# MONTOYA

> District Court, D. Maine · August 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11408312

## Case

- **Full name:** Juliana Milena Ojeda Montoya v. Kevin Joyce, Sheriff, Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** August 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

JULIANA MILENA )
OJEDA MONTOYA, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) 2:25-cv-00558-SDN
)
KEVIN JOYCE, )
Sheriff, Cumberland County )
Sheriff’s Office, et al., )
)
Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES
On November 7, 2025, Petitioner Juliana Milena Ojeda Montoya filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging Respondents unlawfully re-
detained her under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) when they should have detained her, if at all,
only discretionarily under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See ECF No. 6-1 at 5. The Court granted her
petition on November 17, 2025, holding section 1226(a) governs her situation as a
noncitizen who has resided continuously in the United States for more than two years,
which rendered her re-detention unlawful from the outset.1 ECF No. 17 at 4. Ms. Ojeda
Montoya now timely moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of
$10,487.562 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. ECF
No. 22.

1 Although the parties initially contested the applicability of the Laken Riley Act to Ms. Ojeda Montoya’s
case, the Government conceded she was not subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). See ECF No. 15 at 2.
2 Petitioner originally sought $9,735.61 for litigating the underlying habeas petition, but her reply increased
that request to $10,487.56 to cover the costs of litigating the instant fees motion. See ECF No. 30 at 7.
ANALYSIS
The EAJA requires a court to award fees, costs, and other expenses to the
prevailing party in a civil action against the United States “unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The “position of the United States”

covers both the underlying agency action and the United States’ litigation position. Id.
§ 2412(d)(2)(D). To recover fees, a party must show (1) the petitioner prevailed in the civil
case; (2) the petition was filed on time; (3) the Government’s position was not
substantially justified; and (4) no special circumstances exist that would make awarding
fees against the Government unjust. Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder, 723 F.3d 48, 57 (1st
Cir. 2013). Neither party disputes the first two factors are satisfied.3 See ECF No. 22 at
1–4; ECF No. 30 at 7; see generally ECF No. 29. Respondents nonetheless resist the
award of fees on two fronts. First, they argue the EAJA does not waive the Government’s
sovereign immunity for fee awards in immigration habeas petitions—a position that runs
headlong into this Court’s own, repeated, precedent holding the opposite. Second, they
argue that even if the EAJA applies, their litigation position to re-detain Ms. Ojeda

Montoya was substantially justified.
I. EAJA
The threshold issue is whether the District Court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees under the EAJA for a habeas corpus petition arising

3 A fee petition is timely if filed within thirty days after the deadline to appeal the final judgment expires.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (EAJA requires fee application be filed within 30 days of “final judgment”);
id. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (“final judgment” means “a judgment that is final and not appealable”); Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(B) (party has 60 days after judgment is entered by the district court to file an appeal); Pierce v.
Barnhart, 440 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he thirty-day EAJA clock ‘begins to run after the time to
appeal that final judgment has expired.’” (quoting Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991)).
from civil immigration detention. The EAJA provides in relevant part: “a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The dispositive question is whether Petitioner’s challenge to
her immigration detention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 constitutes a “civil action” under

the EAJA.
Two courts in this District have already fulsomely considered and rejected
Respondents’ core argument that habeas challenges to civil immigration detention fall
outside of the EAJA’s definition of “civil action.” See Bernardo-Rodrigues v. Hyde, No.
25-CV-00553, 2026 WL 370863, at *2 (D. Me. Feb. 10, 2026); Pérez Piña v. Stamper,
Dkt. No. 25-CV-00509, ECF No. 34, at *6 (D. Me. May 20, 2026). The reasoning bears
repeating. The EAJA’s text sweeps broadly, covering “any civil action (other than cases
sounding in tort).” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Respondents themselves
concede as much, quoting the Supreme Court’s own observation that “habeas corpus is
technically ‘civil.’” ECF No. 29 at 5 (quoting Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4
(1971)). The statute’s use of the word “any” does the rest of the work: once a habeas action

