# Khan

> District Court, N.D. New York · July 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409622

## Case

- **Full name:** Shaheen Khan v. John Armstrong et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________

SHAHEEN KHAN,

Plaintiff,

-v- 1:25-CV-1033 (AJB/PJE)

JOHN ARMSTRONG et al.,

Defendants.
_____________________________________

Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:

DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 2025, plaintiff Shaheen Khan (“plaintiff”), a United States citizen, com-
menced this action against defendants John Armstrong, a Senior Official of the Bureau of Consular
Affairs, and Natalie A. Baker, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Islam-
abad (collectively, “defendants”).
Plaintiff asserts claims for Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and mandamus (under
28 U.S.C. § 1361) relief arising out of an alleged delay in processing an immigrant visa petition
filed on behalf of plaintiff’s sister and her derivative beneficiaries. According to plaintiff’s com-
plaint, defendants have failed to timely discharge their obligation to review and adjudicate visa
applications under 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b). Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).
On May 6, 2026, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiff, who is represented
by counsel, has not opposed the motion, and the deadline for doing so has passed. See id.
The motion will be considered on the basis of the available submissions without oral argu-
ment.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shaheen Khan is a United States citizen. Compl. ¶ 1. On April 17, 2007, plaintiff

filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (“USCIS”) on behalf of her sister, Shamim Khan, and her four derivative beneficiaries. Id.
¶ 12; Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A; see also id. at 2. USCIS approved the petition on August 17, 2010. Id.
¶ 13; Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. B.
Following approval, the petition was forwarded to the National Visa Center (“NVC”) for
consular processing. Compl. ¶ 14; Dkt. No 1-1, Ex. C. Plaintiff alleges that she timely paid all
required fees and submitted all requested forms and supporting documentation through the Con-
sular Electronic Application Center (“CEAC”). Id. ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. D. According to the
complaint, the visa petition became documentarily qualified, i.e., all required documents had been
submitted and the application was ready for adjudication by a consular officer, on May 7, 2024.

Id. ¶ 16; Dkt. No. 1-1; Ex. E.
Plaintiff alleges that, despite satisfying all documentary requirements for processing, nei-
ther the NVC nor the United States Embassy in Islamabad had scheduled an immigrant visa inter-
view or issued a final decision on her visa petition as of the date of the complaint’s filing. Compl.
¶¶ 17–19. Plaintiff further alleges that she made repeated inquiries concerning the status of the
petition but received neither a final adjudication nor meaningful updates regarding the petition’s
progress. Id. ¶ 18.
On August 3, 2025, plaintiff commenced this action seeking mandamus and APA relief.
See Compl. at 2. In support of their motion, defendants have submitted a declaration establishing
that the beneficiary and derivative applicants appeared for a consular interview at the United States
Embassy in Islamabad on December 15, 2025. Dkt. No. 10-2 ¶ 4–5. Defendants claim that, fol-
lowing that interview, a consular officer refused the visa applications pursuant to § 221(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 12(b)(1)
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). “A plaintiff as-
serting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that it exists.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And “[i]n resolving a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court . . . may refer to evidence out-
side the pleadings.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
B. 12(b)(6)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a pleading for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To sur-
vive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quot-
ing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to
dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). While “[t]hreadbare recitals of the ele-
ments of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their ve-

racity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
To assess this facial plausibility requirement, the court “must accept as true all of the fac-
tual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in the
pleading, documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference, and matters
of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that defendants have unreasonably delayed adjudication of the visa peti-
tion in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b), the Mandamus Act, and the APA. Compl. ¶¶ 20–41. As

