# Burris

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · July 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410290

## Case

- **Full name:** Reginald V. Wilson v. Sgt. Keegan Burris, in his Individual Capacity
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** July 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

REGINALD V. WILSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-24-539-D
)
SGT. KEEGAN BURRIS, in his )
Individual Capacity, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Sgt. Keegan Burris’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and Brief in Support [Doc. No. 47]. Plaintiff Reginald V. Wilson filed a response [Doc. No.
53], and Sgt. Burris replied [Doc. No. 54]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff initiated this action against Sgt. Burris of the Oklahoma City Police
Department (OCPD), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights
were violated when Sgt. Burris deployed his K-9 partner, Edge, during a search of a
neighborhood. Sgt. Burris had responded to the neighborhood at approximately 4:00 a.m.
after reports of a burglary, with one burglary victim telling police that four males on
bicycles were breaking into cars in the neighborhood. When OCPD arrived on the scene,
Plaintiff ran and hid in an area with thick, tall grass and bushes. While on Sgt. Burris’s
leash, Edge discovered Plaintiff in his hiding spot, biting and injuring Plaintiff’s calf.
In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Burris used excessive force and unlawfully
seized him, in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff sues Sgt. Burris
in his individual capacity only. In the present motion, Sgt. Burris moves for summary
judgment, claiming he is entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s excessive force and

unlawful seizure claims. Sgt. Burris also contends that he did not use excessive force on
Plaintiff or unlawfully seize him.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS1
On July 20, 2023, at approximately 3:40 a.m., OCPD officer Justin Jarrett responded
to a call that four black males were attempting to break into vehicles in the area near 1316
NW 113th Street in Oklahoma City. As Officer Jarrett approached the location, he “saw

three black males on bicycles and one black male on foot next to a white SUV that was
parked in the driveway.” One of the four individuals yelled “Police!” and all four
individuals fled. [Def.’s UMF Nos. 1-3; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF Nos. 1-3].
Officer Jarrett lost sight of the individuals after attempting to go around a corner
and cut them off. He spoke with the SUV’s owner who reported that his car had been

burglarized and that ten dollars had been stolen from the center console. [Def.’s UMF Nos.
3-4; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF Nos. 3-4].

1 For several of Defendant’s undisputed material facts, Plaintiff does not specifically controvert
them. For instance, Defendant’s UMF No. 5 describes home security footage showing “one male
entering the SUV” and “[t]he same four individuals return[ing] to the SUV a few minutes later.”
In response, Plaintiff “denie[s] to the extent Plaintiff denied he was either of the juveniles entering
the SUV,” which UMF No. 5 does not allege. Defendant’s UMF No. 9 explains that Plaintiff hid
for ten to twenty minutes while police and a helicopter searched the area, and that Plaintiff could
see the police searching with their flashlights, could see the police cars, and could hear them getting
closer to him but did not come out from his hiding spot. In response, Plaintiff denies because
“Plaintiff testified he did not know a police dog was present and did not hear any warning that he
may be bitten if he did not come out,” which again does not controvert the facts presented in
Defendant’s UMF No. 9.
Home security footage of the burglary shows one male entering the SUV while the
other three individuals ride bicycles on the street and in the neighboring driveway. One

male takes what appears to be cash from the center console, then rides his bicycle to join
the group on the street. The four individuals ride away from the SUV, returning a few
minutes later. The same individual enters the SUV again, looking in and around the center
console while the other three individuals ride bicycles in the street. At this time, one of the
individuals yells “Police!” and all four individuals run or bike away from the approaching
patrol car. [Def.’s UMF No. 5; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF No. 5; Def.’s Ex. 2].

