# Reyling

> District Court, E.D. New York · July 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411316

## Case

- **Full name:** Jacqueline Reyling, as natural guardian to B.R., an infant, Keith Reyling, as natural guardian to B.R., an infant v. Three Village Central School District, Three Village Central School District Board of Education, William Bernhard, and John and Jane Does
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
JACQUELINE REYLING, as natural guardian to
B.R., an infant, KEITH REYLING, as natural
guardian to B.R., an infant,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against- CV 23-0266 (RER) (AYS)

THREE VILLAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT, THREE VILLAGE CENTRAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
WILLIAM BERNHARD, and JOHN AND JANE
DOES,

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
SHIELDS, United States Magistrate Judge:

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorney’s fees and costs,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, as part of a sanctions order issued by this Court.
Plaintiffs seek $183,393.61 in attorney’s fees and $704.00 in costs. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’
motion and request that the fee application be either denied in its entirety or reduced by ninety
percent (90%). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs is
granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the facts of this action is presumed. By Order dated June 10, 2025, this
Court rendered a decision on a discovery motion for sanctions brought by Plaintiffs (the
“Discovery Order”). The Discovery Order found that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37, Plaintiffs were entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs with respect to
certain witness statements that were either belatedly produced by Defendants or not produced at
all. No attorney’s fees or costs were awarded with respect to the part of Plaintiffs’ motion for
sanctions that was withdrawn – i.e., the portion pertaining to alleged spoliation of video footage.
Plaintiffs were directed to submit their application for fees and costs by June 24, 2025. (Order of
Shields, M.J., dated June 10, 2025.)
Defendants appealed the Discovery Order to the District Court on July 8, 2025. (DE

[101].) In light of that appeal, the parties were afforded numerous extensions of time to file and
oppose Plaintiffs’ fee application. Ultimately, the fully-briefed motion for attorney’s fees and
costs was filed on November 19, 2025. (DE [111]. On April 17, 2026, the District Court denied
Defendants’ appeal of the Discovery Order. (Order of Reyes, J., dated Apr. 17, 2026.)
By the within motion, Plaintiffs seek $183,393.61 in attorney’s fees and $704.00 in costs
in accordance with the Discovery Order. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ application on several
grounds: (1) that the hourly rates requested are not reasonable; (2) that the hours expended by
Plaintiffs’ counsel are excessive; (3) that reimbursement is sought for hours unrelated to the
Discovery Order; (4) that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries are vague and duplicative; and, (5)
that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s use of quarter-hour billing is unreasonable and excessive. Defendants

request that the motion be denied in its entirety or that the fees sought be reduced by ninety
percent (90%). (DE [112].) The Court now turns to the merits of the motion.
DICUSSION
I. Legal Standard
In the Second Circuit, the “starting point” for calculating a “presumptively reasonable
fee,” is “the lodestar – the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of
hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Both this Court and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar – the product of a
reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case – creates a
‘presumptively reasonable fee.’”) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc.
v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). The Supreme Court has held that “the
lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney
would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the

hour in a comparable case.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) (emphasis in
original). “[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a
‘reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Id. at 553 (citation omitted); see also Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190-91
(holding that a court determines a “presumptively reasonable fee” by considering case specific
factors in order to establish a reasonable hourly rate that a “reasonable, paying client would be
willing to pay,” and then multiplying that rate by the number of reasonable hours). This
assessment is undertaken “bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the
minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.
The reasonableness of hourly rates is guided by the market rate “[p]revailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984), and the relevant community is
generally the “district in which the court sits.” Polk v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 722
F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to
submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed,” Hugee v. Kimso
Apartments, LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), and this Circuit requires
contemporaneous billing records for each attorney who worked on the action. See Scott v. City
of New York, 643 F.3d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2011). Finally, there is a “strong presumption” that the
lodestar represents the appropriate award, though “enhancements may be awarded in rare and
exceptional circumstances.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552.
II. Plaintiffs’ Application
Plaintiffs seek $183,393.61 in attorney’s fees. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs have
submitted the Declaration of Cheryl L. Berger (“Berger”), dated August 28, 2025 (“Berger
Decl.”), and the Supplemental Reply Declaration of Cheryl L. Berger, dated April 23, 2026,