relief, plaintiff seeks an order compelling defendants to schedule a consular interview for the
beneficiary and derivative applicants and to issue a final decision on the underlying visa petition.
See id. at 8–9.
Defendants move to dismiss on several grounds. First, defendants argue that the doctrine
of consular nonreviewability bars judicial scrutiny of plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. No. 10-1 (“Defs.’
Mem.”) at 15–17. Second, defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims are moot because the bene-
ficiary and derivative applicants have since appeared for a consular interview and their visa ap-
plications have been refused pursuant to § 221(g) of the INA. Id. at 18–19. And third, defend-
ants maintain that plaintiff’s claims fail on the merits because neither the APA nor the
Mandamus Act authorizes the Court to compel any further action following the consular officer’s
refusal of the visa applications under § 221(g) and any alleged delay is reasonable. Id. at 19–28.
Plaintiff has not opposed defendants’ motion, leaving defendants’ arguments unchallenged.
Under INA § 221(g), a consular officer must refuse to issue a visa if it appears “from

statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith” that the alien is ineligible for
a visa under any provision of law, or if the officer “knows or has reason to believe that such alien
is ineligible to receive a visa[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). Consistent with that statutory framework,
Department of State regulations provide that, once a visa application has been properly com-
pleted and executed before a consular officer, the officer must either “issue the visa” or “refuse
the visa under INA [§] 212(a) or [§] 221(g) or other applicable law.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). “If
the consular officer determines that he does not have sufficient information to establish visa eli-
gibility, he may ‘refuse’ the visa pending further administrative processing pursuant to [§] 221(g)
of the INA, which typically consists of additional information gathering.” Ahmed v. Blinken, 759
F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2024) (citing U.S. Dep’t. of State, Administrative Processing Infor-
mation;1 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g); Giliana v. Blinken, 596 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2022)).

As the United States Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual and Handbook (the
“FAM”)2 explains, “[a] refusal under INA [§] 221(g) is, legally, a refusal on a visa application,
even if that refusal is eventually overcome.” 9 FAM 302.1-8(B). Although a consular officer
may later reconsider a § 221(g) refusal based on additional evidence or the completion of admin-
istrative processing, see 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e); 9 FAM 504.11-4(A), the application remains

1 Available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/administrative-pro-
cessing-information.html.

2 The FAM “governs the duties and responsibilities of consular officers in issuing and refusing immigrant visas.”
Alharbi v. Miller, 368 F. Supp. 3d 527, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
refused unless and until the consular officer determines that the applicant has established eligibil-
ity for a visa.
A. Consular Nonreviewability
First, defendants argue that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars judicial relief
in this case. The Court disagrees.

The doctrine of consular nonreviewability generally precludes judicial review of a consu-
lar officer’s decision to issue or deny a visa. See Alhariri v. Blinken, 2025 WL 1434317, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2025); Ramizi v. Blinken, 745 F. Supp. 3d 244, 258 (E.D.N.C. 2024). This is
because “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’”
Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 907 (2024) (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702
(2018)).
Courts in this Circuit have applied the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to “pre-
clude[] judicial review not only under the [INA], but also under other jurisdictional statutes, such
as the APA,” and have extended that principle to unreasonable-delay claims brought under the

APA and the Mandamus Act. Al Saidi v. U.S. Embassy in Djibouti, 544 F. Supp. 3d 289, 299
(E.D.N.Y. 2021); see also Nawaz v. Dep’t of State, 2024 WL 99486, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
2024).
At the same time, courts have recognized a distinction between challenges to the substance
of a visa determination and claims seeking to compel agency action allegedly withheld or unrea-
sonably delayed. See Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (“[C]onsular nonreviewability ‘does not bar
suits that merely seek to compel some agency action—regardless of the substance of that action.’”)
(quoting Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2022) and
collecting cases).
Here, defendants argue that the doctrine bars plaintiff’s claims because the consular officer
has already refused the visa applications pursuant to § 221(g), and any order directing further ac-
tion would improperly intrude upon the visa-adjudication process. Defs.’ Mem. at 15–20. But
refusal under § 221(g) pending further administrative processing differs materially from a final

visa denial. Although a § 221(g) refusal is legally a refusal, the application may be reconsidered
upon the completion of administrative processing or the submission of additional information. See
22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e); 9 FAM 504.11-4(A). And here, defendants appear to acknowledge that the
visa applications have been placed into post-refusal administrative processing. See Defs.’ Mem.
at 15 (“[Consular nonreviewability] extends to the consular officer’s decision to place the visa
application into post-refusal administrative processing, as happened here.”) (cleaned up).
Courts considering visa applications refused under § 221(g) pending further administrative
processing have reached differing conclusions regarding the doctrine’s applicability. Compare
Sharifi v. Blinken, 731 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (declining to apply the doctrine
when, “in refusing [plaintiff’s] visa application for further administrative processing under [§]

