# Moore

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · July 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11408484

## Case

- **Full name:** Edward Moore v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** July 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
EDWARD MOORE PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 5:25-CV-5153
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner,
Social Security Administration DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 18) of the
Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of
Arkansas. The R&R recommends affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security Administration (“SSA”)}—which denied Plaintiff Edward Moore a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)}—and dismissing Mr. Moore’s complaint
(Doc. 2) with prejudice. Mr. Moore filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 23), and SSA
responded (Doc. 25). For the following reasons, the R&R is ADOPTED IN FULL.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Moore filed his claim for DIB on May 17, 2021, alleging that anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and depression made him unable to work and/or function as of
October 22, 2018. See Doc. 9, p. 81. His claim was denied initially and again on
reconsideration, id. at p. 82, so Mr. Moore requested an administrative hearing. Mr.
Moore’s first administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Harold Davis in January 2023. /d. at pp. 40-80, 693-733. Alongside the hearing came
a small change to Mr. Moore’s claim: he amended his onset date to March 23, 2021, so
as to be consistent with the date he started receiving treatment for his symptoms. /d. at

p. 43. The results, however, were the same—on March 15, 2023, ALJ Davis concluded
that Mr. Moore was not disabled under the Social Security Act. /d. at p. 35.
Mr. Moore then requested a review of ALJ Davis’s decision in this Court. See
Moore v. Commissioner, No. 5:24-cv-5032 (W.D. Ark.). Although the Commissioner
initially opposed Mr. Moore’s appeal, he changed tact and filed an unopposed motion for
remand for further administrative action under “sentence four’ of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
(‘The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”).
On remand from this Court, the case went back to the SSA Appeals Council, which
then remanded the case to an ALJ for further consideration of two issues, only one of
which is relevant here. The Appeals Council's concern was:
“The claimant's representative submitted a brief to the Administrative Law
Judge objecting to the testimony of the vocational expert (Exhibit 18E).
HALLEX 1-2-5-30 provides that the Administrative Law Judge will respond
to any objections to the vocational expert raised by the claimant either in
writing or on the record at the hearing. Here, the objections were raised after
the hearing, but the Administrative Law Judge did not acknowledge,
discuss, or rule on the objections in the decision.”
Doc. 9, p. 689 (emphasis added).
The Appeals Council therefore ordered the ALJ to “[clonsider and rule on the
objections submitted by the claimant's representative in Exhibit 18E.” The ALJ was also
directed to obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of
Mr. Moore’s assessed limitations on his occupational base (or, the jobs he can do in the
national economy), to ask the vocational expert to identify examples of appropriate jobs
and to state the incidence of those jobs in the national economy, and to resolve any

conflicts between the vocational expert's occupational evidence and information in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (‘DOT’) and its companion publication, the Selected
Characteristics of Occupations (“SCO”). /d.
A remand hearing was then held before ALJ Elizabeth McGee, id. at pp. 604—46,
and she entered her decision on March 24, 2025. ALJ McGee determined that Mr. Moore
met the requirements to remain insured under the Social Security Act through December
31, 2023. Id. at p. 580. She found Mr. Moore’s severe impairments to include generalized
anxiety disorder, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder, but that none of the impairments met or medically equaled the
severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. /d. at p.
582. ALJ McGee concluded that Mr. Moore retained the Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”) to perform “medium” work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) except that he
could not drive as part of work. /d. at p. 585. She added that Mr. Moore could understand,
remember, and carry out simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and also have occasional
social interaction. /d. Ultimately, ALU McGee found that Mr. Moore could work as a Night
Cleaner, Hand Packer, or Kitchen Helper. /d. at p. 595.
Once again, Mr. Moore appealed. The Appeals Council denied Mr. Moore's
request for review on July 21, 2025, id. at pp. 7-12, thus making it final, and Mr. Moore
now seeks review of ALU McGee’s unfavorable decision, see Doc. 2.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews “the ALJ’s denial of disability insurance benefits de novo to
ensure that there was no legal error and that the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th

