# Haines

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410665

## Case

- **Full name:** Lori Haines v. Jesse Brown and Wolverine Trucking Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LORI HAINES, No. 4:24-CV-00536

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

JESSE BROWN, and
WOLVERINE TRUCKING INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JULY 17, 2026
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lori Haines commenced this diversity action against Defendants
Jesse Brown and Wolverine Trucking, Inc. (“Wolverine”), asserting claims arising
from a motor vehicle collision that occurred in May of 2023, in Wyalusing,
Pennsylvania.1 Plaintiff alleges that Brown negligently and recklessly operated a
commercial tractor-trailer owned by Wolverine when he failed to stop for traffic in
a marked construction zone, causing a multi-vehicle collision in which Plaintiff
sustained personal injuries.2 Plaintiff further asserts claims against Wolverine for
negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, as well as

1 See Doc. 26.
vicarious liability for Brown’s conduct.3 Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive
damages.4

Following the completion of discovery, Defendants moved for partial
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, requesting
dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims.5 Defendants contend that, even

accepting Plaintiff’s evidence as true, the record establishes no more than ordinary
negligence and therefore cannot support punitive damages under Pennsylvania law.6
Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that disputed facts concerning both Brown’s
conduct immediately preceding the collision and Wolverine’s corporate safety

practices present classic jury questions regarding reckless indifference.7
The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons
stated below, it is denied.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”8 Material facts are those “that

3 See Doc. 28.
4 See id.
5 See Doc. 22.
6 See Doc. 23.
7 See Doc. 26.
8 F .R.C .P. 56(a).
could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person

with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”9 A defendant “meets this
standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s
case.”10 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to

admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie
case under applicable substantive law.”11 “Further, in ruling on a summary judgment
motion a court may, in appropriate cases, render partial summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”12

Party testimony is sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on an
issue: “‘a single, non-conclusory affidavit or witness’s testimony, when based on
personal knowledge and directed at a material issue, is sufficient to defeat summary
judgment.’”13 “This is true even where, as here, the information is self-serving.”14

However, courts are not required to credit conclusory testimony, that is, evidence
failing to set forth specific factual assertions and instead regurgitating opinions and

9 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
10 Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).
11 Id.
12 Kramer v. Newman, 840 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
13 Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lupyan v. Corinthian
Colleges, Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2014)).
14 Id.
conclusions.15 “[C]onclusory testimonial evidence cannot defeat summary
judgment.”16

In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”17 the Court “must view the
facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.”18 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of

fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c),” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”19
Finally, although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may

consider other materials in the record.”20
B. Undisputed Facts
With that standard outlining the framework for review, the Court now turns
to the undisputed facts, resolving doubts in favor of the Plaintiff, the non-moving

party.
As I noted above, this action arises from a motor vehicle collision that
occurred on May 22, 2023, at approximately 11:22 a.m., on State Route 6 near the

15 Daimler v. Moehle, No. 23-2611, 2025 WL 1355138, at *5 (3d Cir. May 9, 2025).
16 Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012).
17 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.
Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).
18 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d
Cir. 2018).
20 F .R.C .P. 56(c)(3).
intersection of Tamarack Road in Wyalusing, Pennsylvania.21 At the time of the
collision, State Route 6 was an active PennDOT construction zone.22 Advance

warning signs had been placed to notify approaching motorists of the work zone.23
Haines was operating her 2004 Jeep Wrangler eastbound on State Route 6.24
Plaintiff observed construction warning signs before reaching the work zone.25
Plaintiff also observed a flagger directing traffic through the construction area.26

Plaintiff slowed her vehicle and came to a complete stop behind other traffic because
of the construction activity.27
Brown was operating a 2019 Mack Anthem tractor-trailer owned by

Defendant Wolverine Trucking, Inc. at the time of the collision.28 Brown was acting
within the course and scope of his employment with Wolverine Trucking;29 he
testified that the tractor-trailer weighed approximately 79,000 pounds.30

Brown further testified that he did not observe the construction warning signs
before approaching the stopped traffic, which was just over the crest of a hill.31 Due
to oncoming traffic in the left lane, however, Brown also testified that he attempted