(“Supplemental Berger Decl.”), as well as contemporaneous billing records. (DE [111-2], [111-
3], [119], [119-1].) Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for attorney services rendered at the following
rates: (1) $596.56 per hour for Berger, a partner, for services rendered prior to February 3, 2026,
and $650.00 per hour for services rendered after February 3, 2026; (2) $492.81 for Leah Johnson
(“Johnson”), an associate; (3) $492.81 per hour for Claudia Cannam (“Cannam”), an associate,
for services rendered prior to February 3, 2026, and $500.00 per hour for services rendered after
February 3, 2026; (4) $337.19 per hour for Joseph Abergail, a law clerk; (5) $337.19 per hour for
“law interns” Luke Lentini (“Lentini”) and Robert Traveso (“Traveso”); (6) $337.19 per hour for
Suzanne Damante (“Damante”), Lauren Rios (“Rios”), and Rachel Grossbard (“Grossbard”), all
paralegals, for services rendered prior to February 3, 2026, and $350.00 per hour for services

rendered after February 3, 2026; and, (7) $337.19 per hour for Amira Elmansoury
(“Elmansoury”), who is described as providing “law firm support to the attorneys and staff.”
(Berger Decl. 94; Supplemental Berger Decl. ¶ 12-13 and Ex. 1, annexed thereto.) Plaintiffs seek
reimbursement for costs in the amount of $704.00.
As to attorney time, Plaintiffs’ motion states that attorneys and staff expended the
following hours on this matter: (1) Berger = 259.55; (2) Johnson = 7.25; (3) Cannam = 14.5; (4)
Abergail = 1.75; (5) Lentini = 0.25; (6) Traveso = 0.25; (7) Damante = 20.25; (8) Rios = 20.45;
(9) Grossbard = 0.75; and, (10) Elmansoury = 5.75. (Berger Decl. ¶ 94; Supplemental Berger
Decl., Ex. 1.) The total attorney and staff time expended on this action by Plaintiffs’ counsel
amounts to 330.75 hours.
III. Disposition of the Motion
A. Hourly Rates

Presumptively reasonable hourly rates in this District are currently “$450-$650
for partners, $300-$450 for senior associates, $150-$300 for junior associates, and $100-$150 for
paralegals.” Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 763 F. Supp. 3d 233, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2025).
However, “[t]he determination of what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate also requires the
submission of information concerning the credentials or experience of counsel applying for
fees.” Fuchs v. Tara Gen. Contracting, Inc., No. CV 06-1282, 2009 WL 3756655, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Where information
concerning the credentials or experience of counsel has not been provided, “a deduction of the
hourly rates is warranted.” RCB Equities No. 3, LLC v. Alma Bldg., LLC, No. 11 CV 1004,
2012 WL 832263, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Molefi v. Oppenheimer Trust, No. 03

CV 5631, 2007 WL 538547, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2007)), adopted as modified by, 2012 WL
832286 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012); see also Fuchs, 2009 WL 3756655, at *2 (“Where such
information is lacking, the court may reduce the award of attorney’s fees accordingly.”); Night
Hawk Ltd. v. Briarpatch Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 1382, 2004 WL 1375558, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
2004) (“[W]here no information is provided concerning the credentials or experience of counsel
applying for fees, it is appropriate to reduce the amount of a fee award sought.”).
Here, while Plaintiffs have submitted contemporaneous billing records in support of
their motion, they only provided credentials and background information for certain attorneys
and paralegals. Specifically, Plaintiffs only provided background information and credentials for
Berger and Cannam and limited information for Damante, Rios, Grossbard, and Elmansoury. No
information whatsoever was provided for Johnson, Abergail, or the “law interns” Lentini and
Traveso. While Plaintiffs did provide background information for Johnson in their reply
submission, after being advised of the omission by Defendants, such information should have
been included in their moving papers.1

In light of the failure to provide background information for numerous individuals who
billed time to this action, as well as the fact that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs are either at
the upper end or above the accepted range in this district, the Court awards Plaintiffs fees at the
following rates: (1) Berger (partner) = $450.00 per hour; (2) Johnson and Cannam (associates) =
$150.00 per hour; (3) Abergail (law clerk) = $100.00 per hour2; (4) Lentini and Traveso (“law
interns”) = $100 per hour3; (5) Damante, Rios and Grossbard (paralegals) = $100.00 per hour;
and (6) Elmounsary (support staff) = $100.00 per hour.
B. Reasonableness of Hours Sought
As stated above, “[a]n application for attorney’s fees must be supported ‘by

accurate, detailed, and contemporaneous time records.’” Datiz, 2020 WL 5899881, at *9

