# Simmons

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · August 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410034

## Case

- **Full name:** Tearria and Clinton Simmons, Individuals, their children, A.B.P., O.S.S., and R.T.S., by and through their mother, and Billy Lee Coram, an individual, pro se v. City of Hurricane, a municipality, Scott Edwards, Mayor of the City of Hurricane, in his individual capacity, Chief Michael Mullins, Chief of Hurricane Police Department, in his individual capacity, Corporal Brett Johnson, Patrolman, W.D. Allen, Patrolman Payton Carr, Sergeant Makenzie White, Detective Jonathan Payne, and Officer John Does 1-10, inclusive, in their individual capacities, and Alyson Denison, a worker for Child Protective Services, in her individual capacity
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** August 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HUNTINGTON DIVISION

TEARRIA and CLINTON SIMMONS,
Individuals, their children, A.B.P., O.S.S.,
and R.T.S., by and through their mother, and
BILLY LEE CORAM, an individual, pro se,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-0345

CITY OF HURRICANE, a municipality,
SCOTT EDWARDS, Mayor of the City of Hurricane,
in his individual capacity, CHIEF MICHAEL MULLINS,
Chief of Hurricane Police Department, in his individual
capacity, CORPORAL BRETT JOHNSON, PATROLMAN,
W.D. ALLEN, PATROLMAN PAYTON CARR, SERGEANT
MAKENZIE WHITE, DETECTIVE JONATHAN PAYNE, and
OFFICER JOHN DOES 1-10, inclusive, in their individual capacities,
and ALYSON DENISON, a worker for Child Protective Services,
in her individual capacity,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was referred to the Honorable Joseph Reeder, United States Magistrate Judge,
for submission to this Court of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate Judge has submitted findings of fact and
recommended that the Court grant, in part, and deny, in part, Defendants’ Motions for Judgment
on the Pleadings and Motion to Dismiss. Proposed Findings and Recommendations 2, ECF No. 92
(“PF&R”).
Specifically, Magistrate Judge Reeder recommends that the Court (1) dismiss official
capacity claims; (2) dismiss without prejudice the claim against the City of Hurricane; (3) dismiss
Defendants Mayor Scott Edwards and Chief Michael Mullins from the action; (4) dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Alyson Denison; and (5) allow to
proceed Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful entry and unlawful
detention against Defendants Corporal Brett Johnson, Patrolman W.D. Allen, Patrolman Payton
Carr, Sargeant Makenzie White, Detective Jonathan Payne, and Alyson Denison, along with

associated state-law claims. PF&R 2.
Multiple parties have filed objections1 to the Proposed Findings and Recommendations.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings2 and objections de novo, ADOPTS in part and
DECLINES TO ADOPT in part the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.
I. BACKGROUND
This case, commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated multiple state laws.
Compl. 2, ECF No. 4. Plaintiffs include Billy Lee Coram and married couple Clinton Simmons
and Tearria Simmons. Id. Tearria Simmons brings suit on behalf of herself and her minor children,

A.B.P., O.S.S., and R.T.S. Id. ¶ 6.
The underlying conduct includes alleged interactions involving the Hurricane Police
Department officers and Child Protective Services (CPS) worker Alyson Denison at the residence

1 Defendant Alyson Denison’s Objections to PF&R, ECF No. 93 (“Def. Denison’s Objs.”);
Pls.’ Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s PF&R, ECF No. 94 (“Pls.’ Objs.”); Defs. City of
Hurricane, Scott Edwards, Michael Mullins, Brett Johnson, W.D. Allen, Payton Carr, Makenzie
White, and Jonathon Payne’s Objections to PF&R, ECF No. 95 (“Defs.’ Objs.”).
2 Defs.’ Mots. for J. on the Pleadings and Mems. of L., ECF Nos. 35–50; Pls.’ Resp. to
Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, ECF Nos. 51, 53, 58, 59; Defs.’ Replies to Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s
Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, ECF Nos. 56, 57, 61, 62; Def. Denison’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
87; Def. Denison’s Mem of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 88 (“Def. Denison’s Mem.”);
Pls.’ Resp. in Opp. to Def. Alyson Denison’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 89 (“Pls.’ Denison Resp.”);
Def. Denison’s Reply to Pls.’ Resp. in Opp. to Def. Alyson Denison’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 90.
of the Simmons’ and the separate upstairs apartment occupied by Billy Lee Coram. Id. at 2, 8–11.
The Complaint alleges that, on September 18, 2024, Defendant Patrolman W.D. Allen “threatened
Plaintiff Tearria Simmons with charges of aiding and abetting and removal of her children if she
did not allow a warrantless search of her home to look for her husband and intimidated the
family[.]” Id. ¶ 29. Her husband, Plaintiff Clinton Simmons, purportedly had an outstanding

