# Eletson Holdings Inc.

> United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · August 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410276

## Case

- **Full name:** In re: Eletson Holdings Inc.
- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------x FOR PUBLICATION
:
In re: : Chapter 11
:
ELETSON HOLDINGS INC.,1 : Case No. 23-10322 (JPM)
:
:
Debtor. :
:
---------------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION: (I) TO VACATE THE
DEFAULT ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS; (II) FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER STAYING FURTHER ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEFAULT ORDERS AND
JUDGMENTS AND ORDERING ANY ENTITY IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
FUNDS TO HOLD SAME IN ESCROW; (III) SETTING EMERGENCY HEARING
DATE ON MOTION; AND (IV) FIXING THE FORM AND MANNER OF NOTICE

1 Prior to November 19, 2024, the debtors in these cases were: Eletson Holdings Inc., Eletson
Finance (US) LLC, and Agathonissos Finance LLC (the “Debtors”). On March 5, 2025, the Court
entered a final decree and order closing the Chapter 11 cases of Eletson Finance (US) LLC and
Agathonissos Finance LLC. Commencing on March 5, 2025, all motions, notices, and other
pleadings relating to any of the Debtors shall be filed in the Chapter 11 case of Eletson Holdings
Inc. The Debtor’s mailing address is c/o Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer (US) LLP, 1177 Avenue
of the Americas, New York, New York 10036.
JOHN P. MASTANDO III
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the Motion: (I) To Vacate The Default Orders And Judgments; (II) For
A Temporary Restraining Order Staying Further Enforcement Of The Default Orders And
Judgments And Ordering Any Entity In Possession Of The Subject Funds To Hold Same In Escrow;
(III) Setting Emergency Hearing Date On Motion; And (IV) Fixing The Form And Manner Of
Notice (“Motion”), dated July 1, 2026, filed by Vassilis Kertsikoff. Dkt. No. 2077. The Motion
argues that the following orders issuing sanctions and judgments culminating from those orders
should be vacated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b): the October 31,

2025 order, Dkt. No. 1874; the November 19, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 1885; the December 30, 2025
judgment, Dkt. No. 1933; the May 4, 2026 orders, Dkt. Nos. 2005, 2006; the May 11, 2026
judgment, Dkt. No. 2009; the May 28, 2026 order, Dkt. No. 2051; and the June 11, 2026 order,
Dkt. No. 2069 (collectively, the “Orders and Judgments”). In support of the Motion are the
declarations of Michael S. Amato, Dkt. No. 2077-1, and Vassilis Kertsikoff (“Kertsikoff
Declaration”), Dkt. No. 2077-2. The Motion also seeks a temporary restraining order of any
enforcement of the Orders and Judgments pending a ruling on the Motion. Dkt. No. 2077.
Eletson Holdings Inc. (“Holdings”) filed a response to the Motion (“Response”), dated July
16, 2026. Dkt. No. 2083. In support of the Response is the declaration of Nathaniel Koslof
(“Koslof Declaration”). Dkt. No. 2084.

Vassilis Kertsikoff filed a reply (“Reply”) on July 23, 2026. Dkt. No. 2087.
The Court held a hearing on the Motion on July 30, 2026.
II. JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and
(b)(1) and the Amended Standing Order of Reference dated January 31, 2012 (Preska, C.J.). This
is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
III. BACKGROUND
The Motion argues that the Orders and Judgments should be vacated pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), as the Orders and Judgments are allegedly void because the

motions giving rise to the Orders and Judgments (“Underlying Motions”) “were never properly
served on Kertsikoff and the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him.” Dkt. No. 2077 at 2–5.
The Motion states that “[t]he burden of proof is ultimately on Reorganized Holdings and Levona
to prove that the Court had personal jurisdiction over Kertsikoff.” Id. at 2.
The Motion argues that the Underlying Motions needed to be personally served on
Kertsikoff, as “service cannot be effectuated by mail or email in Greece” because Greece has
objected to such service under Article 10 of the Hague Convention.2 Id. at 2–3 (citing Smart Study
Co., Ltd v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, 164 F.4th 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2025)). The Motion
argues that actual notice does not cure any defects in service, and neither does “emailing the motion

papers to attorneys that never appeared in this Bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. at 4.
Next, the Motion asserts that, even if service were proper, exercising jurisdiction over
Kertsikoff would be unreasonable, as “minimum contacts are lacking here, particularly since this
Bankruptcy proceeding was commenced as an involuntary proceeding,” and doing so “would
impose a significant burden in terms of travel, expense, and time.” Id. at 4–5.
The Motion then argues that the Orders and Judgments should be vacated pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b). Id. at 5–9. The Motion claims that Kertsikoff’s

