# Tucker

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · July 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411830

## Case

- **Full name:** Morris Tucker v. United States of America, d/b/a United States Postal Service
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** July 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

MORRIS TUCKER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. ) 2:23cv63-MHT
) (WO)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
d/b/a United States )
Postal Service, )
)
Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER
This lawsuit stems from an accident in which a U.S.
Postal Service (USPS) truck hit and injured plaintiff
Morris Tucker while he was riding a bicycle. Tucker
seeks to recover damages from defendant United States of
America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The government moves to dismiss
Tucker’s lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
based on two theories. It argues, first, that Tucker
‘settled’ his claim. Second, it argues that it has not
‘finally denied’ Tucker’s claim. For the following
reasons, the motion will be denied.

I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The United States is generally immune from suit
unless Congress explicitly waives the government’s

immunity.” Koletas v. United States, 159 F.4th 813, 817
(11th Cir. 2025). “In the FTCA, Congress waived the
United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out
of torts committed by federal employees.” Ali v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 217–18 (2008). The
government contends that this court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over Tucker’s lawsuit because he cannot
recover under the FTCA and thus his suit falls outside

the waiver of sovereign immunity. The government seeks
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
There are two types of subject-matter-jurisdiction
attacks under Rule 12(b)(1): facial attacks and factual

attacks. When a defendant makes a facial attack on
jurisdiction, the court reviews the complaint to
2
determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lawrence
v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). In

contrast, when a defendant makes a factual attack, the
court must determine “the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings,” and
“matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and

affidavits, are considered.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here the government brings a factual attack. “In
the face of a factual challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove

that jurisdiction exists.” OSI, Inc. v. United States,
285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2002).

II. BACKGROUND
The court will first provide the factual background
leading up to the filing of this lawsuit under the FTCA.
The court will then briefly summarize the relevant

3
structure of the FTCA.

A. Factual Allegations

On or about January 27, 2020, Tucker was riding a
bicycle in Montgomery, Alabama, when a USPS box truck hit
him. He suffered “severe and permanent personal
injuries” and other permanent and future damages.

Complaint (Doc. 1) at 6.
On January 25, 2022, counsel for Tucker submitted an
administrative claim for Tucker’s injuries to the USPS,
along with a cover letter. On the Standard Form 95

(“SF-95”)--the vehicle for submitting an FTCA claim to a
government agency--his counsel wrote that the total
amount in damages was $ 16,460.58 for personal injuries
and signed the form. The form contained a line stating:

“I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF CLAIM COVERS ONLY DAMAGES
AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT ABOVE.” Claim
(Doc. 15-1) at 1 (capitalization in original). It goes

on to say that, “[I] AGREE TO ACCEPT SAID AMOUNT IN FULL
4
SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CLAIM.” Id.
However, in the accompanying cover letter, counsel wrote:
“Please see the attached Standard Form 95 attached along

with Mr. Tucker’s medical records and billing. Please
note that Mr. Tucker has seen additional medical
providers and has consistently been treated throughout
the end of 2021. At this time, our office has requested

additional medical records and will supplement upon
receipt of said records.” January 25 Cover Letter
(Doc. 19-1) at 6.
More than six months later, in August 2022, the USPS

sent a letter to Tucker’s counsel with a check for the
full amount requested on his SF-95. The check was made
payable to Tucker and his attorney. See Check
(Doc. 19-1) at 8. The accompanying letter stated that

the payment was “in full and final settlement of the
claim filed on behalf of the above-referenced claimant.”

5
Settlement Letter (Doc. 15-2).1 It further stated:
“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672 and 39 C.F.R. § 912.14,
acceptance of this check operates as a complete release

and bars recovery of any additional or future claims
against the United States, the U.S. Postal Service, or
any employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim
by reason of the same subject matter.” Id. (emphasis

added). The letter was sent by certified mail and was
received by Tucker’s counsel on August 30, 2022. See
Certified Mail Receipt (Doc. 15-3). The check was not
cashed or returned.

On January 27, 2023, less than five months after
receiving the check, Tucker filed this lawsuit. He now
seeks $ 3 million in damages.