warrant for his arrest for failure to appear on a misdemeanor charge in Putnam County. Id. ¶ 27.
The Complaint also alleges that, on October 21, 2024, Defendant Denison responded to the
Simmons’ residence after an anonymous referral alleging abuse or neglect. Id. ¶ 30. Defendant
Denison allegedly became hostile when Plaintiff Tearria Simmons denied her entry to the
residence. Id. According to the Complaint, on the next day, Defendant Patrolman Payton Carr
presented and executed a warrant at the Simmons’ residence for unrelated conduct. Id. ¶ 31.
Defendant Denison allegedly arrived at the scene and ultimately received coerced consent for a
walkthrough, on the condition that Plaintiff Tearria Simmons would accompany the officers. Id.
The Complaint alleges that, after the walkthrough, Plaintiff Tearria Simmons was further coerced

to provide written consent to Defendant Carr for a search of her residence for the purpose of finding
her husband. Id. ¶ 32. Further, despite Plaintiff Tearria Simmons’s protest, a search for Plaintiff
Clinton Simmons was then carried out by Defendant Carr and the Hurricane Police Department in
Plaintiff Tearria Simmons’s absence. Id. ¶ 33. Additionally, the Complaint alleges that, during the
search, Defendant Patrolman Carr failed to prevent or authorized Defendant Denison’s entry of
the Simmons’ residence and contact with the Simmons children without their guardians present.
Id. ¶ 34.
The Complaint next alleges that, on October 24, 2024, a SWAT team entered the Simmons’
residence, without following proper procedure, executing an invalid search warrant directed at
Plaintiff Tearria Simmons which was dated the same day as the prior “consented” search of her
residence. Id. ¶¶ 36–38. The Complaint states that, during this subsequent search, Plaintiff Clinton
Simmons was arrested in Plaintiff Billy Lee Coram’s separate upstairs apartment which was
marked with a sign reading: “No Trespassing, Private Property.” Id. ¶ 39. The Complaint also
alleges that Defendant Carr punched Plaintiff Clinton Simmons’s head multiple times during the

arrest and that Defendants subjected the entire family to harassment; destroyed Plaintiff Tearria
Simmons’s phone; and unlawfully seized property belonging to Plaintiff Billy Lee Coram. Id.
¶¶ 40–42. Plaintiffs allege that the CPS referral case was closed, and no criminal charges were
brought against them. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44.
Magistrate Judge Reeder made Proposed Findings and Recommendations addressing
Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c) and Defendant Denison’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations” of a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, a court must
conduct a de novo review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings “to which objection
is made.” Id. Courts need not conduct a review of factual and legal conclusions to which a party
does not object. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the reviewing court must liberally construe the pro se
litigant’s complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). While a court is not “expected to construct full blown claims from sentence
fragments,” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), a court should not
“permit technical pleading requirements to defeat the vindication of any constitutional rights which
the plaintiff alleges, however inartfully, to have been infringed.” Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,
1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, the allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. at 555 (citations omitted). While
factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss,
this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To
survive a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the same standard of review applies.
Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405–06 (4th Cir. 2002); Priority
Auto Grp., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 757 F.3d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant Denison raises two specific objections to the Proposed Findings and

Recommendations. She does not object to the recommendation that the Fourteenth Amendment
claims against her are dismissed, however, she objects to the survival of the Fourth Amendment
claims against her and the related state law claims. Def. Denison’s Objs. 2.
Plaintiffs raise two specific objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendations.
They do not object to the recommended dismissal of official capacity claims or the Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Defendant Denison. Pls.’ Objs. 2. They also do not object to the
recommendation that the individual-capacity Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful entry and
unlawful detention and associated state law claims proceed. Id.
Defendants City of Hurricane, Scott Edwards, Michael Mullins, Brett Johnson, W.D.
Allen, Payton Carr, Makenzie White, and Jonathon Payne raise three specific objections to the
Proposed Findings and Recommendations. They do not object to the recommendation for the
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Hurricane, Defendant Mullins, Defendant
Edwards, and official capacity claims against the officers. Defs.’ Objs. 2.

The Court proceeds with a de novo review of the specific objections raised by each party
in the order in which they were filed.
A. Defendant Alyson Denison’s Objections
i. Fourth Amendment Claim
Defendant Denison argues that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations fail to
appropriately analyze her qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment claim against her which
entitles her to protection at the earliest stage of litigation. Def. Denison’s Objs. 2–3 (citing
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987)). The Proposed Findings and
Recommendations state that factual questions remain as to Defendant Denison’s role in the alleged

conduct at the Simmons’ residence which give rise to violations of Fourth Amendment rights,
ultimately determining that a qualified immunity determination would be premature. PF&R 12.
Liability is imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a person acting under color of state law
deprives an individual of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Qualified immunity shields government officials, including CPS
workers, from liability from civil damages, protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (citation omitted);
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Parker v. Henry & William Evans Home for Children,
Inc., 762 Fed.Appx. 147, 154 (4th Cir. 2019). It provides officials “breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (citation
omitted). An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) they violated a federal statutory
or constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of its violation. See
Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att’y’s Off., 767 F.3d 379, 395 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

First, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable search and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend. IV. A search conducted without a warrant, absent an applicable exception like voluntary
consent, is presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980); Quinn
v. Zerkle, 111 F.4th 281, 291 (4th Cir. 2024). “Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.”
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). The Complaint contains allegations that a
day after Plaintiff Tearria Simmons refused Defendant Denison’s entry into the residence and
requested to speak to an attorney prior to an interview, Defendant Denison, along with police
officers, engaged in malicious and coercive tactics to unlawfully search the Simmons’ residence.
Compl. ¶¶ 111, 117–128, 145. If proven, this conduct may establish a Fourth Amendment claim.