221(g), consular officials have taken no final action: though nominally ‘refused,’ [plaintiff’s] visa
application remains under consideration in a state of administrative limbo that cannot fairly be
described as a final determination.”), and Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (finding that the doctrine
did not apply when “plaintiff[] [is] not challenging the consular officer’s refusal of [plaintiff’s]
visa application, but rather the period of post-refusal administrative processing that has ensued
after the refusal.”), with Nawaz, 2024 WL 99486, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s unreasonable delay
claim was barred by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability where she challenged a visa refusal
for further administrative processing because “[c]ourts in this [c]ircuit have expressly noted that,
notwithstanding caselaw in other circuits, a distinction between challenging a decision and com-
pelling adjudication is not a distinction that has a basis in Second Circuit law”)
The Court finds the reasoning of Sharifi and Ramizi more persuasive. Where a plaintiff
seeks only to compel further agency action on a visa application that remains under consideration,

rather than challenge the substance of a visa determination, judicial review does not implicate the
core concerns underlying the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. See Sharifi, 731 F. Supp. 3d
at 438 (“For the Court to exercise its authority over undue delay cases under such circumstances
does not interfere with Congress’ plenary powers nor disturb the doctrine of consular nonreview-
ability.”). Accordingly, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar plaintiff’s claims.
B. Mootness
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking an order compelling defendants to schedule an
immigrant visa interview for the beneficiary and derivative applicants and to issue a final deci-
sion on the underlying visa petition. Compl. at 8–9. Defendants respond that the action is now
moot because the requested interview has occurred and the visa applications at issue have been
adjudicated. Defs.’ Mem. at 18–19. The Court is not convinced by this argument, either.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate only live cases and
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a
‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer live
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568
U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, where intervening events
make it impossible for a court to grant the relief sought by a plaintiff, the action must be dis-
missed as moot. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160–61 (2016).
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims are moot because “[t]he consular officer took the
only action required here—adjudicating the visa application on the day of the interview—by
refusing the visa.” Defs.’ Mem. at 18 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g); 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a)); see also
Dkt. No. 10-2 ¶ 4–5.
Courts have reached differing conclusions regarding whether a refusal under § 221(g)
during administrative processing moots an action seeking to compel adjudication of a visa appli-

cation. Compare Esghai v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 WL 4753799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 12,
2024) (holding that a § 221(g) refusal did not moot a claim seeking completion of administrative
processing because “the consular[ ] officer[’s] refusal does not deprive [plaintiff] of a personal
stake in this litigation because he seeks different relief here: a further decision on [the visa] ap-
plication.”), and Pars Equality Ctr. v. Blinken, 2024 WL 4700636, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5,
2024) (finding persuasive “the reasoning contained in the decisions of numerous other courts that
have found a [§] 221(g) refusal does not operate as a final decision under facts as alleged here”
and collecting cases), with Liew v. Sanders, 737 F. Supp. 3d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2024) (finding plain-
tiff’s claim moot because “[the] State [Department] has already discharged the only duty it owes
[plaintiff]—to either ‘issue the visa’ or ‘refuse the visa under INA § 212(a) or 221(g).’”).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the Court rejects defendants’ argu-
ment. Although the visa applications have been refused pursuant to § 221(g), the record reflects
that they remain subject to administrative processing. See Dkt. No. 10-2 ¶ 5. Plaintiff therefore
retains a concrete interest in the completion of that process and the ultimate disposition of the ap-
plications. See Sharifi, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (“Since [plaintiff’s] visa application has not yet
been finally resolved, [p]laintiff’s complaint is not mooted by USCIS's purported ‘refusal’ pursu-
ant to [§] 221(g).”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the § 221(g) refusal did not moot
plaintiff’s claims.
C. Plaintiff’s Mandamus Act and APA Claims
The Court now turns to the merits of plaintiff’s Mandamus Act and APA claims. Plain-
tiff requests that the Court “declare the defendants’ delay in both the scheduling of the aforemen-
tioned interview and administrative processing of the plaintiff’s visa petition is a violation of the
Mandamus Act and APA” and “compel the defendants . . . to take all necessary and appropriate