1. The letter was dated August 9, 2022, but because
the check that accompanied the letter was dated August
10, 2022, it is unclear whether the date on the letter
was the actual mailing date. See Settlement Letter
(Doc. 15-2). In any event, the statute of limitations,
which turns on the mailing date, is not at issue here.
6
B. The FTCA’s Relevant Structure
As stated, the government contends that this court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Tucker’s lawsuit
because his suit falls outside the waiver of sovereign
immunity in that he cannot recover under the FTCA.
Whether this suit can move forward, therefore, turns on

whether Tucker may recover under the FTCA.
The FTCA permits the government to be sued for the
negligence of its employees under the same circumstances
and to the same extent as a private party. The act has

both an administrative-exhaustion requirement, set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), and a statute of limitations, set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Combined, § 2675(a) and
§ 2401(b) “act as chronological bookends to an FTCA

claim, marking both a date before which a claim may not
be filed and a date after which any filing is untimely.”
Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir.

2015). Section 2675(a) “bars claimants from bringing
7
suit in federal court until they have exhausted their
administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Plaintiffs may meet this

requirement in two ways: (1) they may “have their
administrative claims finally denied by the relevant
federal agency; or (2) if the agency fails to act on
their administrative claims within six months of

presentment, they may thereafter deem the claims denied,
that is, that they may consider that claim as having been
constructively denied. Barnes, 776 F.3d. at 1139.
As observed above, while “§ 2675(a)’s exhaustion

requirement establishes a date before which a claim
cannot be filed, § 2401(b)’s limitations period
establishes the date after which any claim is barred.”
Id. (emphasis in original). Section 2401(b) provides

that, “A tort claim against the United States shall be
forever barred unless ... action is begun within six
months after the date of mailing, by certified or

registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim
8
by the agency to which it was presented.” Id.
The FTCA authorizes each federal agency to settle
administrative claims, and it prevents the filing of

lawsuits when the claimant has accepted a settlement.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2672. The act provides that, “The
acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise,
or settlement shall be final and conclusive on the

claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any
claim against the United States and against the employee
of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, by reason of the same subject matter.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION
To rehash some of the critical facts, the record
reflects that, on January 27, 2020, Tucker was hit on his

bike by a USPS box truck; on January 25, 2022, counsel
for Tucker submitted an administrative claim to the USPS;
in August 2022, the USPS sent a letter to Tucker with a
check for the full amount requested in the claim; and on

9
January 27, 2023, Tucker filed this lawsuit.
As stated, the central question before the court is
whether Tucker may recover under the FTCA. And, as
further stated, the government moves to dismiss for two

reasons. It argues, first, that it ‘settled’ Tucker’s
claim, and the FTCA bars settled claims. Second, it

argues that Tucker may not sue the government because the
USPS has not ‘finally denied’ his claim, as required by
the FTCA. The court will discuss each argument, in turn.

A. Settlement as Bar to Suit
The government argues that Tucker “accepted the
settlement by retaining the check for a year with no
notice that he would not accept the check.” Govt’s Mot.
to Dis. (Doc. 15) at 4. And the cover letter accompanying
the check stated: “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672 and 39
C.F.R. § 912.14, acceptance of this check operates as a
complete release and bars recovery of any additional or
future claims against the United States.” Settlement

10

Letter (Doc. 15-2).
As support for its contention, the government points
to a variety of federal cases in which FTCA lawsuits were

dismissed because the plaintiffs were found to have
accepted the government’s settlement offer. See Mot. to
Dismiss (Doc. 15) at 5-6 (citing, e.g., Schwarder v.
United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 1992)).2

The court finds these cases distinguishable because, in
each such case, the plaintiff cashed the check from the
government and, thereby, provided a clear indication of
accepting the settlement offer.3 Here, in contrast,

2. The government further cites Ziler v. USA, No.
6:21-CV-01697, 2022 WL 2390045, at *1 (W.D. La. July 1,
2022) (Summerhays, J.); Contreras v. United States, No.
1:19-CV-12870, 2022 WL 970192, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 31,
2022) (O’Hearn, J.); Circelli v. United States, No.
17-CV-5269, 2018 WL 3000334, at *1 (D.N.J. June 15, 2018)
(Wigenton, J.); and Murphree v. United States, No.
10-CV-4122, 2011 WL 1980371, at *1 (D. Kan. May 20, 2011)
(Brown, J.).