In approaching the second question of whether a constitutional right is clearly established,
the Court must define the right within the specific context of the case, as the Supreme Court has
“repeatedly told courts … not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” City
of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (citation omitted); Thorpe v. Clarke, 37
F.4th 926, 940 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he Court has regularly insisted on highly particularized law in
the Fourth Amendment context[.]”). The Supreme Court has clarified that while “caselaw does not
require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,
104 (2018) (citation omitted); Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. A right is clearly established when any
reasonable individual in Defendant Denison’s circumstances would have understood that they
were violating a right. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. The Complaint alleges that Defendant Denison
knowingly and intentionally obtained coerced consent for the search of the Simmons’ residence
by threatening to remove the Simmons children if consent to search was not provided. Compl.
¶¶ 119–120. Defendant Denison accurately states that qualified immunity should be resolved at

the earliest possible stage of litigation. Def. Denison’s Objs. 3; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citation
omitted). However, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that there are
questions of fact surrounding Defendant Denison’s conduct that preclude the Court from
evaluating qualified immunity at this stage. PF&R 21. Defendant Denison argues that Plaintiffs’
rights are not clearly established because there is no precedent establishing the Fourth Amendment
rights of individuals subject to a CPS worker’s investigation. Def. Denison’s Objs. 3–4 (citing
Rogers v. Cumberland Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 5:20-CV-477-BO, 2022 WL 1132153, at
*12 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 2022); Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993); Ross
v. Klesius, 715 Fed.Appx. 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2017)). Here, the Complaint addresses Defendant

Denison’s actions in concert with the police officers in conducting a search of the residence; it
does not assert constitutional violations arising solely in the context of a CPS investigation. Thus,
the Court does not make a ruling as to qualified immunity at this stage. As Magistrate Judge Reeder
stated, Defendant Denison can reassert qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
PF&R 21.
Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendant Denison’s objection to the qualified immunity
analysis of the Fourth Amendment claim against her.
ii. State Law Claims
Defendant Denison argues that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations failed to
address the sufficiency of the pleadings of the state law claims. Def. Denison’s Objs. 6. The
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court assume supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims and refrained from addressing the sufficiency of the pleadings, reasoning that such an

evaluation would be premature. See PF&R 23. The Court will address whether Plaintiffs have
sufficiently pled claims against Defendant Denison of Count IX (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Count XIV and XV (trespass and trespass to chattels); and Count XIV (professional
negligence).
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia first recognized a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED), also known as the tort of outrage, in Harless v. First
National Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982), when it said: “[o]ne who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is

subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm.” Syl. Pt. 6, Harless, 289 S.E.2d 692.
A plaintiff must establish the following four elements to prevail on a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress:
(1) that the defendant's conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and
outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with
the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or
substantially certain emotional distress would result from [their] conduct; (3) that
the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and,
(4) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Syl. Pt. 3, Travis v. Alcon Lab., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1998). Defendant Denison argues
that Plaintiffs fail to plead specific intent, that the conduct was not extreme and outrageous, and
that the claims asserted by Plaintiff Billy Lee Coram, Plaintiff Clinton Simmons, and the children
through Plaintiff Tearria Simmons are not supported by facts. Def. Denison’s Mem. 14–15.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Denison engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that she knew

or reasonably should have known would cause extreme emotional distress to Plaintiffs. Compl.
¶¶ 237, 239. The alleged conduct includes, in part, threatening to take her children if consent to
search was not provided and entering the home to contact the children without guardian consent.
Id. ¶¶ 237, 239, 240. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the conduct is outrageous given the
sensitive nature of familial relationships, naturally resulting in emotional distress. Pls.’ Denison
Resp. 19. While minimal, the Complaint asserts that Defendant Denison’s conduct caused
emotional distress. Compl. ¶ 240. The Court agrees that the Complaint fails to state a claim of IIED
against Defendant Denison for conduct toward Plaintiff Billy Lee Coram. However, Plaintiff
Clinton Simmons, Plaintiff Tearria Simmons, and the children through Plaintiff Tearria Simmons

sufficiently plead that Defendant Denison engaged in conduct that may establish an IIED claim.
Accordingly, the IIED claim against Defendant Denison survives.
2. Trespass and Trespass to Chattels
Under West Virginia common law, trespass is “an entry on another man's ground without
lawful authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property.” Whiteman
v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 386 (W. Va. 2013) (citing Hark v. Mountain
Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 352 (W. Va. 1945)). Plaintiffs omit the element requiring damage
from their definition. Pls.’ Denison Resp. 19. The Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to allege that
Defendant Denison caused damage to Plaintiffs’ real property, particularly considering Defendant
Denison was not alleged to be present at the Simmons residence on the day that the alleged
property damage occurred. Compl. 10–11. Plaintiffs fail to argue otherwise. Additionally,
Plaintiffs do not address Defendant Denison’s request to dismiss the trespass to chattels claim and
do not sufficiently allege facts to support such a claim. Thus, the trespass to chattels and trespass
claims asserted against Defendant Denison will be dismissed.