21 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 10-19.
22 Id. ¶ 11.
23 Id. ¶ 12.
24 Doc. 28-2 at 36:1-39:12.
25 Id. at 36:1-37:24
26 Id.
27 Id. at 38:1-39:12.
28 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 14.
29 Id. ¶ 6.
30 Doc. 28-3 at 54:3-12.
31 Id. at 95:20-96:10.
to avoid the collision by steering left after recognizing the stopped traffic.32 Brown
nevertheless collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle after swerving back into the right

lane.33
Plaintiff testified that Brown’s tractor-trailer violently struck her stopped
vehicle,34 and further testified that Brown’s tractor-trailer continued forward after
striking her vehicle and collided with additional stopped vehicles.35 Brown testified

that he was not speeding immediately before the collision.36 Plaintiff, however, relies
on Brown’s testimony that he was traveling approximately forty-five to fifty miles
per hour into stopped traffic immediately before impact.37

Brown testified that the construction workers were responsible for his
inability to recognize the construction zone and safely stop his vehicle, as they failed
to place sufficient signage to war of stopped vehicles ahead.38 Plaintiff, by contrast,

testified that she and every vehicle ahead of Brown recognized the construction
zone, observed the warning signs, and safely stopped their respective vehicles before
the collision.39

32 Id. at 95:20-105:16.
33 Id.
34 Doc. 28-2 at 38:1-39:12.
35 Id.
36 Doc. 28-3 at 101:17-102:14.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 74:1-83:16.
39 Doc. 28-2 at 36:1-39:12.
Brown obtained his commercial driver’s license (CDL) after attending Greater
Southern Tier BOCES.40 Brown subsequently worked as a commercial driver for

Coca-Cola.41 Wolverine hired Brown on May 27, 2020,42 and Brown received ride-
along training when he joined Wolverine.43 Approximately two months after joining
Wolverine, Brown was involved in a commercial vehicle accident in which he struck
a bridge.44 Plaintiff relies on evidence that Brown received neither retraining nor

discipline following that accident, nor did Wolverine provide any formal post-
accident training.45
Plaintiff further relies on evidence that Wolverine reviewed an incomplete

employment history before hiring Brown.46 Plaintiff also relies on testimony that
Wolverine did not provide drivers with specific safe-driving training.47 Plaintiff
additionally relies on testimony that Wolverine did not provide formal post-accident

training, and relies on testimony that Wolverine maintained neither a safety
committee nor a safety consultant.48 Plaintiff further relies on testimony that

40 Doc. 24-3 at 19:3-21.
41 Id. at 28:16, 33:23.
42 Doc. 28-4 at 47-50.
43 Doc. 28-5 at 15:1-21; Doc. 24-3 at 41:24-45:12.
44 Doc. 28-4 at 49:1-50:8.
45 Doc. 28-4 at 38; 49:1-50:8.
46 Doc. 28-6, Matthews Report (the Matthews Report was prepared by Plaintiff’s trucking safety
expert, Ted Matthews. Matthews relies on the rule as set forth in 49 C.F.R § 391.23 which
requires carriers to contact previous employers in order to obtain and evaluate a driver’s past
experience and performance. Matthews asserts that Brown’s previous employers did not
submit the requisite forms outlining Brown’s history to Wolverine).
47 Doc. 28-4 at 32-33; 40.
48 Id. at 38; 40.
Wolverine had no standard operating procedure governing the download of post-
accident telematics despite possessing the technology to do so.49

John Agar, Wolverine’s Product Fulfillment Manager at the time of his
deposition, testified that drivers should begin slowing after encountering
construction warning signs.50 Agar testified that drivers should “slow it down” after
observing a “One Lane Road Ahead” sign.51 Agar further testified that drivers should

be “going very slow” after observing a “Flagger Ahead” sign.52 He also agreed that
speeding in a construction zone is more dangerous than speeding on an ordinary
roadway.53