2 Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361 (1969) (“Hague Convention”).
default was not willful because Kertsikoff was not properly served, id. at 5; there is no prejudice
to Holdings or Levona as delay does not establish prejudice, id. at 6; and Kertsikoff has meritorious
defenses to the Underlying Motions, including that: Kertsikoff cannot be held in contempt of
orders that “did not expressly apply to him,” id. at 6–8; there is “no clear proof that Kertsikoff was
in contempt” of this Courts order confirming the Chapter 11 plan (Dkt. No. 1223, “Confirmation

Order”) because “the Court had already recognized that Kertsikoff was in compliance with the
Confirmation Order,” id. at 8; and Kertsikoff purged any contempt by “resign[ing] from Eletson
in or about November 2024 . . . in accordance with the Plan,” id. at 8–9.
The Motion also seeks a temporary restraining order “while this Motion is being decided,”
arguing, inter alia, that Kertsikoff “will be irreparably harmed if he is incarcerated for purportedly
violating the . . . Orders and Judgments.” Id. at 9–10.
The Response argues that Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a basis to vacate the Orders and
Judgments, as an arguable basis exists on which the Court exercised jurisdiction over Kertsikoff.
Dkt. No. 2083 at 12–20. The Response states that the burden lies with the movant. Id. at 13. The

Response argues that this Court has jurisdiction over Kertsikoff “because he consented to
jurisdiction and because his contacts with the forum give rise to specific jurisdiction.” Id.
The Response further asserts that Kertsikoff consented to jurisdiction by appearing and
participating in the bankruptcy cases, which moots his claim of improper service or
unreasonableness. Id. at 14–15. Next, the Response argues that Kertsikoff was properly served in
conformance with this Court’s orders permitting email or mail service. Id. at 15–16. The Response
states that “the Hague Convention is thus irrelevant,” that “Kertsikoff consented to jurisdiction,
mooting the application of the Hague Convention,” and that “at the time the Court first approved
of the email service . . . there was . . . an arguable basis for email service,” notwithstanding that
“the Second Circuit has since held otherwise in Smart Study.” Id. at 16. Further, the Response
argues that the Hague Convention “contains special and more lenient rules applicable to cases, like
this one, involving the need for ‘provisional or protective measures.’” Id. at 16–17 (citing Fox
Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V., 820 F. Supp. 3d 299, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y.
2026)). The Response states that “there is no doubt that Mr. Kertsikoff received actual notice.”

Id. at 17 & n.12.
Next, the Response argues that exercising personal jurisdiction over Kertsikoff was not
unreasonable given “Kertsikoff’s extensive participation in the bankruptcy cases,” and
Kertsikoff’s ipse dixit assertion of a lack of minimum contacts and his similarly “vague
assert[ion]” that exercising jurisdiction would impose an undue burden on him are not bases to
conclude otherwise. Id. at 18–20.
The Response further asserts that the Court should deny any Rule 55(c) relief, which “has
no separate or independent applicability here (since it incorporates Rule 60(b)), and in any event,
Mr. Kertsikoff fails to satisfy the relevant standard.” Id. at 20. The Response argues that Rule

55(c)’s good cause standard applies only to the entry of default, a ministerial act performed by the
clerk of court and which is not relevant to this case, and that the default judgments are subject to
review under Rule 60(b). Id. The Response then asserts that, even under a good cause standard,
the Motion should be denied, as Kertsikoff’s default was willful (he was served and noticed for all
relevant proceedings), and vacating the Orders and Judgments would be prejudicial to Holdings,
which has spent two years and millions in attorneys’ fees and costs trying to enforce the
Confirmation Order. Id. at 21–22.
Next, the Response argues that Kertsikoff has no meritorious defense to the Orders and
Judgments or Underlying Motions, as each of the Orders and Judgments did apply to him. Id. at
22–23. As to the November 19, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 1885, which “flows” from this Court’s
August 1, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 1759, Apargo Ltd. “was specially named and sanctioned,” and this
“is enough,” as “there is little distinction between Apargo and Mr. Kertsikoff.” Id. Further, the
Response argues that the October 31, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 1874, found Mr. Kertsikoff in contempt
of the Confirmation Order, which “clearly and undisputedly applied to him,” and that all

