# CLAY

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · July 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410245

## Case

- **Full name:** Lucretia Clay v. Andrew Thorup in his individual and official capacity, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** July 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

LUCRETIA CLAY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB
)
ANDREW THORUP in his individual and )
official capacity, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Lucretia Clay is pursuing civil-rights claims arising out of an altercation
with City of Lawrence police officers and her subsequent arrest. The State of
Indiana, City of Indianapolis, and Axon Enterprise have filed motions to
dismiss the claims against them in Ms. Clay's third amended complaint. Dkt.
[132]; dkt. [138]; dkt. [140]. For the reasons below, those motions are
GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court accepts and recites "the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true."
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
In August 2022, Ms. Clay was driving with her three children when her
car got a flat tire. Dkt. 130 at 4 (third amended complaint). She first stopped
in a church parking lot, where Lawrence Police Officer Andrew Thorup checked
on her, and then left. Id. After attempting to air up the tire, Ms. Clay drove to
a nearby Jiffy Lube, where Officer Thorup pulled in behind her and started
yelling at her about her car. Id. at 4–5. Ms. Clay walked back toward her car
to be with her children. Id. at 5–6. Lawrence Police Officer Khalid Brooks then

pulled into the parking lot, "joining Officer Thorup in his aggressive approach
toward [Ms. Clay] and her vehicle." Id.
Officer Thorup yelled that Ms. Clay would be going to jail and then
jumped on her from behind while telling her to give him her hands. Id. at 6.
Ms. Clay could not move her hands because Officer Thorup was "forcing her
into a fetal position," and Officer Thorup started yelling that she was resisting
arrest. Id. Officer Thorup then tased her without warning. Id. Officer Brooks
lifted Ms. Clay enough that she could free her hands, and handcuffed her. Id.

After Ms. Clay was handcuffed, her mother arrived and took care of the
children. Id. at 7. Another officer transported Ms. Clay to the Marion County
processing center, where "she was forced to give the State of Indiana a DNA
swab against her will and religious beliefs" and was released on bond. Id. at 8.
Ms. Clay was charged with resisting arrest, neglect of dependents, attempting
to disarm an officer, and disorderly conduct. Id. at 7–8. Ms. Clay's court-
appointed public defender was biased against her, telling her "that he 'did not
like her kind.'" Id. at 9. The charges against her were later dropped. Id.

Ms. Clay brought this case in Indiana state court, and Defendants City of
Lawrence, Officer Brooks, and Officer Thorup removed the case to this Court.
Dkt. 1; see dkt. 52 (order denying Ms. Clay's motion to remand). In December
2025, Ms. Clay filed her third amended complaint against the City of Lawrence,
Lawrence Police Department, Officer Brooks, and Officer Thorup; unnamed
City of Lawrence EMTs and police officers; the City of Indianapolis and
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD"); an unnamed IMPD

transport officer and unnamed jail employees; the State of Indiana; and Axon
Enterprise, which manufactures TASER weapons. Dkt. 130 at 2–4. She
alleges negligence; false imprisonment, false arrest, and/or criminal
confinement; intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); unreasonable
search and seizure; assault and battery; excessive force; defamation;
obstruction of justice; violation of her religious beliefs; and a products liability
claim. Id. at 11–28.
Defendants Axon Enterprise, the State of Indiana, and the City of

Indianapolis and IMPD have filed motions to dismiss the claims against them.
Dkt. 132; dkt. 138; dkt. 140.
II.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is
one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In other words, a complaint "must
allege enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story
that holds together," Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021),
"but it need not supply the specifics required at the summary judgment stage."
Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2021).

