# Bryan Wardell v. Pitt County, North Carolina

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · August 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409072

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 5, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1077 Doc: 35 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 1 of 12

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1077

BRYAN WARDELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

PITT COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA; PITT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; JANIS GALLAGHER, in Her Individual Capacity;
CHRISTOPHER NUNNALLY, in His Individual Capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (5:24-cv-00276-D-RJ)

Submitted: April 24, 2026 Decided: August 5, 2026

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Artur Davis, HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP, Birmingham,
Alabama, for Appellant. Jennifer B. Milak, TEAGUE CAMPBELL DENNIS &
GORHAM, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 25-1077 Doc: 35 Filed: 08/05/2026 Pg: 2 of 12

PER CURIAM:

After Bryan Wardell’s employment as County Attorney for Pitt County, North

Carolina, was terminated by the County’s Board of Commissioners, he commenced this

action against Pitt County, Pitt County Board of Commissioners, County Manager Janis

Gallagher, and County Commissioner Christopher Nunnally, alleging that his employment

was terminated because of his race, Black. He brought claims against (1) Pitt County

alleging race discrimination, in violation of Title VII; (2) Gallagher alleging race

discrimination, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; (3) Pitt County

alleging race discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; (4) the Board of

Commissioners alleging wrongful discharge, in violation of North Carolina public policy;

and (5) Nunnally alleging tortious interference with contract. By order dated January 17,

2025, the district court dismissed all of Wardell’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).

On appeal, Wardell challenges specifically the district court’s dismissal of his Title

VII claim against Pitt County and his claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 against Pitt County

and Gallagher in her individual capacity. After carefully reviewing the record and the

submissions of the parties, we agree that Wardell did not allege sufficient facts to support

a plausible claim of racial discrimination and therefore affirm.

I

In June 2023, the Pitt County Board of Commissioners selected Wardell to serve as

County Attorney, and Wardell, the first Black person to serve in that role, began work in

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August 2023. Wardell’s employment agreement did not specify a term of employment,

but the Board of Commissioners conveyed to Wardell that it anticipated a long-term

employment relationship. As County Attorney, Wardell reported directly to County

Manager Janis Gallagher, a White woman who had participated in hiring Wardell.

Wardell’s tenure with the County, however, was short, as the Board of Commissioners

voted to terminate his employment in November 2023. Wardell then commenced this

action.

In his complaint, Wardell alleged that the County engaged in a “recurrent pattern of

racially discriminatory personnel practices” and that his termination was “inspired by . . .

unlawful motives.” He detailed several examples, pointing out that County officials

promoted Gallagher, a White woman, who had worked in the County Attorney’s office for

over 20 years, over a Black man, Brian Barnett, who had worked for the County for 4 years.

He also alleged that an unnamed County Commissioner told the Interim Director of Social

Services, a Black man, to “speak more clearly” when he interviewed for a County position

and that that same Black Interim Director had also filed an “insubordination complaint”

with County Manager Gallagher, alleging that a White program director under his

supervision had told him that he was “barking like a dog.” And he alleged that County

Manager Gallagher had made a racially charged comment to the County Sheriff, a Black

woman, and that she had “failed to recommend compensation increases” for the Sheriff,

while certain White officials had received pay increases. Wardell also noted in his

complaint that while Pitt County is over one-third African-American, the County’s

leadership was, at the time he was hired, 90% White.

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As to the termination of his employment specifically, Wardell alleged that County

Manager Gallagher and Christopher Nunnally, presented “false justifications for [his]

termination” to the County Board, which “effectively rubber-stamped [those] unlawfully

motivated claims.” Wardell also alleged that County Manager Gallagher “put limitations

on the scope of his role,” blocking his offer to a Black attorney to serve as an assistant

county attorney. He claimed that Gallagher “blocked the hire on the ostensible grounds

that new personnel had to be reserved for the next budget cycle,” yet she “routinely

approved other mid-budget cycle additions of personnel in departments run by white

officials.” He alleged that Gallagher “declined to invite” him to an annual meeting of

county, municipal, and civic leaders and that she tasked him with “cultivating relationships

with prominent Black figures in the community” but not “with the county’s white

influencers in the political, business, or civic community as previous County Attorneys had

routinely done.” Wardell alleged further that he identified “deficiencies” in two proposed

contracts, but Gallagher declined to “defer[] to his expertise as County Attorney” and

instead “steered the contracts to approval by the Board of Commissioners.”