qualifies as civil in nature, even partially, the EAJA covers it. Every district court in this
Circuit to address the question has reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Ndongala v.
Wesling, No. 26-cv-10194, 2026 WL 1534981, at *1 (D. Mass. June 1, 2026) (“[H]abeas
petitions are civil actions within the meaning of the EAJA.”); Peruano v. Wesling, No. CV
26-10300, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2026 WL 1413758, at *12 (D. Mass. May 20, 2026) (“[I]t is
well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding,” such that “the EAJA unambiguously
applies to habeas challenges to immigration detention.” (quotation modified)); Orrego
Orrego v. Hyde, No. CV 26-10260, 2026 WL 1480362, at *2 (D. Mass. May 27, 2026)
(concluding “habeas actions are civil actions for the purposes of EAJA”); Nguyen v.
Lyons, No. CV 25-631, 2026 WL 2137874, at *2 (D.R.I. July 24, 2026) (“[A] habeas
proceeding is a civil action for purposes of EAJA fees and costs.”); Bernardo-Rodrigues,
2026 WL 370863, at *1.
Respondents ask the Court to revisit that conclusion, arguing the better reading of

the EAJA’s text treats habeas actions challenging civil immigration detention as “hybrid”
in nature. ECF No. 29 at 14. The Court remains unpersuaded, at least where the detention
stems from civil immigration detention, rather than criminal proceedings. Cf. O’Brien v.
Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o the extent that a habeas proceeding
reviews a criminal punishment with the potential of overturning it, the habeas proceeding
necessarily assumes part of the underlying case’s criminal nature . . . .”). And even
granting Respondents’ framing, a “hybrid” proceeding still qualifies as civil to fall within
the EAJA’s use of “any”; nothing in the statute’s text demands an action be “purely a civil
action” in order to qualify. ECF No. 29 at 9 (quoting Barco v. Witte, 65 F.4th 782, 785
(5th Cir. 2023)) (emphasis added).
To the extent Respondents lean on Barco, 65 F.4th 782, and Obando-Segura v.

Garland, 999 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2021), the Court has already explained why those cases
are unpersuasive. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *5–6. A civil immigration habeas
petition exists to protect individual liberty and redress unlawful detention. Because Ms.
Ojeda Montoya’s detention arose from a civil immigration process, her challenge to it is
likewise an adversarial civil proceeding. See Ryan v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 974
F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[I]mmigration arrests are undeniably civil in nature.”);
Bernardo-Rodrigues, 2026 WL 370863, at *1 (“Through a civil habeas petition, an
individual in custody on civil process challenges the lawfulness of their detention through
an adversarial civil proceeding.”). Barco and Obando-Segura fail to grapple with this
distinction. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *6.
In sum, EAJA’s text unambiguously classifies Ms. Ojeda Montoya’s habeas petition
as a “civil action” such that the statute’s waiver of sovereign immunity reaches
Respondents for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees. The Court thus retains

jurisdiction over the motion.
II. Substantially Justified
Respondents’ second objection contends their litigation position—that Ms. Ojeda
Montoya faced mandatory re-detention without a bond hearing under section 1225(b)—
was substantially justified. The Government bears the burden of proving substantial
justification by a preponderance of the evidence. Saysana v. Gillen, 614 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2010). To be “substantially justified,” the Government’s position need not be “justified to
a high degree,” rather, it suffices if it is “justified in substance or in the main.” Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
The Court sets out the facts here because they inform, and ultimately undercut,
Respondents’ claim of substantial justification.4 Ms. Ojeda Montoya entered the country
uninspected on February 22, 2023. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Within a day, the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended her and placed her into removal
proceedings, ECF No. 8-1 at 1, classifying her as “a[] [noncitizen] present in the United
States who has not been admitted or paroled” under section 236 of the Immigration and