1 There is also much dispute among the parties about a timekeeper listed in the billing records
with the initials “NMD.” No background information was originally provided for this individual;
however, Berger’s Reply Declaration, (DE [115-1]), identifies her as Natalie Donaldson
(“Donaldson”), an associate. Donaldson, who appears to have only billed 0.5 hours to this
matter, is not included in the chart of timekeepers set forth in Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law and
was not originally identified by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court is disregarding her hours
altogether.
2 As no background information is provided for Abergail, the Court assumes he is a “law school
graduate who ha[s] not yet been admitted to the practice of law.” Gao v. Jian Song Shi, No. 18
CV 2708, 2021 WL 1949275, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2021) (citing Douyon v. NY Med.
Health Care, P.C., 49 F. Supp. 3d 328, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). “In this district, fees for law clerks
are awarded at the same rates as legal assistants and support staff.” Gao, 2021 WL 1949275, at
*19 (collecting cases).
3 “Law students ‘are generally billed at rates similar to those of paralegals.’” Mary Jo C. v.
Dinapoli, No. 09-CV-5635, 2014 WL 7334863, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting Larsen
v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 588 F. Supp. 2d 360, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)).
(quoting LaBarbera v. ASTC Labs, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 263, 277 (E.D.NY. 2010)) (additional
citation omitted). “Hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’ are to be
excluded, and in dealing with such surplusage, the court has the discretion simply to deduct a
reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from

the fee application.’” Dagostino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 404, 413 (E.D.N.Y.
2017) (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998)).
A review of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records demonstrates that a large portion of the
hours for which reimbursement is sought pertain to work unrelated to the missing and belatedly
produced witness statements – the only issues for which sanctions were awarded. In addition,
fees are sought for hours expended on Plaintiffs’ spoliation motion, which was withdrawn by
Plaintiffs, (DE [91]), and for which the Court specifically stated that no attorney’s fees or costs
were awarded. (Discovery Order dated June 10, 2025.) Moreover, the Court finds a large portion
of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records to be vague, duplicative, and overstaffed, warranting a
reduction. See Lochren v. County of Suffolk, 344 F. App’x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming

25% reduction in hours billed “because plaintiffs overstaffed the case, resulting in needless
duplication of work”); Serin v. N. Leasing Systems, Inc., No. 06-cv-1625, 2011 WL 147560, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011), aff’d 501 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that “unspecific or
vague records are generally removed” from a fee application and noting that “can be
accomplished through excision of the vague entries or reducing the total hours by a flat
percentage”).
For all these reasons, this Court is making an across-the-board deduction of fifty percent
(50%). See Smith v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-6198, 2022 WL 939711, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2022) (“Where entries on a time sheet are vague or duplicative or otherwise insufficient, a
court need not itemize individual entries as excessive; rather, it may make an ‘across-the-board
reduction, or percentage cut, in the amount of hours.’”) (quoting Martinez v. City of New York,
330 F.R.D. 60, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)); T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Cardinale. No. 09 CV 0451, 2011 WL
344759, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (“In reducing the ‘lodestar’ amount, the court may

exclude the excessive and unreasonable hours from its calculation by making an across-the-board
reduction, or percentage cut, in the amount of hours.”) (citing Green v. City of New York, 403
Fed. App’x 626, 630 (2d Cir. 2010)). Applying the foregoing reductions, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs are entitled to $62,509.00 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for Defendants’ conduct
herein, in accordance with the Discovery Order dated June 10, 2025.
C. Costs
Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of their costs in the amount of $704.00.
However, documentation of such costs is only provided for mailing and postage expenses of
$245.51. (DE [111-3], [119-2].) No description or documentation of the remaining costs has
been submitted by Plaintiffs.

Reasonable and identifiable out-of-pocket disbursements ordinarily charged to clients are
recoverable. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998). However, the
party seeking to recover costs “bears the burden of adequately documenting and itemizing the
costs requested.” Ganci v. U.S. Limousine Serv. Ltd., No. 10-cv-3027, 2015 WL 1529772, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2015) (citation omitted). “Courts have repeatedly . . . refused to award costs
absent supporting documentation.” Farrington v. Jewish Voice Inc., No. 21-CV-1575, 2022 WL
541645, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As
Plaintiffs only provided documentary proof of $241.45 in costs, that is all the Court will award.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs are awarded $62,509.00 in attorney’s fees and $241.45
in costs as a sanctions award for Defendants’ conduct herein, as set forth in the Discovery Order.
Defendants shall make payment to Plaintiffs’ counsel within two (2) weeks of the date of this

Order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York
July 22, 2026
/s/ Anne Y. Shields
ANNE Y. SHIELDS
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11411316. Public record. Not legal advice.