# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. New York · July 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410692

## Case

- **Full name:** Amazon.com Services LLC v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board et al.; Amazon Labor Union No. 1 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Defendant-Intervenor
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------

AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-5311(EK)(MMH)
-against-

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD et al.,

Defendants,

-and-

AMAZON LABOR UNION NO. 1
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS,

Defendant-Intervenor.

-----------------------------------

ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Currently before the Court is Amazon’s motion for
summary judgment on Count I. The Court presumes familiarity
with the procedural and factual background of this case, as set
forth in our November 26, 2025 order granting Amazon’s motion
for a preliminary injunction. See generally ECF No. 49 (the
“Preliminary Injunction Order”).1
Amazon’s motion is granted for substantially the same
reasons articulated in the Preliminary Injunction Order: the

1 The Court also adopts all abbreviations used in the Preliminary
Injunction Order in this order.
SERA Amendment is squarely preempted by the NLRA as interpreted
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).2 We write further to address several new arguments

raised in the summary judgment briefing. None leads the Court
to “reconsider its conclusions in [the] Preliminary Injunction
Order.” Defs.’ Opp’n 3, ECF No. 70.
Discussion
A. This Court Does Not Have the Authority to Invent a New
Exception to Garmon Preemption
No matter how defendants frame their argument, they
are ultimately asking the Court to overrule — or invent a new
exception to — the preemption doctrine laid out by the Supreme
Court in Garmon. See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp’n 13 (asking the Court
to “decid[e] whether Garmon’s finding of implied preemption
continues to apply”). Defendants readily admit that the SERA
Amendment gives PERB and the NLRB “concurrent” jurisdiction,
see, e.g., id. at 1, 9, 23, which is precisely what Garmon
disallows. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 (“When an activity is
arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of
the [NLRB].” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, defendants ask us
to conduct an implied preemption analysis from scratch, as

2 Having determined that this case turns on pure questions of law, we
stayed discovery pending resolution of Amazon’s motion for summary judgment.
See docket order dated Jan. 16, 2026; minute entry dated Jan. 29, 2026.
though the NLRA’s preemptive effect were a matter of first
impression. See Defs.’ Opp’n 11-18. But, again, this Court is
bound by Garmon “[u]ntil and unless the Supreme Court itself
overrules or limits” it. Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d 123, 125

n.4 (2d Cir. 2002).
Defendants urge us to reconsider in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision overturning Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which had upheld for-
cause removal protections for members of “independent” executive
agencies like the NLRB. See Notice of Suppl. Authority, ECF No.
75 (citing Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, 2026 WL 1855612 (U.S.
June 29, 2026)). But whether for-cause removal protections are
an essential underpinning of the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction,
as laid out in Garmon, is a question for the Supreme Court and /
or Congress. See Defs.’ Opp’n 1 (“These changes have erased
Congress and the Supreme Court’s basis for entrusting

administration of the labor policy for the Nation to the NLRB.”
(emphasis added)); see also Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr.
Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1290 (2026) (Thomas and Barrett, JJ.,
concurring) (“Statutes change only when Congress changes them,
not when judges decide that they no longer vindicate Congress’s
purposes.”).3
The 1959 amendments to the NLRA merely underscore this

point. Defendants argue that Congress passed those amendments
in “reaction to Supreme Court decisions that had permitted . . .
jurisdictional no-man’s lands” in American labor law. Defs.’
Opp’n 17. But just as Congress acted then, it could act now to
the extent it believes that changed political circumstances
warrant reconsideration of the scope of the NLRB’s exclusive
jurisdiction. So too, the purported inefficiencies and
obstruction at the NLRB that defendants describe, see, e.g.,
Defs.’ Opp’n 6-9, are a political issue more appropriately
addressed to Congress.
B. The Sears Exception Does Not Apply
To support its argument that Garmon does not apply now
that “ending quorums is . . . a tool of presidential control,”

