# Bourgeois

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · July 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11408169

## Case

- **Full name:** Errol J. Bourgeois, et al. v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ERROL J. BOURGEOIS, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-526
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions for partial summary judgment filed by Defendant Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Liberty”), as the alleged insurer of Hopeman Brothers, Inc.
(“Hopeman”).1 In this litigation, Plaintiffs Errol J. Bourgeois, Sr. and Mary Anne Bourgeois
Richardson’s (“Plaintiffs”) allege Decedent Emanuel J. Bourgeois (“Decedent”), while an
employee for Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (“Avondale”),2 was exposed to asbestos and
asbestos-containing products manufactured, distributed, sold, and/or handled by Avondale and
other parties.3 Plaintiffs allege this exposure caused and/or contributed to Decedent’s development
of mesothelioma and, ultimately, his death.4
Liberty moves for summary judgment on four issues: (1) Hopeman is not liable for an

intentional tort; (2) Hopeman is not liable for fraud; (3) Hopeman is not an alter ego of Wayne
Manufacturing Corporation (“Wayne”); and (4) Hopeman was not a manufacturer of asbestos-

1 Rec. Docs. 257, 261.
2 Huntington Ingalls, Inc. was formerly known as: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems, Inc., Avondale Industries, Inc., Avondale Shipyard Inc., and Avondale Marine Ways, Inc.
3 Rec. Doc. 13.
4 Id.
containing products.5 Plaintiffs oppose the motions.6 Having considered the motions, the
memoranda in support and opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants both
motions.
I. Background
On February 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a petition against Avondale, Sparta Insurance

Company, Travelers Indemnity Company, and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London in the
Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.7 On March 17, 2025, Avondale removed the case to
this Court.8 On April 9, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental and Amending Complaint
adding Bayer CropScience, Inc., Eagle, Inc., Foster-Wheeler LLC, General Electric Company,
Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc., The McCarty Corporation, Paramount Global, Uniroyal, Inc.,
International Paper Company, and American Insurance Company as Defendants.9 On May 19,
2025, Plaintiffs filed a Second Supplemental and Amending Complaint adding Liberty, as the
alleged insurer of Hopeman, as a Defendant.10 Avondale has also filed crossclaims and a Third-
Party Complaint naming numerous additional third-party defendants, including Liberty, as the
alleged insurer of Wayne.11

5 Rec. Docs. 257, 261.
6 Rec. Doc. 286.
7 Rec. Doc. 1-2.
8 Rec. Doc. 1.
9 Rec. Doc. 13. Plaintiffs’ claims against International Paper Company were dismissed with prejudice on
December 18, 2025. Rec. Doc. 144.
10 Rec. Doc. 77.
11 Rec. Docs. 4, 43, 86.
2
The Amended Complaint alleges that Decedent was employed by Avondale between 1963
and 2005, and during his employment he was allegedly exposed to asbestos.12 The Amended
Complaint alleges that Decedent was also exposed to asbestos through contact with his family
members who were employed at Avondale.13 The Amended Complaint states that these exposures
caused and/or contributed to Decedent’s development of mesothelioma and other related ill health

effects, and ultimately his death.14 The Amended Complaint states that Decedent was first
diagnosed with cancer on approximately October 31, 2024, and the diagnosis was confirmed as
mesothelioma on November 13, 2024.15 The Amended Complaint states that Decedent died on
November 12, 2024, as a result of the mesothelioma and complications therefrom.16 The Amended
Complaint states that Decedent was survived by his siblings, Errol Bourgeois and Mary Anne
Bourgeois Richardson.17
On June 9, 2026, Liberty filed the instant Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.18 On
June 16, 2026, Plaintiffs opposed the motions.19

12 Rec. Doc. 13 at 2.
13 Id.

14 Id.
15 Id. at 5.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Rec. Docs. 257, 261.
19 Rec. Doc. 272.
3
II. Parties Arguments
A. Liberty’s Arguments in Support of the Motions
Liberty moves for summary judgment on four issues: (1) Hopeman is not liable for an
intentional tort; (2) Hopeman is not liable for fraud; (3) Hopeman is not an alter ego of Wayne;
and (4) Hopeman was not a manufacturer of asbestos-containing products.20