3. The cashing of a check is of particular
significance in contract law. See, e.g., Ala. Code
§ 7-3-311 (2025) (defining accord and satisfaction by use
of a negotiable instrument, and requiring that “the
11
Tucker did not cash the government’s check and therefore
did not clearly “accept” the settlement offer.
Anticipating this issue, the government argues that

it does not matter to the analysis of acceptance that
Tucker did not cash the check. Before analyzing this
argument, the court must determine the law that applies
to the question. The government contends that Alabama

law controls.
As an initial matter, the FTCA requires that the
government’s tendering of the check be viewed as a
settlement offer to Tucker. See Wiseman v. United

States, 976 F.2d 604, 606 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because
§ 2672 requires ‘acceptance by the claimant,’ filing an
administrative claim is not a settlement offer by the
claimant, but an invitation to negotiate.”). The FTCA

“explicitly vests the power of acceptance in the
claimant, and not in the agency. ... [S]ince the statute

claimant obtained payment of the instrument” for the
provision to apply); U.C.C. § 3-311(a) (2002) (same).

12
gives the claimant the power of acceptance, an agency’s
decision to grant the claim is not an acceptance, but an
offer.” Odin v. United States, 656 F.2d 798, 804 (D.C.

Cir. 1981). Thus, regardless of which substantive body
of law controls this inquiry, the court’s analysis must
start from this statutory premise.
Claims brought under the FTCA are governed by the

substantive law of the State where the injury occurred.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346.4 “[A] reading of the statute as a
whole, with due regard to its purpose, requires
application of the whole law of the State where the act

or omission occurred.” Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 11 (1962). That said, it is not entirely clear

4. Section 1346 gives district courts jurisdiction
“of civil actions on claims against the United States,
for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.” (Emphasis added.)
13
whether the statute’s reference to substantive law refers
to only the state law relevant to the cause of action or
also refers to state law regarding whether a settlement

offer has been accepted.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided
whether state or federal law applies in an FTCA case to
whether a plaintiff accepted a settlement by retention

of a check. However, the appellate court has expressed
a general reluctance to rely on federal common law except
in limited settings. See Resnick v. Uccello Immobilien
GMBH, Inc., 227 F.3d 1347, 1350 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2000).5

Moreover, several courts have applied state law in
the FTCA context to decide related issues. See, e.g.,
Reo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“The basic purpose of the FTCA is to subject the United

5. In Resnick, the court stated: “We generally
disfavor federal common law and apply it in only rare
instances concerning rights and obligation of the United
States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.” 227
F.3d at 1350 n. 4 (quotation and citation omitted).
14
States to tort liability under state law to the same
extent as private individuals. State law thus governs
both the creation of liability and the effect of a
purported release of liability.”).6 For these reasons,

the court will apply Alabama law to decide whether Tucker
accepted the settlement offer by retaining the check
without cashing it.

6. See also Schwarder v. United States, 974 F.2d
1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying state law to
determine the impact of an FTCA settlement on a
non-settling party, but “conclud[ing], as a matter of
federal law, that an administrative settlement reached
pursuant to section 2672 bars further claims by the
settling party, without regard to the effect it would
have as a matter of state law ... [because] [s]uch a
construction gives meaning to all of section 2672, and
effectuates the apparent Congressional intent to provide
a uniform procedure, independent of underlying state law,
by which the government can settle tort claims against
it”); Green v. United States, 709 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th
Cir. 1983) (“[T]he effect of a release from liability
must be determined according to that state’s law.”)
(citation omitted); Rushford v. United States, 204 F.2d
831, 832 (2d Cir. 1953) (“[I]t is plain that Congress
meant to make the proper state law in all respects the
model for the liabilities it consented to accept; and
that the ‘circumstances’ included as much those facts
that would release a liability once arisen, as those on
which its creation depended.”).
15
The government cites one Alabama case dealing with
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction to argue that
Tucker held onto the check for an unreasonable amount of

time and thus treated it as a full settlement: Craft v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 123 So. 265, 270 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1928), rev’d and remanded by Craft, 123 So. 271, 274
(Ala. 1929). Under Alabama law, “[a] valid accord and

satisfaction is premised upon there being an express or
implied contract between the parties.” Bank Indep. v.
Byars, 538 So. 2d 432, 435 (Ala. 1988). “[I]n order for
there to be a valid accord and satisfaction, there must

