# Rose

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · July 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412050

## Case

- **Full name:** Tina Rose v. City of West Frankfort, Timothy C. Arview, and Thad Snell
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TINA ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-00845-JPG

CITY OF WEST FRANKFORT,
TIMOTHY C. ARVIEW, and
THAD SNELL,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendants City of West Frankfort (“the City”), Timothy
Arview (“Arview”), and Thad Snell (“Snell”)’s Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative, Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 104) and Plaintiff Tina Rose’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint
(Doc. 93).
I. BACKGROUND
The Court has already given both a detailed recitation and a short summary of the facts
(Docs. 54, 75). It will not repeat them here.
Plaintiff filed her third amended complaint on April 17, 2026. It was screened pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Nine claims survived screening and are currently pending before the
Court: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation; (2) a claim under
Title II of the American with Disabilities Act for failure to accommodate; (3) a claim under Title
II of the American with Disabilities Act for retaliation; (4) a claim under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate; (5) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation
of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights; (6) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights; (7) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for civil conspiracy; (8) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for municipal liability; and (9) a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Counts 2, 3, 4, and 8 are against the City only.
The remaining five claims are against Arview and Snell only.
II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative, to Dismiss:
Defendants ask this Court to either abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the
Colorado River doctrine or, alternatively, dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 of Plaintiff’s third
amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 106).
i. Motion to Stay:
“Federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction given
to them.” City of Fishers v. DIRECTV, 5 F.4th 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Due to this obligation,
“[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado

River, 424 U.S. at 813. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has identified several situations where
abstention would be proper. J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021). Defendants
have cited one of these prior applications: Colorado River abstention.
To determine whether abstention under the Colorado River doctrine is appropriate, the
Court must conduct a two-part analysis. Tyrer v. City of S. Beloit, 456 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir.
2006). First, it must decide whether the concurrent state and federal actions are parallel. Id. If
there is doubt about whether actions are parallel, the Court should not abstain under Colorado
River. Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 657 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2011). But if the actions are
parallel, the Court must determine if “exceptional circumstances” exist to justify Colorado River

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abstention. Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 751.
In this case, there is one relevant state court action, Tina Rose v. Andrea Bolen, Franklin
County Case No. 2025-LA-20 (“Rose v. Bolen”), and two relevant administrative proceedings,
Tina Rose v. Thad Snell, IDHR Charge No. 2025CP3233 (“Rose v. Snell”) and Tina Rose v. City
of West Frankfort, IDHR Charge No. 2025CP0703 (“Rose v. City”).

The Court questions whether any of these actions are parallel to this case. Rose v. Bolen
was dismissed with prejudice by the Franklin County Circuit Court on June 12, 2026. It is not
clear that Rose v. Snell and Rose v. City, as administrative proceedings, are even covered by the
Colorado River doctrine. Regardless, even assuming that all three actions are parallel, no
exceptional circumstances warrant abstention. This case was filed before the state court and
administrative proceedings and has made substantial progress. Plaintiff has filed a third amended
complaint, some of her claims have survived dismissal, the parties are actively engaged in
discovery, and the Court has already devoted substantial time and judicial resources to this case.
Accordingly, the Court declines to abstain under the Colorado River doctrine.

ii. Motion to Dismiss:
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all
allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint
(1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to

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relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; EEOC v. Concentra Health
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Although

liberal federal notice pleading standards ensure that even non-detailed complaints can survive a
motion to dismiss, they will not prevent dismissal of complaints that plead too much. A case can
be dismissed because a complaint pleads facts establishing that the defendant is entitled to
prevail. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1998); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St. Louis Sw.
Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997).
1. Counts 2, 3 and 4 – Title II of the American with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act:
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act “generally prohibit discriminating based on
disability in public programs.” Zimny v. Geneva Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 304, 718 F. Supp. 3d 766,
781 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating based on
disability; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies that same prohibition to federally funded
programs and activities. Id. The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Plaintiff brings two claims under the ADA: (1) failure to accommodate; and (2)