First, Liberty argues that summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of intent because
Hopeman did not: (1) have a conscious desire to inflict Decedent with mesothelioma; or (2) know
with substantial certainty that Decedent would contract mesothelioma because of exposure to
Hopeman’s operations.21
Second, Liberty asserts that Hopeman cannot be held liable for fraud or concealment
because Hopeman did not: (1) tell Decedent that asbestos was safe or suppress information from
him; or (2) make such a statement or omission with the intent to gain an unjust advantage over, or
harm, Decedent.22
Third, Liberty argues that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that Hopeman
and Wayne are alter egos.23 Liberty submits that Hopeman and Wayne are separate corporations,

and they were incorporated at different times, in different states, and for completely different
business purposes.24 According to Liberty, the corporations are distinct legal entities because: (1)
Hopeman was, and remains, properly incorporated; (2) Hopeman was a profitable business both

20 Rec. Docs. 257, 261.
21 Rec. Doc. 257-2 at 4–8.
22 Id. at 8–9.
23 Id. at 9.
24 Id. at 12.
4
before and after the dissolution of Wayne; (3) Wayne and Hopeman maintained separate checking
accounts as well as a separate accounting thereof; (4) Hopeman has always separately filed its tax
returns; and (5) customers always knew they were dealing with separate corporate entities.25
Fourth, Liberty contends there is no evidence that Hopeman was a manufacturer of
asbestos-containing products.26 Liberty cites numerous cases finding that Hopeman was not a

manufacturer of asbestos-containing products.27 Liberty argues that the Louisiana Products
Liability Act (“LPLA”) should not apply to this case because it was enacted after the asbestos-
exposure at issue in this case.28 Liberty submits that Hopeman was directed to install asbestos-
containing wallboard by the relevant specifications and Hopeman followed those specifications.29
Liberty asserts these actions do not make Hopeman a manufacturer.30
B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition to the Motions
Plaintiffs oppose summary judgment on all four issues.31 First, Plaintiffs assert that
summary judgment must be denied on the intentional tort claims.32 Plaintiffs submit Hopeman
knew of the hazards of asbestos and precautionary measures that should have been taken years

25 Id. at 13–14.
26 Rec. Doc. 261-2 at 4.
27 Id. at 4–5.
28 Id. at 5.
29 Id. at 6.
30 Id.
31 Rec. Doc. 245.
32 Id. at 16–24.
5
before Decedent’s exposure.33 Despite having this knowledge, Plaintiffs contend Hopeman
nevertheless took steps to conceal warnings regarding the hazards of asbestos from workers.34
Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that Decedent was exposed to asbestos from Hopeman and Wayne’s
wallboards at Avondale without any safety precautions being taken, and with warnings being
suppressed by Hopeman.35

Second, Plaintiffs contend that Hopeman committed fraud because it was aware of the
hazards of asbestos and the precautionary measures that should have been taken, but Hopeman
chose to remain silent and failed to institute necessary precautionary measures.36
Third, Plaintiffs argue Hopeman is an alter ego of Wayne.37 Plaintiffs contend Wayne was
a wholly owned subsidiary of Hopeman during the relevant time period, there was duplication of
officers between Hopeman and Wayne, most of Wayne’s assets were transferred to another wholly
owned subsidiary of Hopeman when Wayne was liquidated, Hopeman supplied micarta and
marinite to Wayne so that Wayne could glue the boards together, and Hopeman directed Wayne
to remove warning labels from the marinite during the gluing process.38

Fourth, Plaintiffs contend that Hopeman and Wayne incorporated asbestos-containing
micarta and marinite into a new wallboard product that was then further modified by Hopeman

33 Id. at 19.
34 Id. at 20.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 24–25.
37 Id. at 3–6.
38 Id. at 4–5.
6
and incorporated into vessels being constructed at Avondale as component parts of those vessels.39
As such, Plaintiffs argue Hopeman is liable as a manufacturer of asbestos-containing products.40

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”41 The court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant.42 Initially, the movant bears the burden of presenting the
basis for the motion; that is, the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact or facts.43 The
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine
dispute.44 “A dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”45
IV. Analysis
A. Intentional Tort Claims

Liberty, as the alleged insurer of Hopeman, moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
intentional tort claims. As an initial matter, the Court notes that generally, summary judgment is