action to schedule beneficiary and all derivative applicants for their consular interview without
further delay, as well as issue a final decision on the underlying visa petition.” Compl. at 9
(cleaned up).
Under the Mandamus Act, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any ac-
tion in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. “The extraordinary
remedy of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 will issue only to compel the performance of a
clear nondiscretionary duty.” Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 121 (1988).
To obtain mandamus relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a clear right in the plaintiff
to the relief sought; (2) a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the part of the defendant to do

the act in question; and (3) no other adequate remedy available.” Anderson v. Bowen, 881 F.2d
1, 5 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1972)).
Plaintiff’s claims under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) “are substantively the
same, challenging a purported unreasonable delay by USCIS.” Sharifi, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
The APA tasks courts with “compel[ling] agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). However, “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plain-
tiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Nor-
ton v. S. Utah Wilderness All. (“SUWA”), 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphases in original). The
APA also provides that “within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a mat-
ter presented to it.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s mandamus and APA claims turn on the same threshold question:
whether defendants remain subject to a mandatory duty capable of judicial enforcement. See

Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 256 (“Because the governing standards are substantially the same, the
court will consider [plaintiff’s APA and mandamus] claims together.”). Although the analyses
overlap, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring a clear and nondiscretionary duty,
whereas relief under § 706(1) of the APA requires identification of a discrete agency action that
the agency is legally obligated to perform. See Pittston Coal Grp., 488 U.S. at 121; SUWA, 542
U.S. at 64.
Defendants argue that no discrete, nondiscretionary duty exists because the applications
were adjudicated when a consular officer refused them pursuant to § 221(g) on the day of the in-
terview. Defs.’ Mem. at 17–20. The Court is not persuaded.
As discussed supra, the § 221(g) refusal neither rendered this action moot nor triggered

the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. Those conclusions rest on the determination that the
applications remain in administrative processing and continue to be subject to further review.
See Dkt. No. 10-2 ¶ 5; Defs.’ Mem. at 15; Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 10 n.3 (“A [§]
221(g) refusal is not a final adjudication of a visa application.”).
At the pleading stage, defendants’ alleged continuing obligation is sufficient to satisfy the
threshold requirement that plaintiff identify a discrete agency action defendants are required to
take. Section 1202(b) provides that immigrant visa applications “shall be reviewed and adjudi-
cated by a consular officer,” while § 555(b) requires agencies to conclude matters presented to
them “within a reasonable time.” Although defendants contend that any duty imposed by those
provisions was satisfied upon the entry of the § 221(g) refusal, courts considering visa applica-
tions that remain in administrative processing have reached differing conclusions. See Pars
Equality Ctr., 2024 WL 4700636, at *10–12, but see Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 259–61.
At this stage, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning of Pars Equality Center and simi-

lar decisions recognizing that a § 221(g) refusal pending administrative processing does not nec-
essarily mark the completion of the adjudicative process. See Pars Equality Ctr., 2024 WL
4700636, at *10–12; see also Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (“Issuing a final decision
on a visa application is plainly a discrete agency action, and it is required by both the APA and
federal regulations.”). Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately identified a discrete agency action
that defendants are required to take and may pursue relief under § 706(1) of the APA.
Having concluded that plaintiff has adequately alleged the existence of a continuing duty
subject to judicial review, the remaining question is whether the alleged pace of defendants’ ac-
tion is so unreasonable as to warrant relief under the APA. On this point, defendants argue that
any delay is reasonable as a matter of law. See Defs.’ Mem. at 20–27.

