# Vaphides

> District Court, N.D. New York · July 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409661

## Case

- **Full name:** Nina Vaphides, individually, and as the Administratrix of the Estate of N.R., deceased v. Norwich City School District, Scott Ryan and Jacob Roe
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NINA VAPHIDES, individually, and as the
Administratrix of the Estate of N.R., deceased,
Plaintiff,
-v- 3:25-CV-960 (AJB/ML)

NORWICH CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
SCOTT RYAN and JACOB ROE,
Defendants.

Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:

DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2025, plaintiff Nina Vaphides (“plaintiff”) commenced this action, individually
and as administratrix of the estate of her minor daughter N.R. (“N.R.”), against Norwich City
School District (the “District”) and District administrators Scott Ryan and Jacob Roe (collectively
“defendants”). Dkt. No. 1. This action follows the tragic suicide of N.R., a former student of the
District’s schools. Id.
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “Reha-
bilitation Act”), and related state law. Dkt. No. 1. In short, plaintiff alleges that defendants denied
N.R. reasonable accommodations for her mental health condition and failed to protect her from an
escalating pattern of bullying that ultimately led to her death by suicide on November 3, 2024. Id.
Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 8. Defendants’ motion has been fully briefed, Dkt. Nos.
12–13, and will be considered on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.
II. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the complaint and will be assumed true for the purpose
of evaluating defendants’ motion to dismiss.
N.R. was a student of the District from eighth grade until the end of tenth grade. Dkt. No.

1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 9, 23. During the 2021–2022 academic year, when N.R. was in eighth grade,
other students began to bully her at school. Id. ¶¶ 23–25, 35. As a result of the bullying, N.R. was
diagnosed with emotional mental health injuries that required medical treatment. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff
and N.R. notified the District of N.R.’s mental health diagnoses and provided documentation from
N.R.’s treating medical provider recommending that N.R. receive at-home, online instruction as a
necessary accommodation for her condition. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. The District allowed N.R. to complete
the remainder of her eighth-grade year online. Id. ¶ 40.
In the fall of 2022, N.R. returned to school for her ninth-grade year. Compl. ¶ 41. The in-
school bullying resumed, and N.R.’s mental health condition worsened. Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiff and
N.R. submitted documentation from N.R.’s treating medical provider to the District’s guidance

counselor and the District’s high school principal, Jacob Roe (“Principal Roe”), advising them of
her continuing diagnoses and, again, requesting that N.R. receive online instruction as an accom-
modation. Id. ¶¶ 13, 45. Defendants allowed N.R. to complete the rest of the school year online.
Id. ¶ 46.
At the outset of the 2023–2024 school year, plaintiff and N.R. submitted documentation
from N.R.’s treating provider who, again, recommended online instruction as an accommodation
for N.R.’s mental health condition. Compl. ¶ 51. Defendants denied the request, and N.R. returned
to school for her sophomore year. Id. ¶¶ 47, 52. The bullying resumed, and N.R.’s mental health
continued to deteriorate. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. Plaintiff appealed defendants’ denial of an online
instruction accommodation to District Superintendent Scott Ryan (“Superintendent Ryan”). Id. ¶¶
11, 55. Superintendent Ryan denied the appeal and advised plaintiff that the District would not
permit N.R. to receive online instruction that year. Id. ¶ 56.
In lieu of N.R.’s requested accommodation, defendants placed N.R. into a smaller-sized

class with just three to four other students. Compl. ¶ 61. As the school year went on, defendants
placed additional students in N.R.’s class. Id. ¶ 62. Eventually, N.R.’s class reached the size of a
standard general education class. Id. Consequently, N.R.’s mental health condition worsened. Id.
¶¶ 73–74. She experienced increased anxiety and depression and suffered daily panic attacks. Id.
¶ 75. At some point, Principal Roe advised plaintiff and N.R. that another student in the District
had been afforded the same at-home, online instruction accommodation that defendants denied to
plaintiff. Id. ¶ 77. The other student was approximately the same age as N.R. and had the same
diagnoses as her. Id.
In late March or early April of 2024, defendants finally granted N.R.’s request to receive
online instruction. Compl. ¶ 84. But by that point, “N.R.’s emotional mental health injury was