Wardell also described in his complaint how he got into a disagreement with

Commissioner Nunnally regarding an expenditure for a lake and dam project. Wardell had

told Nunnally that he believed the expenditure violated the North Carolina Constitution, as

it involved the use of public funds to repair privately owned property. In response,

Nunnally proposed a workaround, which would have involved the County’s purchasing the

property and designating it a County park. Wardell nonetheless maintained that the

expenditure would still be unlawful. According to Wardell, Nunnally “pressured” him to

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approve the project and told another attorney that “Wardell had deliberately misrepresented

the scope of the county’s legal authority.”

According to the complaint, County Manager Gallagher and Commissioner

Nunnally “had multiple conversations in November 2023 about the feasibility of the Board

of Commissioners voting to terminate [his] contract,” and on November 20, 2023, the

Board, on Nunnally’s motion, convened an executive closed-door session to do so. At that

session, Gallagher, as County Manager, assumed the de facto role of secretary of the Board,

preparing the agenda and taking minutes for the meeting. During the meeting, Gallagher

characterized Wardell as “insubordinate,” “unqualified,” and often in conflict with County

officials. Nunnally, in turn, repeated his claim that Wardell had been “dishonest” about

the County’s legal authority in negotiations with a local attorney. At the conclusion of the

meeting, the Board voted to terminate Wardell’s employment — a vote that Wardell

characterized as a “rubber-stamp[]” of the recommendations made by Gallagher and

Nunnally.

On May 14, 2024, Wardell commenced this action against Pitt County, the Pitt

County Board of Commissioners, Pitt County Manager Gallagher in her individual

capacity, and County Commissioner Christopher Nunnally in his individual capacity,

alleging various claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and North Carolina

state law. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all counts, and

Wardell now appeals the dismissal of his claims as to Pitt County and Gallagher.

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II

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de

novo. Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2022).

A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination “need not plead a prima facie case

of discrimination under the evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green . . . to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)). The district court therefore erred by requiring Wardell to plead

facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint nonetheless “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. In

short, “[m]ere ‘labels and conclusions’ will not do.” Holloway, 32 F.4th at 298 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In Count One of his complaint, which was brought under Title VII, Wardell alleged

that County Manager Gallagher recommended his termination to the Board of

Commissioners, which followed that recommendation, and that both Gallagher and the

Board were, in part, motivated by Wardall’s race. The district court, however, concluded

that Wardell’s allegations in this respect were insufficient.

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Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-2(a), (a)(1). To survive a motion to dismiss on a Title VII claim for unlawful

termination, a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his

employer discharged him because of his race.” Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1)) (emphasis added).

Recognizing that the Pitt County Board of Commissioners, not Gallagher, acted as

the “final policymaking authority over personnel decisions,” Wardell purported to allege a

“cat’s paw” theory of liability. Such a theory of liability imputes “the discriminatory

animus of an employee . . . onto the employer to establish causation.” Barnhill v. Bondi,

138 F.4th 123, 134 (4th Cir. 2025). “To satisfy the cat’s paw theory at the motion to dismiss

stage, a plaintiff must plead that a coworker harboring discriminatory animus toward [him]

exercised authority over an adverse employment action that the plaintiff suffered such that

the colleague should be viewed as the actual decisionmaker principally responsible for the

adverse action.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

But here, Wardell failed to plausibly allege that Gallagher was the “actual

decisionmaker.” As Wardell’s complaint acknowledges, the Board acted as the “final

policymaking authority” over personnel matters, and it was the Board that voted to

terminate Wardell’s employment on November 20, 2023. Gallagher served only as the

secretary at that session. To be sure, as Wardell alleged, Gallagher offered several race-

neutral justifications for his termination, including that he had been “insubordinate” to her,

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proved to be “unqualified,” and had been “in conflict” with County leadership, there is no

allegation that she was the actual decisionmaker. While Wardell did make the conclusory

allegation that the Commissioners effectively “rubber-stamped” her recommendation, he

does not plead facts sufficient to support an inference that Gallagher was “principally

responsible” for the decision. See Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401,

410–11 (4th Cir. 2013) (theory of liability unsatisfied where a discriminating employee

substantially influenced the actual decisionmaker, but was not principally responsible for

the decision); see also Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 134 (“[W]here committee members exercising

authority over an adverse action the plaintiff suffered acted together in making the decision

. . . the plaintiff [must] show that the committee members harbored discriminatory animus

toward them” (citations omitted)).