When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] the well-pleaded
facts in the complaint as true, but legal conclusions and conclusory allegations
merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of
truth." McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616. "It is enough to plead a plausible claim,
after which a plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the
hypotheses are consistent with the complaint." Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop.,
875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017).
Indiana substantive law governs Ms. Clay's state-law claims. See Webber

v. Butner, 923 F.3d 479, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2019). Absent a controlling decision
from the Indiana Supreme Court, the Court does its best to predict how that
court would rule on the issues of law. Mashallah, Inc. v. West Bend Mut. Ins.
Co., 20 F.4th 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2021). In doing so, the Court may consider
decisions from the Indiana Court of Appeals. See id.
III.
Analysis
A. Axon's Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Clay brings claims against Axon—which manufactures TASER
weapons—for negligence, IIED, assault and battery, and failure to warn under
the Indiana Product Liability Act ("IPLA"). Dkt. 130 at 11–28.
1. Negligence and failure to warn
Ms. Clay's negligence and failure-to-warn claims allege that Axon failed
to provide warnings, including "integrated audible warnings, to mitigate the

risks associated with rapid or unannounced deployment of the TASER device."
Dkt. 130 at 15–16, 27–28.1 Axon argues that these claims must be dismissed
because Ms. Clay "does not allege a specific latent danger in the use of an
energy weapon necessitating a warning." Dkt. 141 at 7. Ms. Clay responds
that the TASER weapon's ability "to deliver high-voltage electricity into a
human spine" requires a warning "from the device itself" to allow her to comply
with orders or brace herself. Dkt. 178 at 1–2.
A manufacturer may be liable under Indiana law for failing "to warn of a

danger . . . as to which the average consumer would not be aware." Ford Motor
Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007). But a TASER weapon's
capabilities are an obvious and inherent danger of the weapon, rather than a
"latent dangerous characteristic" that triggers a duty to warn. Kaiser v.
Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1015 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying Nat. Gas
Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)); First Nat'l
Bank & Tr. Corp. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 2004)

1 The parties have not addressed whether Ms. Clay is a "user or consumer" of the
TASER weapon under Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1, which would require all her claims
against Axon to proceed under IPLA, see Robinson v. Davol Inc., 913 F.3d 690, 693
(7th Cir. 2019); Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. 2002)
(explaining that "consumer" includes "any bystander injured by the product who
would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably
expected use"). The Court does not address that question because these claims are
subject to dismissal regardless of whether they are within IPLA's scope. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007).
("There is no duty to warn that a knife or an ax will cut, a match will take fire,
dynamite will explode, or a hammer may mash a finger.").
Ms. Clay nevertheless contends that the danger was hidden from her

because the officers approached her from behind. Dkt. 178 at 1–2. But
whether a danger is latent depends on what would be hidden from "the
ordinary consumer," not from Ms. Clay in her own experience. Am. Eurocopter,
378 F.3d at 690. For example, the danger from a BB gun is not latent "under
the objective test that Indiana uses," even if the specific plaintiffs were not
aware of it. Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1998);
Ind. Code § 34-20-4-4 ("A product is not defective under the article if the
product is incapable of being made safe for its reasonably expected use, when

manufactured, sold, handled, and packaged properly."). Ms. Clay therefore has
not pleaded a plausible claim against Axon based on a duty to warn. See
Welch v. Scripto–Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he
risks posed by a disposable butane lighter are open and obvious to an ordinary
user of the lighter" so there was "no duty to warn.").
2. Assault and battery, and IIED
Axon argues that Ms. Clay's assault and battery and IIED claims must be
dismissed because they both require intent, which Ms. Clay has not plausibly

alleged. Dkt. 141 at 4–6. Ms. Clay responds that intent can be inferred from
Axon's decision "to distribute a weapon capable of delivering 50,000 volts into a
human spine." Dkt. 178 at 3.
To prevail on these claims, Ms. Clay must plausibly allege that Axon
intended to harm her. "[B]attery is an intentional tort and requires the intent
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff." Price v. Kuchaes,

950 N.E.2d 1218, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); see Hellums v. Raber, 853 N.E.2d
143, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that an aiding and abetting theory
requires "intent to commit a tort, or [ ] negligence"). Assault similarly "is
effectuated when one acts intending to cause an imminent apprehension of a
harmful or offensive contact with another person." Raess v. Doescher, 883
N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ind. 2008). And IIED claims can proceed only "with the
requisite intent or recklessness to cause . . . severe emotional distress." Fox v.
Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 204 N.E.3d 320, 329–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

