# Eaton

> District Court, D. Oregon · July 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410935

## Case

- **Full name:** Theron E. v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** July 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

THERON E.,1 Case No. 6:25-cv-01092-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Theron E. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his applications for Child’s Insurance
Benefits (“CIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision
because it is based on harmful legal error and not supported by substantial evidence in the
record.

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last
name of the non-governmental party.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is
limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). A federal
court’s review is limited because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a
claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise,

and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing
courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important
rules” in reviewing social security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492
(9th Cir. 2015).
First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).
Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at
1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is

harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or that,
despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency
explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see
also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest
[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the
error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on
other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.
2022))).
///
BACKGROUND
I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS
Plaintiff was born in May 1994, making him twenty-one years old on April 30, 2016, his
alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 15, 17, 24, 64, 72, 81, 90.) Plaintiff is a high school graduate
who has no past work experience. (Id. at 24, 48, 280.) In his applications, Plaintiff alleges
disability due to paranoia, anxiety, depression, learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder (“ADHD”), sleep apnea, and “[s]ociopathic [t]endencies.” (Id. at 64, 72, 81, 90) (bold
omitted).
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and upon reconsideration, and
on September 28, 2022, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at an administrative hearing before the ALJ
on November 15, 2023, and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified at a supplemental
hearing held on July 10, 2024. (Id. at 15, 34-40, 43-60.) On July 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a
written decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Id. at 15-25.) On April 24, 2025, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s written decision the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s
decision.
II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve]
months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential
process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). Those five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a
listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether
the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

Id. at 724-25.
To establish a “prima facie case of a disability,” a claimant must demonstrate “at steps
one through four of the sequential evaluation process that she suffers from a severe impairment
that prevents her from doing any work she has done in the past, or that she has a severe
impairment and has no relevant past work[.]” White v. Kijakazi, 44 F.4th 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2022)
(citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)). If the claimant does so, “[t]he
burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five to establish that the claimant can perform a
‘significant number[]’ of jobs in the national economy given the claimant’s physical and mental
limitations, age, education, and work experience.” Id. (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2);
and then citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002)). “If the Commissioner

meets [his] burden, the claimant has failed to establish disability.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955
(simplified).
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff is
disabled. (Tr. 15-25.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since April 30, 2016, his alleged disability onset date. (Id. at 17.) At step two, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from three severe impairments: “[O]besity; obstructive sleep
apnea; major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and [ADHD.]” (Id.) At step
three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not suffer from an impairment that meets or equals a
listing. (Id.)
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
“light work,” subject to the following limitations: (1) Plaintiff can stand and walk up to two
hours in an eight-hour workday, (2) Plaintiff can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
crawl, and climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, (3) Plaintiff can

make “simple work-related decisions” and “understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions,” (4) Plaintiff can “perform tasks that do not involve a specific production rate
pace,” such as “assembly-line work or an hourly production quota,” (5) Plaintiff can “adjust to
occasional changes in the work setting,” and (6) Plaintiff can engage in “occasional interaction
with the public, co-workers, and supervisors.” (Id. at 19.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff has no past work experience. (Id. at 24.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
was not disabled because a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that he
could perform, such as a small products assembler II, marker, and electronics worker. (Id. at 24-
25.)
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because he found

persuasive the opinion of the consultative psychiatric examiner, Dayna Stierley, Psy.D.
(“Dr. Stierley”), yet formulated an RFC (and VE hypothetical) that failed to capture the marked
limitation that she identified. (See Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 n.1, ECF No. 17, providing a succinct
summary of the issue; cf. Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2, ECF No. 11, identifying the “dispositive”
records; Def.’s Br. at 2, ECF No. 14, framing the “main issue” on appeal). Emphasizing that the
ALJ effectively rejected Dr. Stierley’s opinion without providing any explanation for doing so
and that the VE’s testimony reflects that Dr. Stierley’s opinion supports finding him disabled,
Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse and remand this case for an award of benefits. (See
Pl.’s Opening Br. at 6, arguing that the “improperly rejected opinion should be fully credited as
true”).
The Court agrees that the ALJ’s decision is based on harmful legal error and not
supported by substantial evidence but finds that unresolved issues preclude an award of benefits.