Security footage from a second home shows four individuals in a driveway with
three parked vehicles. Two of the individuals attempt and eventually enter one of the parked
vehicles while the other two individuals ride their bicycles in and around the driveway.
Plaintiff denies that he was one of the individuals entering the vehicles, but he does admit
that he is one of the four individuals riding a bicycle in the home security videos. [Def.’s

UMF Nos. 6-7; Pl.’s Resp. to UMF Nos. 6-7; Def.’s Ex. 3].
When Plaintiff saw the police car approach with lights on, Plaintiff got off of his
bicycle and started running away. He ran towards a pond and hid, standing in a narrow spot
behind a bush for ten to twenty minutes while the police and a helicopter were searching
the area. At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he could see the police searching with

their flashlights, could see the police cars, and could hear the police getting close to him
but did not come out from his hiding spot. Plaintiff also testified that he did not know that
a K-9 unit was participating in the search and did not hear any warnings that a K-9 was on
scene. [Def.’s UMF No. 9; Pl.’s Resp. to UMF No. 9].
Just after 4:00 a.m., Sgt. Burris and Edge were dispatched to assist in the search for
four individuals breaking into vehicles. Sgt. Burris was advised that felony third degree

burglary had been committed and that the suspects had run from the area. He was given a
brief description of the suspects and their direction of travel. [Def.’s UMF Nos. 12-13; Pl.’s
Resp. to Def.’s UMF Nos. 12-13].
Sgt. Burris “was aware of automobile burglaries during this time period committed
in the relative area that this crime occurred perpetrated with the sole intention of stealing
handguns to resell on social media.” [Def.’s UMF No. 14]. Accordingly, “when [Sgt.]

Burris commenced the search he considered that the suspects were potentially armed.” Id.
In Plaintiff’s response to UMF No. 14, he contends that Sgt. Burris “cannot use being
present in an area prone to violence as basis for the belief that Plaintiff was potentially
armed,” and that “no one reported that a firearm had been stolen or that the suspects were
armed.” [Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF No. 14].

Plaintiff “knew they were looking for him and the other individuals he had been
with but he stayed hidden because he thought the police might not be able to find him.”
[Def.’s UMF No. 10; Pl.’s Resp. to UMF No. 10; Doc. No. 47-4, at 7].2
Sgt. Burris testified that he believed his K-9 unit was the “best option” due to high
grass in the area and because a helicopter on scene “[w]as not able to locate [them].” [Def.’s

UMF No. 16; Doc. No. 47-5, at 21]. In response to Defendant’s UMF No. 16, Plaintiff cites

2 In response to Defendant’s UMF No. 10, Plaintiff denies “as to the extent that Plaintiff did not
hear warning that he may be bitten by a police dog if he does not make himself known,” which
does not refute the information provided in UMF No. 10.
to the OCPD Operations Manual, which provides that a K-9 unit handler shall not allow
his dog to engage “when the size, age, and physical capabilities of the offender are such

that use of the canine would be inappropriate.” [Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF No. 16]. Sgt.
Burris asserts that he “was not aware of Plaintiff’s size, age, and physical capabilities when
the dog was deployed.” [Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF No. 16].
Sgt. Burris and Edge had completed a 14-week training program together, and Edge
was trained to locate and apprehend criminal suspects. Edge was trained that “when he
comes into contact with the suspect he is searching for, he will bite and then immediately

release the bite upon command.” [Def.’s UMF Nos. 17-18; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF Nos.
17-18]. Sgt. Burris was trained to give the release command to his K-9 unit “once the
suspect is in a position where [Sgt.] Burris can see the person’s hands.” [Def.’s UMF No.
19; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF No. 19].
When Sgt. Burris and Edge arrived on the scene, Sgt. Burris’s body camera footage

confirms that he gave two verbal warnings prior to beginning the search. Specifically, Sgt.
Burris twice shouted, “Oklahoma City Police K-9 unit, come out or I’ll release a dog, you
may get bit.” Plaintiff denies hearing either of these warnings, and Plaintiff notes that the
first two warnings were given approximately 330 meters from the location where Plaintiff
was ultimately found. [Def.’s UMF No. 22; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF No. 22; Def.’s Ex. 7].

After the two warnings, Sgt. Burris began a search of the area for the four suspects
with Edge on a 6-foot leash. Officer Blood accompanied them as a backup officer. As they
began to search the area near a retention pond, Sgt. Burris made a third announcement
about the use of his K-9 unit, shouting “Police K-9 unit – come to my voice … make
yourself known.” [Def.’s Ex. 7]. Sgt. Burris testified that he made the announcement at that
location because the helicopter had located a heat signature there and because Edge had a

slight change in behavior indicating he was picking up an odor of some kind. Plaintiff
asserts that the third announcement was made approximately 60 meters away “in a heavily
weeded area facing the opposite direction” from Plaintiff’s hiding spot, and Plaintiff did
not hear the third warning. [Def.’s UMF Nos. 24-25; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF Nos. 24-
25; Def.’s Ex. 7].
Sgt. Burris testified that if he had “believed a suspect was hiding [where Plaintiff

was found], he would have made another K-9 warning announcement and given the suspect
another opportunity to surrender.” [Def.’s UMF No. 27]. In response, Plaintiff asserts that
Sgt. Burris “should have been giving announcements in all new areas searched to make
Plaintiff aware of police dog presence and the risk of being bitten.” [Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
UMF No. 27].