be (1) proper subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3)
assent or meeting of the minds; and (4) consideration.”
Id. (citations omitted).
“[A meeting of the minds] is not a determination of

law, but one of fact, based upon the evidence presented.”
Ray v. Alabama Cent. Credit Union, 472 So. 2d 1012, 1014
(Ala. 1985). “Generally speaking an offeree has a right

to make no reply to offers, and his silence and inaction
16
cannot be construed as an assent to the offer.” Brunswick
Corp. v. Sittason, 277 Ala. 45 (Ala. 1964) (quotations
omitted). There are exceptions to this general contract

rule. Previous dealings between the parties, the
offeree’s conduct, or an extended retention of goods or
services without objection can indicate acceptance. See
id. at 47. The Sittason court stated that “silence gives

consent in these cases only when there is a duty to
speak.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In Craft, the case cited by the government, an
Alabama appeals court found that a party had accepted a

check in full accord and satisfaction of a claim,
reasoning that, under certain circumstances, retaining a
settlement check “for an unreasonable time will amount
to an election to treat the payment as a full settlement.”

Craft, 123 So. at 270.7 Notably, on appeal, the Alabama

7. In citing the Alabama Court of Appeals’ Craft
decision in its motion, the government described the
Alabama Supreme Court’s subsequent decision as a reversal
“on other grounds.” See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 15-1) at
7. The court is not sure whether this description is
17
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, including
on its finding of accord and satisfaction, explaining
that, “[t]he mere retention of an uncertified personal

check purporting to be issued in full satisfaction of a
disputed demand, where notice is given on its receipt
that it will not be received in full satisfaction of the
demand, in the absence of the subsequent indorsement and

collection, does not, as a matter of law, constitute an
acceptance of the check as accord and satisfaction.”
Craft, 123 So. at 274.
These cases guide the court insofar as one sets out

a general unreasonable-time standard for acceptance by
silence, and the other provides a set of facts in which
retention of a check definitely does not amount to accord
and satisfaction. However, neither Craft opinion makes

accurate. The Alabama Supreme Court expressly disagreed
with the court below as to its resolution of the accord
and satisfaction issue and reversed and remanded the
case. However, it did not expressly reject the idea that
retaining a settlement check for an unreasonable time can
amount to an election to treat the check as a full
settlement.
18
clear how long the checks were retained and therefore
they offer little guidance as to what counts as an
unreasonable time.

Tucker retained the check without cashing it for less
than five months before filing suit.8 In an effort to
elucidate the meaning of “unreasonable time,” the
government cites several non-Alabama cases in support of

its argument. While none of these cases is binding, the
court can consider them as persuasive authority.
However, in none of the cited cases did any court find
that retaining a check for less than five months amounts

to acceptance. In one case, a federal court found that
an FTCA claimant accepted a USPS settlement offer where
the claimant retained the check for more than two years.
Arnold v. United States, No. 1:21-CV-399-WJ-JFR, 2022 WL

7008294, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 12, 2022) (Johnson, C.J.).

8. As the government notes, Tucker put the government
on notice that he deemed his claim denied in January
2023, when he “filed” the complaint. Govt. Reply Br.
(Doc. 20) at 2.
19
Two years is substantially longer than five months, which
alone makes Arnold distinguishable from the instant
case.9

In a footnote, the government also cited cases from
other States holding that acceptance occurred when a
check was retained for (a) eight years, (b) 18 months,
and (c) seven months. See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 15) at

7 n. 3.10 Hoffman v. Ralston Purina Co., 273 N.W.2d 214
(Wis. 1979), the seven-month case (the only one close

9. In Arnold, the claimant also failed to return the
check despite being told by the USPS that “she must return
the check in order to demand an updated settlement
offer,” an added fact that made retention more akin to
assent. Id. at 3. Here, the USPS did not tell Tucker
to return the check.