subsequent orders and judgements that the Motion seeks to vacate “flow from either” the
November 19, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 1885, or the October 31, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 1874. Id. at 23.
The Response also asserts that several of the Orders and Judgments “were issued as a result of
[Kertsikoff’s] noncompliance with subpoenas and depositions,” and that Kertsikoff has not
presented any meritorious defenses to these orders and judgments. Id. at 24. Lastly, the Response
argues that Kertsikoff has not purged any contempt, and that his resignation from the board of
Eletson occurred prior to the Orders and Judgments and “is unrelated to the actions for which he
was later held in contempt.” Id.3
The Reply repeats the argument that Kertsikoff was not properly served with the

Underlying Motions. Dkt. No. 2087 at 3–7. The Reply claims that Kertsikoff’s appearances in
this Court “were in a corporate capacity on behalf of the Debtors,” that “Kertsikoff never appeared
in an individual capacity,” and that accordingly he did not waive a personal jurisdiction defense.
Id. at 3–5. The Reply states that Holdings “downplays” Smart Study, which “expressly held that
email service was prohibited by the Hague Convention.” Id. at 5. The Reply argues that Fox Corp.
is distinguishable, as “the court permitted email service of a motion seeking a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction because of the urgency involved,” and that “[n]o

3 The Response also argues that the Kertsikoff Declaration is “not just implausible, but in some
cases false and perjurious.” Dkt. No. 2083 at 25–26.
such urgency was present here.” Id. at 6. The Reply repeats the argument that actual notice does
not cure a service defect. Id. at 6–7. The Reply then repeats the argument that, even assuming
proper service, exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. at 7–9. The Reply also asserts
that the default was not willful, there is no prejudice to Holdings in vacating the Orders and
Judgments, and Kertsikoff has meritorious defenses. Id. at 9–11.4 The Reply argues that Holdings

“fails to reference any evidence to show that Kertsikoff controlled Apargo Ltd.” Id. at 11.5 The
Reply claims Kertsikoff was not in violation of the Confirmation Order. Id. at 12–13. The Reply
again asserts that Kertsikoff purged any contempt by resigning from the board of Eletson. Id. at
14. The Reply also repeats the request for a temporary restraining order. Id. at 14–15.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides the “[g]rounds for [r]elief from a [f]inal
[j]udgment, [o]rder, or [p]roceeding,” and states that the Court “may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” including, inter alia, for “(1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . the judgment is void; . . . [or] any other reason
that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (4), (6); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 (“In [g]eneral
. . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 applies in a bankruptcy case[.]”). “The court may set aside an entry of
default for good cause, and it may set aside a final default judgment under Rule 60(b).” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(c).

4 The Reply notes that Kertsikoff seeks relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1),
(4), and (6), and that the same good cause standard applies to relief under all three subsections.
Dkt. No. 2087 at 9 n.15.

5 “Apargo was owned by Kertsikoff[.]” Eletson Holdings, Inc. v. Levona Holdings, Ltd., No. 23-
cv-7331, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5528, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2026).
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020 provides that Rule 9014 “governs a motion
for a contempt order[.]” Bankruptcy Rule 9014(b)(1) in turn provides that a motion in a contested
matter “must be served … in the manner for serving a summons and complaint provided by Rule
7004.” Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a) provides that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) “applies in an
adversary proceeding.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(1) provides that an individual in a

foreign country may by served “by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably
calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.”
B. Motion to Vacate the Orders and Judgments
i. Burden of proof
The Motion argues that the burden of proof is on Holdings to demonstrate that the Court
had personal jurisdiction over Kertsikoff as to the Orders and Judgments that the Motion seeks to
vacate. Dkt. No. 2077 (Motion) at 2 (citing Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“When either subject matter or personal jurisdiction is contested under Rule