Defendants rely on evidence that, following the incident, Brown underwent
the post-accident drug and alcohol testing required by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations.54 They further note that Brown’s post-accident drug and alcohol

test returned negative results.55 Furthermore, Jack Van Steenburg, Defendants’
trucking safety and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (“FMCSA”) expert, opined

49 Id. at 16:9-17.
50 Doc. 28-5 at 22:1-25:8.
51 Id. at 24:11-16.
52 Id. at 24:17-23.
53 Id. at 25:1-8.
54 Doc. 24-5 (this Court notes, however, that testing that occurred after the accident is largely
irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is whether Brown and Wolverine acted beyond mere
negligence in causing the accident. Anything that occurred post-accident does not speak to
Defendants’ conduct leading up to the accident. One may act with extreme care following an
event while also having engaged in activity that he knew or should have known would cause
an unreasonable risk to others prior to and in causing the event).
55 Doc. 24-5; Doc. 28-5 at 26:1-9.
that Wolverine complied with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
governing interstate motor carriers.56 Van Steenburg further opined that Wolverine

maintained systems governing drug and alcohol testing, cell-phone use, vehicle
maintenance, and driver discipline.57 Finally, Van Steenburg opined that Applicant
Insight, a third-party employment screening and background investigation company,

investigated Brown’s qualifications before his hiring and concluded that Brown
satisfied the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations applicable to commercial
drivers.58
C. Analysis

Defendants move for summary judgment solely with respect to Plaintiff’s
claims for punitive damages.59 Defendants argue that, even viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record establishes no more than ordinary
negligence and is therefore insufficient to support punitive damages under

Pennsylvania law.60 Plaintiff responds that genuine disputes of material fact exist
regarding both Brown’s operation of the tractor-trailer and Wolverine’s hiring,
training, supervision, and safety practices.61 After what it considers a thorough

review of the record, the Court agrees with Plaintiff.

56 Doc. 24-6 at 6.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 6-7.
59 Doc. 22.
60 Doc. 23 at 5-16.
61 Doc. 26 at 4-17.
1. Pennsylvania Law Governing Punitive Damages
Under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are an “extreme remedy”

available only in exceptional cases.62 Their purpose is not to compensate an injured
plaintiff but to punish outrageous conduct and deter similar conduct in the future.63
Punitive damages may be awarded only where a defendant’s “conduct is

outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or . . . reckless indifference to the
rights of others.”64 Mere negligence, or even gross negligence, is insufficient; rather,
the plaintiff must “establish that (1) the defendant had a subjective appreciation of
the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to

act . . . in conscious disregard of that risk.”65
Although the issue of punitive damages frequently presents a question for the
jury, summary judgment is appropriate where the record contains no evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant acted with the requisite
state of mind.66 Conversely, where competing evidence permits differing reasonable

62 Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005).
63 SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1991).
64 Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (Pa. 1984).
65 Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. 2005).
66 See id. (to determine requisite state of mind, Pennsylvania has adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 500 which states “[T]he actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the
safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but
also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.”).
inferences regarding a defendant’s appreciation of the risk and conscious disregard
thereof, the issue must be resolved by the jury.67

2. Defendant Brown
Defendants characterize this matter as a routine rear-end collision resulting
from momentary inattention.68 Plaintiff, however, contends that Brown ignored

multiple construction-zone warnings while operating a fully loaded commercial
tractor-trailer and thereby consciously disregarded an obvious risk of serious harm.69
The record contains sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to accept
Plaintiff’s characterization.

It is undisputed that the collision occurred within an active construction
zone.70 Plaintiff testified that she observed multiple construction warning signs and
a flagger before bringing her vehicle to a complete stop behind other traffic.71

Brown, by contrast, testified that he did not observe the construction warning signs
before approaching the stopped traffic.72 Brown further testified that he attempted to
steer left after recognizing the stopped traffic but nevertheless struck Plaintiff’s
vehicle.73

