# Brown

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · July 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411673

## Case

- **Full name:** Olivia Brown v. Fairview Hospital, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411673

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Olivia Brown, Case No. 1:24-cv-01920-PAB

Plaintiff,

-vs-
JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

Fairview Hospital, et al.,

Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants Fairview Hospital and The Cleveland Clinic
Foundation’s (collectively, “Defendants or the “Cleveland Clinic”) Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Doc. No. 18.) Plaintiff Olivia Brown (“Brown”) filed her Opposition on March 24, 2026, to which
Defendants filed their Reply on April 22, 2026. (Doc. Nos. 29, 31.) For the following reasons,
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. Background
The following facts are undisputed.
A. Brown pleads guilty to a felony in 2012
In 2012, Brown pled guilty to a felony in Missouri related to a theft at a store where she was
working at the time. (Brown Dep. 11:11–22, 12:15–17, 46:3–15.) Although Brown pled guilty, she
was never convicted of any crime related to the theft. (Brown Dep. 37:25–38:5.) Instead, she was
given probation that suspended the imposition of her sentence. (Brown Dep. 12:1–17.) Brown
accordingly was never “convicted” of a felony despite pleading guilty to a felony. (Doc. No. 19-3,
PageID #378.)
B. Brown provides false information to the Cleveland Clinic in 2018
About six years later, in February 2018, Brown applied for a job with the Cleveland Clinic as
a specimen transporter. (Brown Dep. 43:24–44:12.) As part of her application, Brown was asked
the following question:
Have you ever been convicted of, or pled guilty to, any felonies? A “yes” response
will not automatically disqualify you from consideration.

(Doc. No. 18-1, PageID #135.) Despite having pled guilty to a felony, Brown answered “no” to this
question. (Id.; Brown Dep. 46:3–15).)
In March 2018, the Cleveland Clinic made a conditional offer of employment to Brown, which
was contingent upon a background check. Brown accepted the offer and began her employment in
April 2018. (Doc. No. 11, ¶¶ 23–24.) Despite conducting the background check, at that time, the
Cleveland Clinic was unaware that Brown submitted false information with her application. (Doc.
No. 18-1, ¶ 21.)
C. Brown works for the Cleveland Clinic for five years and takes FMLA leave
Between April 2018 and February 2023, Brown worked for the Cleveland Clinic in various
roles. (Doc. No. 18-1, ¶ 8.) During that same time, Brown applied for significant FMLA leave,
which was always approved by the Cleveland Clinic. (Brown Dep. 75:5–76:12, 83:6–84:6, 88:13–
89:5, 93:3–98:13, 99:17–100:7.) Then, in the Fall of 2022, Brown became pregnant. (Brown Dep.
108:12–109:21.) As a result, Brown requested specific accommodations, which were approved by
the Cleveland Clinic. (Id.)
Prior to giving birth, Brown applied for an anesthesia technician position at the Cleveland
Clinic’s Beachwood Surgery Center. (Brown Dep. 71:8–15, Doc. No. 18-1, ¶ 8.) This position
required that Brown be fingerprinted to qualify for the job, which also triggered a background check.

2
(Tyler Dep. 16:24–17:22.) The Cleveland Clinic ultimately offered Brown the job, and Brown started
as an anesthesia technician on February 19, 2023. (Doc. No. 11, ¶ 11.) While employed as an
anesthesia technician, Brown was initially supervised by Melissa Bacon (“Bacon”) and then by Leah
Peterson (“Peterson”). (Brown Dep. 122:4–123:2; Doc. No. 18-3, ¶ 4.)
Then, Brown applied, was approved for maternity leave from March 20, 2023 through June
11, 2023. (Brown Dep. 118:14–21.)