60(b)(4), the burden of proof is properly placed on the party asserting that jurisdiction
existed.”)); Dkt. No. 2087 (Reply) at 2. Holdings responds that the burden lies with the movant.
Dkt. No. 2083 (Response) at 13 (citing In re Richardson Foods, Inc., 667 B.R. 500, 512 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“The movants bear a heavy burden because Rule 60 provides extraordinary
relief and is, therefore, generally viewed with disfavor.” (citation modified)); Burda Media, Inc.
v. Viertel, 417 F.3d 292, 299 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[O]n a motion to vacate a default judgment based
on improper service of process where the defaulting defendant had actual notice of the original
proceeding but delayed in bringing the motion, the defendant bears the burden of proof to
establish that the purported service did not occur.”)). Holdings asserts that Kertsikoff received
actual notice of all relevant proceedings. Dkt. No. 2083 (Response) at 17 & n.12. Kertsikoff
contends that he only received notice after a bank account in his name was frozen, and the funds
therein were subsequently ordered turned over to Holdings by this Court. Dkt. No. 2077
(Motion) at 4, 13; Dkt. No. 2087 (Reply) at 6–7. In light of Kertsikoff’s extended and extensive
involvement in this case, discussed further below, the Court agrees with Holdings that Kertsikoff

had actual notice of all relevant proceedings and delayed in bringing the Motion. Moreover,
while Kertsikoff disputes his actual notice of the Underlying Motions, he cannot dispute his
actual notice of the original proceeding in which the Underlying Motions were filed – this very
bankruptcy case in which he participated in multiple ways. Accordingly, the burden lies on
Kertsikoff. Burda Media, Inc., 417 F.3d at 299.
ii. Service under the Hague Convention
The Motion principally argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Kertsikoff
because Holdings served the Underlying Motions on Kertsikoff by mail or email, and not personal
service as purportedly required by Article 10 of the Hague Convention. Dkt. No. 2077 (Motion)

at 2–5; Dkt. No. 2087 (Reply) at 3–7; Smart Study Co., Ltd v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi,
164 F.4th 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2025) (holding that email service on China-based defendants was
improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) given China’s objection to service by the
methods provided under Article 10 of the Hague Convention). Holdings argues that “at the time
the Court first approved of the email service . . . there was . . . an arguable basis for email service,”
stating that “the Second Circuit has since held otherwise in Smart Study.” Dkt. No. 2083
(Response) at 16. However, Holdings argues further that the Hague Convention “contains special
and more lenient rules applicable to cases, like this one, involving the need for ‘provisional or
protective measures.’” Id. at 16–17 (citing Fox Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico, S. de R.L. de
C.V., 820 F. Supp. 3d 299, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2026)). Accordingly, Holdings argues that “even in
the wake of Smart Study, the manner of service of the papers underlying the . . . Orders and
Judgments was appropriate under the Hague Convention.” Id. at 17. Kertsikoff replies that
Holdings “downplays” Smart Study, and that Fox Corp. is distinguishable, as that “court permitted
email service of a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

because of the urgency involved,” and that “[n]o such urgency was present here.” Dkt. No. 2087
(Reply) at 6.
The Court agrees with Holdings and the District Court in Fox Corp. 820 F. Supp. 3d at
306–08. As in Fox Corp., the Court here previously held that mail and email service upon
Kertsikoff was authorized prior to Smart Study. Id. at 306; see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1468 (Feb. 20, 2025
Hr’g Tr.) at 92:3–6; Dkt. No. 1874 (Oct. 31, 2025 Or. Imposing And Increasing Sanctions Against
The Violating Parties) ¶ 6; see also Dkt. No. 1933 (Dec. 30, 2025 Judgment); Dkt. No. 2009 (May
11, 2026 Supplemental Judgment Against Vassilis Kertsikoff). Also as in Fox Corp., here the
Court concludes that “Smart Study’s holdings do not invalidate the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction

to either (1) grant plaintiffs’ motions for temporary injunctive relief; or (2) hold [defendant and its
affiliate who had appeared before the Court] and their co-contemnors in civil contempt and impose
appropriate sanctions on them.” 820 F. Supp. 3d at 306. “Smart Study does not address the scope
of a district court’s jurisdiction to order, in case of urgency, any ‘provisional or protective
measures,’ even where usual Hague Convention service has not been effectuated.” Id.
As Kertsikoff correctly points out, Fox Corp. addressed a temporary restraining order and
a preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 2087 (Reply) at 6. Kertsikoff, however, fails to address that
Fox Corp. also imposed civil contempt and sanctions. 820 F. Supp. 3d at 307 (“[T]he Court has
exercised jurisdiction only by entering temporary injunctive relief and by sanctioning
contumacious conduct. The text of the Hague Convention, as well as the well-reasoned opinions
of other courts that have interpreted it, fully support the conclusion that the Hague Convention
authorizes the Court to do so[.]”). Moreover, the Orders and Judgments to one extent or another
all relate back to violations of or attempts to undermine this Court’s unstayed Confirmation Order,
which enjoined all actions taken to interfere with the implementation or consummation of the plan