39 Id. at 12.
40 Id.
41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
42 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
43 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
44 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).
45 Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted).
7
disfavored when issues of intent or state of mind are involved because those determinations are
inherently a question of fact which turns on credibility.46 However, a court is not precluded from
granting summary judgment where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue.47 The
Fifth Circuit has cautioned that “the court must be vigilant to draw every reasonable inference from
the evidence in the record in a light most flattering to the nonmoving party.”48 For example,

summary judgment may still be appropriate when intent or state of mind is at issue if the non-
moving party merely rests on conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation.49
To prove that a defendant committed an intentional tort under Louisiana law, a plaintiff
must show that a defendant either: “‘(1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever
the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that the result is substantially
certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.’”50 “Thus, intent
has reference to the consequences of an act rather than to the act itself.”51 Therefore, Plaintiffs
must prove that Hopeman either consciously desired that Decedent would contract mesothelioma,
or knew that result was “substantially certain to follow from [Hopeman’s] conduct.”52 Plaintiffs

46 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1265–66 (5th Cir. 1991) (“When state of mind is an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, it is less fashionable to grant summary judgment because a party’s
state of mind is inherently a question of fact which turns on credibility.”).
47 Id. at 1266 (“This is not to say that the court can never enter summary judgment when intent or state of
mind is at issue, only that the court must recognize that undermining the moving party’s professed state of mind is not
a simple task. Therefore, the court must be vigilant to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence in the record
in a light most flattering to the nonmoving party.”).
48 Id.
49 Id. (internal citation omitted).
50 Reeves v. Structural Pres. Sys., 98-1795 (La. 3/12/99), 731 So. 2d 208, 211 (quoting Bazley v. Tortorich,
397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981)).
51 Bazley, 397 So. 2d at 481.
52 Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 2003-0658 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05); 905 So. 2d 465, 475, writ denied, 2005-2102
8
do not address the first prong, but instead argue that Hopeman knew of the hazards of asbestos and
were substantially certain that disease would occur.
Substantial certainty “requires more than a reasonable probability that an injury will
occur.”53 To satisfy the criterion of “substantial certainty,” Plaintiffs must prove that Decedent’s
contracting mesothelioma was “inevitable or incapable of failing.”54 “[M]ere knowledge and

appreciation of a risk does not constitute intent, nor does reckless or wanton conduct.”55 The
“belie[f] that someone may, or even probably will, eventually get hurt if a workplace practice is
continued does not rise to the level of intentional tort, but instead falls within the range of negligent
acts. . . .”56 To prove a claim for intentional tort, Plaintiffs would have to show that Hopeman’s
“conduct [went] beyond knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, ordering an
employee to perform an extremely dangerous job, or willfully failing to furnish a safe place to
work. . . .”57
Several judges in this District have considered intentional tort claims against Avondale
arising out of asbestos exposure.58 In Vedros v. Northop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., the plaintiffs

argued that Avondale had awareness of the risks associated with asbestos as well as unsafe working

(La. 3/17/06), 925 So. 2d 538 (internal citations omitted).
53 Reeves, 731 So. 2d at 213 (internal citations omitted).
54 Id. (internal citations omitted).
55 Id. (internal citations omitted).
56 Id. at 212.
57 Zimko, 905 So. 2d at 477 (internal citations omitted).
58 Legendre v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n, No. 22-1767, 2024 WL 1556842 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2024); Becnel
v. Lamorak Ins. Co., No. CV 19-14536, 2022 WL 3665085 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2022); Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co., 597
F. Supp. 3d 959 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2022); Vedros v. Northop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., No. 11-1198, 2014 WL
906164 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2014).
9
conditions, and despite this knowledge, Avondale did not remedy those conditions.59 The district
judge granted summary judgment and found that “[e]ven considering the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs and assuming that Defendants were aware that there was a major risk, or
even a probability, that [the decedent] would contract mesothelioma,” the plaintiffs did not provide
evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to determine “that [the decedent’s] contracting

mesothelioma was ‘inevitable or incapable of failing’ and was thus substantially certain to result
from” Avondale’s conduct.60 Similarly in Cortez, the district judge found that the plaintiff’s
general assertions that Avondale “knew that asbestos was a health hazard,” that asbestos “caused
fatal lung disease,” and that Avondale “had problems with it . . . falls short of what is necessary to
raise a material issue for an intentional-tort claim.”61 Likewise in Becnel, the district court held
that “even assuming the defendants were aware that the alleged asbestos from their respective
products was dangerous, and they should have used precautionary measures,” plaintiffs failed to
meet their evidentiary burden “whereby a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff’s]
primary lung cancer was ‘inevitable or incapable of failing.’”62

In Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co., this Court denied Avondale’s motion for
reconsideration of a prior state court order denying summary judgment on this issue.63 The Court
noted that Avondale had not presented any newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence,