3. Professional Negligence
To plead a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must allege that “the defendant owes him a duty,
that there was a negligent breach of that duty, and that injuries received by the plaintiff resulted
proximately from the breach of the duty.” Jones v. Logan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 881 S.E.2d 374, 383
(W. Va. 2022); Hayes v. Kanawha Valley Reg’l Transp. Auth., 902 S.E.2d 477, 482 (W. Va. 2024).
Defendant Denison argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish the element of duty and that
immunity bars the claim. Def. Denison’s Mem. 17. Plaintiffs allege Defendant Denison violated
procedural duties owed to them, as established by the Child Protective Services Policy Handbook
(2022). Compl. ¶¶ 298–309. Plaintiffs claim that no state law immunity applies because of the

purported violation of a constitutional right. Pls.’ Denison Resp. 19.
Defendant Denison relies on a Western District of Virginia case applying Virginia law to
argue that “[i]t is well-settled that internal policies do not set a legal duty of care actionable in
negligence as a matter of law.” Def. Denison Objs. 9 (citing Allen v. Walker, No. 3:24-cv-00067,
2025 WL 1332969, at *12 (W.D. Va. May 7, 2025)). The same premise applies in West Virginia.
W. Va. Dep’t of Hum. Serv. v. David B., 911 S.E.2d 884, 895 (W.Va. 2024). Plaintiffs broadly
refer to the Child Protective Services Policy Handbook (2022) to assert that Defendant Denison
failed to satisfy her duty of care. Compl. ¶¶ 298–99. Plaintiffs also broadly allege that Defendant
Denison owed Plaintiffs a duty of care to “conduct her child welfare investigation in compliance
with established procedures, policies and state and federal law.” Compl. ¶ 298. Reliance on the
policy handbook, alone, and conclusory statements of a source of a duty would be insufficient.
David B., 911 S.E.2d at 893; West Virginia Department of Human Services v. A.R., 900 S.E.2d 16,
26 (W. Va. 2024) (citation omitted). However, Plaintiffs’ factual allegations include, in part, that
Defendant Denison breached her duty of care by making baseless threats to remove the Simmons

children; coercing consent to search; violations of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights and
reasonable expectation of privacy; failing to respect Plaintiffs’ rights as a whole, “intentionally or
negligently and with reckless disregard, by engaging in conduct which inflicted severe emotional
distress”; and “behaving inappropriately and unprofessionally, going beyond the bounds of the
scope of her duties of employment as a CPS worker, and failing to comply with the policies and
procedures set forth in the handbook that governs her job, nor with state and federal law.” Compl.
¶ 299. Thus, Plaintiffs have pled that Defendant Denison breached duties she owed Plaintiffs
arising under the Constitution.
Defendant Denison next argues that she has complete immunity for discretionary acts

under West Virginia law. Def. Denison’s Mem. Qualified immunity shields government officials
from liability when they perform discretionary activities in an official capacity so long as they “did
not violate clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known.” Maston v.
Wagner, 781 S.E.2d 936, 947 (W. Va. 2015). Immunity does not apply when acts are “fraudulent,
malicious, or otherwise oppressive.” Crouch v. Gillispie, 809 S.E.2d 699, 704 (W. Va. 2018)
(citation omitted); David B., 911 S.E.2d at 893. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Denison’s conduct
violated rights and expectations established by the Constitution by engaging in conduct also
forming the basis for the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Denison. Considering the
Fourth Amendment claim persists, and the Court is not able to determine the issue of immunity at
this stage because Defendant Denison may have established a violation of a clearly established
right, this claim also survives.
B. Plaintiffs’ Objections
Plaintiffs claim the Proposed Findings and Recommendations erroneously recommend
dismissal of supervisory liability claims and a Monell claim against the City of Hurricane, or

alternatively, request leave to amend. Pls.’ Objs. 2.
i. Section 1983 Claims of Supervisory Liability
Plaintiffs argue that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations erroneously concluded
that the Complaint failed to state a claim in Count VI’s supervisory liability claim against
Defendant Mullin, Chief of Hurricane Police Department, and Defendant Edwards, Mayor of the
City of Hurricane. Pls.’ Objs. 3. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss the
supervisory liability claims because the Complaint failed to establish that the individuals, through
their own actions or by way of conduct from which such involvement could reasonably be inferred,
violated the Constitution. PF&R 10.