The Court therefore reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands this case for further
proceedings.
I. MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Applicable Law
“In January 2017, the Social Security Administration issued revised regulations for
evaluating medical opinions relating to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017.”2 Cross v.
O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts.
404 & 416)). The revised “regulations provide that ALJs will no longer ‘defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight’ to any medical opinion.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)).
Instead, “ALJ[s] must assess the persuasiveness of each medical opinion after considering

specified factors.” Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2024) (first citing Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022); and then citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c),
416.920c(a)-(b)).
Specifically, the revised “regulations require an ALJ to discuss the supportability and
consistency of medical evidence—the factors the agency has historically found to be the most

2 Given that Plaintiff filed his applications on August 25, 2021 (Tr. 15), the parties agree
that the revised regulations apply here. (See Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2, 5, emphasizing the ALJ’s
reliance on the supportability and consistency factors in evaluating Dr. Stierley’s opinion; Def.’s
Br. at 1-10, relying on the ALJ’s findings regarding the persuasiveness of medical opinion
evidence).
important in evaluating medical opinions—while allowing for discussion of other factors listed
in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5), as appropriate.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1215 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(a)); see also Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 (“‘The most important factors’ that the agency
considers when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are ‘supportability’ and

‘consistency.’” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a))). “Supportability focuses on whether ‘a
medical source supports a medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical
evidence.’” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92); see also Kitchen v.
Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 740 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Supportability concerns how ‘a medical source
supports a medical opinion’ with relevant evidence[.]” (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92)).
“Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources[.]” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Woods, 32
F.4th at 792).
In addition to supportability and consistency, “[a]n ALJ may discuss other factors [listed
in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)], such as the medical source’s ‘relationship with the claimant’

or ‘specialization,’ but generally has no obligation to do so.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1214 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)). If, however, an ALJ concludes that “two or more contradictory medical
opinions ‘both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record[,]’ . . . the regulations
mandate discussion of these other factors.” Id. at 1214-15 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3),
(c)(3)-(5)).
Where, as here, the new regulations apply, a district court reviews the ALJ’s evaluation of
a medical opinion for substantial evidence. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 787 (“For claims subject to
the new regulations, . . . an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit any medical
opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.”); id. at 792 (“Even under the new
regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or
inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”); Metcalf v.
Kijakazi, No. 22-35201, 2022 WL 17592194, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) (observing that
“under the revised regulations . . . , the ALJ’s evaluation of a medical opinion is reviewed for

substantial evidence” (citing Woods, 32 F.4th at 789)); see also Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1108 (“In
sum, the ALJ’s evaluation of [the physician’s] medical opinion is supported by substantial
evidence.”).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ effectively rejected Dr. Stierley’s opinion because he found
her opinion persuasive but formulated an RFC and VE hypothetical that failed to account for the
marked limitations that she identified. (Pl.’s Reply at 3 n.1; Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2-4.) The Court
agrees.
1. Dr. Stierley’s Opinion
On February 24, 2024, Oregon’s Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) referred
Plaintiff to Dr. Stierley for a consultative psychiatric evaluation. (Tr. 1187-97; see also id. at

1183-86, 1198, setting forth the remaining pages of Exhibit 19F at 1-16; cf. Ct. Tr. Index at 5,
ECF No. 8-1.)
Dr. Stierley’s “functional assessment” and “diagnostic impressions” were based on her
clinical observations and interview, review of Plaintiff’s “record,” and administration of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test–Fourth Edition (“WAIS-IV”), the Wechsler Memory Scale–
Fourth Edition (“WMS-IV”), and the Trail Marking Test (“TMT”). (Tr. 1187, 1192-94) (all caps
omitted). Notably, DDS provided Dr. Stierley with a form that (1) addressed an individual’s
ability to perform various work-related mental activities, (2) defined a “[m]arked” limitation as a
“serious[] limit[]” on one’s ability to “[f]unction[] . . . independently, appropriately, effectively,
and on a sustained basis,” and (3) defined “[s]ustained basis” as the “ability to perform [the
mental activity] eight hours a day for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” (Id. at
1183.)
Dr. Stierley prepared an eleven-page report and addressed questions on DDS’s three-page

form, using its “rating terms” like “[m]ild,” “[m]oderate,” and “[m]arked.” (See id. at 1183,
1192.) Dr. Stierley opined that Plaintiff was “[m]arked[ly] impair[ed]” in his “[t]olerance to
stress associated with [activities of daily living] and work activity.” (Id. at 1192.) Furthermore,
Dr. Stierley opined that Plaintiff was “[m]oderate[ly] impair[ed]” in his “[i]nterpersonal
capabilities” with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, “[m]oderate[ly] impair[ed]” in
his ability to “sustain attention and perform simple repetitive tasks or persist in [a] competitive
work environment,” and “[m]ild[ly] impair[ed]” in his ability to “retain and follow instructions.”
(Id.)
In terms of diagnostic impressions, Dr. Stierley recounted that Plaintiff “endorsed
symptoms of social communication disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and [ADHD.]”

