# GRIER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409790

## Case

- **Full name:** David Vaughn Grier v. Global Tel Link/Via Path Technologies, Corporation, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID VAUGHN GRIER, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2515
:
GLOBAL TEL LINK/VIA PATH :
TECHNOLOGIES, CORPORATION, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

YOUNGE, J. JULY 13, 2026

Plaintiff David Vaughn Grier, who is currently confined at SCI Phoenix, brings this pro
se action against Global Tel Link Corporation (“GTL”) and several of its employees, asserting
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) as well as
various state law claims because he allegedly purchased a defective tablet and received a
refurbished replacement that was also defective. He asserts, inter alia, a breach of warranty
claim because he had to pay for a replacement battery while his tablet was still under warranty.
The Court will grant Grier’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and will screen his
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As explained below, the Court will dismiss
the Complaint.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Grier alleges that he was sold a defective tablet, and while that tablet was replaced with a
refurbished tablet, the refurbished tablet stopped working a few months later. He also claims
that he had to pay for a replacement battery even though his tablet was still under warranty.
Grier names GTL as a Defendant as well as the following GTL employees: Deb Alderson

(identified in the Complaint as a “chief executive officer”); Eve Doe2 (identified as a “chief
executive officer”); Jeffery Haidinger (identified as the “president and Chief Operating
Officer”); and John Does I-III (identified as the “Manager,” “Tech Support 2,” and “Tech
Support 16,” respectively). (See ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”) at 2-4.) Grier avers that GTL, a
corporation out of Falls Church, Virginia, supplies the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) with “telecommunications and . . . media products including physical devices such as
tablets.” (Id. at 2.)
Grier purchased a tablet from GTL for $80 in June 2024. (Id. at 4.) He avers that on July
25, 2024, the tablet “became defective, failing to properly run its software.” (Id.) Grier sent an

electronic message to “GTL Support” on July 27, 2024, indicating that the music player on his
tablet would stop working whenever he pressed pause. (Id. at 13.) He received a response with
instructions to correct the issue with his tablet. (Id.) However, in August 2024, Grier sent
additional messages indicating that despite the information received, the radio on his tablet

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Grier’s Complaint, which
consists of eleven typewritten pages (ECF No. 2 at 1-11), and twenty-seven pages of attached
exhibits (id. at 12-38). The Court deems the entire submission to constitute the Complaint and
adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where the Court
quotes from pro se pleadings, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up
as needed for clarity.

2 Although Grier initially identifies this Defendant as Eve Doe, he later refers to this individual
as “Eve.” (Compl. at 3.) It appears that Grier is not aware of this individual’s surname.
would not work, and he requested a new device, averring that he was sold a “defective product.”
(Id. at 4, 13.) On or about August 19, 2024, GTL arranged for the tablet to be shipped out “for
testing and repairs.” (Id. at 14.) On October 10, 2024, Grier was informed that following an
evaluation, his tablet would be “replaced under warranty.” (Id. at 4, 14.) Grier avers that he
received a refurbished tablet. (Id. at 4.)

On January 21, 2025, Grier “informed GTL that the replacement tablet did not turn on
and had no ability to function.” (Id. at 5.) He sent multiple messages to GTL Support in January
2025 indicating that his tablet would randomly shut off and not turn back on. (Id. at 15.)
GTL Support responded to Grier on January 31, 2025, advising him that the “original 90-day
warranty period on [his] battery has expired.” (Id.) Grier was informed via message from “GTL
Inmate Support 2” that if he wanted to purchase a new battery, Grier should “request a check for
$47.00 to be paid to ViaPath,” and the check and tablet would be sent to ViaPath for replacement
“with a brand-new battery, which comes with a new 90-day warranty period,” effective from the
date of install. (Id.)

