# Aseves

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · July 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410421

## Case

- **Full name:** Anton Aseves v. Ted Ledbetter, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

ANTON ASEVES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 25-1516
)
TED LEDBETTER, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center,
was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the Court for a merit
review of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such
process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id.
The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the
plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges events that occurred at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). The
individuals he named as defendants all work at the facility in various capacities.
Plaintiff alleges that another inmate monopolized the gallery telephone for approximately
five hours on December 25, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Malcome refused to remedy
the problem, even after Defendant Dayton, a correctional lieutenant, directed him to do so.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dayton failed to ensure his order was executed. Plaintiff alleges
that he became homicidal and otherwise suffered from emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sutter continued to allow the other inmate to monopolize

the telephone the next morning after count, prompting Plaintiff to flood the gallery. Plaintiff
alleges that he was suffering symptoms related to his mental health conditions, and that
Defendant Dayton directed Defendants Baker and Sutter to take Plaintiff to crisis watch. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Sutter first offered food if Plaintiff calmed down and agreed to forego
crisis watch, and, when Plaintiff declined, Defendant Sutter refused to follow Defendant
Dayton’s orders. Plaintiff alleges that he flooded the gallery again and that Defendant Sutter told
him to start a fire. Plaintiff alleges he started a fire in front of Defendant Ledbetter and suffered
smoke inhalation.
Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to crisis watch at some point that evening or early on

December 26, 2024, and that several officials and defendants agreed that Defendant Sutter
lacked the authority to deny crisis watch and was wrong to do so. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Jane Doe #1 failed to provide medical treatment for smoke inhalation. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants John Doe #10 and John Doe #11 searched his cell because of the fire, threw away
$40.00 worth of commissary and non-contraband items, and failed to issue a shakedown slip.
Plaintiff alleges that other inmates stole his property while he was on crisis watch. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Jane Doe #2 and John Doe #6, both Internal Affairs officials, did not
document his crisis watch.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from chest pains, heavy breathing, and productive
coughs resulting from the smoke inhalation from the date of the incident through May 2025.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe #7, the doctor, did not treat his chest pains or document
“anything.” Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances regarding these events, only for them to
disappear while Defendants Ledbetter and John Doe #8 were processing them. Plaintiff alleges
that he lives in fear because of everything that occurred.

DISCUSSION
Denial of Access to a Telephone
A prisoner also has a First Amendment right to communicate with individuals outside the
prison, subject to legitimate penological interests. Felton v. Brown, 129 F.4th 999, 1011 (7th Cir.
2025); Lashbrook v. Hyatte, 758 F. App’x. 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2019). Unreasonable restrictions
on telephone access may violate the Constitution. See Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391 (7th
Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the telephone for at least five hours on one
occasion. He does not allege that prison officials otherwise hindered his ability to communicate

with individuals outside the prison or that the inability to use the telephone persisted for a
significant time. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim to the extent that he alleges a
First Amendment claim related to the denial of access to a telephone.
Denial of Medical and Mental Health Care
Inmates are entitled to adequate medical and mental health care under the Eighth
Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). To survive screening under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, a plaintiff must allege facts permitting a plausible inference that the prison
official acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical or mental health need. Id. at 105.
Claims of negligence, medical malpractice, or disagreement with a prescribed course of
treatment are not sufficient. See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2016) (en
banc); McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016).
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when “the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official’s
subjective awareness of a risk “is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842.
Courts defer to treatment decisions made by medical professionals unless the evidence shows
that “no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.”
Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008).
A treatment decision permits an inference that the medical provider acted with deliberate
indifference only when the decision constitutes “such a substantial departure from accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible
actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729 (internal
quotations omitted). Persisting in a course of treatment known to be ineffective, failing to follow
an existing protocol, delaying treatment without penological justification, and refusing to follow
a specialist’s recommendations may permit an inference that a medical professional failed to
exercise the appropriate judgment. Id. at 729-30.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dayton directed his subordinates to take Plaintiff to crisis
watch. Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit a plausible inference that Defendant Dayton knew
that the other officials were likely to disobey his orders, and to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to
hold him liable solely because he was a supervisor, he does not state a viable claim.
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations that officials later placed him on crisis watch and
concluded that Defendant Sutter should not have disobeyed his lieutenant’s orders, the complaint
permits a plausible inference that Defendant Sutter consciously disregarded Plaintiff’s need for