(Id. at 1193) (simplified). Dr. Stierley also explained that “[a]dditional diagnostic considerations
include[d] major depressive disorder, and autism spectrum disorder [(‘ASD’)], as [Plaintiff]
endorsed many social problems aligned with an ASD diagnosis and reported a historical
diagnosis.” (Id.) Dr. Stierley also explained that she believed that Plaintiff’s “social limitations”
reflected more than “just low average to average” intelligence quotient (“IQ”) scores. (Id.)
(simplified).
2. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found Dr. Stierley’s opinion “persuasive” and did not provide any explanation
for discounting it. (Tr. 23.) As relevant here, the ALJ noted that Dr. Stierley opined that Plaintiff
suffers from “[m]arked limitations” in his ability to tolerate stress “associated with limited
judgment and insight, and preoccupation with self-stress tolerance” and “mak[e] complex work-
related decisions and responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine
work setting.” (Id.) The ALJ explained that he found Dr. Stierley’s opinions persuasive because
they were “consistent with the other medical evidence” in the record and “well-supported” by her

“explanations, observations [that she] made during the examination,” and her “objective
testing[.]” (Id.)
Immediately thereafter, the ALJ noted that “[c]onsistent with [Dr. Stierley’s] opinion,” his
RFC assessment limited Plaintiff to “understand[ing], remember[ing], and carry[ing] out simple
instructions,” performing “tasks that do not involve a specific production rate pace” like
“assembly-line work or an hourly production quota,” making “simple work-related decisions,”
“adjust[ing] to occasional changes in the work setting,” and “occasional[ly] interact[ing] with the
public, co-workers, and supervisors.” (Id.) The ALJ stated that by limiting Plaintiff to “simple
work performed without significant contact with others, frequent changes, or decision making,”
he “avoids aggravation of mood issues or distractibility that could lead to excessive off-task

behavior.” (Id.)
3. Disposition
The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is based on harmful legal error and not supported
by substantial evidence in the record. For that reason, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s
decision.
Plaintiff’s principal argument concerns Dr. Stierley’s opinion that Plaintiff suffers from
“marked limitations in tolerance to stress and responding appropriately to usual work situations
on a sustained basis.” (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 4.) Emphasizing that the ALJ found Dr. Stierley’s
opinion persuasive and offered no explanation for discounting any portion of it, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ’s RFC assessment and VE hypothetical failed to account for the foregoing marked
limitations, which are based on Paragraph B’s fourth criteria (i.e., “B4” or “adapt or manage
oneself”). (See id.; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3-4 & n.3, arguing that the RFC “does not address ‘B4’”);
cf. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Paragraph B of [nearly every] listing . . . provides the
functional criteria [the agency] assess[es], in conjunction with a rating scale . . . , to evaluate how

[a claimant’s] mental disorder limits [his] functioning. These criteria represent the areas of
mental functioning a person uses in a work setting. They are[ u]nderstand, remember, or apply
information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage
oneself.”).
“[A]n ALJ evaluates Paragraph B criteria to determine if the severity of the claimant’s
mental impairment meets or is medically equal to the criteria of a listed impairment.” Kimberly
A. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-cv-01802-SB, 2022 WL 19203, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2022) (citing 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1). In other words, “[t]he limitations identified in the Paragraph B
criteria are not an RFC assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s) at
steps [two] and [three] of the sequential evaluation process.” Id. (simplified); (cf. Tr. 19, stating

the same). By contrast, in formulating a claimant’s “mental RFC assessment” at subsequent steps
of the sequential process, an “ALJ is required to perform a more detailed assessment by
itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories found in [P]aragraphs B and C of
the adult mental disorders listings in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments, and summarized on the
[agency’s] PRTF (Psychiatric Review Technique Form).” Kimberly A., 2022 WL 19203, at *5
(simplified).
Given this understanding, courts have recognized that “[w]hile similar evidence may be
used in both assessments of [a claimant’s] mental impairments, they are distinct, and limitations
assessed in the context of the [P]aragraph B assessment are not necessarily transferable to the
more detailed assessment required when formulating the RFC.” Id. (quoting JW U.C. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-cv-00090, 2019 WL 3451515, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2019)). Thus,
“the question is not whether the ALJ’s [P]aragraph B findings are consistent with the RFC, but
whether the ALJ has provided an adequate explanation for the mental limitations contained in the