3 Defendants had pointed to Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges v. Owen, 139
F.4th 293 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. granted, opinion rev’d sub nom. Margolin v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026), as “particularly
persuasive” support for their position in this case. See Defs.’ Opp’n 15
n.10; Defs.’ Opp’ to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 14, ECF No. 30. That case “held
that an exception to exhaustion requirements for federal employee claims
regarding personnel actions covered by the Civil Service Reform Act might be
justified by the Special Counsel and Merit System Protection Board’s loss of
independence.” Defs.’ Opp’n 15 n.10. The Supreme Court has since summarily
reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating the principle of party
presentation. See Margolin, 146 S. Ct. at 1287. Justices Thomas and Barrett
wrote separately to criticize the Fourth Circuit’s decision on the merits for
reading an exception into a statutory exhaustion requirement on the basis of
changed political circumstances. Id. at 1290 (Thomas and Barrett, JJ.,
concurring).
ALU invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Sears v. San Diego
County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). See
ALU’s Opp’n 17-21, ECF No. 71; see also Defs.’ Opp’n 21 (relying
on Sears to argue that the SERA Amendment can be applied

constitutionally when the NLRB lacks a quorum). Specifically,
ALU contends that Sears “blessed an exception to Garmon
permitting state regulation when parties ‘lack[] a reasonable
opportunity to secure’” an NLRB decision — as they do now, in
ALU’s view, due to the NLRB’s dysfunction. ALU’s Opp’n 18
(quoting Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. Union
No. 174, 598 U.S. 771, 777 n.1 (2023)).
That argument is simply incorrect. Sears held that a
state court could “entertain an action” that “arguably — but not
definitively” involved conduct prohibited or protected by the
NLRA when the plaintiff had no “reasonable opportunity either to
invoke the Board’s jurisdiction himself or else to induce his

adversary to do so.” 436 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added). Here,
by contrast, the SERA Amendment gives PERB the authority to
regulate matters clearly within the NLRB’s exclusive
jurisdiction. That is unconstitutional. Indeed, the Sears
Court reiterated that “unquestionably[,] . . . when the same
controversy may be presented to the state [body] or the NLRB, it
must be presented to the Board.” Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
C. Defendants’ Request for a “Tailored” Remedy Is Denied
Defendants also argue that, at the very least, the
Court should “reject [Amazon’s] facial challenge or . . .
provide a tailored remedy” because there are circumstances under

which the SERA Amendment’s application would be valid. Defs.’
Opp’n 18. Specifically, defendants ask the Court to hold that
“the 2025 Amendment can be constitutionally applied when the
NLRB is unable to exercise jurisdiction – either when Board
Member firings without cause eliminate a quorum or when courts
enjoin the NLRB from processing a case.” Id. at 20. We
disagree.
First, defendants argue that the SERA Amendment “is
constitutional when applied in circumstances like 2025 in which
the NLRB cannot function” due to its lack of quorum. Id. at 19.
But that is merely a variant on defendants’ argument for an
exception to Garmon. It does not merit further discussion,

except to note that the NLRB regained its quorum less than a
month after the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction Order.4
Second, defendants claim that the SERA Amendment’s
“grant of jurisdiction . . . could encompass specific labor

4 See Parker Purifoy, “NLRB Regains Quorum as Senate Confirms Trump
Labor Slate,” Bloomberg Law (Dec. 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/97BV-R7JX. ALU
also contends that it would be constitutional for PERB to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the NLRB during a federal government shutdown. ALU’s Opp’n
22. That argument fails for similar reasons.
disputes that fall under [recognized] Garmon exceptions.” Id.
at 19 (citing Glacier, 598 U.S. at 777 n.1). But defendants do
not explain how. We have already explained why the Sears
exception is inapplicable here. See supra Section I.B. The

other two recognized exceptions — for conduct that “is a merely
peripheral concern of the NLRA” and “conduct [that] touches
interests . . . deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility” — are also inapposite, largely for the reasons
articulated in Amazon’s reply brief. Glacier, 598 U.S. at 777
n.1; see Amazon’s Reply 11-13, ECF No. 74.
SERA, by defendants’ own admission, provides “parallel
rights” to the NLRB. See Defs.’ Opp’n 3. Indeed, New York
courts have repeatedly recognized that “The [NLRA], and the
[SERA] are not only alike in their provisions but are almost
identical in their language.” New York State Lab. Rels. Bd. v.
Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 492 (N.Y. 1945). Clearly then,