67 See Brand Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Intertek Testing Servs., N.A., Inc., 801 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir.
2015).
68 Doc. 23 at 6-8.
69 Doc. 26 at 4-8.
70 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11-13.
71 Doc. 28-2 at 36:1-39:12.
72 Doc. 24-3 at 95:20-105:16.
73 Id.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable
jury could conclude that Brown failed to perceive not merely a single warning sign

but an entire sequence of construction-zone warnings and traffic-control devices.
Plaintiff testified that she safely recognized the construction zone and complied with
the flagger’s instructions;74 she further testified that the vehicles ahead of her
likewise recognized the construction zone and stopped without incident.75 Brown,

on the other hand, testified that he failed to recognize the construction zone before
encountering stopped traffic.76
The record likewise contains evidence regarding Brown’s speed and the

operation of his commercial vehicle immediately before impact. Brown testified that
his tractor-trailer weighed approximately 79,000 pounds.77 He further testified that
he was traveling approximately forty-five to fifty miles per hour immediately before
the collision.78 Although Brown denied that he was speeding,79 Plaintiff argues that

a reasonable jury could nevertheless conclude that Brown was traveling at an
unreasonable speed given the existence of both an active construction zone and
stopped traffic.80

74 Doc. 28-2 at 36:1-39:12.
75 Id.
76 Doc. 24-3 at 95:20-105:16.
77 Id. at 54:3-12.
78 Id. at 101:17-102:14.
79 Id.
80 Doc. 26 at 5-8.
Plaintiff also relies upon Brown’s testimony that he blamed the construction
workers because, in Brown’s view, the work zone was inadequately marked.81

Plaintiff, however, observed the construction warning signs, recognized the flagger,
and safely stopped before the collision occurred.82 Plaintiff further testified that
Brown’s tractor-trailer continued forward after striking her vehicle and collided with
additional vehicles before coming to rest.83

Moreover, John Agar, Wolverine’s Product Fulfillment Manager, testified
concerning the operation of commercial vehicles in construction zones.84 Agar stated
that drivers encountering a “One Lane Road Ahead” sign should “slow it down.”85

He further testified that drivers should be “going very slow” after encountering a
“Flagger Ahead” sign;86 he also agreed that speeding in a construction zone presents
greater danger than speeding under ordinary roadway conditions.87

Defendants emphasize that Brown testified he was not speeding and that he
attempted to avoid the collision after recognizing the stopped traffic.88 They

81 Doc. 24-3 at 74:1-83:16.
82 Doc. 28-2 at 36:1-39:12.
83 Id.
84 Doc. 28-5 at 24:11-25:8.
85 Id. at 24:11-16.
86 Id. at 24:17-23.
87 Id. at 25:1-8.
88 Doc. 24-3 at 95:20-105:16; 101:17-102:14.
therefore contend that Brown’s conduct amounts to no more than ordinary
negligence.89 The Court cannot accept that argument at the summary judgment stage.

A reasonable jury could conclude that Brown merely failed to perceive the
construction zone in time to stop safely. A reasonable jury could likewise conclude
that Brown consciously disregarded an obvious risk by operating a fully loaded

commercial tractor-trailer through an active construction zone without timely
recognizing multiple warning signs and stopped traffic. Because the competing
evidence supports differing reasonable inferences regarding Brown’s state of mind,

summary judgment is inappropriate.
3. Defendant Wolverine Trucking
The Court likewise concludes that genuine disputes of material fact preclude

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against Wolverine.
Defendants principally rely on the opinions of their trucking safety expert,
Jack Van Steenburg. Van Steenburg opines that Wolverine complied with the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations applicable to interstate motor carriers.90
He further opines that Wolverine maintained systems governing drug and alcohol
testing, vehicle maintenance, cell-phone use, and driver discipline.91 He also asserts
that Wolverine retained Applicant Insight, a third-party background screening

89 Doc. 23 at 6-8.
90 Doc. 24-6 at 6.
91 Id.
company, to investigate Brown’s qualifications before hiring him and that Brown
satisfied the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations applicable to commercial

drivers.92 Finally, Van Steenburg opines that Wolverine was not required to
administer its own road test because Brown already possessed a valid commercial
driver’s license.93