As Sgt. Burris turned the corner into Plaintiff’s hiding spot, Edge bit and held onto
Plaintiff’s leg. Plaintiff did not do anything to make his presence known to the officers
prior to Edge discovering him. Plaintiff does not dispute that Edge “did not give [Sgt.]
Burris any indication that he had located a suspect until he bit Plaintiff on the leg,” that
“[t]he helicopter did not pick up a heat signature at Plaintiff’s hiding spot,” or that “[t]he

first indication [Sgt.] Burris had that Edge had located Plaintiff was when [Sgt. Burris]
heard [Plaintiff] screaming.” [Def.’s UMF Nos. 29-30; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF Nos. 29-
30].
When Sgt. Burris heard Plaintiff scream, he ordered Plaintiff to “let me see your
hands” and to “slide out, slide out, slide!” [Def.’s UMF No. 31; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF

No. 31; Def.’s Ex. 7]. Sgt. Burris then instructed Officer Blood to “come on in” to the tight
area and to “slide in and get his hands and I can get the dog off.” Def.’s Ex. 7. Sgt. Burris
can also be heard telling Plaintiff “hey – don’t hit my dog.” Id. Although Sgt. Burris
contends that “Plaintiff began actively kicking the dog’s head and took a swing at either
[Sgt.] Burris or Edge while [Sgt.] Burris was removing the dog,” Plaintiff describes his
movements as “reflexive reactions while the police dog was clamped down and thrashing

[his] leg.” [Def.’s UMF No. 32; Pl.’s Resp. to UMF No. 32]. Plaintiff testified that he did
not try to hit the dog or Sgt. Burris. Id.
Sgt. Burris testified that due to the darkness, the tight area with high grasses, and
Plaintiff’s movements (that Plaintiff describes as reflexive reactions), gaining control of
Plaintiff’s hands prolonged the time Edge held onto Plaintiff. Sgt. Burris testified that,

given the circumstances, it would not have been safe to instruct Edge to release Plaintiff
until Plaintiff’s hands were contained. The body camera footage reflects that Officer Blood
gained control of one of Plaintiff’s arms approximately ten seconds before Sgt. Burris
ordered Edge to release Plaintiff’s leg. [Def.’s UMF Nos. 33-34; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF
Nos. 33-34; Def.’s Ex. 7, 8]. After Sgt. Burris ordered Edge to release, Officer Blood

handcuffed Plaintiff. [Def.’s Ex. 7, 8].
STANDARD OF DECISION
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute is genuine if the facts and evidence are such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The inquiry is whether the
facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.” Id. at 251-52.

42 U.S.C. § 1983
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Qualified Immunity – Summary Judgment Standard

A public official sued under § 1983 in their individual capacity may invoke the
defense of qualified immunity. Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206, 1219 (10th
Cir. 2025). “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right
and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established” at the time of the challenged

conduct. Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). The court “can
decide which prong to address first, and need not address both.” Dahn v. Amedei, 867 F.3d
1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 2017).
In the qualified-immunity context, “[i]n determining whether the plaintiff has met
[his] burden of establishing a constitutional violation that was clearly established, [courts]

construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party.”
Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1312. “However, because at summary judgment we are beyond the
pleading phase of the litigation, a plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the
record.” Id.3
“To be clearly established, ordinarily there must be prior Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit precedent, or the weight of authority from other circuits, that would have put an

objective officer in [defendant]’s position on notice that he was violating [plaintiff]’s
Fourth Amendment rights.” Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2021) (quotations and citation omitted). Although there need not be a case “directly on
point,” the existing precedent must “place[] the unconstitutionality of the alleged conduct
beyond debate.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). In analyzing this question, courts

may not “define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” which directive is

3 As clarified by Judge Holmes in his concurrence, in addressing the legal issue of qualified
immunity in the context of summary judgment,

… the principal purpose of assessing whether plaintiff’s evidence
gives rise to genuine issues of material fact is different than it is in
the traditional summary judgment analytic paradigm. Specifically,
contrary to the latter, the objective is not to determine whether a
plaintiff survives summary judgment because plaintiff’s evidence
raises material issues that warrant resolution by a jury. Instead, the
principal purpose is to determine whether plaintiff’s factual
allegations are sufficiently grounded in the record such that they
may permissibly comprise the universe of facts that will serve as the
foundation for answering the legal question before the court.

Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1325 (Holmes, J., concurring).
“particularly important in excessive force cases.” Id. (citing City of Escondido v. Emmons,
586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019)).

DISCUSSION
I. Excessive Force
a. Constitutional Violation
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against excessive use of force by
officers, whose conduct is judged for its “objective reasonableness.” For a plaintiff to
establish an excessive force claim, he must show “both that a seizure occurred and that the

seizure was unreasonable.” Luethje v. Kyle, 131 F.4th 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2025). Courts
utilize the following three factors found in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), to
determine whether a seizure was unreasonable: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2)
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and
(3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Luethje, 131 F.4th at 1196 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This analysis requires a court
to look at the “facts and circumstances as they existed at the moment force was used, while
also taking into consideration the events leading up to that moment.” Id. The inquiry
“considers the totality of the circumstances and is ‘judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Id.

(quoting Vette, 989 F.3d at 1169).
Applying the Graham factors and considering the totality of the circumstances, the
Court agrees with Sgt. Burris that the first factor—the severity of the crime at issue—favors
Sgt. Burris. In this case, it is undisputed that Sgt. Burris arrived at the scene to search for
four individuals suspected of breaking into vehicles in a residential neighborhood, which
Plaintiff concedes is a felony. [Doc. No. 53, at 13]. Plaintiff’s description of the crime as a

“nonviolent property offense with no confrontation and no indication of weapons” does not
change the fact that officers arriving to the scene were searching for four individuals
suspected of the felony crime of burglary. See Vette, 989 F.3d at 1170 (“[O]ur binding
precedent indicates the first Graham factor weighs against the plaintiff when the crime at
issue is a felony, irrespective of whether that felony is violent or nonviolent.”).
The second factor concerns whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others. Plaintiff suggests that he did not pose an immediate threat
to the officers when they decided to deploy a “bite-and-hold” police K-9 to search for the
four burglary suspects. However, viewing the totality of the circumstances from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, the Court finds that Sgt. Burris’s use of
his K-9 partner in the search was not objectively unreasonable. First, Sgt. Burris arrived on

the scene where four individuals had fled after reports that vehicles were being burglarized,
at approximately 4:00 a.m. As reflected in the officers’ body camera footage, it was very
dark, the officers were searching for burglary suspects in the middle of a residential
neighborhood with gated backyards and drainage areas with tall grasses, and a helicopter
had been unable to locate any of the burglary suspects. [Def.’s Ex. 7, 8]. Sgt. Burris also

testified that given the recent car burglaries where suspects were searching for handguns
to sell on social media, he anticipated that the burglary suspects may be armed. [Doc. No.
47-5, at 19-20]. Further, Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to couch himself as nonthreatening
because he “was concealed and stationary behind a bush” and did not end up being armed
would require the Court to view the circumstances with 20/20 hindsight, which the Court
declines to do.4 Luethje, 131 F.4th at 1196.

The third Graham factor considers whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was evading arrest by
hiding from the police, and that Plaintiff knew that the police were looking for him. [Doc.
No. 47-4, at 7]. Plaintiff also testified that he could hear the police as they came closer to
his hiding spot, but he did not make himself known to the police until Edge bit Plaintiff in
the high grasses of Plaintiff’s hiding spot. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also testified that he understood

that the police were looking for him and the other three individuals, and Plaintiff answered
“yes” when asked whether he thought he was “going to be able to hide and [the police]
might not find [him].” Id. at 7. Accordingly, at the time that Sgt. Burris utilized his bite-
and-hold K-9 unit in the search for Plaintiff and the other three individuals, the Court finds
that Plaintiff was actively attempting to evade arrest by flight.5

4 The Court further disagrees with Plaintiff that Sgt. Burris’s belief that the suspects may be armed
was unreasonable or overly generic. Sgt. Burris testified that his decision to use his K-9 unit was
based in part on his knowledge of individuals in the area recently breaking into cars for the specific
purpose of stealing handguns to resell on social media. [Doc. No. 47-5, at 19-20]. The Court finds
Sgt. Burris’s belief to be reasonably based on specific, recent events, and not based on a mere high-
crime area or other generic circumstance.