retaliation. She also brings a failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
a. Failure to Accommodate:
To state a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)
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she is a qualified person; (2) she has a disability; and (3) the defendant denied her access to a
program or activity by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. See
Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The Rehabilitation Act
requires the plaintiff to plead an additional requirement: the defendant is an entity that receives
federal funds.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to accommodate. She alleges that she is a
qualified individual with a disability, and that she was denied access to public services, including
the zoning process. However, she does not plausibly allege that any of the accommodations she
requested from the City—emailed notices or agendas, communications-related accommodations,
and access to a neutral ADA coordinator—were necessary to afford her meaningful access to the
zoning process.
First, she does not explain how any of her disabilities prevented her from reviewing the
zoning board agenda in person, nor does she allege that receiving the zoning board agenda by
email was necessary to afford meaningful access to the zoning process. The interaction that

occurred after Plaintiff went to City Hall to obtain the agenda may give rise to another claim, but
it does not show that any reasonable accommodation was necessary for access to public services.
Second, she does not allege that she ever requested any accommodation related to
communication, or that the City denied such a request. Instead, she alleges only that city officials
corrected her speech and pronunciation in public. These corrections may have been embarrassing
or upsetting to Plaintiff, but she does not plausibly allege that they denied her access to public
services because of her disability.
Finally, she does not explain how access to a neutral ADA coordinator was necessary for

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meaningful access to the zoning process. To the extent Plaintiff believes an ADA coordinator
could have scheduled her zoning board hearing, that is not the role of an ADA coordinator.
Since Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged she was denied meaningful access to the zoning
process due to the City’s failure to provide reasonable accommodation, the Court will dismiss
Counts 2 and 4 of the third amended complaint without prejudice.

b. Retaliation:
To state a claim for retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal
connection existed between the two. See Edwards v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin., 210 F. Supp. 3d 931,
953 (N.D. Ill. 2016). A plaintiff engages in a statutorily protected activity by seeking
accommodation or by raising a claim of discrimination based on her disability. Preddie v.
Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2015). An action is adverse if
it would “dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity.” Henry v. Milwaukee
Cnty., 539 F.3d 573, 586 (7th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff has stated a claim for retaliation. First, she alleges that she engaged in a
statutorily protected activity by seeking accommodation. She claims that she requested an
emailed copy of the zoning board agenda as an accommodation for her disability. Second, she
alleges that she suffered adverse action. The same day the City refused to provide her with an
emailed agenda, Plaintiff appeared at City Hall to review the agenda in person. She alleges that,
upon her arrival, Arview threatened her home and physically menaced her, and the City Clerk
called the police and reported that Plaintiff was terrorizing Arview. She claims that, four days
later, she attempted to speak at a zoning board meeting. Arview interrupted her by loudly stating,

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“You are not a whistleblower,” multiple times. She alleges that two days after that, Arview filed
a petition for an order of protection against her based on false or misleading statements. Third,
she has pleaded a specific timeline from which the Court can plausibly infer that her statutorily
protected activity caused the adverse action. Since Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim for
retaliation, the Court will allow this claim to proceed.

2. Count 5 – Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process:
To state a § 1983 claim against an individual, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant
deprived her of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and was acting
under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); McKinney v. Duplain, 463
F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2006). “[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. The plaintiff must demonstrate a causal
connection between (1) the sued officials and (2) the alleged misconduct.” Colbert v. City of
Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotations marks omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1. This clause
encompasses three types of protection. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). The one
that is relevant here is the “guarantee of fair procedure.” Id. “To demonstrate a procedural due
process violation of a property right, the plaintiff must establish that there is ‘(1) a cognizable
property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) a denial of due process.’”
Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hudson v. City of Chicago, 374 F.3d
554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004)). To have a constitutionally protected property interest, “an individual
must have a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Kim Const. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of Vill. of

