# Abramson

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · July 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409468

## Case

- **Full name:** Nicholas L. Abramson v. Ederica Andrade
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

NICHOLAS L. ABRAMSON ) CASE NO. 5:25-CV-02030
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
vs. )
)
EDERICA ANDRADE ) ORDER AND DECISION
) (Resolving Doc. 15)
Defendant. )
)
)
Pending before this Court is Defendant Ederica Andrade’s unopposed motion for judgment
on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.Civ.R. 12(c). Doc. 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES the complaint in its entirety.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Nicholas Abramson contends that he submitted an anonymous complaint against
Defendant, a police officer in Alliance, Ohio. Doc. 1, ¶8. Plaintiff asserts that on that same day,
Defendant filed a criminal complaint with the Massillon Police Department accusing him of
menacing by stalking. Doc. 1, ¶10. Plaintiff contends that Defendant made the complaint while on
duty and in uniform. Doc. 1, ¶21. “Plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted[.]” Doc. 1, ¶14. On August
18, 2025, the Stark County Grand Jury declined to charge him with the offense. Doc. 1, ¶15.
Plaintiff contends that “Defendant’s actions were retaliatory, malicious, and intended to chill [his]
protected speech.” Doc. 1, ¶16.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for reviewing a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as
th e standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit stated the
standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss in Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 502

F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007) as follows:
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the law with respect to what a plaintiff
must plead in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Court stated that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 1964-
65 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the Court emphasized that
even though a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id.
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the Court
disavowed the oft-quoted Rule 12(b)(6) standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957) (recognizing “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”),
characterizing that rule as one “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on
an accepted pleading standard.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.

Id. at 548. Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
If an allegation is capable of more than one inference, this Court must construe it in the
plaintiff’s favor. Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing
Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993)). This Court may not grant a Rule
12(b)(6) motion merely because it may not believe the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Id. Although
this is a liberal standard of review, the plaintiff still must do more than merely assert bare legal
conclusions. Id. Specifically, the complaint must contain “either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Scheid
v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotations and emphasis
omitted).
“In addition, it is well settled that this Court may ‘grant dispositive motions because they
are unopposed.’ When a party fails to respond to a dispositive motion, it may be treated ‘as a

confession to’ the motion’s merits.” Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, No. 5:20-cv-02189,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99012, at *8 (N.D. Ohio May 31, 2022).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: First Amendment Retaliation, Fourth
Amendment Malicious Prosecution, and Abuse of Process-Conspiracy. Plaintiff asserts one state

law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To establish a federal claim under §1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that a person acting
under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003).
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the violation of federal rights by a person
acting ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In rare circumstances, private actors may also be liable
under §1983, but only when the plaintiff can show that the private party’s actions
‘so approximate state action that they may be fairly attributed to the state.’ Inner
City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Township of Northville, 87 F.4th 743, 757 (6th
Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Generally, we look to three tests to determine whether
private action has become state action: (1) the public-function test, (2) the state-
compulsion test, and (3) the nexus test. See Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 516
(6th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff may also show state action by establishing ‘that a private
party has engaged in a conspiracy or concerted action with other state actors.’ Id.;
see also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed.
2d 142 (1970).

Leta v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 23-3406, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1548, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024);
Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff asserts that “[a]cting under color of law, Defendant influenced another Police
Officer from the Massillon Police Department to accept and file her allegations without conducting
an y meaningful investigation.” Doc. 1, ¶14. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant acted under
color of law when she filed “her complaint while on duty, in uniform, and leveraging her position

as a police officer.” Doc. 1, ¶21.
To the extent that Plaintiff contends Defendant was acting under the color of law merely
because she was wearing her uniform and was on duty when she filed the complaint, this argument
is without merit. “When determining whether a person acted under color of state law, [t]he fact
that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. It is the nature of
the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty,
which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law.” (internal quotations omitted)
Morris v. City of Detroit, 789 F. App’x 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stengel v. Belcher, 522
F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)).
Here, Defendant, an Alliance Police Officer, filed a criminal complaint at the Massillon Police

Department accusing Plaintiff of menacing by stalking. Doc. 1, ¶¶7, 10, 13. This is clearly the act
of a private citizen. “Acts of police officers in the ambit of their personal, private pursuits fall
outside of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Morris, supra. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant
was acting under color of law on this basis.
Plaintiff’s further asserts that Defendant “influenced” another police officer to file her
allegations. The Court construes this as an argument on the theory that Defendant “engaged in a
conspiracy or concerted action with other state actors.” Leta, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1548, at *7.
A conspiracy claim must be pled with specificity.
To hold a private party liable under §1983, the plaintiff must show that the private
actor ‘willfully participate[d] in joint action with state agents.’ Weser, 965 F.3d at
516 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must ‘alleg[e] that (1) a single plan existed, (2)
the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed.’ Revis v. Meldrum, 489
F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d
503, 517 (6th Cir. 2020). ‘A complaint must identify the alleged conspiracy with
more than vague and conclusory allegations.’ Rudd, 977 F.3d at 517 (citation
omitted); see also Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003) (‘It is
well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity. .
. .’ (citation omitted)).

Id. Plaintiff fails to set forth the necessary specificity to establish that such a conspiracy existed
between Defendant or the Massillon police officer who took her complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
B. State Claims
Plaintiff’s remaining claim sound in state law. Supplemental jurisdiction exists whenever
state law and federal law claims derive from the same nucleus of operative facts and when
considerations of judicial economy dictate having a single trial. United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). The Court, however, may exercise discretion in hearing state
law matters. Id. at 726. In cases where the federal law claims are dismissed before trial, the state
law claims should also be dismissed. Id. Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal law claims, this Court
declines jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. This matter is hereby
DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: July 20, 2026 /s/ John R. Adams
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409468. Public record. Not legal advice.