted in part and denied in part; and their Motions to Strike are
denied; Johnson’s Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel is granted; and his Motion for Injunction
is denied without prejudice subject to refiling by pro bono counsel as appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

te YDYA KAY GRAGGSBY ©
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412104. Public record. Not legal advice.