Here, intended or reckless harm to Ms. Clay cannot be inferred from
Axon's decision to make a product, even a weapon designed to contact another
person. See Price, 950 N.E.2d at 1231–32 (holding that a vaccine
manufacturer could not have intended to harm the plaintiff). So, Axon's
decision to make TASER weapons does not support the inference that it
intended harm to Ms. Clay in her interaction with Officers Thorup and Brooks.
See id. ("The vaccine manufacturers could not have intended to cause any
contact, let alone harmful contact, of the vaccine with Cathy." (emphasis

added)); cf. Baker v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 2:17-cv-429-JVB-JPK, 2021 WL
3726050 at *7 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2021) (holding that even if manufacturers of
lead-containing products concealed contamination, plaintiffs did not plead
intent to harm them). Ms. Clay therefore has not plausibly alleged that Axon
intended to harm her as required for her assault and battery and IIED claims.
Ms. Clay's claims against Axon are DISMISSED.

B. State of Indiana's Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Clay brings negligence, IIED, and defamation claims against the
State of Indiana. Dkt. 130 at 11–28. She alleges that Indiana appointed her a
biased public defender in her criminal case and published "public records"
related to her criminal case that said she "was a criminal" and "was violent and
a threat to police." Id.
1. Negligence and IIED
The State of Indiana argues that Ms. Clay's negligence and IIED claims

are barred by absolute immunity because they are based on her public
defender appointment, which is a judicial act. Dkt. 133 at 5–6; dkt. 182 at 1.
Ms. Clay responds, without supporting authority, that the public-defender
appointment was an administrative act rather than a judicial one. Dkt. 177 at
2.
Under Indiana law, "absolute judicial immunity" applies to judges and
non-judicial officers "who perform quasi-judicial functions." Marion Sup. Ct.
Prob. Dept. v. Trapuzzano, 223 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). This

immunity "applies even if the action the defendant took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Ind. Bd. of Pharm. v. Elmer, 207
N.E.3d 1237, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).
That immunity applies here because a public defender's appointment is a
judicial act. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6; Johnson v. State, 640 N.E.2d 747, 749
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("It is a judicial function to determine whether counsel

shall be appointed at public expense."); see also Trapuzzano, 223 N.E.3d at 288
("Absolute judicial immunity . . . extends to persons performing tasks so
integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are
considered an arm of the judicial officer."). Indeed, Ms. Clay admits that her
public defender was appointed "by a state judicial officer." Dkt. 130 at 9. So
even accepting Ms. Clay's allegations that her public defender was biased, his
appointment was a judicial act, making the State of Indiana immune2 from Ms.
Clay's negligence and IIED claims. See Dawson v. Newman, 845 N.E.2d 1076,

1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the argument that sending certified copies
of a sentence as required by statute was a mere "administrative duty," and
therefore finding immunity from suit).
2. Defamation
For Ms. Clay's defamation claim, the State of Indiana argues that it is
protected by a qualified privilege because the records at issue are public under
Indiana law. Dkt. 133 at 7; dkt. 182 at 2. Ms. Clay responds that the State of
Indiana does not have a "license to lie" in its public records. Dkt. 177 at 3.

2 Judicial immunity applies even though Ms. Clay has named the State of Indiana as
the defendant, rather than the person who appointed her public defender. See
Mendenhall v. Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining
that judicial immunity "look[s] to the nature of the function performed, not the identity
of the person who performed it" and holding that the City of Indianapolis was immune
for its officers' actions).
"Qualified privilege is a defense to a defamation action and applies to
communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which the party
making the communication . . . has a duty, either public or private, either

legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or
duty." Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992). Here, the State of
Indiana had a duty to make public records available. See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-1
et seq. ("[A]ll persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the
affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as
public officials and employees."). And the public has a "corresponding interest"
in accessing those records. Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356; see Taylor v. Antisdel,
185 N.E.3d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that criminal

prosecutions are "matter[s] of public concern"). Ms. Clay cites no legal
authority in support of her defamation claim based on the State of Indiana's
publication of public records. See dkt. 177 at 3–5. And while Ms. Clay briefly
argues that the State of Indiana acted with malice, id., providing public access
to public court records cannot support such a finding, see Taylor, 185 N.E.3d
at 875.
Ms. Clay's claims against the State of Indiana are therefore DISMISSED.3