In evaluating APA unreasonable delay claims, courts generally turn to the familiar six-
factor text set forth in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79–
80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”). Those factors are:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2)
where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it
expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply
content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of eco-
nomic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the
court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a
higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and
extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropri-
ety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably
delayed.

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 (cleaned up). Some courts have held that “the unreasonable delay inquiry
is typically too fact-specific to be decided on a motion to dismiss.” See Pars Equality Ctr., 2024
WL 4700636, at *11 (collecting cases). Others have done so on the pleadings. See Liew, 737 F.
Supp. 3d at 37–39 (applying TRAC factors and dismissing claim); Ahmed v. Bitter, 2024 WL
22763, at *6–8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024) (same).
At the pre-answer stage, the Court’s task is not to determine whether plaintiff ultimately
will establish an unreasonable delay, but only whether the complaint plausibly alleges one.
Here, plaintiff alleges that the applications became documentarily qualified in May 2024 and
that, despite satisfying all requested requirements, defendants have continued administrative pro-
cessing without reaching a final resolution. See Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.

Although the unreasonable-delay inquiry is often fact intensive, dismissal is appropriate
where the allegations and materials properly before the Court demonstrate that the challenged
delay is reasonable as a matter of law. See Brzezinski v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2021 WL
4191958, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (quoting Sarlak v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 3082018, at *5
(D.D.C. June 10, 2020)) (noting that the TRAC “factors have been employed at the motion to dis-
miss stage” when “the ‘record contains enough facts to evaluate [them]’”).
Here, consideration of the TRAC factors weighs against relief. “The first factor is the
most important TRAC factor, and is typically considered together with the second TRAC fac-
tor.” Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 69 (D.D.C. 2022) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). Together, the first two TRAC factors ask “‘whether the agency’s response time com-
plies with an existing specified schedule and whether it is governed by an identifiable ra-
tionale.’” Dennis v. Blinken, 2023 WL 4764576, at *5 (D. Md. July 26, 2023) (quoting Ctr. for
Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 74 F. Supp. 3d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 2014)); see

also Begum v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2022 WL 16575703, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2022) (explaining
that the first two factors “focus on the reasonableness of the delay and whether Congress has set
a timeline for the completion of the action in question”).
Defendants argue that “case law—which finds any purported delay not unreasonably long
even after years as opposed to a few months—supports dismissal here.” Defs.’ Mem. at 24. The
Court agrees. Congress has supplied no timetable governing the completion of administrative
processing for immigrant visa applications, and plaintiff identifies no statute or regulation requir-
ing adjudication within a specified period.
“Absent a congressionally supplied yardstick, courts typically turn to case law as a
guide.” Sarlak v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020). And “[d]istrict

courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unrea-
sonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Id. at *6. “Many
courts have ‘declined to find a two-year period to be unreasonable as a matter of law[,]’ espe-
cially when the agency provides a reasonable explanation for the delay and ‘regularly revisit[s]
the question’ of whether visa processing can proceed.’” Begum, 2022 WL 16575703, at *7
(quoting Ghadami v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2020 WL 1308376, at *8 (D.D.C.
Mar. 19, 2020)).
Here, the earliest proper starting date when considering plaintiff’s unreasonable delay
claim is May 7, 2024, the date plaintiff’s visa petition was deemed documentarily qualified.
Compl. ¶ 16; see Ahmed v. Bitter, 2024 WL 22763, at *7–8 (“At the earliest, the [d]efendants
could not have acted until . . . a visa number became available.”); Mahmood v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 2021 WL 5998385, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021) (“Similar cases seem to focus
on the delay from the last Government action to the issuance of the opinion.”).