D. In March 2023, the Cleveland Clinic discovers that Brown provided false
information with her 2018 application
In March 2023, around the same time that Brown took her maternity leave, the Cleveland
Clinic discovered that Brown had provided false information on her 2018 application. (Doc. No. 18-
1, ¶¶ 10, 11.) It made this discovery based upon records that it had received from the fingerprinting
of Brown. (Id.) The inspector in charge of the fingerprinting and a “talent acquisition” employee
brought this discovery to the attention of the human resources department. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
HR Generalist Courtney Tyler (“Tyler”) investigated the matter. (Tyler Dep. 18–19.) As part
of her investigation, Tyler reviewed several documents, including a 2018 FBI Rap Sheet Report and
a 2023 FBI Rap Sheet Report. (Doc. No. 18-1, ¶¶ 13–14.) Both FBI Rap Sheets show Brown’s
felony charge and list the disposition as “Guilty – SIS.” (Doc. No. 18-1, PageID #128, 134.) Tyler
also spoke with Brown regarding the 2012 felony charge. (Brown Dep. 123:12–124:19; Doc. No.
18-1, ¶ 18.) Tyler also discovered that while the 2018 FBI Rap Sheet showed the 2012 felony charge,
it was not brought to human resource’s attention in 2018. (Doc. No. 18-1, ¶¶ 15–16.) Based upon
her investigation, Tyler determined that Brown had lied on her 2018 application. (Doc. No. 18-1, ¶
20.)

3
E. The Cleveland Clinic terminates Brown’s employment
Tyler concluded that had Brown violated the Cleveland Clinic’s Corrective Action policy.
(Tyler Dep. 20:9–17.) The Corrective Action policy lists “[f]alsification of any official patient,
origination, or employee records” as one of many “[m]ajor infractions, those of a severe nature [that]
will subject an employee to corrective action usually resulting in a Step 3, Final Written Warning or
a Step 4, Termination.” (Doc. No. 27-2, PageID #737.) The policy further provides that:
Employees who fail to abide by established standards and rules may be subject to
corrective action. The step of corrective action may vary depending upon the nature
of the infraction, the circumstances surrounding the offense and the employee’s
past records. Although employment may be terminated at-will at any time, without
following any formal system of discipline or warning, forms of discipline that are
less severe than termination may be utilized.

(Id. at PageID #738.) Based upon this violation, the Cleveland Clinic determined that discharge was
appropriate. (Peterson Dep. 18:25–19:3; Bacon Dep. 23:24–24:2.)
On June 12, 2023, Brown returned from maternity leave. (Doc. No 11, ¶ 46.) The next day,
on June 13, 2023, the Cleveland Clinic informed Brown that her employment was terminated. (Doc.
No 11, ¶ 51.) Although the Cleveland Clinic terminated Brown’s employment, she was encouraged
to reapply for the position. (Tyler Dep. 21; Brown Dep. 132). Brown applied for several new
positions with the Cleveland Clinic, but did not apply for an anesthesia technician job. (Doc. No. 18-
1, ¶ 23.) The Cleveland Clinic did not offer Brown employment for any of the positions for which
she applied. (Brown Dep. 166–67.)
F. Brown files suit against the Cleveland Clinic and Fairview Hospital
This civil action followed. On November 1, 2024, Brown filed her Complaint. (Doc. No 1.)
Therein, Brown brings the following claims: (1) FMLA retaliation (Count I), (2) gender
discrimination under federal law (Count II), and (3) gender discrimination under Ohio law (Count
4
III). (Id.) On January 10, 2025, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint.
The case proceeded through discovery, and on February 9, 2026, Defendants filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 18.) Brown filed her Opposition on March 24, 2026.
(Doc. No. 29.) Defendants filed their Reply on April 22, 2026. (Doc. No. 31.) Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for review.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A
dispute is ‘genuine’ only if based on evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
favor of the non-moving party.” Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir.
2006). “Thus, ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’”
Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). A fact is “material” only “if its resolution might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Henderson, 469 F.3d at 487. At the
summary judgment stage, “[a] court should view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party.” Pittman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir.

2018). In addition, “the moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact.” Ask Chems., LP v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 593 F. App’x 506, 508 (6th
Cir. 2014). The moving party may satisfy this initial burden by “identifying those parts of the record
which demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Lindsey v. Whirlpool Corp.,
295 F. App’x 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2008). “[I]f the moving party seeks summary judgment on an issue

5
for which it does not bear the burden of proof at trial,” the moving party may also “meet its initial
burden by showing that ‘there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Id.
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, “the burden shifts to the non-moving party who
must then point to evidence that demonstrates that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial.”
Ask Chems., 593 F. App’x at 508–09. “[T]he nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleading,

but must ‘produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury.’” MISC
Berhad v. Advanced Polymer Coatings, Inc., 101 F.Supp.3d 731, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting Cox,
53 F.3d at 150).
III. Analysis
The parties agree that Brown’s claims are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting framework. The Court is familiar with the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework
and will not repeat it herein. See, e.g., Lott v. Playhouse Square Hotel, No. 1:20-cv-1515, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 162152, at *21–22 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2021) (Barker, J.); Lloyd v. Greater Cleveland
Reg’l Transit Auth., No. 1:18-CV-01557, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155826, at *36 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
27, 2020) (Barker, J.). Defendants argue that Brown cannot establish a prima facie case of either
FMLA retaliation or gender discrimination, and even if she could, Brown cannot establish pretext.