of reorganization. Dkt. No. 1223 (Confirmation Order) at §§ 5(iii),6 12.7 Thus, as in Fox Corp.,
at issue in this case are both injunctive relief and sanctions resulting from contumacious conduct.
There thus was and has been the same level of urgency here as was contemplated in Fox Corp.
Smart Study, and Kertsikoff’s argument here, rests on Article 10 of the Hague Convention,
and a country’s objection to service thereunder through “postal channels.” 164 F.4th at 170; Dkt.
No. 2077 (Motion) at 2–3; Dkt. No. 2087 (Reply) at 5–6. However, “Article 15 [of the Hague
Convention] also preserves a judge’s authority to ‘order, in case of urgency, any provisional or
protective measures.’” Smart Study, 164 F.4th at 167 (quoting Hague Convention, art. 15(3)); Fox

6 “Plan Implementation Authorization. . . . In connection with actions taken pursuant to this
Paragraph 4 and all other actions required by the Plan and this Confirmation Order to effectuate,
implement, or consummate the Plan and the transactions contemplated therein, the Debtors are
hereby authorized and directed to take or not take any and all actions as instructed by the
Petitioning Creditors and shall not take any actions inconsistent with the Plan or this Confirmation
Order without the prior written consent of the Petitioning Creditors or further order of the Court.”
Dkt. No. 1223 (Confirmation Order) at § 5(iii).

7 “Exculpation and Injunction Provisions. The injunctions, exculpations, and related provisions
set forth in Article X of the Plan are incorporated herein in their entirety, and, in accordance with
Bankruptcy Rule 3020(c)(1), are hereby approved and authorized in all respects, are so ordered,
and shall be immediately effective on the Effective Date without further notice to or order or action
on the part of this Court or any other party. Upon entry of this Confirmation Order, all Holders of
Claims or Interests and other parties in interest, along with their respective present or former
employees, agents, officers, directors, principals, and affiliates, shall be enjoined from taking any
actions to interfere with the implementation or consummation of the Plan or interfering with any
distributions and payments contemplated by the Plan.” Dkt. No. 1223 (Confirmation Order) at §
12.
Corp., 820 F. Supp. 3d at 307. “Article 15(3) does not impose any requirements regarding the
form of service, electronic or otherwise, that is required before a court may order such measures.”
820 F. Supp. 3d at 307.
“[T]he entry of temporary injunctive relief and the imposition of civil contempt sanctions
squarely fall within the category of ‘provisional or protective measures[.]’” Id. at 308. “Both a

temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are ‘protective’ in that they are designed
to prevent irreparable injury that would otherwise likely occur while litigation continues.” Id.
“Temporary injunctive relief is also, by definition, ‘provisional’ because both a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction remain in force only until a court renders a
subsequent decision on the merits.” Id.
“Likewise, civil contempt sanctions are inherently ‘protective’ in that a court has authority
to impose such sanctions when its orders to preserve the status quo . . . are violated.” Id. (citation
modified); see also Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs.,
Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 657 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The imposition of civil contempt sanctions may serve

dual purposes: to secure future compliance with court orders and to compensate the party that has
been wronged.” (emphasis added)). “Civil contempt sanctions are also ‘provisional,’ lasting only
as long as the contemnor persists in the contumacious conduct.” Fox Corp., 820 F. Supp. 3d at
308. As all of the Orders and Judgments that the Motion seeks to vacate stem from Kertsikoff’s
contumacious conduct, the Orders and Judgments all concern provisional and protective measures.
Id. Indeed, as noted above, supra nn. 6–7, this Court’s Confirmation Order enjoined Kertsikoff
and others from taking any actions to interfere with the implementation or consummation of the
plan of reorganization.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the service of the Underlying Motions was
authorized pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Convention, and thus complied with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(f).8 Moreover, as discussed more below, in light of Kertsikoff’s participation
in this case, the Court also concludes that the service of the Underlying Motions was otherwise
reasonably calculated to give notice to Kertsikoff of the proceedings relating to the Orders and
Judgments.