59 Vedros, 2014 WL 906164 at *3.
60 Id.
61 597 F.Supp.3d at 977.
62 Becnel, 2022 WL 3665085 at *4.
63 Dempster v. Lamorak Ins. Co., No. 20-95, 2020 WL 3892810 (E.D. La. July 10, 2020).
10
nor did Avondale identify a change of law that would warrant granting the motion.64 In Constanza
v. Sparta Insurance Co., this Court found its prior decision in Dempster distinguishable because
the Court was considering the motion for partial summary judgment for the first time, not on a
motion for reconsideration of any earlier decision made in state court.65 The Court concluded that
Liberty was entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to show

that Hopeman consciously intended to harm the decedent or that his mesothelioma was “inevitable
or incapable of failing.”66
The Court finds that the evidence Plaintiffs present in this case falls below the bar of what
is needed to raise a material issue for an intentional tort claim. Plaintiffs cite the deposition
testimony of Decedent’s co-workers, showing that Decedent was exposed to various asbestos-
containing products by Hopeman employees.67 Plaintiffs cite to the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act, the Walsh Healey Act, and the 1943 Louisiana Sanitary Code for support that
Hopeman had notice of the hazards of asbestos.68 Plaintiffs also cite testimony from former
Hopeman executives establishing that Hopeman had knowledge of the dangers of asbestos in
1965.69

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence only suggests
that Hopeman knew of the hazards of asbestos at the time of Decedent’s exposure. However,

64 Id. at 7.
65 Constanza v. Sparta Insurance Company, No. 24-871, Rec. Doc. 375, at *10 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2025).
66 Id. at 11 (quoting Reeves, 731 So. 2d at 213).
67 Rec. Doc. 286 at 20–21.
68 Id. at 19.
69 Id. at 19–20.
11
Plaintiffs do not submit any evidence suggesting that Hopeman consciously intended to harm
Decedent or that his mesothelioma was “inevitable or incapable of failing.”70 Even assuming that
Hopeman had awareness that workplace exposure to asbestos was dangerous and that they should
have utilized precautionary measures, Plaintiffs fail to bring forward sufficient evidence “whereby
a reasonable juror could conclude that [Decedent’s mesothelioma] was inevitable” such that it was

substantially certain to result from Hopeman’s conduct.71 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’
claim against Hopeman “lies in the realm of negligence, not in the realm of intentional tort.”72
Thus, Liberty is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ intentional tort claim against
it as the insurer for Hopeman.
B. Fraud and Concealment Claims
Liberty, as the alleged insurer of Hopeman, moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
fraud and concealment claims. In Louisiana, the elements of a claim for fraud are: (1) a
misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) made with the intent to deceive, and (3) causing justifiable
reliance with resultant injury.73 Therefore, in order to succeed on a tort claim for fraud, Plaintiffs

must prove that (1) Hopeman misrepresented a material fact, (2) with the intent to deceive, and (3)
caused justifiable reliance and resultant injury.74 Under Louisiana law, fraud may result from
silence or inaction.75 However, “[i]n order to find fraud from silence or suppression of the truth,

70 Reeves, 731 So. 2d at 213.
71 Becnel, 2022 WL 3665085 at *4.
72 Cortez, 597 F. Supp. 3d at 977.
73 Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1999).
74 Id.
75 La. Civ. Code art. 1953 (“Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention
either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also
12
there must exist a duty to speak or disclose information . . . And while fraud may indeed result
from a party’s silence or inaction, mere silence or inaction without fraudulent intent does not
constitute fraud. Fraudulent intent, or the intent to deceive, is a necessary and inherent element of
fraud.”76
The evidence presented by Plaintiffs does not support the assertion that Hopeman acted

with fraudulent intent. Even if the evidence suggests that Hopeman was aware of the risks
associated with exposure to asbestos products and did not warn Decedent of the hazards, these
assertions alone “without fraudulent intent do[ ] not constitute fraud.”77 Because Plaintiffs have
not produced any evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Hopeman’s
fraudulent intent, Liberty is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ fraud and concealment
claims against Hopeman.
C. Alter Ego Claims
Liberty also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against Hopeman as the
alleged alter ego of Wayne. Under Louisiana law, “[c]orporations function as distinct legal entities,

separate from the individuals who own them, and their shareholders are not generally liable for the
debts of the corporation.”78 The same principal of limited shareholder liability “applies where one
corporation wholly owns another.”79 In certain circumstances Louisiana law permits “piercing the