10. The government cites Rosenberg v. Townsend,
Rosenberg & Young, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (acceptance of settlement offer where check was
retained for 18 months without notifying other party that
check would not be accepted as payment in full); Bestor
v. Am. Nat'l Stores, 691 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(acceptance where initial check was retained for eight
years and subsequent checks were cashed); and Hoffman v.
Ralston Purina Co., 273 N.W.2d 214 (Wis. 1979)
(acceptance where check was retained for seven months,
with silence).
20
enough to the time period in this case to warrant closer
examination), is distinguishable: the court based its
finding of accord and satisfaction on not only the

offeree’s retention of a check for that period of time
but also the offeree’s retention of an accompanying
credit memorandum and acceptance “without objection [of]
the fruits of that credit memorandum[--]the cancellation

of his existing indebtedness.” Id. at 218-19. Tucker,
in contrast, accepted no additional benefit from the
government that would support a finding that he accepted
the government’s offer. And the government concedes that

he gave notice that he would not accept the check when
he filed suit. See Govt. Reply Br. (Doc. 20) at 2 (“Mr.
Tucker did not put the United States on notice that he
deemed his claim to be denied until he filed the complaint

in January 2023.”).
The court concludes that retaining the government’s
settlement offer for less than five months before filing

suit--thereby putting the government on notice that the
21
check would not be accepted--does not, by itself, amount
to Tucker’s accepting of the check as an accord and
satisfaction of his tort claim under Alabama law.

Further, while Tucker did not supplement his claim with
additional medical bills before the government sent the
check, his attorney did put the government on notice from
the outset that the amount Tucker requested on his SF-95

did not encompass the full amount of his damages--in
particular, bills. Thus, the government knew at the time
it sent the check that the amount was likely insufficient
from plaintiff’s perspective. Under these circumstances,

the court cannot conclude that the government obtained
Tucker’s acceptance of its settlement offer through
accord and satisfaction.
Finally, at the end of its acceptance argument, the

government briefly argues that the court lacks
jurisdiction because the case was settled for the maximum
amount Tucker could receive in court. It contends that

28 U.S.C. § 2675(b)--which states, in part, that, “Action
22
under this section shall not be instituted for any sum
in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the
federal agency”--robs the court of jurisdiction because

Tucker sued for $ 3 million while his administrative
claim listed his damages as $ 16,460.58.
The government’s argument depends in large part on
ignoring the language that follows the quoted part of

§ 2675(b). The full provision allows FTCA cases to be
brought for more than the amount requested in the
administrative claim “where the increased amount is based
upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably

discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the
federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of
intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.”
28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). The applicability of this provision

cannot be resolved at this early stage of the case. See
Rudd v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 730, 734 (M.D. Ala.
1964) (Johnson, J.) (“The application of this rule of

‘limitation of liability’ does not require the dismissal
23
of plaintiffs’ claims. In such instances, the courts have
held that the limitation is merely upon the amount
recoverable.”) (collecting cases). The government may
reassert this defense on summary judgment or thereafter.
See generally Frazier v. United States, 766 F.2d 478
(llth Cir. 1985) (applying § 2675(b) after trial). That
said, the amount Tucker may recover in this case appears
likely to be significantly limited by § 2675(b).
Having found that Tucker did not accept’ the
government’s settlement offer, the court turns to the
government’s second argument--that Tucker has not met the
prerequisites laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

B. Exhaustion as a Bar to Suit
“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in
federal court until they have exhausted their
administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993). As stated, there are two ways for

a claimant to exhaust his administrative remedies:

24

concretely or constructively. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)
provides that the plaintiff must have “first presented
the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim

shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing
and sent by certified or registered mail.” (Emphasis
added.) But a formal written denial is not the only way
a claim can be denied: § 2675(a) further provides that,

“The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a
claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the
option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a
final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.”

Id. (emphasis added). In other words, “to meet the
threshold requirement of administrative exhaustion,
plaintiffs must either (1) have their administrative
claims finally denied by the relevant federal agency; or

(2) if the agency fails to act on their administrative
claims within six months of presentment, they may
thereafter deem the claims (constructively) denied.”

25
Dotson v. U.S., 30 F.4th 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
To rehash some of the critical facts, the record

reflects that, on January 27, 2020, Tucker was hit on his
bike by a USPS box truck; on January 25, 2022, counsel
for Tucker submitted an administrative claim to the USPS;
in August 2022, the USPS sent a letter to Tucker with a

check for the full amount requested in the claim; and,
on January 27, 2023, Tucker filed this lawsuit.
The specific issue here is whether an agency’s
issuance and offer of a check for the full amount claimed

on the SF-95--after six months without a final
disposition--eliminates his statutory right to deem his
claim denied and file suit. Or to put it another way,
does an unaccepted offer do so? For the reasons below,