exacerbated to the point of being totally devastated.” Id. ¶ 85. N.R. finished the tenth-grade school
year online, but did not return to school for her eleventh-grade year. Id. ¶ 87. Unable to recover
from her emotional mental health injuries, N.R. tragically took her own life on November 3, 2024.
Id. ¶¶ 92–93.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th
101, 106 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim is plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Palin v. New York Times Co., 940 F.3d 804, 810 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
To assess this plausibility requirement, the court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152
(2d Cir. 2002). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in the pleading,
documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference, and matters of which
judicial notice may be taken. Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts four federal causes of action: (1) a § 1983 “class-of-one” equal

protection claim against all defendants, see Compl. ¶¶ 94–132; (2) a disability discrimination claim
under Title II of the ADA against the District, id. ¶¶ 133–54; (3) a disability discrimination claim
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the District, id. ¶¶ 155–76; and (4) a municipal
liability claim1 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978) against the District, id. ¶¶ 177–207.

1 Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action asserts a standalone “Monell Liability” claim against the District based on the
alleged conduct of Principal Roe and Superintendent Ryan. Compl. ¶¶ 177–207. But “Monell does not create a stand-
alone cause of action.” Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013). Rather, “it extends [§ 1983] liability
to a municipal organization where that organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned,
led to an independent constitutional violation.” Segal v. City of N.Y., 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in
original). Accordingly, the allegations underlying plaintiff’s Monell claim will be understood as relating to plaintiff’s
§ 1983 equal protection claim against the District.
Defendants have moved to dismiss all of plaintiff’s federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Dkt. No. 8-2 (“Defs.’ Mem”).2 Plaintiff opposes dismissal. Dkt. No. 12 (“Pl.’s Opp.”).
A. Section 1983 Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts § 1983 “class-of-one” equal protection claims against all de-
fendants based on allegations that they intentionally treated N.R. differently from a similarly situ-

ated student by denying N.R.’s request for at-home, online instruction her sophomore year.
Compl. ¶¶ 94–132, 177–207. Defendants argue3 that plaintiff’s class-of-one equal protection
claim must be dismissed because: (1) plaintiff cannot maintain a class-of-one claim based on de-
fendants’ discretionary denial of an accommodation; (2) defendants had a rational basis for deny-
ing N.R.’s requested accommodation; and (3) plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give rise to
municipal liability against the District. Defs.’ Reply at 4–6.4 Plaintiff maintains that she has
plausibly alleged a viable class-of-one equal protection claim against all defendants. Pl.’s Opp. at
5–7, 12–13.

1. Discretionary State Action
First, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot maintain a class-of-one equal protection claim
based on the discretionary decisionmaking of state actors. Defs.’ Reply at 5.

2 Defendants’ opening memorandum of law is over 60 pages long. See Defs.’ Mem. This well exceeds the presump-
tive 25-page limit set by Local Rule 7.1(b), see N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b), and defendants have not sought leave to file an
oversized brief. Upon further review of defendants’ filing, it appears that defendants unintentionally submitted three
identical copies of their brief in a single filing. The Court has discretion to strike filings in violation of this District’s
Local Rules, but it declines to do so under the circumstances.
3 As an initial matter, defendants’ opening memorandum makes no reference to plaintiff’s § 1983 class-of-one equal
protection claims. Pl.’s Opp. at 5 (citing Defs.’ Mem. at 16–18). Instead, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to
plausibly allege § 1983 procedural or substantive due process claims, see Defs.’ Mem. at 16–18—neither of which
have been asserted in plaintiff’s complaint, see generally Compl.; Pl.’s Opp. at 5 (explaining that plaintiff has not
asserted substantive due process or procedural due process claims). Recognizing their oversight, defendants addressed
plaintiff’s class-of-one equal protection claim in their reply papers. See Dkt. No. 12 (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 4–6.
4 Citations to the parties’ briefing refer to the CM/ECF-generated pagination.
“The Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] requires that the government
treat all similarly situated people alike.” Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494,
499 (2d Cir. 2001). “[T]he prototypical equal protection claim involves discrimination against
people based on their membership in a vulnerable class,” but the Second Circuit has “long recog-