result from silence or inaction.”).
76 Terrebonne Concrete, LLC v. CEC Enters., LLC, 2011-0072 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/17/11), 76 So. 3d 502, 509,
writ denied, 2011-2021 (La. 11/18/11), 75 So. 3d 464 (internal citations omitted).
77 Becnel, 2022 WL 3665085 at *4.
78 Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Riggins v. Dixie
Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (La. 1991)).
79 Bujol v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 2003-0492 (La. 5/25/04), 922 So. 2d 1113, 1127.
13
corporate veil” on an alter ego basis.80 This usually involves “situations where fraud or deceit has
been practiced by the shareholder acting through the corporation.”81 “Louisiana courts have
declared that the strong policy of Louisiana is to favor the recognition of the corporation’s separate
existence, so that veil-piercing is an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only rarely.”82
In Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co. the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the following factors

for courts to consider when determining whether to apply the alter ego doctrine:
(1) commingling of corporate and shareholder funds;
(2) failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and transacting
corporate affairs;
(3) undercapitalization;
(4) failure to provide separate bank accounts and bookkeeping records; and
(5) failure to hold regular shareholder and director meetings.83

Plaintiffs do not present any evidence to support application of the alter ego doctrine based on
these factors. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on Green v. Champion Insurance Co.,84 and request that the
Court deem Hopeman and Wayne a single business enterprise under the eighteen-factor test laid
out in that case. Green set forth eighteen factors for determining whether affiliated entities
constitute a single business enterprise:
(1) corporations with identity or substantial identity of ownership, that is,
ownership of sufficient stock to give actual working control;
(2) common directors or officers;
(3) unified administrative control of corporations whose business functions are
similar or supplementary;
(4) directors and officers of one corporation act independently in the interest of that

80 Hollowell, 217 F.3d at 385 (quoting Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1168).
81 Id. (quoting Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1168).
82 Bujol, 922 So. 2d at 1128 (quoting Glenn G. Morris and Wendell H. Holmes, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise,
Vol. 8, Business Organizations § 32.02 (1999)).
83 Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1168.
84 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991).
14
corporation;
(5) corporation financing another corporation;
(6) inadequate capitalization (“thin incorporation”);
(7) corporation causing the incorporation of another affiliated corporation;
(8) corporation paying the salaries and other expenses or losses of another
corporation;
(9) receiving no business other than that given to it by its affiliated corporations;
(10) corporation using the property of another corporation as its own;
(11) noncompliance with corporate formalities;
(12) common employees;
(13) services rendered by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another
corporation;
(14) common offices;
(15) centralized accounting;
(16) undocumented transfers of funds between corporations;
(17) unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations; and
(18) excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate corporations.85

The court explained that the factors are “illustrative and [are] not intended as an exhaustive list,”
and “[n]o one factor is dispositive.”86
Plaintiffs do not contest Liberty’s evidence that: the companies were separately
incorporated in different states at different times, the companies maintained separate accounting
systems, the companies used separate checking accounts, the companies filed separate tax returns,
and Wayne was profitable from its inception in 1922 to its dissolution in 1985.87 Plaintiffs submit
evidence showing that Wayne and Hopeman shared some officers, the businesses shared the same
address for a period of time, Wayne primarily provided composite wallboards to Hopeman, and
Wayne was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hopeman at the relevant time.88

85 Id. at 257–58.
86 Id. at 258.
87 Rec. Doc. 257-2 at 12–13.
88 Rec. Doc. 286 at 4–5.
15
Louisiana appellate courts have declined to pierce the corporate veil under the single
business enterprise framework where “[u]nlike in the Green case . . . there is simply no wrongdoing
or other extraordinary circumstances present in the relationship between [the companies] that
justifies disregarding the law of Louisiana corporations.”89 The Fifth Circuit has also instructed
that single business enterprise veil-piercing is utilized “for the purpose of preventing fraud or

achieving equity.”90 The evidence presented to support application of the single business enterprise
doctrine in this case is “perfectly consistent with legitimate, efficient business operations, such as
common control, common employees, officers, and directors, shared offices, and some form of
centralized accounting.”91
Plaintiffs have not shown that the single business enterprise theory should apply in this
case. Only a few of the Green factors are present, and the factors at issue are all consistent with
legitimate business practices. Plaintiffs have not pointed to evidence showing that any
extraordinary circumstances, such as fraud or other wrongdoing, exist. Claims against Wayne and
Hopeman are both pending before this Court. Therefore, considering Louisiana’s strong public

policy supporting corporations functioning as distinct legal entities, the Court finds that application
of the alter ego doctrine is not appropriate in this case.