SERA does not address conduct “peripheral” to the NLRA or rooted
in local concerns. Rather, it governs the very same conduct at
the heart of the NLRA.
Finally, defendants contend that the SERA Amendment
can be applied constitutionally “when the NLRB is enjoined from
processing a case.” Defs.’ Opp’n 22. But that would turn the
statute on its head. As written, the SERA Amendment applies
except when the NLRB “successfully asserts jurisdiction over any
employer, employees, trades, or industries” via a federal court
order. See SERA Amendment, ECF No. 1-1. “Statutes should be
construed to avoid constitutional questions, but this

interpretative canon is not a license for the judiciary to
rewrite language enacted by the legislature.” Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1997).
D. Amazon’s Claims Are Neither Moot, Nor Duplicative
Lastly, ALU argues that the case is now moot because
Amazon’s “particularized injury” — the PERB charge that ALU
filed on Brima Sylla’s behalf — “has been withdrawn.” ALU’s
Opp’n 9. This argument fails. For one thing, a plaintiff can
“bring[] a pre-enforcement facial challenge against a statute”
without “demonstrat[ing] to a certainty that it will be
prosecuted under the statute”; rather, it must prove “only that
it has an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be
enforced against it.” Pac. Cap. Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542

F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 2008). Amazon has clearly done so here.
Moreover, even if the Sylla charge was the only basis
for Amazon’s standing, “[a]n exception to the mootness doctrine
applies when a defendant ceases the challenged action
voluntarily.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, No. 97-CV-23, 2003 WL
21418198, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2003). ALU argues this case is
different because it “didn’t do anything allegedly unlawful
[itself], and Amazon didn’t sue [ALU].” ALU’s Opp’n 10. But
that is a distinction without a difference: ALU sought to
intervene as a defendant in this case in part to defend the
Sylla charge. See Mot. to Intervene 14, ECF No. 26-1. And it

withdrew that charge in response to the Preliminary Injunction
Order, which led Sylla to conclude that his “case would be
decided more promptly” by the NLRB. ALU’s Jan. 26, 2026 Ltr.-
Mot. for a Pre-Mot. Conf., ECF No. 58. If that were to render
this case moot, the Court would vacate its injunction, and Sylla
(or a different member of ALU) could bring another charge to
PERB, which — by ALU’s own telling — is the preferable forum.
That is exactly what the voluntary cessation doctrine seeks to
prevent. See Connecticut Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont,
6 F.4th 439, 446 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The voluntary cessation rule
ensures that a party cannot evade judicial review . . . by
temporarily altering [its] behavior.”).

ALU also briefly argues, in the alternative, that the
Court should dismiss this litigation as duplicative of that
currently pending in the Northern District of New York. See
ALU’s Opp’n 9-10; see also NLRB v. New York, No. 25-CV-01283
(N.D.N.Y.). We have already twice rejected variants of this
argument and will not consider it anew. See Sept. 29, 2025
docket order denying motion for a stay; Preliminary Injunction
Order 13-14.
E. Amazon Has Met the Standards for Summary Judgment and
Permanent Injunctive Relief
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, such that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Here, because we hold that the SERA Amendment is
unconstitutional as a matter of law, summary judgment is
warranted, and Amazon is entitled to declaratory relief.
Amazon has also fulfilled the requirements for
permanent injunctive relief:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
When the plaintiff seeks an injunction against the government,
the final two factors merge. Cf. New York v. United States
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2020)
(articulating the same rule in the context of a preliminary
injunction motion).
Each of these factors has been met here. As the Court
previously noted, “it is well-settled that an alleged
constitutional violation constitutes irreparable harm.”
Gallagher v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 477 F. Supp. 3d 19, 41
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases); see also Prelim. Inj. Order
12-13. And it is equally obvious that a constitutional
violation of the sort alleged here cannot be remedied with money
damages. Cf. Axon Enter., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S.

175, 191 (2023) (“[An unconstitutional] proceeding that has
already happened cannot be undone.”). Finally, the state’s
“interest in administering its laws without interference by
federal equitable power . . . is diminished when the laws at
issue likely impinge a federal constitutional right. . . . [And]
the public interest is well served by the correction of this
constitutional harm.” A.H. by & through Hester v. French, 985
F.3d 165, 184 (2d Cir. 2021).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Amazon’s motion for summary
judgment on Count I is granted. It is hereby declared that the
SERA Amendment is unconstitutional, null, and void. And

defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing the SERA
Amendment. Because that is the extent of the relief that Amazon
seeks, Counts II through IV are dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment
for Amazon and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United State

s District Judge

D ated: July 20, 2026
Brooklyn, New York

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410692. Public record. Not legal advice.