nized that the equal protection guarantee also extends to individuals who allege no specific class
membership but are nonetheless subjected to invidious discrimination at the hands of government
officials.” Id.
Generally speaking, “[a] class-of-one claim exists ‘where the plaintiff alleges that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.’” Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135,
140 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). But the
class-of-one theory of equal protection is not without limits. As the Supreme Court has explained:
There are some forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary
decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In
such cases the rule that people should be “treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions” is not violated when one person is treated differently from others,
because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the dis-
cretion granted.
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008).
Defendants argue that the Court’s reasoning in Engquist applies to plaintiff’s class-of-one
equal protection claim because defendants’ denial of N.R.’s accommodation request for online
instruction was the result of discretionary decisionmaking. Defs.’ Reply at 5–6.
The Court disagrees. For one, the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Engquist
to the public employment context. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603 (“In concluding that the class-
of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment context—and that
is all we decide—we are guided . . . by the ‘common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.’” (quoting Con-
nick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (emphasis added)). And although the Second Circuit has
suggested that Engquist “added a third requirement to ‘class of one’ claims . . . [i.e.,] that the
offending governmental action at issue be non-discretionary,” Ruston v. Town Bd. for Skaneateles,

610 F.3d 55, 58 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010), subsequent Second Circuit decisions have made clear that
“Engquist does not bar all class-of-one claims involving discretionary state action.” Analytical
Diagnostic Labs, Inc., 626 F.3d at 142; see also Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208,
222 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We have since held that Engquist does not bar all class-of-one claims involv-
ing discretionary state action.”).
Indeed, the Second Circuit has consistently recognized class-of-one equal protection chal-
lenges to discretionary state action where: (1) the state was “acting in its regulatory capacity as a
sovereign rather than as a propriet[o]r”; and (2) the decisionmaker “did not have complete discre-
tion.” Fortress Bible Church, 694 F.3d at 222; see also Hu v. City of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 100 n.5
(2d Cir. 2019) (finding that Engquist did not bar class-of-one claim because “(1) the state act[ed]

as a sovereign rather than a proprietor; and (2) the defendants operat[ed] within a regulatory frame-
work . . . that articulate[d] clear standards of conduct, limit[ed] their discretion, and provide[d]
mechanisms for challenging and reviewing their determinations”).
As alleged, plaintiff’s class-of-one claim satisfies both conditions. First, by denying N.R.’s
request for online instruction, defendants acted pursuant to the state’s authority as a sovereign to
regulate public education, not the state’s authority as a proprietor to manage its own internal af-
fairs. And second, as defendants acknowledge, they did not have unfettered discretion in deciding
N.R.’s request; their determination was guided by a regulatory framework and subject to review.
See Defs.’ Reply at 5 (referring to “the regulations . . . that guide how [the] District evaluates
medical requests for in-home online instruction” (citing 8 NYCRR § 100.22(d)); see also 8 NY-
CRR § 100.22(d)(5); Compl. ¶¶ 55–56 (alleging that plaintiff appealed defendants’ denial to Su-
perintendent Ryan). Accordingly, Engquist does not preclude plaintiff’s class-of-one equal pro-
tection claim.