Brown, of course, takes the opposite position. As explained in detail below, the Court agrees with
Defendants and grants summary judgment in their favor on Brown’s claims.
A. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s FMLA claim
The Court first addresses Brown’s FMLA claim. Even assuming Brown can establish a prima

6
facie case,1 the Court finds that Brown cannot establish that Defendants’ proffered reason for
terminating her was pretextual.
Defendants argue that “discharge[ing] Plaintiff because she lied on her original employment
application” is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge. (Doc. No. 18, PageID
#103.) Defendants further argue that “Plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext by any means.” (Id. at
PageID #104.) They assert that “[n]ot only did the Clinic honestly believe that Plaintiff lied on her

application – it was correct. Plaintiff pled guilty to the 2012 Missouri felony.” (Id. at PageID #104.)
Defendants next assert that “the Clinic consistently explained that it discharged Plaintiff for lying on
her application” and that “[t]he Clinic granted every request submitted and allowed Plaintiff to use
significant amounts of FMLA leave.” (Id. at PageID #105.) Defendants further assert that “through
its consistent practices, the Clinic has demonstrated that falsifying application-related information is
sufficient for termination.” (Id. at PageID #107.)

1 Defendants only dispute the fourth element. (Doc. No. 18, PageID #100.) Brown argues, among other things, that
“[t]he temporal proximity between the FMLA leave and the adverse employment action at the very least creates an
inference that the actions would not have been taken absent Brown’s taking of FMLA.” (Doc. No. 29, PageID #760.)
Generally, “case law from this circuit cautions about the permissibility of drawing an inference of causation from temporal
proximity alone.” Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing cases). But “[t]his
Circuit has embraced the premise that in certain distinct cases where the temporal proximity between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action is acutely near in time, that close proximity is deemed indirect evidence such as to
permit an inference of retaliation to arise.” Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 2004)). “In such cases, the adverse employment action is often taken just
days or weeks from when the employer learns of the employee’s protected activity.” George v. Youngstown State Univ.,
966 F.3d 446, 460 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing cases).

In Seeger, for example, the Sixth Circuit held that “the nearness in time between [plaintiff’s] return from FMLA leave
and his termination — three weeks after his reinstatement and less than two months after he first notified [his employer]
of his medical leave — suffices in these circumstances to meet the low threshold of proof necessary to establish a prima
facie case of retaliatory discharge.” Seeger, 681 F.3d at 283. Seeger suggests that Brown can make a prima facie case
here. Brown was terminated just two days after her reinstatement and about three months after she requested leave after
she gave birth to her child. See also Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Here, Regis terminated
Bryson on March 10, 2004, three months after Bryson requested FMLA leave, and the very day that she was scheduled
to return to work. We have previously held that proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action may constitute evidence of a causal connection”). But the Court does not need to decide this issue
today because, as explained below, the Court finds that Brown cannot establish pretext.

7
In her Opposition, Brown argues that Defendants’ decision had no basis in fact and was
insufficient to warrant termination. As to the former, Brown argues that “Defendants asserted to
Brown that the reason for her termination was related to lying on her application that she did not have
a felony conviction on her record,” but “Brown [does] not have a felony conviction on her record.”
(Doc. No. 29, PageID #763.) Brown asserts that “Defendants had the FBI rap sheet in their possession
prior to Brown’s termination—a rap sheet that explicitly stated that Brown’s felony charge was not a