3 Because the State of Indiana relies on defenses, it should have answered Ms. Clay's
complaint and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). But
that does not affect the standard of review or this Court's ability to address the issue,
since the relevant facts have been presented with the complaint and motion to
dismiss. Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 1013, 1016 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014);
see Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012).
Because those defenses are dispositive, the Court does not address the State of
Indiana's argument that Ms. Clay's claims against it are barred by law enforcement
immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. See dkt. 133 at 6–7.
C. Indianapolis Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Clay brings negligence; "false imprisonment, false arrest, and/or
criminal confinement"; unreasonable search and seizure; defamation; and First

Amendment religious expression claims against the City of Indianapolis and
the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department.4 Dkt. 130 at 11–28.
Because IMPD cannot be sued under Indiana law, City of Peru v. Lewis, 950
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-155, and is not a
"person" who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 independently of the City of
Indianapolis, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 645 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007), it
is dismissed as a Defendant and the Court considers the claims against the
City of Indianapolis.

For defamation—Ms. Clay's only state-law claim against Indianapolis—
Indianapolis argues that Ms. Clay has not alleged enough detail to plausibly
plead this claim. Dkt. 139 at 6–7; see Webber, 923 F.3d at 480–81. Ms. Clay
responds that she has pleaded that Indianapolis published statements that she
was "a 'threat to police' and 'unfit parent'" on its website. Dkt. 176 at 2. Ms.
Clay has not alleged, however, what "documentation" Indianapolis may have

4 Ms. Clay also names as defendants in their "official capacities" a "John Doe
Transport Officer" who drove Ms. Clay to the Marion County Jail, and unnamed
Marion County Jail employees "responsible for processing" Ms. Clay. Dkt. 130 at 3.
Because these are official, rather than individual, capacity claims, they are against
Indianapolis under Monell. Sow v. Fortville Police Dept., 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir.
2011) (An official capacity suit "is another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which the officer is an agent."). These defendants are therefore dismissed as
duplicative. See Stanek v. St. Charles Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634,
640 (7th Cir. 2015).
published, including whether it was public records; when any publication
occurred; or the context of any allegedly false statements. See dkt. 130 at 9,
24–26. She therefore has not plausibly pleaded a defamation claim against

Indianapolis. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (Legal conclusions and
conclusory allegations do not state a plausible claim.); Integrity Kokosing
Pipeline Servs., LLC v. Pipeliners Union 798, No. 1:20-cv-2321-RLM-MG, 2021
WL 4194435 at *9 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2021) ("While the pleading does not need
to incorporate the literal statement, a party asserting a defamation claim must
provide some context as to when and how the allegedly defamatory statement
was made to allow the defendant to form an appropriate response.").
Ms. Clay's remaining claims against Indianapolis are federal-law claims

brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See dkt. 130 at 11–28. Indianapolis
"cannot be held liable for the constitutional torts of its employees or agents."
First Midwest Bank Guardian v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.
2021) (explaining Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)). Instead, the violation must have been caused by Indianapolis's own
"policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Id. So, to plausibly plead a
Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) the [municipality] had an express

policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the
[municipality] had a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage within the force of law; or (3) plaintiff's
constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking
authority." McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000).
Indianapolis argues that Ms. Clay's Monell claims against it must be

dismissed because she alleges only individual employees' actions, not harm
from a municipal policy or custom. Dkt. 139 at 7–9. Ms. Clay responds that
she has pleaded "standardized, system-wide practices that no individual officer
could invent." Dkt. 176 at 2.
For her "false imprisonment, false arrest, and/or criminal confinement"
and unreasonable search and seizure claims, Ms. Clay has not identified an
express policy or widespread practice that led to her alleged constitutional
violations. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 615. She instead relies on the actions of

the individual officer who transported her to the detention center after her
arrest, and the actions of detention center staff who held her after her arrest
and implemented her bond. See dkt. 130 at 16, 21.5 Because, under Monell,
"a plaintiff must challenge conduct that is properly attributable to the
municipality itself," her allegations about individual officers' actions do not
state a claim. First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 986; see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs.
of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997) (Monell "require[s]
application of rigorous culpability and causation standards in order to ensure

that the municipality is not held liable solely for its employee's actions.").