Grier contends that because his tablet would not power on, it was a “software issue” that
was “separate from ‘battery issues,’” and he maintains that his tablet was covered by GTL’s
supplemental warranty. (Id. at 5-6.) On February 1, 2025, Grier sent a message to GLT Support,
indicating that GTL was “in error” because he reported that the replacement tablet was defective
89 days after he received it, and, as such, he maintained that the tablet was still covered by
warranty. (Id. at 16.) In response, Grier was told that when a tablet is “replaced under warranty
at [their] facility, any remaining warranty time from the previous device rolls over to the
replacement device” and the “replacement device does NOT come with a new warranty.” (Id.)
Grier was also informed that his “battery warranty expired on 09/16/2024.” (Id.)
Grier sent another message on February 3, 2025, again disputing coverage under the
warranty, asserting that because his tablet “has a defect,” GTL did not complete its original
obligation under the warranty. (Id.) On February 4, 2025, Grier sent another message asserting
that the “software is not functioning as the device will not shut on” and that “civil litigation”
would ensue if GTL did not comply. (Id.) GTL Inmate Support 2 responded that “[i]f the device

will not turn on it is not a software issue” and that “[l]egal matters will not be discussed through
support link.” (Id.) On April 20, 2025, Grier completed an inmate request form requesting that a
check be sent to the business office so he could obtain “a new tablet battery.” (Id. at 6, 27.) On
April 21, 2025, Grier was informed that his request to have his tablet shipped “for a battery
replacement” was set up. (Id. at 17.) Grier claims, without further explanation, that his tablet
was returned to him “without work being done.” (Id. at 6.) It is unclear whether the battery in
Grier’s tablet was replaced.
Based on these allegations, Grier avers that Defendants John Does I-III “breached
warranty/breached contract with a blanketed denial of repair.” (Id. at 6.) He also asserts that

Defendants Eve, Alderson, and Haidinger affirmed the “policy and practice of charging patrons
while under warranty.” (Id.) He alleges that GLT and its employees deprived him of property
without redress, and that GTL committed theft by receiving his stolen property and also
“attempted extortion by submitting the request to deprive [him] of funds.” (Id. at 8.) Grier
contends that these acts demonstrate “racketeering activity,” and he further avers that GTL
committed mail fraud by using the “mail and the United States Postal Service to further its
scheme to defraud [him] of his property through artiface [sic], false promotion, and promises.”
(Id. at 8-9, 10.)
Grier contends that the “joined actions” of GTL and its employees “in procuring [his]
tablet through falsity” constitutes fraud, unjust enrichment, theft by unlawful taking, theft by
deception, theft by extortion, receiving stolen property, civil conspiracy, evading prosecution,
breach of contract and warranty, the creation of false documents, negligence, interference with
contractual relations, misrepresentation, false advertisement, violation of unfair trade practices

and consumer protection laws, corrupt organization, federal mail fraud, and a RICO violation.
(Id. at 1, 9.) He seeks declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages in excess
of one million dollars. (Id. at 10-11.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Grier leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he
is incapable of prepaying the fees to commence this civil action.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen and dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
requires the Court to dismiss Complaint if it is frivolous, and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires

dismissal if a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A complaint is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Brown v. City of Philadelphia,
750 F. App’x 171, 173 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
The use of the term “frivolous” in § 1915 “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion,
but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. Section 1915 accords judges
“the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those
claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless[,]” including claims that describe “fantastic

3 However, since Grier is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in
accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
or delusional scenarios[.]” Id. at 327-28; see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.
2003). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level
of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts
available to contradict them.” Smith v. N. Cambria Police, No. 25-1273, 2025 WL 1324070, at
*1 (3d Cir. May 7, 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

A claim is legally baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v.
United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison
officials took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back).
Whether the Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 560 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). At the screening stage, the

Court will accept the facts alleged in a pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint contains facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other
grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Additionally, the
Court must review the Complaint and dismiss the matter if it determines that subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v.
Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte”).
As Grier is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). However, conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
see also Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot
survive dismissal just by alleging the conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”). “[P]ro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185
(quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules —
they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d
at 245); see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d
Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the
applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it b[y] name,’ Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to
identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).
III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Law Claims
Grier’s RICO claims are legally baseless. RICO “makes it unlawful ‘for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern racketeering activity.’” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). To state a civil RICO
claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise
(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). When a
plaintiff presents a fraud-based RICO claim, he “must plead with particularity the circumstances
of the alleged fraud.” Mierzwa v. Safe & Secure Self Storage, LLC, 493 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d
Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). An “enterprise” is defined as “any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity” or a “group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “‘Racketeering activity’ is defined in
the RICO statute to comprise the state law offenses of murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson,

robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and dealing in a controlled substance or
listed chemical, as well as several federal offenses such as mail and wire fraud.” Talley v.
Halpern ex rel. Est. of Winderman, No. 05-4184, 2005 WL 2002611, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16,
2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). “According to the RICO statute, a ‘pattern of racketeering
activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten-year period.” In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 363 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)). Additionally, a
plaintiff must have sustained “injury to business or property” caused by the alleged RICO
violation in order to bring a RICO claim. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482-83 (3d Cir.
2000).