the answer to this question is no.
While § 2675(a) mandates that a claimant who has
submitted an administrative claim wait either to receive

a denial from the agency or until six months have passed
26
from filing the claim before filing suit, there is
nothing in the FTCA to require the claimant to engage in
the administrative process beyond these baseline

presentment requirements. See Adams v. United States,
615 F.2d 284, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1980) (“A claimant’s
refusal to settle his or her claim will not deprive the
federal court of jurisdiction, if the claimant has

provided the statutorily required notice. Although many
claimants will rationally elect to settle their claims,
Congress clearly did not deem settlement mandatory.”)
(footnotes omitted), decision clarified on denial of

reh’g, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).11 “A federal court’s
power to adjudicate a tort claim brought against the
United States depends solely on whether the claimant has
previously complied with the minimal requirements of the

statute. Federal court power does not depend on whether

11. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
27
a claimant has successfully navigated his or her way
through the gauntlet of the administrative settlement
process ... .” Id. at 292 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)).

The government argues that this suit must be
dismissed because the USPS did not finally deny Tucker’s
claim. In response, Tucker argues that, because the
agency did not finally dispose of his claim within six

months after filing, he had the option “at any time
thereafter” to deem the claim finally denied, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a), which he did. To resolve the issue in this
case, the court must first determine what this statutory

language means.

1. Statutory Interpretation
When interpreting a statute, “the first step is to

determine whether the statutory language has a plain and
unambiguous meaning by referring to ‘the language itself,
the specific context in which that language is used, and

the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” Bautista
28
v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized,

in its current jurisprudence, that courts interpreting
statutes should rely on a statute’s plain language when
the meaning of such language is clear, rather than
turning to legislative history, speculation about what

Congress might have intended, or policy arguments. See
Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024). “The statutory-interpretation
inquiry ceases if the language is clear and ‘the

statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” Bautista,
396 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340).
Starting with the statutory language, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a) provides that, “The failure of an agency to

make final disposition of a claim within six months after
it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time
thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for

purposes of this section.” (Emphasis added.) The
29
Supreme Court has “repeatedly explained that the word
‘any’ has an expansive meaning. ... The standard
dictionary definition of ‘any’ is [s]ome, regardless of

quantity or number.” Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 405
n.2 (2020) (citations and quotations omitted). The most
natural reading of the plain language is that, once six
months pass without agency action, a claimant has the

option to deem his claim denied whenever he
chooses--unless some other provision cabins the time.12
Moving to the context of the language, the phrase at
issue sits in 28 U.S.C. § 2675, which addresses the

impact of the administrative process on subsequent
litigation. The statute (1) sets the
administrative-exhaustion requirement (§ 2675(a)), (2)
constrains the damages that can be awarded in a lawsuit

12. “Section 2675(a) expressly states that a claim
may be deemed denied only ‘for purposes of this section.’
Thus, a ‘deemed’ final denial under section 2675(a) has
no effect beyond what is stated in that section.” Lehman
v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1998)
(emphasis in original).
30
to the amount requested in the administrative process,
with limited exceptions, (§ 2675(b)), and (3) restricts
the use, in a lawsuit, of any disposition in the

administrative process by the Attorney General or an
agency as evidence of liability or amount of damages
(§ 2675(c)).
Subsection (a) of § 2675, thus, acts as an initial

hurdle that, once overcome, allows a claimant to bring
suit. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112
(“The most natural reading of [§ 2675(a)] indicates that
Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of

Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial
process.”). It is narrowly concerned with exiting the
administrative arena and moving to the judicial arena.
When drafting the 1966 amendments to the FTCA, Congress

had to decide how long it wanted claims to remain with
an agency, and it decided on six months. And in doing
so, it did not further constrain the deemed-denial option

31
by eliminating it if the agency acted after six months
but before suit.
Third and finally, the court looks to the broader

context of the FTCA as a whole. One tool of statutory
interpretation involves looking at other uses of
contested language in a statute. The phrase at issue
here--“at the option of the claimant any time

thereafter”--does not arise elsewhere in the statutory
scheme, and thus other instances are unavailable to aid
in the interpretation of this phrase in § 2675(a).
Moreover, “[s]ection 2675(a) expressly states that a

claim may be deemed denied only ‘for purposes of this
section.’ Thus, a ‘deemed’ final denial under section
2675(a) has no effect beyond what is stated in that
section.” Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1014