To establish a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show
“deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,”;
and
(3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and
the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “Establishing a ‘pervasive’
and ‘unreasonable’ risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least has
been used on several different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the subordinate poses
an unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury.” Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226
(4th Cir. 2014). Liability under a failure to supervise theory requires a history of widespread abuse.
Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983).
In evaluating Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant Edwards, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Defendant Edwards’ role as mayor,
alone, is not sufficient to establish supervisory liability. PF&R 11. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs

allege that Defendant Edwards is responsible for establishing training and implementation along
with Defendant Mullins, and that, “after seventeen years of serving” as a mayor, “knows, or
reasonably should know, which training practices, procedures, and customs are ineffective and
inadequate” and place citizens at risk, “especially after a pattern of similar behavior is established,
as is evidenced by other, similar causes of action filed within this Court, and this is not the first
time allegations such as these have been asserted against the Department and City.” Compl.
¶¶ 185, 188. However, Plaintiffs do not provide facts to support these conclusory assertions.
The Complaint does not contain allegations that establish that Defendant Edwards had
actual or constructive knowledge of a subordinate’s conduct creating an unreasonable risk of

constitutional injury and a gravely inadequate response causing a constitutional injury to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Edwards’ failure to discipline officers after the conduct at-issue in
this case establishes an authorization. Pls.’ Objs. 5. However, for supervisory liability, the
knowledge underlying a failure to supervise must be present prior to the alleged inaction resulting
in a constitutional injury. Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A
supervisor may be held liable under a tacit authorization theory if that supervisor fails to take action
in response to a known pattern of comparable conduct occurring before the incident at issue took
place.”).
Plaintiffs also argue that the pleading requirements allow for Plaintiffs to allege solely that
Defendant Edwards has a supervisory role and the conclusory statement that prior litigation
involving similar conduct has occurred. Pls.’ Objs. 4–5, 8 (citing Owens, 767 F.3d at 403).
However, in Owens, a Monell claim was sufficiently pled when the plaintiff alleged the existence
of reported and unreported cases and numerous successful motions. Owens, 767 F.3d at 403. The
pleadings there demonstrated that the defendant police officers withheld information on multiple

occasions, thus providing factual support for allegations of widespread and recurrent conduct. Id.
Here, the pleadings are conclusory and insufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face and rather “offer[] ‘labels and conclusions’ or formulaically recite[] the elements of [their] §
1983 cause of action.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In Plaintiffs’ Objections, they argue that the attached complaints support their conclusory
allegation that there have been prior claims of similar conduct. Pls.’ Objs. 8–9. The attached
documents include complaints that were filed in this Court in 2021 and 2022. See Smith v. Oiler,
No. 3:21-cv-00649 (S.D. W. Va. 2021), Pls.’ Ex. 3, ECF No. 94-3 (“Smith Compl.”); Young v.
Mullins, No. 3:22-cv-00596 (S.D. W. Va. 2022), Pls.’ Ex. 4, ECF No. 94-4 (“Young Compl.”).3

The 2022 complaint involved a claim surrounding an alleged unjustified traffic stop policy
established by Defendant Edwards. Young Complaint 3. Thus, it does not allege circumstance of a
constitutional violation like this one that could establish a history of widespread and recurrent
conduct. Additionally, there must be an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s alleged

3 The Court excludes from consideration the attachments to Plaintiffs Objections, ECF
Nos. 94-1, 94-2, 94-5, as such attachments are not subject to judicial notice, and otherwise would
result in conversion of the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The third and fourth attachments,
Smith Complaint and Young Complaint, are complaints that were filed in this Court, which are
subject to judicial notice and are considered without converting the motion into a motion for
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c); Goldfarb v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
791 F.3d 500, 506, 508–09 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
268 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986); Armbruster Products, Inc. v. Wilson, 35 F.3d 555, 1994 WL 489983, at
*2 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision).
conduct and the constitutional injury which is lacking. Timpson ex rel. Timpson v. Anderson Cnty.
Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 258 (4th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Court agrees that
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a supervisory liability claim against Defendant Edwards and will
deny Plaintiffs’ objections to the dismissal of Count VI against Defendant Edwards.
Next, the Court evaluates the supervisory liability claim against Defendant Mullins. The

Court disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Complaint contains no allegations that
Defendant Mullins participated in, directed, or was aware of the specific entry into the residence
or detention of Plaintiffs. PF&R 11. As Plaintiffs argue, the Complaint alleges that
Defendant Mullins was present at the scene of the search on October 24, 2024, and was supervising
Plaintiff Clinton Simmons while also providing guidance and authorization to the officers as they
carried out the search of the residence. Pls.’ Objs. 6; Compl. ¶¶ 178–183. However, the Complaint
is still devoid of factual allegations to demonstrate that Defendant Mullins was actually or
constructively aware that subordinates posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury on more than one occasion. As previously stated, Plaintiffs subsequently supplied the Court