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Mundelein, 14 F.3d 1243, 1245 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). “A property interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause is
created by ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits.’” Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process. Her interest in the
use, enjoyment, and exclusive possession of her real property was not deprived by Arview and
Snell; it was deprived by Robert Stanley. To the extent she alleges an interest in the enforcement
of the building and zoning codes, that is not a cognizable property interest. The Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act makes public employees, like
Arview and Snell, immune from liability for injuries caused by any failure to enforce the law.
See 745 ILCS 10/2-202. Accordingly, Plaintiff, as a private citizen, has no protected property
interest in the enforcement of city ordinances.
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she was deprived of a cognizable property interest

without due process of law. Thus, the Court will dismiss Count 5 with prejudice.
3. Count 8 – Monell Liability:
A municipality may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under §
1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978). It may be liable, however, for its own actions as a municipality. Id. at 690–92. A
municipal action occurs where (1) the municipality had an express policy calling for a
constitutional violation, (2) the municipality had a widespread practice of constitutional
violations that was so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the

8
force of law, or (3) if a person with final policymaking authority for the municipality caused the
constitutional violation. Id. at 694. And the policy, custom, or decision must be the moving force
behind the constitutional violation. Id.
Plaintiff has stated a Monell claim based on a ratification theory. A municipality may be
liable under § 1983 where a final policymaker ratifies the unconstitutional conduct by either

approving the decision and the basis for it, see Kernats v. O’Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1182 (7th
Cir. 1994), or acting with deliberate or reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s complaints, see
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff alleges she made
numerous complaints to the City Council asserting that Arview and Snell were violating her
constitutional rights by enforcing the building and zoning codes in an unequal manner and
retaliating against her for protected speech and advocacy. She further alleges that, despite these
warnings, the City Council failed to take corrective action. These allegations, taken as true and
construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are sufficient to plausibly allege that the City
Council acted with deliberate or reckless indifference to her complaints. Therefore, the Court

will allow this claim to proceed.
4. Count 9 – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has three elements: (1) the conduct
involved was “truly extreme and outrageous,” (2) the defendant either intended to inflict, or
knew there was a high probability he would cause, severe emotional distress, and (3) the
defendant actually caused severe emotional distress. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80
(Ill. 2003). To support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the conduct “must go
beyond all bounds of decency and be considered intolerable in a civilized community.” Honaker

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v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. A.C. Equip. Servs. Corp., 610 N.E.2d
745, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
To determine whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, courts consider three factors:
(1) “the more power or control the defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely the conduct
will be deemed extreme;” (2) “whether the defendant reasonably believed its objective was

legitimate;” and (3) “whether the defendant was aware the plaintiff was ‘peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity.’” Franciski v.
Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 338 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting McGrath v. Fahey, 533
N.E.2d 806, 809–11 (Ill. 1988)). “Recovery under this theory does not extend to conduct
involving mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”
Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 569 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). “Nor does it
even extend to conduct ‘characterized by “malice” or a degree of aggravation which would
entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.’” Id. (quoting Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis,
360 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. 1976)).

Plaintiff has stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Arview.
First, she alleges that he engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. She claims that he
physically menaced her at City Hall and threatened to find a way to take her home. In addition,
she alleges that there are at least two factors present that make this conduct extreme and
outrageous: (1) Arview is the mayor of the City and has power over her; and (2) Arview knew
that she was disabled and particularly susceptible to emotional distress. Second, she alleges that
Arview knew there was a high probability that his actions would cause her severe emotional
distress, particularly given his knowledge that she was disabled and vulnerable. Third, she

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alleges that she suffered severe emotional distress, including exacerbation of PTSD symptoms,
insomnia, stress-related vomiting, and elevated blood pressure.
This claim is not preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”).1 “The IHRA
gives the Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”) exclusive jurisdiction over civil rights
violations.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2006). The Illinois

Supreme Court has held that, where a tort claim is “inextricably linked” to a civil rights violation
so there is “no independent basis for imposing liability,” the IHRA precludes the courts from
exercising jurisdiction over the tort claim. See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill.
1997). In general, “discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress are different
wrongs.” Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, FSB, 345 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim that does “not depend on a civil rights violation”
is not preempted by the IHRA. Naeem, 444 F.3d at 604. Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress is based on her allegations that Arview physically menaced her at City Hall
and threatened to find a way to take her home. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, regardless of whether these actions were motivated by
Plaintiff’s disability.
However, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Snell is barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This claim is based on Plaintiff’s allegation that Snell
threatened to demolish her home. This same allegation was considered in a prior lawsuit—Tina
Rose v. West Frankfort and Thad Snell, Franklin County Case No. 2024-LA-47 (“Rose v. City