conviction.” (Id.) As to the latter, Brown argues that “Defendants own corrective action policy states
that ‘major infractions’ do not require termination,” that “the corrective action policy states that even
major infractions can be addressed with a written warning prior to termination,” and that “nowhere
in the policy does it provide that infractions regarding background checks require termination.” (Id.
at PageID #764.)
In their Reply, Defendants argue that “Ms. Tyler stated under oath that she recommended
Plaintiff’s discharge, and did so because Plaintiff lied by failing to disclose the felony on her
background.” (Doc. No. 31, PageID #983.) They assert, however, that “[d]espite Plaintiff’s repeated
attempts to create non-existent testimony, Ms. Tyler did not utter the word ‘conviction’ or phrase
‘felony conviction’ once, let alone testify that she recommended discharge because Plaintiff lied

about a felony conviction.” (Id.) Defendants further assert that, as to the basis for Brown’s
termination, Peterson testified that “I was told that she checked no to pleading guilty or being
convicted of a felony but she had been,” and Bacon testified that she “was told [that Brown] did not
check a box stating about a previous felony.” (Id.) Defendants further assert that “the documents in
the record evidence similarly refute Plaintiff’s claim that the Clinic discharged her because it believed
she lied about having a felony conviction.” (Id. at PageID #983–84.) Defendants also argue “that

8
the undisputed record evidence makes clear that the Clinic made a reasonably informed and
considered decision before discharging Plaintiff” and that “the Clinic honestly believed Plaintiff lied
on her original application.” (Id. at PageID #984–85.) Defendants’ final argument is that Plaintiff
cites “the Clinic’s corrective action policy,” but “doing so ignores the undisputed record evidence
that shows the Clinic’s uniform application of its policy – falsification of application-related
information justifies discharge.” (Id. at PageID #986.)

“Plaintiffs ordinarily show pretext ‘by showing that the proffered reason[] had no basis in
fact; (2) was insufficient motivation for the employment action; or (3) did not actually motivate the
adverse employment action.’” Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498, 515 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Joostberns v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 166 F. App’x 783, 790–91 (6th Cir. 2006)). “This
burden is not heavy, though, as summary judgment is warranted only if no reasonable juror could
conclude that the employer’s offered reason was pretextual.” George v. Youngstown State Univ., 966
F.3d 446, 462 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 620 (6th Cir.
2006); Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 547–48 (6th Cir. 2004)). Brown
argues that the first two categories of pretext are present here. The Court disagrees as explained
below.

1. No reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants’ proffered reason for
terminating Brown had no basis in fact.
The Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants’ proffered reason for
terminating Brown had no basis in fact. Brown does not dispute that she pled guilty to a felony and
that she should have answered the “[h]ave you ever been convicted of, or pled guilty to, any felonies?”
question on her 2018 application with a “yes.” (Brown Dep. 37:25–38:5.) And Brown testified that
Defendants told her that she was fired for “falsification of information.” (Brown Dep. 131:9–21.)
9
Consistent with Brown’s testimony, both of Brown’s supervisors testified that they were told the basis
for terminating Brown was falsification of information. (Bacon Dep. 23:24–24:2 (Q: “What was
communicated to you was the break in policy?” A: “The fraudulent -- lying on the original
application, which was fraudulent personnel records”); Peterson Dep. 18:25–19:3 (Q: “And what’s
your understanding of the reasoning for the termination?” A: “Falsification of information on her
application”); see also Doc. No. 21-4 (listing the basis for Brown’s termination as “falsification of

any official patient, organization, or employee records”).) Simply put, the record undisputedly shows
that Brown did not accurately fill out her 2018 application and that was the basis for her termination.
Tyler’s testimony does not move the needle in Brown’s favor. Defendants correctly point out
that Tyler never testified that lying about a conviction was the basis for Brown’s termination. But
when construing her testimony in Brown’s favor, as the Court must do, Tyler may have actually
believed Brown had a felony conviction on her record. In an email to Peterson and Bacon, Tyler
wrote “[a]ccording to Inspector Cooper, he believes [Inspector] Kwiat saw the felony. However, the
felony would have not prohibited her from starting at the Clinic. The fact she lied on her application,
stating she did not have a felony, should have though.” (Doc. No. 27-3, PageID #742–43.) Tyler
testified that the “lie” referred to in this email “was that [Brown] did in fact have a felony.” (Tyler