Cir. 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other
contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). “It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” /d. (citations
omitted).
The Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotations omitted). So long as there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because
substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome,
or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d
472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw
two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision. /d.
A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his
disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year
and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.
Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted
for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner's regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential
evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has
engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has
a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether
the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the
impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the
claimant is able, notwithstanding his disabilities, to perform other work in the national
economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The
fact finder only considers Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in the light of his
residual functional capacity if the final stage of the analysis is reached. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
ll. DISCUSSION
Mr. Moore argues three issues in his appeal brief: (1) the ALJ failed to comply with
the Appeals Council’s remand order, and rejected Mr. Moore’s expert rebuttal evidence
without reasoned analysis, which constitutes legal error; (2) the ALJ erred by not finding
Mr. Moore’s essential tremor to be a severe impairment.; and (3) the ALJ failed to properly
consider Mr. Moore’s subjective complaints. (Doc. 13). The Court addresses each issue
in turn.
A. Step-Five Determination
Mr. Moore first argues that ALJ McGee failed to comply with the Appeals Council's
remand order by insufficiently discussing his rebuttal evidence, which attacked the
credibility of the vocational expert (“VE”) and the methodology that SkilITRAN, a product
used by VEs, uses to estimate job numbers. (Doc. 9, pp. 332—363; Doc. 9-1, pp. 18-

509). He takes issue with the VE’s testimony at the February 3, 2025 hearing, during
which she noted that she “is not an expert in the field of statistics,” and, with respect to
SKilIITRAN’'s methodology, that she “[is] not a representative for SkilITRAN” and “any
criteria regarding specifics of SkilITRAN’s products would have to be directed to
[SkilITRAN].” See Doc. 13, p. 5; Doc. 9, p. 644. But she also explained that in her
experience as a certified rehabilitation counselor, “SkilITRAN provides a reliable product
to estimate job numbers.” /d. Mr. Moore also objects to the way the ALJ weighed the
VE’s testimony against the evidence in his post-submission brief. ALJ McGee
“considered the representative’s multiple objections to the vocational expert testimony”
and “overrule[d] all the objections,” finding that “Ms. Gallo [Moore’s attorney] cited to no
accurate or persuasive Social Security law, regulation, POMS, HALLEX, or acquiescence
ruling to support any of the arguments she advanced.” (Doc. 9, p. 579).
To Mr. Moore, this constitutes legal error. He reads Biestek, 587 U.S. at 109, to
stand for the categorical rule that a VE’s testimony may not constitute substantial
evidence if the expert does not answer questions about the methodology underlying her
job-number estimates and argues that no reasonable mind could have accepted her
testimony as substantial evidence given the methodological concerns. To turn this
evidentiary dispute into a legal error, Mr. Moore claims that the ALJ’s failure to discuss
the methodological issues at length in her opinion constitutes a due process violation, is
arbitrary and capricious, and violated the remand order. But this misreads Biestek, which
was careful to avoid pronouncing any categorical rule about when a VE’s testimony might

clear the substantial evidence bar—‘[t]he inquiry, as is usually true in determining the
substantiality of evidence, is case-by-case.” 587 U.S. at 108.
And Biestek was clear in announcing its case-by-case rule that the bar is not high.
Biestek itself held that a VE’s failure to produce the private market-survey data that their
opinion relied upon on the applicant’s request (something like the procedure in Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 26(a)(2)(B)) does not preclude a VE’s testimony from being substantial
evidence. /d. at 104. Instead, the ALJ considers and weighs all relevant factors about a
witness's testimony, and other indicia of reliability can bring otherwise deficient testimony
up to the bar. /d. at 108. So if a witness’s failure to produce any supporting data about
job availability is not a categorical bar, why would an expert’s inability to discuss the
methods of their data source be one? Under Biestek, it wouldn’t—instead, the correct
rule is to “take[ ] into account all features of the vocational expert's testimony, as well as
the rest of the administrative record.” /d. “And in so doing, [the Court] defers to the
presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” /d. The few lines from Biestek that
Mr. Moore seizes on might have served to undermine the VE’s testimony in the eyes of
the ALJ, but they are only a few of many factors that the ALJ may permissibly weigh in
deciding whether a VE's testimony is substantial evidence.
Here, as Magistrate Judge Ford concluded, the ALJ found (and the Court agrees)
that Mr. Moore’s counsel cited no accurate or persuasive law or SSA rule or regulation
that would preclude a finding that the VE’s testimony was reliable. (Doc. 9, p. 579). The
ALJ thus credited the VE’s testimony, based in part on the VE’s professional experience
and the job-number estimate’s consistency with SSSA regulations. Under the deferential