2. Rational Basis For Denying Accommodation
Next, defendants argue that plaintiff’s class-of-one equal protection claim must be dis-
missed because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that defendants lacked a rational basis for deny-
ing N.R.’s accommodation request. Defs.’ Reply at 4–5.
As noted supra, a class-of-one equal protection claim exists where a plaintiff alleges “‘[1]
that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and [2] that there
is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Hu, 927 F.3d at 91 (quoting Vill. of Willow-
brook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). “[C]lass-of-one plaintiffs must show an extremely
high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.”
Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, to state a viable class-

of-one equal protection claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that:
(i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from
those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on
the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances
and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defend-
ants acted on the basis of a mistake.
Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc., 626 F.3d at 140.
Plaintiff’s allegations meet these requirements. First, plaintiff alleges that defendants de-
nied N.R.’s request to receive online instruction as an accommodation for her mental health con-
dition but permitted another student of approximately the same age and with “the same diagnoses
as N.R.” to receive online instruction as an accommodation. Compl. ¶ 77. Second, plaintiff alleges
that she appealed defendants’ determination to Superintendent Ryan, who refused to reverse the
denial. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. Collectively and taken as true, these allegations support a plausible inference
that N.R.’s circumstances were highly similar to those of the student who was granted an online
instruction accommodation, and that defendants did not deny N.R.’s request for online instruction
by mistake.5

3. Municipal Liability
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s equal protection claim against the District must
be dismissed because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any unconstitutional conduct attributable
to the District. Defs.’ Mem. at 14–15.
To assert § 1983 claim against a municipality or its agencies a plaintiff must plausibly
allege “(1) a municipal policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the
deprivation of a constitutional right.” Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir.
2020). “‘Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts
of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the

force of law.’” Friend v. Gasparino, 61 F.4th 77, 93 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).
Where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks to hold a municipality liable for a ‘single decision by [a]
municipal policymaker[ ],’ the plaintiff must show that the official had final policymaking power.”

5 Defendants maintain that “the District demonstrated a rational basis to deny [p]laintiff’s request for in-home online
instruction by submitting N.R.’s medical note from August 2023 and the regulations (8 NYCRR § 100.22(d)(5)) that
guide how a District evaluates medical requests for in-home online instruction.” See Defs.’ Reply at 5.
This conclusory avowal does not alter the Court’s conclusion. First, it is unclear what, if any, rational basis can be
gleaned from N.R.’s doctor’s note and the regulations governing the procedures for requesting in-home instruction.
Setting that aside, defendants’ contention ignores the procedural posture. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the proper
inquiry is whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). For the reasons
explained above, plaintiff’s allegations meet the plausibility threshold.
Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). “Whether an official has final policymaking authority is a legal ques-
tion, determined on the basis of state law.” Roe, 542 F.3d at 37. “[T]he critical inquiry is not
whether an official generally has final policymaking authority; rather, the court must specifically

determine whether the government official is a final policymaker with respect to the particular
conduct challenged in the lawsuit.” Id.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the District is premised on the decisions of Superintendent
Ryan and Principal Roe—whom she identifies as District officials with policymaking authority.
Compl. ¶¶ 178–81. The District argues that plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Principal Roe
or Superintendent Ryan had “the level of policymaking discretion” necessary to trigger municipal
liability. Defs.’ Mem. at 15.
The Court disagrees. To be sure, the regulations cited by defendants provide that the denial
of a request for at-home instruction is appealable to “the school district’s board of education.” 8
N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.22(d)(5). However, the Second Circuit has recognized that New York law al-

lows a board of education to delegate its authority. Port Washington Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of
Educ. of Port Washington Union free Sch. Dist., 478 F.3d 494, 501 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing N.Y.
Educ. Law § 1709(33)); see also N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2503(1), (3).
Plaintiff has alleged that she appealed defendants’ determination to Superintendent Ryan
who ultimately denied her appeal. See Compl. ¶¶ 55–56. While additional factual development
may reveal that the District’s board of education had not delegated its authority to hear appeals
under 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.22(d)(5) to Superintendent Ryan, plaintiff’s nonconclusory allegations
are sufficient at this stage to support a plausible inference that Superintendent Ryan had final
policymaking authority over plaintiff’s accommodation request. Accordingly, defendants’ motion
to dismiss this claim must be denied.
B. Disability Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts disability discrimination claims against the District under Title
II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (together, “the Acts”). Compl. ¶¶ 133–