RFC.” Id.
As relevant here, an ALJ’s “finding that an individual has ‘moderate’ limitations in the
[P]aragraph B criteria domains does not require the ALJ to assess a specific degree of functional
limitation in the RFC.” JW U.C., 2019 WL 3451515, at *3 (first citing Collingswood-Bonse v.
Colvin, No. 6:13-01646-AA, 2015 WL 853063, at *5-6 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2015); and then citing
Phillips v. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 925, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2014)); see also Kimberley A., 2022 WL
19203, at *6 (reflecting that this Court previously quoted the same passage from the JW U.C.
decision).
Further, “[a]n ‘ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a
succinct RFC.’” Martinez v. Bisignano, No. 24-4520, 2025 WL 2364595, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 14,

2025) (quoting Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015)); see
also Floe v. O’Malley, No. 23-35589, 2024 WL 4601594, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2024) (“The
ALJ found each medical opinion persuasive and appropriately translated the assessments of [the
claimant’s] moderate mental impairments into the [RFC.]” (citing Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006)).
An ALJ does not commit harmful error in formulating an RFC that is consistent with (or more
restrictive than) the medical opinion evidence that he found persuasive. See Martinez, 2025 WL
2364595, at *1 (“[The claimant] contends that the ALJ [assigned some weight to but] failed
[adequately] to incorporate [a provider’s] assessed limitations into his [RFC.] . . . [This]
argument fails because [the provider’s] medical opinions . . . are entirely consistent with the non-
exertional limitations identified in the ALJ’s RFC. An RFC that articulates a capacity ‘to perform
simple, routine, repetitive tasks’ adequately reflects medical opinions identifying mild and
moderate mental limitations.” (quoting Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.
2008))).

By contrast, if the ALJ formulates an RFC that is inconsistent with (or less restrictive
than) a medical opinion that he found persuasive, then the ALJ has committed a harmful error.
See Jeffrey G. v. Kijakazi, No. 6:23-cv-00283-MK, 2024 WL 414422, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2024)
(explaining that the Commissioner’s cases were “distinguishable” because they “only applie[d] if
the [ALJ’s RFC] determination is consistent with the restrictions identified in the medical
evidence,” which was “not the case [t]here”) (simplified); see also Timothy N. v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 3:25-cv-00994-SB, 2026 WL 1724684, at *4 (D. Or. June 15, 2026) (noting the
same).
The Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ “found Dr. Stierley’s opinion persuasive
in its entirety[.]” (Def.’s Br. at 5.) Unlike Plaintiff, however, the Commissioner argues that the

RFC “accounted” for Dr. Stierley’s opinion. (See id., asserting that the ALJ “accounted for” and
“reasonably translated and incorporated Dr. Stierley’s opinion of marked limitation tolerating
‘stress with work activity’ into the [RFC]”; but cf. Tr. 1192, opining that Plaintiff is markedly
impaired in his ability to “tolerate stress associated with [activities of daily living] and work
activity”) (simplified).
The Court finds the Commissioner’s argument unpersuasive. The ALJ failed to provide
an adequate explanation for the mental limitations contained in the RFC. See JW U.C., 2019 WL
3451515, at *3 (“[T]he question is not whether the ALJ’s [P]aragraph B findings are consistent
with the RFC, but whether the ALJ has provided an adequate explanation for the mental
limitations contained in the RFC.”). The ALJ recognized that the Paragraph B criteria are “used
to rate the severity of mental impairments” at steps two and three of the sequential evaluation
process and are “not a[n RFC] assessment,” which “requires a more detailed” evaluation of the
“areas of mental functioning.” (Tr. 19.) The ALJ then explained that the RFC “reflect[ed] the