standard this Court applies to reviewing ALJ findings, this is enough. As such, Mr. Moore's
first objection is OVERRULED.
B. Step Two Analysis
Next, Mr. Moore argues that ALJ McGee erred by not finding his essential tremor
to be a severe impairment (as ALJ Davis had). Additionally, Mr. Moore argues that even
accepting the ALJ’s determination that his essential tremor was a medically determinable
impairment rather than a severe one, the ALJ still ought to have imposed manipulative
limitations or other functional limitations. As discussed below, though, this is a distinction
without a difference.
At step two, a claimant has the burden of providing evidence of functional
limitations in support of his contention of disability. Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th
Cir. 2007). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that
would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” /d. (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1521(a)). “If the impairment would have no more than a minimal effect on the
claimant's ability to work, then it does not satisfy the requirement of step two.” /d. (citing
Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007)).
The Court again agrees with the R&R. The medical record before the ALJ was
inconsistent as to the tremor’s severity. Mr. Moore’s attorney represented during
questioning (although they were not visible to the ALJ) that his hands were shaking during
questioning. See Doc. 9, p. 614. But there was evidence to the contrary, too. For
example, during a doctor's visit, Mr. Moore reported tremors but appeared to claim that
they were related to medical marijuana withdrawals. /d. at p. 555. His performance was

average and not impaired when the psychomotor speed, manual dexterity, and strength
of his hands were tested. /d. at p. 449. In June 2023, he reported experiencing neck
tremors, but stated that he had not had any in his arms or legs recently. (Doc. 9-1, p.
589). And at various times throughout 2021 and 2022, he reported engaging in activities
like planting trees, (Doc. 9, pp. 406-409), and fishing, id. at pp. 444-46, 454-57.
Given this evidence, there was substantial evidence in the record to support the
ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Moore’s tremors were not severe and did not require additional
manipulative restrictions. “Whether the ALJ should have provided additional limitations
amounts to a disagreement over the weighing of evidence within the record, and ‘it is not
this Court's role to reweight that evidence.” Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723 (8th Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted). Mr. Moore’s second objection is OVERRULED.
C. Subjective Complaint Analysis
Mr. Moore’s last argument is that ALJ McGee failed to properly consider his
subjective complaints. Specifically, he claims that the ALJ relied on “cherry-picked and
manipulated statements to support his unfavorable decision” and to “manufacture
inconsistency” in Mr. Moore’s testimony. See Doc. 13, p. 14. In his objections to the
R&R, he states that the R&R did not address the particulars of his argument—namely,
that the ALJ should have weighed differently one earlier function report against a later
one to show Mr. Moore's deterioration. He also states that the R&R provides rationales
for the decision that the ALJ did not herself offer.
The ALJ was required to consider all evidence relating to Mr. Moore's subjective
complaints, including: (1) Mr. Moore’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and
intensity of his pain; (3) precipitation and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness,

and side effects of his medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler,
739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). Further, if the ALJ rejects a claimant's testimony,
she must make an express credibility determination detailing her reasons for discrediting
the testimony. Prince v. Bowen, 894 F.2d 283, 286 (8th Cir. 1990).
ALJ McGee did these things. She considered Mr. Moore’s subjective complaints
alongside the medical evidence and ultimately found his credibility to be wanting, noting
the internal inconsistency in his complaints and also their inconsistency with the medical
records. (Doc. 9, pp. 592-93). Mr. Moore’s argument on appeal and his objections to the
R&R amount to no more than a desire that the evidence be weighed differently in deciding
his claim. Because the Court “may not reverse simply because [it] would have reached
a different conclusion than the ALJ or because substantial evidence supports a contrary
conclusion,” Miller, 784. F.3d at 477, Mr. Moore’s third objection to the R&R is
OVERRULED.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT 1S THEREFORE ORDERED that Mr. Moore’s Objections are OVERRULED, the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 18) is ADOPTED, and the ALJ’s decision to deny Mr.
Moore benefits is AFFIRMED. Mr. Moore) case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT 1S SO ORDERED on this Jo day of Jy fo.
is
WOTHY L S
CHIEF UNITBB-STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11408484. Public record. Not legal advice.