76. The District argues that plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims must be dismissed because:
(1) they are barred by sovereign immunity, Defs.’ Mem. at 21; (2) plaintiff has not plausibly al-
leged that the District discriminated against N.R. on the basis of her disabilities, id. at 13–14; and
(3) plaintiff seeks relief that is not available under the Acts, id. at 11–13. In opposition, plaintiff
maintains that she has plausibly alleged viable disability discrimination claims against the District.
Pl.’s Opp. at 7–11.
“[The Acts] prohibit discrimination against qualified disabled individuals by requiring that
they receive ‘reasonable accommodations’ that permit them to have access to and take a meaning-
ful part in public services and public accommodations.” Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners,
364 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.) (quoting Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 273 (2d Cir. 2003)),

opinion corrected, 511 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2004). Courts analyze claims brought under the Acts
together because they “impose identical requirements.” Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 197 F.3d 611,
618 (2d Cir. 1999); see Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 272.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Because sovereign immunity operates as a jurisdictional limitation, the Court addresses it
first. See Baroni v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 161 F.4th 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2025) (“[S]tate sovereign
immunity raises a threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”)
(internal quotation omitted). The District argues that plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims
are barred by sovereign immunity. Defs.’ Mem. at 18–21. Plaintiff has not responded to this
argument directly, but maintains that she has plausibly alleged viable disability discrimination
claims against the District. Pl.’s Opp. at 5–7.
“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits the ‘Judicial power of the United States’ from extend-

ing to ‘any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State . . .’” In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
U.S. Const. amend. XI.). “This jurisdictional bar also immunizes a state entity that is an ‘arm of
the State[.]’” In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d at 617 (citing N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham
Cnty., Ga., 547 U.S. 189 (2006)). The party asserting sovereign immunity bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is “an arm of the State.” Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2009).
The District has assumed, without explanation, that it is an arm of the State of New York
entitled to sovereign immunity. See Defs.’ Mem. at 19. On the contrary—the Second Circuit has
consistently “held that local school districts in New York State are not arms of the state.” Gorton,
554 F.3d at 62 (citing Fay v. S. Colonie Cent. School Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1986)); see

also Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting
same). Absent even a cursory attempt to establish its entitlement to sovereign immunity, the Court
must reject the District’s argument that sovereign immunity bars plaintiff’s disability discrimina-
tion claims.
2. Merits
Next, the District argues that plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims must be dismissed
because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the District treated N.R. less favorably than others
because of N.R.’s disabilities. Defs.’ Mem. at 13–14. In opposition, plaintiff maintains that her
failure to accommodate claim does not require a showing of disparate impact. Pl.’s Opp. at 7–9.
The Court agrees with plaintiff. “[A] claim of discrimination based on a failure reasonably
to accommodate is distinct from a claim of discrimination based on disparate impact.” Henrietta
D., 331 F.3d at 276–77; see also Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2021)
(explaining that “[a] plaintiff may base her Title II claim on any of three theories of liability: dis-

parate treatment (intentional discrimination), disparate impact, or failure to make a reasonable ac-
commodation”). “Quite simply, the demonstration that a disability makes it difficult for a plaintiff
to access benefits that are available to both those with and without disabilities is sufficient to sus-
tain a claim for a reasonable accommodation.” Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 277.
Plaintiff asserts disability discrimination claims under a failure to accommodate theory.
Specifically, she alleges that the District failed to accommodate N.R. by denying her request for
online instruction at the outset of her tenth-grade year and by gradually depriving her of the benefit
of her substitute accommodation. Compl. ¶¶ 133–76. According to plaintiff, these failures made
it difficult for N.R. to receive the free and public education to which she was entitled. Id. ¶¶ 149,
171. In all, these allegations make out a plausible disability discrimination claim based on the