Plaintiff commenced this action on August 3, 2025, approximately fifteen months after
the petition became documentarily qualified. Even assuming the relevant period extends through
the present, the delay at issue remains substantially shorter than delays that courts have routinely
found insufficient to state a plausible unreasonable-delay claim. See, e.g., Begum, 2022 WL
16575703, at *6 (collecting cases concluding that delays of three to five years were not unrea-
sonable); Almakalani v. McAleenan, 527 F. Supp. 3d 205, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[C]ourts in this
circuit have repeatedly found that delays of as long as five years in USCIS’s adjudication of im-
migration benefits are not unreasonable.”).
“The burden is on the plaintiff to plausibly allege unreasonable delay, and ‘other than the
passage of time, plaintiff has given the court no basis on which to conclude that the process of

adjudicating her petition has been unreasonably prolonged or delayed.’” Ahmed v. Bitter, 2024
WL 22763, at *8 (quoting Almakalani, 527 F. Supp. 3d at 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (cleaned up)).
That observation applies with equal force here. Plaintiff has not opposed defendants’ motion
and, in any event, has offered no basis other than the passage of a relatively short amount of time
from which the Court could infer that defendants have unreasonably delayed adjudication of the
applications.
The remaining TRAC factors do not alter this conclusion. Although the Court does not
discount the hardship that continued administrative processing may impose on plaintiff and the
beneficiary applicants, those interests are present in virtually every visa-delay case. More
importantly, granting the requested relief would necessarily require defendants to prioritize
plaintiff’s applications ahead of others awaiting adjudication.
Courts have repeatedly recognized that such relief risks improperly interfering with the
agency’s allocation of finite resources and competing priorities. See, e.g., Lee v. Blinken, 2024

WL 639635, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2024) (“[Plaintiff] do[es] not present any argument . . . as to
why their requested relief would not amount to a judicial reordering of agency priorities.”) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
Notably, plaintiff has filed no opposition to defendants’ motion and therefore has not re-
sponded to defendants’ arguments regarding the TRAC factors or identified any authority sup-
porting a contrary conclusion. Considering the TRAC factors as a whole, and without any reason
advanced by plaintiff’s counsel to conclude otherwise, plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a
delay so egregious as to warrant relief under either the APA or the Mandamus Act.
D. Remaining APA Claims
The Court will also dismiss plaintiff’s remaining counts for failure to state a claim. As to
her 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) claim, plaintiff argues that “[d]efendants have unreasonably delayed

administrative action and have failed to act in ways consistent with their statutory obligations un-
der the INA and the APA, all of which are arbitrary and capricious as well as a violation of 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” Compl. ¶ 40.
That claim fails because § 706(2)(A) empowers courts to set aside final agency actions
that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. See 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A). Plaintiff does not identify any final agency action subject to review under that provi-
sion. Instead, the complaint challenges the pace at which defendants processed the visa applica-
tions. Such allegations are properly analyzed, if at all, under § 706(1) and § 555(b), which ad-
dress agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. See Lee, 2024 WL 639635, at
*7 (“Even assuming the plaintiff[] intended to plead a § 706(2)(A) claim, when review is sought
under a general review provision of the APA, like [§] 706(2)(A), the agency action in question
must be final agency action.”) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, because plaintiff identi-
fies no final agency action subject to review, she fails to state a claim under § 706(2)(A).

Plaintiff’s claim under 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) likewise fails. Section 551(13) merely defines
“agency action” for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act; it does not itself impose any
independent substantive obligation on agencies or create a standalone cause of action. See 5
U.S.C. § 551(13). To the extent plaintiff invokes that provision in support of her APA theory,
any purported claim under § 551(13) is duplicative of her unreasonable-delay allegations under §
706(1) and § 555(b), which the Court has already concluded fail under the TRAC framework.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 551(13) claim will be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
is DENIED, and defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. The

complaint is dismissed. Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
2. Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is dismissed.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
e ’ 4
Dated: July 23, 2026
Utica, New York. —__
na NOW EOE Anthony J. Brindis
U.S. District Judg

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409622. Public record. Not legal advice.