1 This is not a finding of fact or a final holding. At this stage, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as
true and construe them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. In addition, because IHRA preemption is a question
of subject-matter jurisdiction, Defendants remain free to raise the issue again after the factual record has been
developed.
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and Snell”). To determine preclusive effect of Rose v. City and Snell, the Court looks to Illinois
law. Sapp v. Foxx, 106 F.4th 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2024). In Illinois, collateral estoppel applies if
three elements are met: “(1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be identical to the one
in the current suit; (2) the prior adjudication must have been a final judgment on the merits; and
(3) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted must have been a party to, or must be in

privity with a party to, the prior adjudication.” Id. All three elements are met here. Plaintiff was a
party to Rose v. City and Snell. That case resulted in a final judgment on the merits, determining,
in relevant part, that Snell was immune from liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on his alleged threat to demolish Plaintiff’s home. As such, collateral estoppel
precludes Plaintiff from relitigating the issue in this case.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Arview, but her claim against Snell is barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. As such, it will allow Count 9 to proceed against Arview but will dismiss it
with prejudice against Snell.

B. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 93):
Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to file a supplemental complaint setting out events that
occurred after she filed this action. Defendants filed a response (Doc. 97), and Plaintiff filed a
reply (Doc. 98).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides that: “[o]n motion and reasonable notice,
the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be
supplemented.” “A party does not have an absolute right to file a supplemental pleading.”

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Chalmers v. Rector, No. 15-CV-044-MJR, 2015 WL 5675799, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2015).
“Rather, ‘the district court has substantial discretion either to permit or to deny such a motion.’”
Id. (quoting Chicago Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 644 F.3d 353, 356 (7th
Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff filed this case on May 2, 2025. She now seeks to file a supplemental complaint

detailing events that occurred as recently as March 27, 2026. The allegations in her proposed
supplemental complaint focus on the alleged continuation of the same conduct underlying her
initial claims. Based on her most recent filings and the statements she made to the Court during a
July 6, 2026, motion hearing, Plaintiff believes this conduct is still occurring.
The Court declines to allow Plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint for three reasons.
First, her proposed supplemental complaint would greatly expand this litigation. It adds nearly a
year of events to this case and expands the operative pleading by 17 pages and 81 paragraphs.
Second, many of the allegations in her proposed supplemental complaint are conclusory, while
others cannot form the basis for her claims. For example, her proposed supplemental complaint

contains 5 pages of allegations that Arview and Snell made false or misleading statements to the
Illinois Department of Human Rights. This is litigation conduct, which generally does not give
rise to actionable retaliation. See Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t
will be the rare case in which conduct occurring within the scope of litigation constitutes
retaliation prohibited by these statutes.”). She also attempts to hold Arview and Snell responsible
for the conduct of other individuals, including Johnathan Cantrell, Robert Stanley, and Jonathan
Stanley. However, with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, they can only be held liable for their
own wrongdoing. See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1985); Sanville v.

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McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Third, this litigation needs to proceed to
resolution. At some point, the scope of this case must be fixed for the parties to complete
discovery, prepare dispositive motions, and if necessary, proceed to trial. The Court believes the
appropriate temporal endpoint is the filing date of May 2, 2025. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue
claims based on events occurring after that date, she may do so by filing a separate action.
Il. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, the Court:
e GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Stay, or in the
Alternative, to Dismiss (Doc. 104);
o Itis GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts 2, 4, and 5 in their
entirety and Count 9 against Snell;
= Counts 2 and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice in their entirety;
= Count 5 is DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety;
= Count 9 is DISMISSED with prejudice as to Snell;
o Itis DENIED in all other respects;
e DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case;
e DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 93); and
e ORDERS that no further amendments will be permitted absent compliance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and a showing of good cause.
IT IS SO ORDERED. op GAL, LY Mai
DATED: July 31, 2026
1. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11412050. Public record. Not legal advice.