5 The body camera footage does reflect that Plaintiff did not attempt to flee once Edge bit Plaintiff’s
leg, immobilizing him. However, viewing the totality of the circumstances—to include the tight
space with tall grasses in which the officers were attempting to secure Plaintiff’s hands in the
dark—the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that his constitutional rights were violated
in the time between the K-9 unit initiating a bite and Sgt. Burris’s release word.
Upon consideration of the Graham factors, and viewing the totality of the
circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a violation of a

constitutional right as needed to overcome Sgt. Burris’s invocation of qualified immunity.
b. Clearly Established
Plaintiff contends that “it is clearly established that a reasonable officer would have
understood that deploying and maintaining a bite on [a] non-violent, non-armed, and non-
threatening juvenile suspect violated the Fourt[h] Amendment.” [Doc. No. 53, at 25]. “Law
is clearly established ‘if a plaintiff (1) identifies an on-point Supreme Court or published

Tenth Circuit decision or (2) shows the clearly established weight of authority from other
courts has found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.’” Waterhouse v. Direzza, 129 F.4th
1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Flores v. Henderson, 101 F.4th 1185, 1197 (10th Cir.
2024)). “In the rare obvious case, though, ‘the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is
sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.’”

Jordan v. Jenkins, 73 F.4th 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff first cites to Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir.
2021). In that case, a police officer attempted to pull Mr. Vette over on a public road. Vette,
989 F.3d at 1159. With the officer in pursuit, Mr. Vette drove away, into a field, and then
fled on foot. Id. In the field, the pursuing officer and another officer apprehended Mr. Vette.

Id. After Mr. Vette was apprehended by the two officers, a third officer (with his K-9 unit)
repeatedly punched Mr. Vette, hit him in the face with a dog chain, and deployed the K-9
unit to attack Mr. Vette. Id. Mr. Vette was charged with vehicle eluding, identity theft, and
various misdemeanors. Id. at 1160. In Vette, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “punching an
arrestee, hitting him in the face with a dog chain, and allowing a police dog to attack him,
all after he is subdued, violates the Fourth Amendment,” and that the unconstitutionality of

the conduct was clearly established. Id. at 1172-73.
Plaintiff also cites to Luethje v. Kyle, 131 F.4th 1179 (10th Cir. 2025), in which the
Tenth Circuit analyzed a district court’s denial of qualified immunity in the context of a
motion to dismiss. In Luethje, Mr. Luethje alleged that his neighbor had called the police
to report a male breaking the front window of Mr. Luethje’s home, but the neighbor “could
not provide a description of the male.” Luethje, 131 F.4th at 1185. Several sheriff’s deputies

with long rifles were dispatched to the home, as well as deputy Travis Kyle, with his K-9
unit. Id. The officers approached the broken window and noticed the screen was still in
place. Id. One of the deputies “removed the screen and knocked out the rest of the glass to
enable Mr. Kyle to ‘put his canine through the window.’” Id. “Mr. Kyle ordered [his K-9
unit] to ‘find and bite whomever it found inside the residence, regardless of whether the

person(s) were lawfully at the residence and regardless of whether the canine found a child
or adult.’” Id. Mr. Luethje further alleged that the K-9 unit was “sent into the home
unsupervised” and the “deputies apparently did not knock or announce themselves before
[the K-9 unit] was let into the house.” Id.
The K-9 unit found Mr. Luethje sleeping in his bed and “‘immediately started biting