degree of limitation [that he had] found in the ‘[P]aragraph B’ mental functional analysis.” (See
id. at 19, so stating and finding “marked limitation” in “adapting or managing oneself,” in part
because it was “consistent with” Dr. Stierley’s functional assessment (citing Ex. 19F at 10, i.e.,
Tr. 1192)).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ reasonably explained that his RFC aligned with
Dr. Stierley’s opinion because it limited Plaintiff to simple instructions, simple work-related
decisions, tasks that do not involve a specific production rate pace like assembly-line work or an
hourly production quota, and only occasional interactions with the public, co-workers, and
supervisors and changes in work setting. (Def.’s Br. at 5-6, citing Tr. 19, 23.) The Commissioner
in turn argues that the ALJ appropriately translated Dr Stierley’s assessment of marked mental

impairments into the RFC and that to the extent that Plaintiff advances a reasonable alternative
interpretation, the Court must defer to and affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 6-7, arguing that
even if Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Stierley’s opinion or the ALJ could
have interpreted Dr. Stierley’s opinion differently, “it is the ALJ’s rational findings that should be
affirmed”).
The Commissioner fails adequately to address the definitions upon which Dr. Stierley
based her (fully accepted) opinion. The relevant forms defined a “[m]arked” limitation as a
“serious[] limit[]” on an individual’s ability to “[f]unction[] . . . independently, appropriately,
effectively, and on a sustained basis” and defined “[s]ustained basis” as the “ability to perform
[the mental activity] eight hours a day for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.”
(Tr. 1183.) Thus, Dr. Stierley, relying on her clinical interview and observations, record review,
and administration of tests, opined that Plaintiff suffers from a “seriously limited” “[t]olerance to
stress associated with [full-time activities of daily living] and work activity” given his “limited

judgment and insight” and general “preoccupation with using violence to defend himself if he
was attacked.” (Id. at 1192, providing an example of Plaintiff’s general worries). Dr. Stierley
added that Plaintiff was limited in his “mental ability to meet [his] own basic needs[.]” (Id. at
1193.)
The ALJ’s explanation is insufficient because the Court is unable to discern how the ALJ
decided that the RFC’s limitations accounted for Plaintiff’s seriously limited ability to tolerate
stress associated with his full-time activities of daily living or work activity, or his impaired
ability to meet his own basic needs, let alone an employer’s. (See id. at 1183, 1193; see also id. at
19, finding that marked limitations in adapting or managing oneself aligned with Dr. Stierley’s
opinion and Plaintiff’s “limited daily activities outside of gaming or watching videos or

movies”); cf. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“How do we use the [P]aragraph B criteria to
evaluate your mental disorder? . . . Marked limitation [means that y]our functioning in this area
independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited. . . . If you
have difficulty using an area . . . day-to-day at home . . . , you may also have difficulty using that
area to function in a work setting. . . . [Y]ou must be able to . . . adapt and manage yourself in the
workplace. Limitation in any one of these parts (understand or remember or apply; concentrate
or persist or maintain pace; adapt or manage oneself) may prevent you from completing a work-
related task.”).
///
The Court finds that the Commissioner has failed meaningfully to explain how the ALJ
arrived at the RFC despite fully accepting Dr. Stierley’s opinion. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at
492 (holding that “the agency [must] set forth the reasoning behind its decisions in a way that
allows for meaningful review” because without it, “a reviewing court [is] . . . unable to review

[the ALJ’s] reasons meaningfully without improperly ‘substituting [its] conclusions for the
ALJ’s, or speculating as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions’”) (simplified) (quoting
Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103); see also Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that ALJs “must provide sufficient reasoning that allows [federal courts] to perform
[their] own review, because ‘the grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are
those upon which the record discloses that its action was based’” (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at
1102)). As a result, the Court is unable to conclude that substantial evidence supports the denial
of Plaintiff’s applications.
On this record, the Court finds that a remand for further proceedings, not an award of
benefits, is warranted because the credit-as-true criteria are not satisfied. See Jeffrey G., 2024

WL 414422, at *5 (standard). On remand, the ALJ must explain how he translated Dr. Stierley’s
assessment of marked limitations into the RFC and address any related conflicts and ambiguities.
Cf. Floe, 2024 WL 4601594, at *1 (“The ALJ found each medical opinion persuasive and
appropriately translated the assessments of [the claimant’s] moderate mental impairments into
the [RFC.]” (citing Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006)); Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir.
2017) (explaining that an “ALJ is responsible for studying the record and resolving any conflicts
or ambiguities in it”).
///
///
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and
REMANDS this case to the agency for further administrative proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2026.

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 17 — OPINION AND ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410935. Public record. Not legal advice.