# Dellinger

> District Court, D. Oregon · July 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410095

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher D. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** July 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER D., No. 3:25-cv-00236-YY

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.
YOU, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Christopher D.1 seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision
denying Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred by: (1) discounting his
subjective symptom testimony without clear and convincing reasons; (2) improperly evaluating
the medical opinion of Dr. Alvord; (3) improperly addressing the lay witness statements; and (4)
failing to support the step-five finding with substantial evidence. Pl. Br., ECF 12 at 9–19. The
district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the Commissioner applied proper legal
standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. §

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last
name of the nongovernmental party in this case.
405(g); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). With that standard of review applied,
the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
(1) Subjective Symptom Testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give specific,
clear and convincing reasons for discounting his subjective symptom testimony. Pl. Br. 12–

14; Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that if a
claimant provides objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment and there is no
affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing
reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. According to
plaintiff, the ALJ’s grounds for discounting his symptom testimony—inconsistencies with
the medical evidence and improvement with treatment—were unsupported or failed to
consider the entire record. Pl. Br. 12–14.
Regarding the medical evidence, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ singled out a “few periods
of temporary well-being from a sustained period of impairment” in an attempt to discredit his
testimony. Id. at 12 (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2014)). However, as the

Commissioner observes, the ALJ identified specific evidence in the record and linked it to
specific portions of plaintiff’s testimony.
For example, the ALJ observed that despite plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms
stemming from seizures, namely that he experienced “time loss” and performed “automatic
behaviors[,]” plaintiff reported to his provider that he has “no ongoing episodes of time loss after
starting Zonegran and no vision changes,” and “findings on neurological examination were
normal.” Tr. 24, citing Tr. 635–36. The ALJ also found that plaintiff’s seizures were clinically
resolved. Id., citing Tr. 645. The ALJ next acknowledged plaintiff’s claims of “significant seizure
activity[,]” but contrasted those claims with a December 2023 chart note indicating that
plaintiff’s medication was increased after “very brief lapses of awareness lasting just a fraction
of a second” and that “reported seizure activity in mid-2024 was due to not taking his
medication[.]” Tr. 26, citing Tr. 879–80, 890. Finally, the ALJ indicated “there are no
observations by providers or other medical evidence that [plaintiff] is even having seizures,

which was acknowledged by the representative at the hearing.” Tr. 26; see Tr. 50–52.
Regarding plaintiff’s claims of significant memory problems, the ALJ contrasted
plaintiff’s testimony with observations from an August 2023 examination where plaintiff was
“receptive with normal expressive language.” Tr. 24, citing Tr. 877–78. The ALJ then indicated
that the strongest purported evidence of memory issues stemmed from examinations with Scott
Alvord, PhD, but even Dr. Alvord observed that plaintiff’s long- and short-term memory were
“adequate on mental status examination.” Tr. 24–25, citing Tr. 793. The ALJ explained that
although plaintiff alleged that he has trouble “even remembering what he does day-to-day[,]” Dr.
Alvord’s consultative examinations reveal that plaintiff “was alone and gave a full history
including medications he was taking” and “gave a full history to a new primary care provider and

gave a similar full history, including back to his childhood, to a new mental health provider.” Tr.
26, citing Tr. 910–18. The ALJ concluded that these observations demonstrated inconsistencies
with plaintiff’s testimony. See generally Tr. 26. This was a reasonable reading of the evidence.
Because the ALJ provided specific, rational links between the objective medical observations
and plaintiff’s active memory recall, the ALJ’s decision to discount plaintiff’s subjective memory
complaints is supported by substantial evidence and must be affirmed. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53
F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent
with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such
testimony.”).
Lastly, though not contested by plaintiff, the ALJ reasonably considered that plaintiff’s
mental impairments responded well to treatment with the prescribed medications of Sertraline
and Zonegran. Tr. 24, 26, citing Tr. 635, 788, 877, 914, 921; see Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively

with medication are not disabling.”) (citations omitted).
In sum, the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are a reasonable
interpretation of the evidence. The ALJ therefore did not err in evaluating plaintiff’s subjective
symptom testimony.
(2) Scott Alvord, PhD. Dr. Alvord, a licensed psychologist, conducted a psychological
evaluation of plaintiff on October 13, 2023 and November 6, 2023. Tr. 791–97. In his 2023
opinion, Dr. Alvord diagnosed plaintiff with Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, Mood Disorder
(Depression and Anxiety), and Polysubstance Use Disorder (sustained ten-year remission). Tr.
795. Dr. Alvord documented that plaintiff’s affect was “downtrodden and slightly anxious” and
that his long-term memory was “adequate for dates and details of past events. Short-term

memory was adequate. Immediate [or] working memory was adequate as evidenced by his
instant recall of 3 for 3 words.” Tr. 793. Dr. Alvord concluded that plaintiff would have mild to
moderate difficult understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple, one-two step
instructions; marked difficulty understanding, carrying out, and remembering complex
instructions; moderate to marked difficulty sustaining concentration and persisting in work
related activity at a reasonable pace; moderate difficulty maintaining effective social interaction
on a consistent and independent basis with supervisors, co-workers, and in the public; and
moderate difficulty dealing with normal pressures in a competitive work setting. See Tr. 795.
The ALJ found Dr. Alvord’s medical opinion was not persuasive. See Tr. 27. The ALJ
explained that “[w]hile supported by contemporaneous findings, it is not supported by or
consistent with the record as a whole[.]” Tr. 27. The ALJ noted that Dr. Alvord’s opinion had
“significant inconsistencies” with the identical tests conducted by Dr. Trueblood even though the

tests were performed more than a month apart. Id. The ALJ concluded that the “validity measures
utilized by Dr. Trueblood put [the] results of both examinations into serious question.” Tr. 28.
Plaintiff argues that “Dr. Trueblood never stated that the validity measures from his
testing called into question the results of Dr. Alvord’s testing.” Pl. Br. 10. However, plaintiff
mischaracterizes the ALJ’s conclusion. The conclusion that Dr. Trueblood’s validity measures
put the results of both his and Dr. Alvord’s testing into “question” was the ALJ’s own conclusion
after reviewing both opinions. See Tr. 27–28. The ALJ properly resolved a conflict between the
testing results obtained by Dr. Alvord and those obtained by Dr. Trueblood. See Andrews v.
Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.”). During a December

2023 evaluation, Dr. Trueblood administered the same mental capacity testing that Dr. Alvord
had previously utilized across two evaluations. However, Dr. Trueblood explicitly concluded that
his neuropsychological evaluation of plaintiff yielded test results that were “unlikely to provide
accurate information about his neurocognitive skills” and “should not be relied on.” Tr. 851. In
support of this conclusion, Dr. Trueblood highlighted marked discrepancies and inconsistencies
between the two evaluations, noting as an example that plaintiff’s time to complete a processing
speed test was over three times longer during Dr. Alvord’s evaluation than during his own. Id.
The ALJ highlighted this divergence, noting that Dr. Trueblood’s clinical observations were
“very inconsistent” with those of Dr. Alvord. Tr. 27, citing Tr. 649. Crucially, Dr. Trueblood
identified “malingering” or a “somatoform process” as the probable drivers behind plaintiff’s
unreliable test data. Tr. 851. Because the record contains affirmative clinical evidence of sub-
maximal testing effort and symptom magnification, the ALJ was well within her authority to
reject Dr. Alvord’s more restrictive findings. Because the medical evidence is susceptible to more

than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s resolution of this conflict must be upheld. Andrews, 53
F.3d at 1039–40.
Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not fully and fairly develop the record by failing
to recontact plaintiff’s treating provider, Dr. Rolan. Pl. Br. 10. Plaintiff relies on Dr. Trueblood’s
observation that the “best basis for an estimate of the degree of memory impairment for
[plaintiff] may be to obtain Dr. Rolan’s opinion on this.” Pl. Br. 10, citing Tr. 851. Plaintiff
asserts that instead of recontacting Dr. Rolan to resolve this issue, the ALJ impermissibly
discounted Dr. Alvord’s consultative findings as “inconsistent.” Pl. Br. 10. An ALJ’s duty to
further develop the record—including recontacting a medical source—is narrow and triggered
only when the existing evidence is completely ambiguous or insufficient to make a disability