with a complaint in a 2021 case asserting a claim of excessive force against Defendant Mullins.
Smith Compl. 1. The Complaint still fails to assert that widespread and recurrent conduct because
the 2021 suit does not indicate that Defendant Mullins was aware of a pervasive and unreasonable
risk of harm that the officers here may pose against the public. The pleadings also lack allegations
that Defendant Mullins was aware of the alleged conduct that transpired within the residence,
considering Defendant Mullins was outside of the residence, and there are not any factual
allegations that he was aware of previous instances that would give rise to another violation to
which he inadequately responded. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to establish that Defendant Mullins was
acting with deliberate indifference. See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (explaining that a supervisor cannot
be reasonably expected to establish rules for isolated incidents or to prevent deliberate unlawful
acts of properly trained employees to which he cannot anticipate) (citations omitted). Thus, the
claim against Defendant Mullins will also be dismissed, and Plaintiffs’ objection will be overruled.
ii. Section 1983 Claim Against the City of Hurricane
Plaintiffs argue that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations erroneously concluded

that the Complaint failed to plead a § 1983 claim against the City of Hurricane. Pls.’ Objs. 10. The
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss the claim because the Complaint failed to
identify a custom or policy within its pleadings; “[i]nstead, the municipal liability claim is based
solely upon the single set of events involving Plaintiffs.” PF&R 8.
Political subdivisions are amenable to suit for constitutional violations under § 1983.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1976). However, the fact that political
subdivisions may be subject to liability for Monell claims does not render them vicariously liable
for the actions of their employees. Id. at 691 (“In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot
be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be

held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). Rather, a plaintiff must “adequately
plead and prove the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the
municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.” Semple v. City of
Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999). This is an easy burden at this stage. See Owens,
767 F.3d at 403 (explaining “[t]he recitation of facts need not be particularly detailed, and the
chance of success need not be particularly high”). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
specified that:
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four
ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2)
through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest [s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent
and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Here, the Court agrees with
the Proposed Findings and Recommendations’ conclusion that the Complaint is devoid of
allegations of a pattern of comparable conduct or circumstances to justify the inference of a policy
being the moving force of the alleged constitutional violations. PF&R 8–9 (citing Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Estate of Jones by Jones v. City
of Martinsburg, West Virginia, 961 F.3d 661, 671–72 (4th Cir. 2020)).
Plaintiffs rely on Defendant Edwards’ role to argue his omissions or failure to train
establish a policy. Pls.’ Objs. 10. However, as previously stated, the Complaint lacks factual
allegations to establish Defendant Edwards had knowledge of the allegedly violative conduct.
Plaintiffs also fail to identify particular deficiencies within the training program. Reese v. Hannah,
No. 2:23-cv-00805, 2024 WL 3607471, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. July 31, 2024) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Court is unpersuaded by the after-the-fact considerations that Plaintiffs put forth
to support a policy based upon ratification of allegedly improper conduct. Pls.’ Objs. 13. Plaintiffs
also claim that a policy has been alleged through the single action of Defendant Edwards, a final
policymaking official. Id. However the case relied upon by Plaintiffs, Pembauer v. Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469 (1986), held that “municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible” and “that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only
where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives

by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter
in question.” Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 479–80, 483. Plaintiffs fail to allege facts establishing that
Defendant Edwards took action that could satisfy this requirement. Thus, the Court overrules
Plaintiffs’ objection and will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claim.4
C. Defendants City of Hurricane, Scott Edwards, Michael Mullins, Brett Johnson,
W.D. Allen, Payton Carr, Makenzie White, and Jonathon Payne’s Objections

i. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Entry and Unlawful Detention Claims
In addressing the Fourth Amendment claims asserted against them, Defendants solely
object to what they believe is a recharacterization in the Proposed Findings and Recommendations
as one of unlawful entry and unlawful detention. Defs.’ Objs. 3. Defendants correctly state that the
only claim for “coerced entry/invalid consent” is raised against Defendant Denison. Id. at 3–4. As
Defendants acknowledge, courts liberally construe pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 94. The Court finds the facts of the Complaint adequately allege unlawful entry, as conducting
searches or seizures without a valid warrant or qualifying exception is unconstitutional, and thus,
unlawful. The pleadings provide sufficient notice to Defendants of the alleged claims they face, as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Thus, the Court overrules Defendants’
objections to the characterization of Defendants’ alleged Fourth Amendment violations.
ii. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Defendants next argue that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations failed to evaluate
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims within the Complaint. Defs.’ Objs. 4. Plaintiffs state
that their “Fifth-Amendment component of Count VII may be treated as merged within the

4 Within Plaintiffs’ Objections, they request leave to amend their pleadings of their Monell
claim against the City of Hurricane and supervisory liability against Defendant Mullin and
Defendant Edwards. Pls.’ Objs. 16. The Court has found the Complaint inadequately pled such
claims. The Court, too, has found the lawsuits that Plaintiffs have since supplied in support of their
conclusory assertion are dissimilar in nature from this alleged conduct. Thus, amendment would
be futile, as the proposed amendments stated within Plaintiffs’ Objections would still fail to satisfy
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pls.’ Objs. 17; MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v.
Lundbeck LLC, 130 F.4th 91, 113 (4th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim.” Pls.’ Consolidated Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings 24, ECF No. 51. Thus, the Court will dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim.
Plaintiffs argue that dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claims based on their overlap
with the Fourth Amendment claims would be premature. Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings 27. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. There are both substantive and procedural components. “Procedural due process prevents
mistaken or unjust deprivation, while substantive due process prohibits certain actions regardless
of procedural fairness.” Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, 739 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir.
2014).
When a particular amendment provides a constitutional right, that provision guides the
claim instead of a due process analysis. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Smith v.
Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 885 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Dressing a Fourth Amendment claim up in due
process language does not transform it into a Fourteenth Amendment claim.”). The Fourth