Dep. 32:23–33:2.)
But this evidence does not lead to a conclusion that Defendants’ decision had no basis in fact.
Regardless of whether Tyler believed Brown had a felony conviction or merely pled guilty to a felony,
Defendants’ conclusion would have been correct—Brown provided false information with her 2018
application. Accordingly, even assuming Tyler mistakenly believed that Brown had a felony
conviction, Defendants proffered reason for terminating Brown (falsification of information) had a

10
basis in fact, and no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise.
Moreover, the Court finds that even if Tyler thought Brown had a felony conviction,
Defendants would be protected by the honest belief rule. “Under the honest belief rule, a pretext
argument falling into the first category—asserting that the reason given by the employer has no basis
in fact—may be defeated by conclusive evidence that the defendant honestly believed its proffered
reason, and that the belief was reasonably based on particularized facts that were before it at the time

the decision was made.” Briggs, 11 F.4th at 515 (quotations omitted). Based on the record before
the Court, the Court finds that Defendants conducted a reasonable investigation. The Court finds that
Defendants, after conducting their reasonable investigation, discovered that both the 2018 and 2023
FBI Rap Sheets showed Plaintiff’s felony charge and listed the disposition as “Guilty – SIS.”
Regardless of the legal status of whether Plaintiff was convicted, Defendants could reasonably
conclude, based on this information, that Plaintiff lied when she answered “no” to the question
“[h]ave you ever been convicted of, or pled guilty to, any felonies?” At the end of the day, the
outcome of Defendants’ investigation was the correct result—Brown falsified information on her
application.
For all these reasons, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants’

proffered reason for terminating Brown had no basis in fact.
2. No reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants’ proffered reason for
terminating Brown was insufficient motivation for the employment action
The Court also finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants’ proffered
reason for terminating Brown was insufficient motivation for the employment action. Brown’s
reliance on the Corrective Action policy does not create a triable issue. The Corrective Action policy
lists “[f]alsification of any official patient, origination, or employee records” as one of many “[m]ajor
11
infractions, those of a severe nature will subject an employee to corrective action usually resulting
in a Step 3, Final Written Warning or a Step 4, Termination.” (Doc. No. 27-2, PageID #737
(emphasis added).) This language suggests that falsification, by itself, could result in termination.
The policy further provides that:
Employees who fail to abide by established standards and rules may be subject to
corrective action. The step of corrective action may vary depending upon the nature
of the infraction, the circumstances surrounding the offense and the employee’s
past records. Although employment may be terminated at-will at any time, without
following any formal system of discipline or warning, forms of discipline that are
less severe than termination may be utilized.

(Id. at PageID #738 (emphasis added).) This language suggests that the Defendants could terminate
Brown’s employment for any reason without resorting to lesser means (such as issuing a warning)
first.
Defendants, accordingly, complied with the Corrective Action policy when they decided to
terminate Brown without a warning. Moreover, Defendants have introduced undisputed evidence
that, in 2023, they terminated four other employees who falsified information on their employment
application. Accordingly, Defendants’ treatment of Brown was consistent with how they treated
other employees who submitted false information with their employment applications. The Court
accordingly finds that Plaintiff’s reliance on the Corrective Action policy is insufficient to establish
pretext.
In sum, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence sufficient to create a triable issue on the issue of
pretext. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s FMLA claim.
B. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on both of Brown’s gender-
discrimination claims
The Court next turns to Brown’s gender-discrimination claims and the Court finds that they
12
fail at the prima facie stage. To make out a claim for gender discrimination, under either Ohio or
federal law, Brown must establish that she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for
her job, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) was replaced by a person outside the
protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. Redlin v.
Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921 F.3d 599, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008)); Lloyd, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155826 at *35–

36 (finding that “claims under Title VII and Ohio law may be analyzed together” because “Ohio’s
requirements [for gender discrimination claims] are the same as under federal law”) (internal
quotations omitted).2
Defendants only challenge the fourth element. In their Motion, Defendants argue that
“Plaintiff cannot meet her burden because she cannot show that similarly situated employees were
treated more favorably than her.” (Doc. No. 18, PageID #101.) Defendants assert that “numerous
pregnant employees working under the supervision of Ms. Bacon and Ms. Peterson have taken
maternity leave and not been discharged.” (Id. at PageID #102.) According to Defendants, seven
employees took full maternity leave under Bacon and Peterson’s supervision and that “[a]ll seven of
these employees either remain currently employed by the Clinic or voluntarily resigned at some point

2 Although the Court does not have original jurisdiction over Brown’s state law claim for gender discrimination, the Court
will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim because it is “so related to claims in the action within [the Court’s]
original jurisdiction that [it] form[s] part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Further, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) does not require that Court to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brown’s state law claim because (i) it does not raise novel or complex
issues of state law, (ii) it does not substantially predominate over the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction,
and (iii) there are no compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Veneklase v.
Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2012) (“the default assumption is that the court will exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims”) (quoting Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th
Cir. 1998)).