determination. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520b(b), 416.920b(b). Here, Dr. Trueblood’s report was neither ambiguous nor insufficient.
As the ALJ properly recognized, Dr. Trueblood clearly “explains that his conclusion was based
upon the fact that testing from an examination just one month prior was inconsistent with testing
he performed, including, for example, that a test for processing speed took over three times
longer on Dr. Alvord’s evaluation than on Dr. Trueblood’s evaluation.” Tr. 27. The ALJ did not
reject Dr. Alvord’s opinion because it was ambiguous. Instead, the ALJ rejected the opinion
because it was directly contrary to the opinion of Dr. Trueblood.
(3) Lay Witness Testimony. Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of the lay witness
testimony from his wife, mother, and sister. Pl. Br. 14–17. Plaintiff’s wife, mother, and sister
provided third-party statements regarding plaintiff’s mental health-related limitations that tracked
plaintiff’s own allegations. See Tr. 348–59. The ALJ’s basis for discounting plaintiff’s symptom

testimony is tied into why she discounted the lay witness testimony, namely due to improvement
with medication, inconsistent statements to providers, and because the treatment notes do not
support the “extreme limits alleged by” plaintiff and the witness statements. See Tr. 23, 26. For
example, the ALJ pointed out that plaintiff’s mother attended an August 2023 follow-up appoint
with him where she affirmed plaintiff’s partial seizures were “well-controlled on Zonegran.” Tr.
24, citing Tr. 877 (“He is tolerating Zonegran and has had no further episodes of zoning out. He
is accompanied by his mother today who is spent a great deal of time with him recently and
confirms this.”).
Plaintiff argues there is “no reliable evidence to support the ALJ’s contrary conclusion,
and the ALJ’s failure to base his rejection of the lay witness statements on the record and to give

specific and legitimate reasons germane to each witness is reversible error.” Pl. Br. 16. But the
ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom
testimony, and those same reasons constitute germane grounds for discounting the lay witness
statements. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009)
(affirming that if an ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s
subjective complaints, and a lay witness’s testimony is similar to those complaints, it follows that
the ALJ has provided germane reasons for rejecting the lay witness testimony); Jacob D. v.
Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:24-CV-01191-HL, 2025 WL 1779181 (D. Or. June 27, 2025)
(“[B]ecause the ALJ noted how [the lay witness] testimony ‘generally relies on the claimant’s
subjective complaints,” and the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount plaintiff’s
subjective complaints, the ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting [the lay witness’s]
testimony.”). Plaintiff’s statements regarding his limitations were substantially similar to those
provided by his wife, mother, and sister. Compare Tr. 297–98, with Tr. 348–59. Therefore, the

ALJ did not err.
(4) Step Five Determination. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s step five determination that he
can perform the jobs of marker and routing clerk are not based on substantial evidence because
the ALJ did not include Dr. South’s limitation to “no detailed instructions [or] tasks” in the RFC
despite finding his opinion persuasive. Pl. Br. 17–18. Plaintiff argues the jobs of marker and
routing clerk “are improper for someone with [p]laintiff’s limitations” because those jobs require
the understanding and carrying out of detailed instructions, which is inconsistent with the
limitations Dr. South assessed. Id. at 18. But even, assuming arguendo, that this constitutes an
error, it is harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012)). Because the
housekeeping cleaner job alone exists in significant numbers in the national economy (175,000),

it independently satisfies the Commissioner’s burden at step five, and the ALJ’s decision must be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED July 28, 2026.

/s/ Youlee Yim You
Youlee Yim You
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410095. Public record. Not legal advice.