The Court also agrees with Holdings that Kertsikoff has consented to this Court’s
jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 2083 (Response) at 14–15; Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (“[A]n individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the
court by appearance . . . . A variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or
implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.”); In re Bozel S.A., 434 B.R. 86, 98
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[Debtor’s sole director] purposefully availed himself of the protections
afforded by U.S. law by signing and filing for the Debtor's Chapter 11 petition in New York.”);
see also In re Eletson Holdings Inc., No. 25-cv-1312, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187947, at *78 n.19
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2025) (“Sanctions can be imposed on a third party when that party was the

major shareholder, chief executive, and only person affiliated with the defendant to have a
substantive role in the litigation, or where the party had aligned himself closely with Defendants
in the litigation.” (citation modified)). As Holdings argues and Kertsikoff does not dispute,
“Kertsikoff was one of the principals of pre-reorganized Holdings, a company that voluntarily
sought chapter 11 relief in this Court.” Dkt. No. 2083 (Response) at 14; Dkt. No. 1020 (Aug. 26,
2024 Kertsikoff Declaration) at ¶¶ 1,4; see also Dkt. No. 1021 (Aug. 26, 2024 Hadjieleftheriadis

8 Kertsikoff also cites to In re Teknek, LLC, 512 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2007). Dkt. No. 2077 (Motion)
at 4. That case did not contemplate – and certainly did not refute – that service in the manner of
the Underlying Motions was authorized pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Convention as a
provisional or protective measure.
Declaration) at ¶ 25; Eletson Holdings, Inc. v. Levona Holdings, Ltd., No. 23-cv-7331, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5528, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2026) (“Kertsikoff served as the chairman,
president, and director of Eletson Gas, and as the director of Family Unity Trust Co. (“Family
Unity”) . . . . Family Unity [was a] controlling shareholder[] of Holdings . . . owning 30.7% of the
common shares of Holdings.”). Kertsikoff was actively involved in the case, submitting at least

ten declarations, including a declaration in support of first-day relief and a declaration in support
of confirmation of the Debtors’ proposed plan. Dkt. Nos. Nos. 123, 161, 236, 248, 290, 381, 516,
580, 986, 1020. Kertsikoff also was deposed, and testified at the confirmation hearing. Dkt. No.
548 Ex. A; Dkt. No. 1130 (Sept. 11, 2024 Hr’g Tr.) at 197:18–21. He was involved in the Debtors’
proposed plan of reorganization. Dkt. No. 1130 (Sept. 11, 2024 Hr’g Tr.) at 133:7–16 (Vasilis
Hadjieleftheriadis testifying that he, “Laskarina, and Vassilis Kertsikoff had the primary role in
[plan] negotiations”), 203 (Kertsikoff testifying as to his involvement). He also submitted a ballot
on behalf of a majority shareholder. Dkt. No. 2084 (“Koslof Declaration”) Ex. A.
Kertsikoff’s only argument to the contrary is the bare assertion that “minimum contacts are

lacking here,” and his argument that this is “particularly” so given that the case commenced as an
involuntary proceeding is obviously undermined by Holdings’ subsequent consent to convert to a
voluntary proceeding. Dkt. No. 2077 (Response) at 4–5; Dkt. No. 215 (Sept. 25, 2023 Or.
converting involuntary chapter 7 cases to voluntary chapter 11 cases).
For the above stated reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
The request for a temporary restraining order is DENIED as moot. Moreover, Kertsikoff
has failed to establish irreparable harm absent a restraining order: money damages do not establish
irreparable harm, and neither does his potential incarceration for defying this Court’s orders. See,
e.g., We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 295 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Economic harms . .
. [can] be remedied with money damages, and [therefore] . . . fail[] to demonstrate . . . irreparable
harm[.]”); Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) (“[T]he contemnor is able to purge
the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus carries the keys of
his prison in his own pocket.” (citation modified)).
V. CONCLUSION

The Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2026 /s/ John P. Mastando III
New York, New York HONORABLE JOHN P. MASTANDO III
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410276. Public record. Not legal advice.