District’s alleged failure to reasonably accommodate N.R.
Still, “there is undoubtedly a comparative element to the reasonable accommodation anal-
ysis, and a plaintiff must show that the denial of benefits was ‘by reason of . . . disability.’” Hen-
rietta D, 331 F.3d at 280. This element is met where a plaintiff plausibly alleges that:
(i) [She is] facially entitled to public benefits which are also available to similarly
situated persons without disabilities, and (ii) that under a state of affairs where the
social services system functioned properly, [her] disabilities would clearly necessi-
tate a reasonable accommodation in order for [her] meaningfully to access the ben-
efits.
Id.
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged both prongs. First, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the
District’s failure to accommodate N.R. deprived her of a free and appropriate public education.
Compl. ¶¶ 52–56, 62–67, 73–75, 85; see also Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical
Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2015) (“In the education context, the ADA and the Rehabili-

tation Act require a covered institution to offer reasonable accommodations for a student’s known
disability. . .”). Second, plaintiff’s allegations support a plausible inference that N.R. would have
been granted an online instruction accommodation for her condition if the system had been func-
tioning properly. See Compl. ¶¶ 39–40, 45–46 (alleging that N.R. was granted an online instruc-
tion accommodation for portions of the 2021–2022 and 2022–2023 school years), 51–57 (alleging
that N.R.’s diagnoses remained the same going into the 2023–2024 school year, but that defendants
denied N.R. an online instruction accommodation), 77–78 (alleging that another student with the
same diagnoses as N.R. received an online instruction accommodation), 84 (alleging that the Dis-
trict subsequently granted N.R. an online instruction accommodation). Collectively and taken as
true, plaintiff’s allegations plausibly state failure to accommodate claims against the District.

3. Damages
Lastly, the District argues that plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims must be dis-
missed because plaintiff’s complaint demands damages that are unavailable under the Acts. Defs.’
Mem. at 11–13. In opposition, plaintiff maintains that the Acts permit recovery for N.R.’s loss of
education. Pl.’s Opp. at 9–11.
Under the Acts, a plaintiff can recover all remedies available under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, including monetary damages. See Loeffler v. Staten Island
Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12133 (ADA, incorporating remedies available under the Rehabilitation Act). But the scope of
available monetary relief is limited to those damages traditionally recoverable under contract law.
Doherty v. Bice, 101 F.4th 169, 174 (2d Cir.) (citing Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,
596 U.S. 212, 219–21 (2022)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 381 (2024). Consequently, a plaintiff can-
not recover punitive damages or emotional distress damages under the Acts. See Barnes v. Gor-

man, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (punitive damages); Doherty, 101 F.4th at 175 (emotional distress
damages).
The District initially argued that plaintiff’s complaint demands only “consequential dam-
ages” for emotional harm, which are not recoverable under the Acts. Defs.’ Mem. at 11–13. In
opposition, plaintiff concedes that emotional distress damages are unavailable under the Acts,6 and
she clarifies that her complaint demands expectation damages for N.R.’s loss of education. Pl.’s
Opp. at 9–11. In reply, the District has acknowledged that expectation damages are available
under the Acts, but maintains that plaintiff may not recover them because “N.R. is deceased, [and]
there is no compensatory educational program that would ‘correct’ for the alleged loss of educa-
tional opportunities during her 10th grade year.” Defs.’ Reply at 6.

Contrary to the District’s contentions, N.R.’s death did not extinguish her claim for com-
pensatory relief. “Absent some specific direction by Congress, whether an action created by fed-
eral statutory law survives the death of the plaintiff is a matter of federal common law.” United
States v. Wolin, 489 F. Supp. 3d 21, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Estwick v. U.S. Air Shuttle, 950
F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)). “‘In general, under the federal common law, a claim survives
the party’s death if it is remedial rather than punitive.’” Wolin, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 27 (quoting
Sharp v. Ally Fin., Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 81, 88–89 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal quotation omitted)).