immediate mental health treatment, allegedly opting instead to attempt to bribe Plaintiff to forego
the request and then prodding him to create a dangerous situation. The Court finds that Plaintiff
states an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
Defendant Sutter. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding medical care he did or did not receive for
smoke inhalation are too sparse for the Court to find that he states a constitutional claim.
Cell Shakedown and Destruction of Property
Plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials intentionally or negligently destroyed his
property without issuing a shakedown slip permit only the inference that these actions were not
taken pursuant to prison policy or were otherwise unauthorized. Individuals “who complain

about the unauthorized loss or destruction of their property must seek compensation in state court
rather than under § 1983.” Lyons v. Dart, 901 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Stewart v.
McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (1993) (the Illinois Court of Claims provides an adequate remedy
for the unauthorized destruction of property). Plaintiff’s allegations that inmates stole his
property are insufficient to permit a plausible inference that prison officials were personally
involved. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim based on the alleged destruction or
theft of his property.
Use of Grievance Process
Prisoners do not have a freestanding constitutional right to the grievance process. Owens
v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by
the First Amendment and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due
Process Clause.”). Prison officials’ alleged obstruction of Plaintiff’s ability to complete the

grievance process is relevant only to whether these remedies were available for purposes of
complying with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a
claim based on these allegations.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 5)
Plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in this case. In considering the
Plaintiff’s motion, the court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to
obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of
the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,

654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff has not shown that he made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own. A
plaintiff usually does this by attaching copies of letters sent to attorneys seeking representation
and copies of any responses received. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong, the
Court does not address the second. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff’s motion is denied with leave to renew.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 10)
Plaintiff’s motion is granted. This Order addresses all pending issues. The next steps in
the case are outlined below.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court finds that the plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need against Defendant Sutter. Any additional claims shall not be
included in the case, except at the court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause
shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2. This case is now in the process of service. The plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, in order to give notice to
the defendants and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. The
plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the court at this time, unless otherwise directed by
the court.
3. The court will attempt service on the defendants by mailing each defendant a
waiver of service. The defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an
answer. If the defendants have not filed answers or appeared through counsel within 90
days of the entry of this order, the plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of
service. After the defendants have been served, the court will enter an order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
4. With respect to a defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
the plaintiff, the entity for whom that defendant worked while at that address shall provide
to the clerk said defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said defendant's
forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the clerk.
5. The defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is
sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall
be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general, an answer sets forth the
defendants' positions. The court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and
until a motion is filed by the defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary
or will be considered.
6. This district uses electronic filing, which means that, after defense counsel
has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by the plaintiff with the clerk. The plaintiff does not need to
mail to defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that the plaintiff has filed with
the clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery
requests and responses are not filed with the clerk. The plaintiff must mail his discovery
requests and responses directly to defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses
sent to the clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are attached to and the subject of a
motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance
and the court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in
more detail.
7. Counsel for the defendants is hereby granted leave to depose the plaintiff at
his place of confinement. Counsel for the defendants shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
8. The plaintiff shall immediately notify the court, in writing, of any change in
his mailing address and telephone number. The plaintiff's failure to notify the court of a
change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
9. If a defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect formal
service through the U.S. Marshals service on that defendant and will require that
defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
10. The clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
11. The clerk is directed to terminate Ted Ledbetter, Malcome, Dayton, Baker,
John Doe V-XII, and Jane Doe I-II as defendants.
12. The clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendant Sutter pursuant to the
standard procedures.
13. Plaintiff’s Motion [5] is DENIED with leave to renew.
14. Plaintiff’s Motion [10] is GRANTED.
Entered this 31st day of July, 2026.

s/Michael M. Mihm
MICHAEL M. MIHM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410421. Public record. Not legal advice.