Grier’s claims that Defendants engaged in a RICO conspiracy and committed acts of
theft, extortion, and mail fraud in connection with the refurbishment and battery replacement of
his electronic tablet lacks any arguable basis in law and will be dismissed as frivolous. See
Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The claim that the defendants [including
numerous judges, staff attorneys, and an assistant united states attorney] engaged in a RICO
conspiracy by failing to properly address issues on appeal and ‘bribing’ witnesses to testify
pursuant to plea agreements lacks any arguable basis in law and was properly dismissed as
frivolous.”); Mierzwa v. Safe & Secure Self Storage, LLC, 493 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[C]onclusory allegations that defendants conspired for the purpose of defrauding [Mierzwa]
are simply inadequate to plead a valid RICO claim.”)
Grier alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendants committed, inter alia, fraud, theft by
unlawful taking, deception, and extortion, a breach of contract and warranty, as well as acts of
misrepresentation and false advertisement. (Compl. at 1, 9.) The claims he alleges under state

law for, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud, are not enumerated in
Section 1961, nor does he specify any factual allegation that supports a plausible inference of
“racketeering activity” that poses a threat of criminal activity under the federal criminal
provisions relating to enumerated frauds. See Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 199-200 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (“Racketeering” does not include things like “garden-variety state law crimes, torts
and contract breaches.”), overruled on other grounds by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000);
see also Kolar v. Preferred Real Est. Invs., Inc., 361 F. App’x 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
that court should not permit contract claims nor simple fraud disputes to be transformed into
RICO claims).

The Complaint also fails to satisfy the requirements for a RICO conspiracy claim because
Grier cannot allege an agreement to commit predicate acts when the Complaint fails to allege
predicate acts in the first place, nor can he allege requisite knowledge of participants that they
were part of a pattern of racketeering activity because he fails to describe such a pattern. See
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (to state a RICO conspiracy
claim, the plaintiff “must allege (1) agreement to commit the predicate acts of fraud, and (2)
knowledge that those acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity conducted in such a way
as to violate [§ 1962].”’). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Grier’s RICO claims as legally
baseless, without leave to amend.4
B. State Law Claims
The remaining claims alleged in Grier’s Complaint are state law claims that sound in
contract or tort, and are, in some instances, based on violations of Pennsylvania criminal laws.5

However, the Complaint is most aptly interpreted as asserting breach of warranty claims. See
Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable
law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”). Because the Court has
dismissed his federal claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent basis for
jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction
over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”

4 Since Grier has failed to allege a legal basis for a substantive RICO claim, it follows that he
lacks a legal basis for a conspiracy claim under RICO. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,
4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Any claim under section 1962(d) based on a conspiracy to
violate the other subsections of section 1962 necessarily must fail if the substantive claims are
themselves deficient.”).

5 Courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, routinely dismiss
claims seeking to impose civil liability under various sections of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
finding that the “Code gives no authority for a private cause of action and none has been
implied.” Youst v. Roth, No. 23-0848, 2023 WL 3821813, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2023) (quoting
Martrano v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 08-0932, 2009 WL 1704469, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June
15, 2009)); see also Williams v. Wetzel, 827 F. App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(recognizing that plaintiff’s civil claims brought pursuant to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code were
properly rejected by the district court because there was no private right of action available under
the Code); Abouloh v. Lehigh Cnty. Prison, No. 25-3377, 2025 WL 2654904, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 15, 2025).
Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’”
which “means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, no plaintiff may be a citizen
of the same state as any defendant.”6 Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104
(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli
Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). It

is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of citizenship. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72
(1939); see also Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d
1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate
complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been
met).
Even assuming that the parties are diverse, Grier has failed to demonstrate that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (specifying that the sum or value
of the matter in controversy must exceed $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction, exclusive of interest
and costs). A plaintiff’s good faith allegations govern whether the amount in controversy is

satisfied unless it is clear to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.
See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule
governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless

6 An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is
physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v. Hovensa, LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344
(3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he domicile of a prisoner before his imprisonment presumptively remains his
domicile during his imprisonment.” Pierro v. Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). To
determine the citizenship of a corporation for purposes of diversity under § 1332, courts use the
test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77
(2010). Under Hertz, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its principal place
of business, i.e., its “nerve center.” Id. at 80-81. A nerve center is “the place where the
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities,”
which is typically “found at a corporation’s headquarters.” Id.
the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently
made in good faith.” (footnotes omitted)); Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122
(3d Cir. 1997) (“As a general rule, [the amount in controversy] is determined from the good faith
allegations appearing on the face of the complaint.”).

Grier’s Complaint alleges two concrete dollar amounts—the cost of the tablet, $80, and
the cost of the replacement battery, $47. (Compl. at 4, 6.) “Under Pennsylvania law the measure
of damages for breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code ‘is the difference at the
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages
of a different amount.’” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2714(b)); see also Marino v. Sports Auth., 940 F. Supp. 792,
795 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[A] useful objective measure of the difference in the value of the goods as
is and as warranted is the cost of repair or replacement of the goods.”) (citing Cober v. Corle,

610 A.2d 1036, 1041 (1992)). The dollar amounts claimed by Grier are far below the
jurisdictional threshold, even considering any incidental or consequential damages that may be
recoverable for a breach of warranty claim. Id. (citing 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2714(c), 2715,
2A519(d)).
To the extent that Grier asserts a plausible claim under the state consumer protection
laws, he could potentially recover treble damages. See Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 399-400
(including potential damages under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law to calculate amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction); Suber v. Chrysler
Corp.104 F.3d 578, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1997) (considering potential trebled damages under the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act for amount in controversy). On the face of this Complaint, using the
purchase price as the actual damages amount and assuming Grier would be successful on a
consumer protection claim, trebled damages could result in a recovery of at most $240.
Although Grier requests the extraordinary sum of $1,300,000 in his Complaint, the
measure of damages available under either a breach of warranty or violation of state consumer
protection laws claim demonstrates to a legal certainty that he is unable to satisfy the $75,000

amount in controversy requirement.7 See Gibson v. Tip Towing & Recovery LLC, No. 23-2919,
2024 WL 658977, at *1 n.3 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (per curiam) (“Gibson alleged that the value
of her roughly decade-old vehicle was $100,000, and she demanded that the defendants pay her
$10,000 per day for holding it. But the District Court “ha[d] no trouble finding that such
monetary demands are not made in good faith.”); Douglas v. Joseph, 656 F. App’x 602, 605 (3d
Cir. 2016) (noting that it must appear “to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s claim is really for
less than the jurisdictional amount to justify a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”);
see also Kalick v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 372 F. App’x 317, 322 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(affirming the district court’s ruling that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because plaintiff’s

plausible damages were well below $75,000). The dismissal will be without prejudice to Grier
refiling his state law claims in state court, where federal jurisdiction will not be an issue.8 See
N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234, 241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are “by definition without prejudice” (citation
omitted)).

7 Grier seeks punitive damages. (Compl. at 11.) Although punitive damages “must [also] be
considered in determining the amount in controversy,” see Coulter v. Paul Laurence Dunbar
Cmty. Ctr., 685 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted), punitive damages are not
recoverable for breach of contract or warranty claims, see Greenwald Caterers Inc. v. Lancaster
Host, LLC, 599 F. Supp. 3d 235, 249-250 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (citations omitted).

8 The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of any state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Grier leave to proceed in forma pauperis
dismiss his Complaint. The federal RICO claims will be dismissed with prejudice as legally
baseless pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). All state law claims will be dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under the circumstances of this case, leave to

amend will not be given, as amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). An appropriate Order regarding dismissal follows, which shall
be entered separately. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

JOHN MILTON YOUNGE, J.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409790. Public record. Not legal advice.