13
after their maternity leave ended.” (Id.) Defendants then argue that “the Clinic has discharged non-
pregnant employees for the exact same reason it terminated Plaintiff’s employment.” (Id.) They
assert that “[i]n 2023 alone, the Clinic discharged at least four other employees at Fairview or
Beachwood based upon their falsification of application-related information,” which includes “one
employee who sought a transfer and lied on the felony conviction/guilty plea question.” (Id.)
Brown argues in her Opposition that “there is no evidence that the employee who replaced

Brown was pregnant or took maternity leave during her employment.” (Doc. No. 29, PageID #765.)
She asserts that “prior to Brown going on leave, employees made negative comments regarding the
length of Brown’s maternity leave.” (Id.) Brown concludes that “[b]ecause Brown was not replaced
with another pregnant woman, Brown has met her burden in establishing that she was discriminated
against based on her gender.” (Id.)
Defendants argue in their Reply that “Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this element,”
but “cites no record evidence to support [her] contention” that “she ‘was not replaced with another
pregnant employee.’” (Doc. No. 31, PageID #981.) They then argue that “Plaintiff’s allegation that
another employee made a comment about her leave similarly lacks merit or support in the record.”
(Id.)

The Court agrees with Defendants. Brown’s sole argument is that she was replaced by
someone outside her protected class,3 but she has not presented any evidence on this issue. First, the
alleged comments regarding Brown’s maternity leave are based upon speculation. Defendants
correctly point out that Brown could not recall who made the comments and testified that neither

3 Brown does not argue that she was treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. And she does
not dispute Defendants’ evidence showing that seven pregnant employees under Bacon and Peterson’s supervision were
not fired, and that Defendants have fired people for the same reason they fired Brown.
14
Bacon nor Peterson made the comments. Plaintiff’s speculative testimony concerning these alleged
comments is simply insufficient. See, e.g., Grizzel v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711,
724 (6th Cir. 2006) (“It is well settled that ‘[m]ere personal beliefs, conjecture and speculation are
insufficient to support an inference of [] discrimination”) (quoting Woythal v. Tex-Tenn Corp., 112
F.3d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Lomax v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 99-6589, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33884, at *14 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (“Lomax is left to rely on his own opinions and

the hearsay statements of others in order to support this claim. Such conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are insufficient to defeat summary judgment”).
Second, Brown’s contention that “there is no evidence that the employee who replaced Brown
was pregnant or took maternity leave during her employment” is also based on speculation. The
record reflects that Brown was replaced by a woman named Diane Silvis. (Luzar Dep. 30:18–25 (Q:
Who filled that role? A: An internal candidate from – I forget where she was from. Diane Silvis is
her name”).) Brown has not introduced any evidence suggesting Ms. Silvis was, or was not, pregnant
at the time she was hired. In other words, Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence satisfying her
burden to show that she was replaced by a person outside the protected class. See, e.g., Nasrallah v.
Robert Half Int’l Inc., No. 1:19-CV-00795, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65150, at *22 (N.D. Ohio Apr.

14, 2020) (“the plaintiff faces the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination”) (Barker, J.).
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Brown cannot establish a prima facie gender-
discrimination claim under federal or Ohio law. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Brown’s gender-discrimination claims.4

4 But even if Brown could establish a prima facie claim, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for an independent
reason. Even if Brown could set forth a prima facie gender discrimination claim, she cannot establish pretext. Brown
15
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 18) is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: July 28, 2026 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

relies on the same evidence she relied on to establish pretext for her FMLA claim. (Doc. No. 29, PageID #765.) As
explained above, this evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue on this issue of pretext. Accordingly, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s gender-discrimination claim for the separate reason that Brown cannot
establish that Defendants’ proffered reason for terminating her was pretextual.
16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411673. Public record. Not legal advice.