# Fortson

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · July 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11407996

## Case

- **Full name:** Laverne Eugene Fortson v. Sergeant Patrick Dugan, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LAVERNE EUGENE FORTSON, ) CASE NO. 5:26-cv-01238
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
) ORDER
SERGEANT PATRICK DUGAN, et al., )
) (Resolving Docs. 3, 6, 15, 25, and 26)
Defendants. )

I.
Plaintiff’s Lawsuit. On May 29, 2026, plaintiff Laverne Eugene Fortson filed
this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The defendants include a variety of
individuals and organizations linked in some fashion to Akron, Summit County,
Portage County, or the ATF, and further linked to law enforcement in those geographic
areas. (Doc. 1, 5/29/26) On the same day, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that,
among other things, adds a special agent from the ATF as a defendant and cites Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as another legal basis for his
lawsuit. (Doc. 2, 5/29/26)
In Plaintiff’s words, his civil rights action is for relief, which includes $5 million
in compensatory damages plus punitive damages not less than three times the
compensatory damages awarded against each defendant, “for constitutional violations
committed by state and federal actors across two separate prosecutions spanning more
than a decade. The injuries are complete and compensable regardless of the outcome

of the underlying criminal proceedings.” (Doc. 2, PageID #19)
Aside from amending his complaint, Plaintiff has made several other filings. He
seeks to stay all proceedings in this case to give the courts more time to resolve two
pending appeals and a pending motion at the trial level. (Doc. 3, 5/29/26, PageID #31)
These unresolved matters are part and parcel of the proceedings in this district that
resulted in Plaintiff’s federal criminal convictions and sentences. The request for a

stay arises from an acknowledgment that this lawsuit implicates Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), which this order takes up below.
In addition, Plaintiff asks me to recuse myself because I was the presiding judge
in one of the criminal cases where a jury convicted him. (Doc. 6, 6/1/26, PageID #85).
Plaintiff also asks that the Court take judicial notice of a significant number of

documents and other court cases as well as witness testimony related to the federal
criminal proceedings against him. (Doc. 25, 7/6/26, PageID #174, 175-78)
Motions by Defendants to Dismiss. Defendants Deputy Eric Centa, Portage
County, and the Portage County Sheriff’s Office ask the Court to dismiss the lawsuit
in its entirety. (Doc. 15, 6/17/26) These Portage County Defendants base their motion

on three grounds: Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim; Heck bars Plaintiff’s
claims; and Deputy Centa is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id., PageID #98) Plaintiff
has opposed this motion. (Doc. 24, 7/6/26) It is, therefore, ripe for adjudication.
Defendant Summit County also filed a motion to dismiss that raises similar
grounds: Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim; defendant Summit County is
entitled to absolute immunity; Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations;

and Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck. (Doc. 26, 7/13/26, PageID #184) Plaintiff
opposed defendant Summit County’s motion two days later, (Doc. 28, 7/15/26, PageID
#217), so this motion is also ripe for adjudication.
Another group of defendants, which includes Sgt. Patrick Dugan, the Akron
Safer Streets Task Force, and the Summit Narcotics Unit Division, raise these same
defenses in their answer to the amended complaint, including the defense that Heck

bars this action. (Doc. 19, 6/25/26, PageID #138, 145-46)
Plaintiff’s Current Status and Prior or Pending Litigation. Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated in a federal correctional institution. (Doc. 1, 5/29/26, PageID #2) He’s
there because on February 13, 2015, he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
distribute heroin. United States v. Fortson, Case No. 1:14-cr-00194-3 (N.D. Ohio).

Three months later, another district judge of this Court sentenced Plaintiff to 108
months in prison for that conviction. Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged that outcome
through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Fortson, Case No. 19-
3872, slip op. (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2020). A second motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was
dismissed and transferred to the Court of Appeals, which eventually dismissed the case

for want of prosecution. In re: Laverne Fortson, Case No. 25-3804, slip op. (6th Cir.
Dec. 19, 2025). The Court of Appeals also denied a third attempt at post-conviction
relief. In re: Laverne Fortson, Case No. 25-3790, slip op. (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026).
Plaintiff continues to challenge the federal conviction and sentence that
followed his change of plea in 2015. Just four months ago on March 16, 2026, Plaintiff
filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to challenge anew the denial of an earlier

motion that he had brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district judge of this Court
who adjudged Plaintiff guilty and sentenced him has not yet ruled on that most recent
motion.
After serving his prison sentence from his first federal conviction, Plaintiff
violated his supervised release. On October 28, 2025, this Court sentenced Plaintiff to
30 additional months of imprisonment as a result. His challenge to the revocation of

his supervised release is pending in the Court of Appeals. United States v. Fortson,
Case No. 25-3897 (6th Cir.).
Plaintiff is also in prison for another federal case out of this district. United
States v. Fortson, Case No. 5:24-cr-00295-1 (N.D. Ohio). On June 5, 2025, a jury
convicted him of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to