89 Johnson v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., No. 14-541, 2014 WL 5410646, at *4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/22/14), writ
denied, 161 So. 3d 641 (La. 2015); see also Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., No. 47,085 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 110 So. 3d
150, 159, writ denied, 99 So. 3d 652 (La. 2012) (rejecting single business enterprise liability where “the case
present[ed] none of the normal grounds for piercing the corporate veil”); Town of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp.,
No. 42,019 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/2/07), 956 So. 2d 192, 198–99 (reversing trial court’s single business enterprise finding
when there was no evidence of “wrongdoing or other extraordinary circumstances” affecting the plaintiff’s dealings
with a subsidiary within an affiliated group).
90 In re Ark-La-Tex Timber Co., Inc., 482 F.3d 319, 335 (5th Cir. 2007).
91 Bona Fide Demolition & Recovery, LLC v. Crosby Const. Co. of Louisiana, 690 F. Supp. 2d 435, 445 (E.D.
La. 2010).
16
D. Manufacturer Liability Claims

Liberty moves for summary judgment on the issue of whether Hopeman was a
manufacturer of asbestos-containing products. A plaintiff can recover against a manufacturer by
“proving that his injury was caused by a condition of the product existing at the time it left the
manufacturer’s control that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous in normal use.”92
Liberty argues that Hopeman did not manufacture any asbestos-containing products and was
merely a subcontractor that provided furnished wallboard to Avondale. Plaintiffs assert that
Hopeman was a manufacturer because it modified and fabricated the wallboards.
Plaintiffs argue that the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) codified pre-existing
jurisprudence. The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that the LPLA only has prospective
effect.93 Nevertheless, even assuming that the LPLA’s definition of manufacturer applies, Plaintiff
has not demonstrated that Hopeman was a manufacturer.
The LPLA defines a “manufacturer” as “a person or entity who is in the business of
manufacturing a product for placement into trade or commerce.”94 The statute provides that

‘“[m]anufacturing a product means producing, making, fabricating, constructing, designing,
remanufacturing, reconditioning or refurbishing a product.”95 Under the statute, manufacturer is
also defined as: (1) “[a] person or entity who labels a product as his own or who otherwise holds

92 Becnel v. Lamorak Ins. Co., No. 19-14546, 2022 WL 3369163, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2022).
93 Gilboy v. Am. Tobacco Co., 582 So.2d 1263, 1264–65 (La. 1991).
94 La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.53.
95 Id.
17
himself out to be the manufacturer of the product;” and (2) “[a] manufacturer of a product who
incorporates into the product a component or part manufactured by another manufacturer.”96
Plaintiffs assert that Hopeman was a joiner at Avondale from decades and worked to install
asbestos panels throughout ships constructed there. Plaintiffs contend that Wayne would
manufacture panels for Hopeman’s use, which Hopeman would then cut down aboard ships to

install, producing asbestos dust. Multiple judges in this District, including the undersigned, have
found that Hopeman cannot be held liable as a manufacturer based on these same facts.97 Hopeman
was a subcontractor that furnished a component part to Avondale, who was responsible for
production of the ships. “To deem Hopeman a manufacturer would be to deem all joiners,
carpenters, sheet rock installers, and other subcontractors as manufacturers of a finished
product.”98 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that this such an application is consistent with
Louisiana law.
Accordingly,

96 Id.
97 Constanza v. Sparta Insurance Company, No. 24-871, Rec. Doc. 375, at *16 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2025);
Matherne v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., No. 22-2656, Rec. Doc. 327, at *9 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2024); Adams v. Eagle,
Inc., No. 21-694, Rec. Doc. 209, at *12 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2022); Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company, No. 20-
2389, Rec. Doc. 1142 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2022).
98 Matherne, No. 22-2656, Rec. Doc. 327, at *9.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Liberty’s motions for partial summary judgment” are
GRANTED. Liberty is entitled to summary judgment finding that Hopeman is not a manufacturer
under Louisiana law. Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional tort, fraud, concealment and alter ego
liability against Hopeman are also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _21St day of June, 2026.

NANNETTE JOLI TE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

% Rec. Does. 257, 261.
19

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11408169. Public record. Not legal advice.