4 The Court’s earlier order granting Petitioner’s release recounts the factual circumstances in greater detail.
See Ojeda Montoya v. Joyce, Dkt. No. 25-cv-00558, ECF No. 14, at *1–4 (D. Me. Nov. 10, 2025).
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.5 ECF No. 1-1 at 1. The Immigration Court subsequently
held a bond hearing and released her on $1,500 bond and subject to conditions of release.
ECF No. 1-3 at 1.
On August 1, 2025, Massachusetts filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Ojeda
Montoya. ECF No. 8-4 at 5. On November 6, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) agents pulled over her car, which her husband was driving. ECF No.
6-1 at 3. A bystander captured the scene on video: an ICE agent attempting to pry Ms.
Ojeda Montoya’s young daughter from her husband’s arms while he suffered an apparent
seizure. See id. at 4. Agents then re-detained Ms. Ojeda Montoya and placed her into ICE
custody, id., where she remained until this Court ordered her release on November 10,
2026, ECF No. 14. Before her arrest, Ms. Ojeda Montoya lawfully resided in the interior
of the country under conditional release and held a valid work authorization document
that permitted her to maintain gainful employment at Burger King. ECF No. 1-5 at 1; ECF
No. 6-1 at 3. Ms. Ojeda Montoya challenged her re-detention in the habeas petition filed
on November 7, 2025, ECF No. 1, and the Court granted that petition on November 17,
2025, holding section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention scheme governed her case, ECF

No. 17.
Respondents now argue that re-detaining Ms. Ojeda Montoya without notice or an
opportunity to be heard was substantially justified. This Court already rejected that same
defense in Pérez Piña, where Respondents raised an identical substantially-justified

5 Under section 1226, a noncitizen who is “arrested and detained” faces three potential outcomes during the
pendency of their removal proceedings: the Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested
[noncitizen]”; “may release the [noncitizen] on bond of at least $1,500”; or “may release the [noncitizen]
on conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). It therefore “establishes a discretionary detention framework for
noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).
argument in response to a fees motion. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *6–11. Their
continued reliance on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. Sept. 5, 2025), provides no refuge for their decision
to re-detain Petitioner for the reasons this Court has already stated. See Pérez Piña, ECF
No. 34, at *9–10.

More importantly, at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention, Respondents were
bound by—and continue to be beholden to—Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent
that conclusively foreclosed their attempts to re-detain Petitioner without due process,
regardless of the statutory construction of the text of sections 1225 and 1226. Because
DHS had already initially detained and released Ms. Ojeda Montoya on conditional
release in March 2025, ICE’s regulations on revocation of conditional release governed
the decision to re-detain her in November 2025. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2); Kong v.
United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619–20 (1st Cir. 2023) (section 241.13(i)(2) requires “(1) an
individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed circumstances, (4)
removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future”). Kong,
decided in 2023, sits squarely on point and should have guided Respondents’ conduct:

before re-detaining her, Ms. Ojeda Montoya was entitled to an individualized
determination to revoke conditional release that required consideration “prior to re-
detention.” Huynh v. Wesling, No. 25-CV-13794, 2026 WL 183467, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan.
23, 2026) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). ICE failed to follow its own regulations—
regulations designed precisely to protect noncitizens’ due process rights.
Respondents assert “there was no appellate guidance whatsoever” on the issue of
detention. ECF No. 29 at 14. But that claim ignores Kong and decades of Supreme Court
and First Circuit precedent, unequivocally guaranteeing noncitizens due process in
immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (“But
this [Supreme] [C]ourt has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that
administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as
understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is that

no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be
heard . . . .”); Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *8. To the extent Respondents take umbrage with
the application of Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), to this case
because it does not explicitly address the statutory construction of sections 1225 and 1226,
the Court reiterates that Hernandez-Lara stands for the simple proposition that due
process applies in immigration detention cases. See Pérez Piña, ECF No. 34, at *10–11;
Bernardo-Rodrigues, 2026 WL 370863, at *3 (“[T]he preexisting law in this Circuit
required Respondents to afford a noncitizen like Petitioner access to a discretionary
detention regime on due process grounds.” (emphasis in original)). Respondents point to
no evidence in the record that they supplied Ms. Ojeda Montoya the process she was due.
Their litigation position was not substantially justified then, and it is not now.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
ECF No. 22. Pursuant to the Court’s authority under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A),
the Court ORDERS the United States to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,487.56,
in full satisfaction of any and all attorney’s fees and expenses under the EAJA in this
action.
SO ORDERED.

Dated this 4th day of August, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11408312. Public record. Not legal advice.