5 Indianapolis disputes whether that officer was its employee, but because the
allegation does not support a Monell claim the Court does not address that dispute.
See dkt. 139 at 4–5.
While Ms. Clay briefly mentions a failure to train and a "'ransom' policy"
in having to pay a $500 bond, dkt. 176 at 2, generic allegations without factual
elaboration cannot support a Monell claim. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 617,

619 (affirming dismissal of Monell claim that lacked "the factual heft required to
survive a motion to dismiss"); Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 505
(7th Cir. 2001) ("Without a link between the City and the alleged policy, no
claim for municipal liability can survive."). Moreover, she does not allege that
the bond was a city policy, rather than ordered by a judicial officer of the State
of Indiana. See dkt. 130 at 16, 21.
That leaves Ms. Clay's First Amendment religious exercise claim, which
alleges that the Marion County Jail's policy of collecting DNA from arrestees

violated "her sincerely held religious beliefs and her right to religious
expression." Dkt. 130 at 10, 26–28. Indianapolis argues that this claim must
be dismissed because the Marion County Sheriff's Office, rather than
Indianapolis, runs the jail and sets its policies. Dkt. 139 at 4–5, 7–8. Ms. Clay
responds that under the consolidated city–county government, Indianapolis
"sets overarching policy" for the jail. Dkt. 176 at 2.
The consolidation of Indianapolis and Marion County is "only partial,"
and the Marion County Sheriff runs the Marion County Jail. Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The Sheriff's Department has
always remained a separate entity from the City of Indianapolis."); Ind. Code §
36-3-1-5.1 ("Notwithstanding any other law, an ordinance adopted under this
section must provide that the county sheriff's department shall be responsible
for . . . [c]ounty jail operations and facilities."); see Homes v. Marion Cnty.
Sheriff, No. 1:23-cv-1307-TWP-MJD, 2024 WL 2133976 at *2 (S.D. Ind. May
13, 2024). Ms. Clay cites no contrary authority. See dkt. 176.

Ms. Clay also has not alleged that Indianapolis was responsible for
establishing or requiring a DNA-collection policy at the Marion County Jail,
which it did not operate. See dkt. 130 at 10, 27–28; First Midwest Bank, 988
F.3d at 986 ("[A] plaintiff must challenge conduct that is properly attributable
to the municipality itself."). And her bare argument in her response brief that
Indianapolis "sets overarching policy" at the Jail is too vague to support a
Monell claim. See id.; McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (Legal conclusions and
conclusory allegations do not state a plausible claim.).

Ms. Clay's claims against the City of Indianapolis and the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department are therefore DISMISSED.
D. Unidentified Defendants
Ms. Clay has named as Defendants unidentified "emergency medical
technicians employed by or acting as agents of the City of Lawrence" and
additional "officers of the Lawrence Police Department who were present at the
scene." Dkt. 130 at 2–3.
Ms. Clay's claims against these unidentified defendants must be

dismissed. See Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[D]istrict
courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and
nonprisoners alike, regardless of fee status."). The Seventh Circuit has
explained that it is generally "pointless to include [an] anonymous defendant"
because "this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.". Wudtke v. Davel, 128
F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 19977); see Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 497
(7th Cir. 2021). Claims against these defendants are dismissed without
prejudice, so Ms. Clay may seek to file a new complaint with her allegations
against these defendants if she learns their identities and believes it would not
be futile. See Troya v. Wilson, 807 Fed. App'x 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2020)
(unpublished).
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Dkt. [132]; dkt. [138];
dkt. [140]. The Clerk is directed to terminate as Defendants Axon
Enterprise, State of Indiana, City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department, "City of Lawrence EMT," and "Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department Inmate Transport Officer."
SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/28/2026 :
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
LUCRETIA CLAY
10242 John Jay Drive
Indianapolis, IN 46235
All electronically registered counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410245. Public record. Not legal advice.