(9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original).
The court’s interpretation of the phrase is coherent
with the rest of the statutory scheme. It creates no

32
inconsistency or conflict with the other provisions of
the statute.
Further, multiple courts have determined that the

time to invoke the deemed-denial provision is limited by
only a final denial by the agency. See, e.g., Barnes v.
United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“[C]ourts are virtually of one mind in ruling that (at

least until there has been a final denial by the relevant
agency) there is no limit on when a plaintiff may file a
lawsuit predicated on a deemed denial.” (collecting
cases)).13 With the filing of his lawsuit after his claim

13. The FTCA’s statute-of-limitations provision, 28
U.S.C. § 2401(b), requires that lawsuits be filed “within
six months after the date of mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim
by the agency to which it was presented.” Courts have
determined that, when an agency does not act within six
months but later sends a final denial pursuant to
§ 2401(b), this statute of limitations supersedes the
deemed-denial provision. See, e.g., Barnes v. United
States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he
six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) is triggered
by an agency’s formal denial of a potential plaintiff’s
administrative claims—regardless of whether that
plaintiff has filed a claim pursuant to § 2675(a)’s
‘deemed denial’ provision.”).
33
had been pending for six months, Tucker gave notice that
he deemed his claim denied and the filing of his lawsuit
is proper.

2.
The government argues, nonetheless, that an agency’s
issuance of a check as an offer (without acceptance, as

explained in detail in an earlier section of this
opinion) for the full amount claimed on the initial claim
form eliminates the statutory right to deem the claim
denied and file suit. The government’s argument would

require the court to ignore Congress’s direction--in the
plain language of the statute--that a claimant may deem
his claim denied “at any time” after six months has passed
without final disposition by the agency. 28 U.S.C

§ 2675(a). Here, as explained above, the deemed-denied
provision’s operational timeframe--for purposes of

34
administrative exhaustion--is limited by only a final
denial by the agency.14
To be sure, the government may not like the fact that

the deemed-denied provision is limited by only a final

14. While the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
not been presented with the issue in this case (a suit
filed under the deemed-denial provision after six months
have passed and after the agency has offered the entire
amount written on the SF-95) its predecessor, the former
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, has laid out in binding
law, see supra note 12, the minimal requirements of
§ 2675(a) and has never said that the deemed denial under
§ 2675(a) is limited by subsequent agency action. See
Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289–90 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that proper presentment of a claim “alone
allows the claimant to maintain a subsequent action in
the district court following the denial of his or her
claim by the agency or the passage of six
months”), decision clarified on denial of reh'g, 622 F.2d
197 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Free v. United States, 885
F.2d 840, 842 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating, in the context
of a dispute regarding presentment of a claim, that
“[o]nce the claim has been denied or six months after the
claim has been filed, a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit in
federal court”); Turner ex rel. Turner v. United States,
514 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating, in
circumstances where multiple administrative claims had
been filed and only one of them had been pending for
longer than six months, that “[b]efore instituting a
federal suit, the claimant must wait either until the
administrative agency finally denies the claim or until
at least six months have passed after the claim was
filed”).
35
denial by the agency. However, “even the most formidable
policy arguments cannot overcome a clear statutory
directive.” BP P.L.C., 593 U.S. at 245 (quotation

omitted). A court’s “task is to discern and apply the
law’s plain meaning as faithfully as [it] can, not to
assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the
one that produces the least mischief.” Id. (quotation

omitted). Applying that approach here, the court finds
that the plain meaning of the statute allows Tucker’s
claim to move forward, because he properly exercised his
option to deem his claim denied pursuant to § 2675(a) at

a time after six months of USPS inaction.15 The

15. Two courts, Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d
1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1998), and Conn v. United States,
867 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1989), characterized Miller
v. United States, 741 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1984), as
holding that an FTCA action must be filed within a
“reasonable time” after the six-month review period
expires. However, Miller mentioned “reasonable time”
only in passing; there was not basis, in a stature or
case law, given for it; and the phrase was not critical
to the holding. But, in any event, Tucker filed his
lawsuit within a “reasonable time” after the six-month
review period expired.

36
government’s unaccepted offer did not eliminate this
option.

***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant United
States of America’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is

denied.
DONE, this the 28th day of July, 2026.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

37

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411830. Public record. Not legal advice.