6 To the extent that plaintiff’s causes of action under the Acts “could be construed to include a claim for ‘emotional
damages,’” she has abandoned “those specific claimed injuries.” Pl.’s Opp. at 10.
The Acts are routinely characterized as remedial. See Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 279 (de-
scribing the Acts as remedial statutes); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d
98, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984) (noting
the Rehabilitation Act’s “remedial purpose”). And district courts have routinely held that claims

for compensatory damages under the Acts survive a plaintiff’s death. See Est. of Solinsky v. Cus-
todial Maint., Inc., 2009 WL 37164, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2009) (agreeing that “actions under
the ADA survive the death of a party”); Gershanow v. Cnty. of Rockland, 2014 WL 1099821, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (finding that “a viable claim for money damages under the ADA
would survive a plaintiff’s death”); see also O’Rourke v. Drunken Chicken in NY Corp., 2021 WL
1394176, at *3 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (finding that claims under the ADA survived plain-
tiff’s death because the ADA is remedial in nature), report and recommendation adopted, 2021
WL 973086 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021).
Plaintiff’s plausibly alleged disability discrimination claims for compensatory damages
survived N.R.’s death. Accordingly, the District’s motion to dismiss them must be denied.

C. State Law Claims
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts state law negligent supervision and wrongful death claims
against all defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 208–25. Rather than seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s state law
claims, defendants have asked the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over them in the
event that plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed. Defs.’ Mem. at 21–22. Because the Court
declined to dismiss plaintiff’s federal claims, see supra Point IV.A–B, this branch of defendants’
motion must be denied as moot.
D. Motion to Seal
Defendants have moved under Local Rule 5.3 to seal certain documents submitted in con-
nection with their motion to dismiss; namely, plaintiff’s Notice of Claim pursuant to N.Y. General
Municipal Law § 50-e, the transcript of plaintiff’s N.Y. General Municipal Law § 50-h examina-
tion, and a doctor’s note from N.R.’s treating provider. Dkt. No. 9. Plaintiff has not opposed

defendants’ motion to seal.
The common law and the First Amendment accord a presumption of public access to judi-
cial documents. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006). As
relevant here, “a strong presumption attaches to materials filed in connection with dispositive mo-
tions, such as a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion.” Olson v. Major League Base-
ball, 29 F.4th 59, 90 (2d Cir. 2022).
Under this district’s local rules, “[a] party seeking to have a document, a portion of a doc-
ument, a party or an entire case sealed bears the burden of filing an application setting forth the
reason(s) that the referenced material should be sealed under the governing legal standard.” L.R.
5.3(a) (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119-27); see also DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121

F.3d 818, 826 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The burden of demonstrating that a document submitted to a court
should be sealed rests on the party seeking such action.”).
While defendants have identified some potentially viable grounds for sealing or at least
partially redacting7 some of the documents at issue, see Dkt. No. 9-1 ¶¶ 5–6, defendants have not
complied with local rule requiring that they justify their request under the standard set forth in
Lugosch. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to seal is denied without prejudice.

7 Defendants have moved to seal the entire transcript of plaintiff’s 50-h examination. While redacting portions of the
transcript may be necessary to protect the identified privacy interests, defendants have not identified a basis for the
wholesale sealing of the transcript. See Matter of New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that
the redaction of names may be an appropriate alternative “to the wholesale sealing of the papers”).
Within fourteen days of the date of this Order, defendants may resubmit their denied seal-
ing request. Defendants shall support their application for sealing and/or redactions with authority
and articulated reasoning that is specific to the content that they seek to keep under seal. And
given the strong presumption of public access to documents submitted in support of dispositive
motions, a renewed request should also include any proposed redactions that would be sufficient
to protect the privacy interests at stake. If no further application is made within this time frame,
the unredacted materials must be filed on the public docket.
V. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED;
2. Defendants’ motion to seal (Dkt. No. 9) is DENIED, without prejudice;
3. Defendants shall answer the pleading within 14 days of the date of this decision;
4. Any renewed sealing request must be filed within 14 days of this decision and must
comply with the requirements set forth above; and
5. Ifno renewed request to seal is filed within 14 days, defendants shall file the unre-
dacted documents on the public docket.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to:
a. terminate the pending motions (Dkt. Nos. 8 & 9); and
b. set a deadline accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 23, 2026 Gian Fmd
Utica, New York. Anthony J. Brindisj
U.S. District Judg
-18-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409661. Public record. Not legal advice.