Amendment prohibits unreasonable search and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The conduct
alleged in the complaint is that of unreasonable search and seizure. Thus, the more-specific-
provision rule designates the Fourth Amendment approach as controlling. Thus, Count VII will be
dismissed.
iii. State Law Claims
Defendants argue that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations failed to address the
sufficiency of the pleadings of the state law claims. Defs.’ Objs. 4. The Magistrate Judge
recommended the Court assume supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims without
addressing the sufficiency of the pleadings. See PF&R 21–23. However, the Magistrate Judge
indicated that because Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of the state law claims are derivative
of their challenges to the federal claims and rely upon factual determinations, it was premature to
determine their sufficiency. Id. at 23. The Court agrees in part. The Court will briefly address
Plaintiffs’ state law claims of IIED, assault and battery, conversion, trespass and trespass to
chattels, and professional negligence against the corresponding Defendants, excluding Defendant

Denison.5
Plaintiffs failed to counter any motions in regard to the state law claims, instead stating that
the details have plausibly alleged facts stating plausible claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments and that any failure should be curable by amendment. Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for
J. on the Pleadings 27–28.
Briefly, the Court first notes that in each state law claim, Plaintiffs also assert a § 1983
Monell claim against the City of Hurricane and supervisory liability claims against Defendant
Edwards and Defendant Mullins. Compl. ¶¶ 227, 253, 269, 280, 289, 310. For the same reasons
previously addressed, supra Section III.B, and because § 1983 claims cannot be based on state
law,6 the Monell and supervisory liability claims associated with the state law claims fail and will

be dismissed.7

5 See supra Section III.A.ii.
6 Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but rather provides “a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (1994) (citation
omitted). Weller v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Clark v. Link,
855 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he rule repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court and
determined by us in Surdyka that a section 1983 claim can only be sustained by allegations and
proof of a violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States and specifically may not
rest solely on a violation of state statutes or qualify as a common law tort.”).
7 The Court does not rule as to other claims against the City of Hurricane, as the issue is
not before the Court.
1. IIED
Plaintiffs assert claims of IIED against Defendant Carr in Count VIII and against Defendant
Allen in Count X. Compl. ¶¶ 217–32, 245–54. As stated earlier, a plaintiff must establish the
following four elements to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress:
(1) that the defendant's conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and
outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with
the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or
substantially certain emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3) that the
actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and, (4)
that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it.

Syl. Pt. 3, Travis, 504 S.E.2d 419. Defendant Carr’s alleged conduct includes, in part, calling
Plaintiff Tearria Simmons derogatory names, intentionally breaking a cellphone, punching
Plaintiff Clinton Simmons, and refusing Plaintiff Tearria Simmons’s requests regarding her
children. Compl. ¶ 221; Def. Carr’s Mem. in L. in Supp. of J. on the Pleadings 16, ECF No. 44
(“Def. Carr’s Mem.”). Defendant Carr states that Plaintiff fails to establish an IIED claim because
the alleged conduct is not extreme and outrageous. Def. Carr’s Mem. 16. The Court disagrees. At
least some of the alleged conduct is sufficient to state a claim of IIED. Next, Defendant Carr asserts
that he is entitled to immunity under West Virginia Code § 29–12A–5(b),8 arguing that Plaintiffs

8 The West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act (“TCA”), West
Virginia Code §§ 29-12A-1 et seq., provides immunity to political subdivision under certain
circumstances. Specifically, the TCA provides as follows:
(b) An employee of a political subdivision is immune from liability unless one of the
following applies:
(1) His or her acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of
employment or official responsibilities;
(2) His or her acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith,
or in a wanton or reckless manner; or
(3) Liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a provision of this
code.
(c) The immunity conferred upon an employee by subsection (b) of this section
does not affect or limit any liability of a political subdivision for an act or omission
failed to plead facts showing that Defendant Carr acted outside the scope of his employment, in
bad faith, or in a wanton and reckless manner. Def. Carr’s Mem. 17–18. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant Carr engaged in intentionally outrageous tactics that are arguably outside the scope of
employment and at least reckless. The Court finds that the pleadings state an IIED claim against
Defendant Carr. Thus, Defendant Carr’s objection is overruled.