Mr. Luethje in the hands, abdomen, and arm.’” Id. “From outside the home, having heard
Mr. Luethje scream, Mr. Kyle yelled ‘bring my dog to me!’” Id. Mr. Kyle and another
deputy then entered the residence and “quickly located Mr. Luethje in the bedroom,” with
the K-9 unit latched onto his arm as he screamed “I live here! I live here!” Id. at 1186. “The
deputies watched [the K-9 unit] ‘jerking and pulling on Mr. Luethje’s left arm while biting
him,’” but instead of removing the K-9 unit, “Mr. Kyle proceeded to question Mr. Luethje,

asking if anyone else was inside and who broke the front window.” Id. “During this
questioning, [the K-9 unit] continued to ‘clamp down’ on Mr. Luethje’s arm for
‘approximately one minute’ until Mr. Kyle finally removed [the K-9 unit] from Mr.
Luethje’s arm.” Id.
Although Plaintiff cites to Vette and Luethje, neither case places the purported
unconstitutionality of Sgt. Burris’s alleged conduct beyond debate. In Vette, the plaintiff

had already been apprehended by two officers when a third officer repeatedly punched him,
hit him in the face with a dog chain, and deployed his K-9 unit to attack the plaintiff. Vette,
989 F.3d at 1172-73. The Luethje case involved allegations of officers sending a K-9 unit
into the plaintiff’s home, unsupervised, and allowing the K-9 unit to thrash the plaintiff’s
leg for approximately one minute while the officers questioned the plaintiff about who

broke his window. Luethje, 131 F.4th at 1185-86. Here, as reflected in the body camera
footage, Sgt. Burris utilized his K-9 unit to search for four male burglary suspects in the
middle of the night, all four of whom had fled from the police into a residential area.
Plaintiff had not been apprehended at the time Sgt. Burris utilized Edge in the search.
Further, once Edge bit Plaintiff, the video footage reflects a brief struggle in a dark, tight

space with tall grasses, during which time Sgt. Burris confirms that his back-up officer has
control of Plaintiff’s hands before he orders Edge to release Plaintiff. Accordingly, neither
Vette nor Luethje support Plaintiff’s argument that the unconstitutionality of Sgt. Burris’s
conduct was clearly established, and Sgt. Burris is thus entitled to qualified immunity.
II. Probable Cause
Sgt. Burris also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim that Sgt. Burris did not have probable cause to detain Plaintiff. In response,
although Plaintiff argues that probable cause was lacking, Plaintiff makes no attempt to
show that the constitutional right allegedly violated by Sgt. Burris’s conduct was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. See Rojas v. Anderson, 727 F.3d 1000, 1004
(10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 669 (10th Cir. 2010) (“‘The
plaintiff bears the burden of citing to [the Court] what he thinks constitutes clearly

established law.’”)); see also Coulter v. Butler, No. CIV-24-835-R, 2025 WL 1942415, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. July 15, 2025) (granting qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to
lodge a meaningful response to the defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity).
Further, “[p]robable cause exists if facts and circumstances within the arresting
officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are

sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is
committing an offense.” Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quotations and citation omitted). However, in the qualified immunity context, the Court
“ascertain[s] whether a defendant violated clearly established law by asking whether there
was arguable probable cause for the challenged conduct.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d

1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations and citation omitted, emphasis added). “Arguable
probable cause is another way of saying that the officers’ conclusions rest on an objectively
reasonable, even if mistaken, belief that probable cause exists.” Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at
1141. In other words, in the qualified immunity context, “law enforcement officials who
‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present’ are entitled to qualified
immunity.” Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff's Dep t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir.
2007).
Even though Plaintiff did not address in any detail the arguable probable cause
standard for qualified immunity purposes, the Court finds that, viewing the totality of the
circumstances, Sgt. Burris had arguable probable cause to detain Plaintiff. As repeatedly
set forth herein, Sgt. Burris was searching for four male individuals in the middle of the
night, all of whom had fled on foot from the scene of a car burglary. It was thus reasonable
for Sgt. Burris to conclude that he had probable cause to detain Plaintiff—Plaintiff matched
the description of the individuals who had fled from the scene and was discovered hiding
from the police, near the crime scene, at approximately 4:00 a.m. For these reasons, Sgt.
Burris is also entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 47] is
GRANTED.° A separate judgment shall be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17" day of July, 2026.

tal
TIMOTHY D:! DeGIUSTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6 Tn light of this ruling, Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Ken Wallentine Under
Daubert [Doc. No. 46] is DENIED as MOOT.
17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410290. Public record. Not legal advice.