Plaintiff, however, relies upon contrary evidence from both fact witnesses and
Plaintiff’s trucking safety expert, Ted Matthews.94 Matthews opines that Wolverine
failed to maintain a complete driver qualification file for Brown before hiring him,95
and that Brown’s employment application omitted portions of his prior employment

history and contained an unexplained employment gap.96 Matthews also opines that
Wolverine failed to adequately determine whether Brown could safely operate the
commercial vehicle involved in this collision.97 He further concludes that Brown’s
lack of training and experience contributed directly to the collision.98

Moreover, Wolverine’s corporate representatives testified that Brown
received only ride-along training when he joined Wolverine.99 Eric Strang, a
Wolverine employee who was deposed as a corporate representative, testified that

92 Id. at 6-7.
93 Id. at 7.
94 See Doc. 28-6.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Doc. 24-3 at 41:24-45:12; Doc. 28-5 at 15:1-21.
Wolverine did not provide drivers with specific safe-driving instruction beyond
orientation.100 Strang further testified that Wolverine did not provide formal post-

accident driver training,101 and maintained neither a safety committee nor a safety
consultant.102 Finally, he testified that Wolverine had no standard operating
procedure governing the download of post-accident telematics despite possessing
that capability.103

The record also reflects that Brown was involved in another commercial
vehicle accident approximately two months after joining Wolverine.104 Plaintiff
relies upon evidence that Brown received neither discipline nor remedial training

following that accident.105 Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s characterization of
Wolverine’s safety practices, and rely upon evidence that Brown underwent the post-
accident drug and alcohol testing required by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations.106 Defendants further rely upon evidence that Brown’s post-accident

drug and alcohol test returned negative results.107
When viewed collectively, the record presents competing evidence regarding
Wolverine’s appreciation of known safety risks and the adequacy of its hiring,

100 Doc. 28-4 at 32-33.
101 Id. at 38.
102 Id. at 40.
103 Id. at 49:1-50:8.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Doc. 24-5.
107 Doc. 24-5; Doc. 28-5 at 26:1-9.
training, supervision, and post-accident practices. Resolving those competing factual
inferences would require the Court to weigh the credibility of witnesses and

competing expert opinions. These are tasks that are reserved for the jury and
therefore summary judgment is inappropriate.108
4. Remaining Arguments

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention evidence merely repackages ordinary negligence and therefore cannot
support punitive damages.109 Plaintiff responds that Wolverine’s hiring, training,
supervision, and post-accident practices demonstrate a conscious disregard for

known risks associated with commercial trucking operations.110
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court need not determine which
interpretation of the evidence is ultimately correct.111 Plaintiff has produced

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Wolverine appreciated
the dangers associated with commercial trucking operations yet nevertheless failed
to adequately train, supervise, or remediate Brown following an earlier accident.112

108 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Marino v. Indus. Crating Co.,
358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a district court may not make credibility
determinations when deciding a motion for summary judgement).
109 Doc. 23 at 11-16.
110 Doc. 26 at 8-17.
111 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
112 Doc. 28-4 at 32-40, 49:1-50:8; Doc. 28-6 at 6-7.
Whether that evidence ultimately establishes reckless indifference is a question for
the jury.113

Accordingly, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Court concludes that genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against both Defendants.

III. CONCLUSION
Summary judgment serves an important gatekeeping function by eliminating
claims unsupported by the evidentiary record. It does not, however, authorize the
Court to resolve credibility disputes or choose between competing factual

inferences.
Here, Plaintiff has produced evidence that Brown entered a marked
construction zone while operating a heavily loaded commercial tractor-trailer,

allegedly failed to observe multiple construction warnings, continued at a speed a
jury could deem unreasonable under the circumstances, and collided with stopped
traffic. Plaintiff has further presented evidence that Wolverine maintained
inadequate safety practices, failed to provide meaningful driver training or post-

accident remediation, and retained Brown despite an earlier collision and without
corrective action.

113 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Whether that evidence ultimately persuades a jury that Defendants acted with
reckless indifference remains to be seen. At the summary judgment stage, however,

the Court concludes only that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could reach that conclusion. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment will be denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410665. Public record. Not legal advice.