Defendant Allen’s alleged conduct includes, in part, threatening to arrest Tearria Simmons,
threatening to call CPS to have the Simmons children removed, making an unsubstantiated false
allegation to CPS in retaliation, harassing Plaintiffs through incessant yelling and knocking at the
door, and subjecting Plaintiff Coram to eight stops on the street to see if he was subject to a warrant.
Compl. ¶ 250. For the same reasons that the IIED claim asserted against Defendant Denison
survives at this stage, the IIED claim asserting Defendant Allan’s conduct that caused emotional
distress to Tearria Simmons, too, survives. See supra Section III.A.ii.1.
2. Assault and Battery
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Carr struck Plaintiff Clinton Simmons9 multiple times after

he was placed in handcuffs and violently removed from his working in the crawlspace of their
home. Compl. ¶¶ 263–68. Defendant Carr did not address the assault claim, Count XI, or battery
claim, Count XII, in his motion, and the counts remain against him.
3. Conversion
Plaintiffs’ Count XIII asserts a claim of conversion against all Defendants except
Defendant Denison. Compl. ¶¶ 273–82. In West Virginia, conversion is “the exercise of dominion
over the personal property of another by a person who has no legal right to do so.” Dale v. Peoples

of the employee.
West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b), (c).
9 He had an active arrest warrant. Compl. ¶ 262.
Bank Corp., 169 F.4th 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2026) (citing Rodgers v. Rodgers, 184 W.Va. 82, 399
S.E.2d 664, 677 (1990)). Plaintiffs allege that on October 24, 2024, Defendants broke four
windows, replacement of which costs approximately $2,500.00; wrongfully seized and retained
Plaintiff Billy Lee Coram’s personal property including but not limited to a marijuana plant “being
kept immature and transformed into a bonsai plant” and LED grow lights, worth approximately

$250; and, that Defendant Carr intentionally and maliciously broke Plaintiff Tearria Simmons’s
phone, worth approximately $450.00. Compl. ¶¶ 277–279. The Court finds Plaintiffs have
sufficiently pled this claim based upon Plaintiffs’ allegations of an illegal search.
4. Trespass and Trespass to Chattels
Counts XIV and XV assert claims of trespass and trespass to chattels against all
Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 283–91. As previously stated, under West Virginia common law, trespass
is “an entry on another man's ground without lawful authority, and doing some damage, however
inconsiderable, to his real property.” Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 386. Trespass to chattel may be
committed by “intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling

with a chattel in the possession of another.” Yourtee v. Hubbard, 474 S.E.2d 613, 619 (W. Va.
1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (1965)). The Court finds these claims, too, are
sufficiently pled based upon Plaintiffs’ allegations of an illegal search and seizure.
5. Professional Negligence
Count XVI asserts a claim of professional negligence against all defendants in their
individual capacities. Compl. ¶¶ 292–313. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had a duty of care to
respect constitutional rights and protect community members. Compl. ¶ 296. The Complaint
specifically alleges that Defendants breached their duties, in part, by failing to verify and ascertain
the validity and scope of the search warrant prior to execution; failing to knock and announce;
coercing consent to search through threats; executing an overly broad search warrant; and
obtaining a search warrant by means of judicial deception. Id. ¶¶ 296–97. Defendants argue that at
no point within their negligence claim have Plaintiffs alleged that the conduct of the individual
defendants was outside of the scope of their employment or occurred with the requisite intent to
curtail immunity under the TCA. See W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b). However, within the

professional negligence section, Plaintiffs incorporate prior pleadings which include that the
defendants subjected the entire family to verbal abuse, harassed, coerced, threatened, and
physically harmed various Plaintiffs. Compl. ¶¶ 292, 28—31, 40-43. Thus, it is premature to
determine whether immunity applies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, relevant portions of the record, and objections
de novo, ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations in part and
DECLINES TO ADOPT in part.
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant Denison’s Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 87); Defendants Johnson, Allen, Carr, White, Paynes’ Motions for Judgment
on the Pleadings (ECF Nos. 35, 37, 39, 41, 43); and Defendants City of Hurricane, Defendant
Mullins and Defendant Edwards’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF Nos. 45, 47, 49).
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Objections (ECF
Nos. 93, 95).
The Court DISMISSES official capacity claims; DISMISSES without prejudice the claim
against the City of Hurricane; DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant Edwards and
Defendant Mullins from the action; DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims
against Defendant Denison.
The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objection to the characterization of the Fourth
Amendment violations. Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful
entry and unlawful detention against Defendants Johnson, Allen, Carr, White, Payne, and Denison
survive.
The Court SUSTAINS objections to the evaluation of the state law, Fifth Amendment, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Court DISMISSES the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment claims. The Court also DISMISSES the state law claims of trespass (Count XTV) and
trespass to chattels (Count XV) against Defendant Denison.
Plaintiffs’ Objections to the PF&R (ECF No. 94) are OVERRULED.
Pursuant to the Standing Order for the assignment and referral of civil actions and matters
to Magistrate Judges, ECF No. 6 at 2, this matter is again REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge
for entry of scheduling order and all further pretrial proceedings.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Opinion and Order to the
Honorable Joseph Reeder, United States Magistrate Judge, counsel of record, and any
unrepresented parties.
ENTER: August 3, 2026

Z , LV] LL
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ROBERT C. CHAMBERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-26-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11410034. Public record. Not legal advice.