Moreover, Wardell’s allegations of Gallagher’s animus are only speculative and

conclusory. Most of his allegations described Wardell’s disagreements with Gallagher’s

management style. For example, she declined to invite him to an annual networking event;

and she disagreed with him over the purported “deficiencies” of two proposed contracts.

But the “[l]aw does not blindly ascribe to race all personal conflicts between individuals of

different races.” Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2000).

Wardell also contends that Gallagher declined to hire another assistant county

attorney outside of the budget cycle when she learned that the preferred candidate was

Black. Wardell, however, provides no facts, beyond mere speculation, to support this

claim.

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Wardell further alleges that Gallagher “belittle[d] the competence of the county’s

Black female Sheriff . . . on several occasions” and once made a “racially charged

comment” from Gallagher that the Sheriff “would not have spoken to [a vendor]” in a

certain way “if she had been a white woman.” The alleged comment was directed at

someone else at some unspecified time and unrelated to the employment decision in

question and therefore does not provide a plausible basis to impute racial animus to

Gallagher’s recommendation to terminate Wardell, whom she participated in hiring.

And as to the Board, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to raise “a right to

relief above a speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Accordingly, we affirm the

dismissal of his Title VII claim.

Turning next to Counts Two and Three, which alleged racial discrimination claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against Gallagher in her individual capacity and against

Pitt County, Wardell fares no better.

Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making or enforcing of contracts

by providing that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the

same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by

white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); see also CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S.

442, 445 (2008). And “[t]o succeed on a § 1981 claim, ‘a plaintiff must ultimately establish

both that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race, and that the

discrimination interfered with a contractual interest.’” Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th

299, 305 (2022) (quoting Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434 (4th

Cir. 2006)). More specifically, a “plaintiff must also show that the interference with a

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contractual interest would not have happened but for the plaintiff’s race.” Id. (emphasis

added) (citing Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned Media,

589 U.S. 327, 340 (2020)).

Although Wardell correctly points out that the district court “overlooked the

individual claim against Gallagher in Count [Two],” the count nonetheless fails for the

same reasons as does Wardell’s Title VII claim — it lacks sufficient allegations to support

a reasonable inference that Gallagher “intended to discriminate on the basis of race” when

recommending his termination to the Board, let alone sufficient facts to support an

inference that race was the “but for” cause of the Board’s decision to terminate his

employment. See Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 305–306 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss on

§ 1981 claim where complaint included only general allegations and “factual details

regarding race [were] conspicuously absent”).

And as to the claim against Pitt County in Count Three, “[a] municipality may not

be held liable for its employees’ violations of § 1981 under a respondeat superior theory.”

Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989). Instead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed

by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” Id. A county government may

only be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff plausibly alleges the “policy or custom” of

that government caused the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected rights. Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Such a “policy or

custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an

express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a

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person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to

properly train officers that manifests deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4)

through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage

with the force of law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (2003) (cleaned up). Moreover,

as required by § 1983, a “plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 389-90 (1989). Even if a plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to support the requisite final

policymaking authority under state law, there is no respondeat superior liability for local

governments, so the “plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects

deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory

right will follow the decision.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 411; see also Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of

City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2000).

Wardell failed to allege any impermissible policy or custom that was used to

terminate his employment. While he does allege that the Board, acting as the final

decisionmaker, voted to terminate his employment, he failed to plead that the Board acted

with racial animus or that the Board made the decision with “deliberate indifference to the

risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right” would follow

the decision. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411. And “[d]eliberate indifference is a very high

standard — a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d

692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)). He simply

alleged that Gallagher provided several race-neutral justifications for her recommendation

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to terminate Wardell’s employment — including that he was insubordinate, unqualified,

and in conflict with County leadership — and that the Board followed the recommendation,

“rubber-stamping” it. But the complaint does not include any allegation that an

impermissible policy or custom played any role in the Board’s decision to terminate his

employment.

* * *

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s January 17, 2025 order granting the

defendants’ motion to dismiss Wardell’s complaint. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11409072. Public record. Not legal advice.