distribute methamphetamine and cocaine and one count of possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. The jury acquitted him of one count of maintaining a
drug-involved premises. On October 28, 2025, the Court sentenced Plaintiff to 210
months in custody. That same day, the Court ordered that the 30-month sentence
Plaintiff received for his supervised release violations in his first federal case run

consecutively to the sentence he received in his second federal case. This second case
is on direct appeal. United States v. Fortson, Case No. 25-3895 (6th Cir.).
In addition to these proceedings, Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain a writ of mandamus,
In re: Laverne Fortson, Case No. 25-3333 (6th Cir.), to stay the proceedings in this
Court, United States v. Fortson, Case No. 25-3365 (6th Cir.), and to challenge the
jury’s verdict, United States v. Fortson, Case No. 25-3527 (6th Cir.), have been

unsuccessful.
The Parties’ Positions on the Applicability of Heck v. Humphrey. As already
noted, Plaintiff acknowledges that Heck bars at least for the moment some of his causes
of action. In Plaintiff’s view, however, Heck does not bar counts 3, 5, and 8 of the
amended complaint. (Doc. 2, PageID #20) Defendants who answered or who seek
dismissal of this lawsuit disagree. They contend that Heck bars all the causes of action.

Count 3 of the amended complaint alleges abuse of process. (Id., PageID #25)
It concerns allegations that defendant Sgt. Dugan and others participated in searches
based on warrants that defendant Deputy Centa obtained purportedly without federal
authority. Count 3 further alleges that legal process was used without lawful authority
when state charges were filed against Plaintiff and then dropped immediately before

federal indictments were handed down in both federal criminal cases mentioned above.
Count 5 alleges a coordinated abuse of process whereby “[t]he identical two-
step pattern across both prosecutions—state charges filed, state charges silently
dropped, federal indictment on same conduct—combined with Deputy Centa’s
participation in both without lawful authority . . . and the simultaneous search of an

innocent family member’s home . . . that found no contraband, establishes a
coordinated pattern of abuse of state and federal legal process against Plaintiff
across a decade.” (Id., PageID #26)
Count 8 alleges abuse of process by the newly added defendant, ATF SA
Elizabeth Gardner. The amended complaint alleges that she conducted an unlawful

interview of Plaintiff’s co-defendant in his second federal criminal case, using
suggestive questioning without a factual basis to imply that Plaintiff’s two sisters, who
were not charged criminally, may have been involved in criminal activity. (Id., PageID
#27) Count 8 also alleges that SA Gardner abused the federal prosecutorial apparatus
and as a result “harmed Plaintiff by implicating his family in the criminal conduct of
which he is accused.” (Id., PageID #28) According to Plaintiff, in addition to these

activities, SA Gardner “participated in or authorized the 2024 investigation and the
June 26, 2024 search and arrest,” and “participated in a Title 21 methamphetamine
investigation outside ATF’s statutory jurisdiction.” (Id., PageID #20)

II.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the complaint fails to “ ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiff’s complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, but his allegations must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, id. The Court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the

plausibility standard is not akin to a “ ‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Plaintiff proceeds in this case pro se. The Court, therefore, holds the amended
complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true

unless they rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). See also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (per curiam)
(same); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,
99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, Plaintiff must still meet basic pleading
requirements. See, e.g., Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Courts

are not required to conjure allegations or construct claims on behalf of pro se plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court applies
these same rules for a liberal reading when adjudicating Plaintiff’s motions.
Furthermore, as acknowledged by both sides of this lawsuit, the Court’s
adjudication of the pending motions requires consideration of the holding in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). If Heck bars the causes of action in their entirety,
then Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the Court
must dismiss the amended complaint.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,
a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Consequently, if “a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,”
the Court must dismiss the causes of action “unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.
The purpose of this rule is simple: to make clear that civil tort actions are not
the appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.
To challenge outstanding criminal judgments, defendants are to use habeas corpus
proceedings. Id. at 486.
This rule makes a great deal of common sense. Disgruntled convicted
defendants understandably hunt for ways to invalidate their convictions and sentences.
Absent the Heck rule, courts would be overwhelmed by tort actions brought by
defendants seeking compensatory damages for their convictions or sentences. In
addition to a direct appeal, these tort actions would truly be the proverbial second bite
of the apple for defendants wanting to clear their names and to be compensated
monetarily in the process.
The Heck rule continues to be the governing law in this Circuit. See, e.g., Cotton
v. Hughes, slip op., 2026 WL 1453604, at *5 (6th Cir. May 22, 2026). In fact, this
Circuit has refined this law into “[a] clear and consistent two-part rule.” Kitchen v.

Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525, 539 (6th Cir. 2024).
Prisoners can “use only habeas corpus” if “they seek to invalidate
the duration of their confinement—either directly through an
injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a
judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of
the State’s custody.” Wilkinson [v. Dotson], 544 U.S. [74,] at 81
[(2005)] . . . . So prisoners can “proceed under § 1983” if (1) they
do not seek an “injunction ordering immediate or speedier release
into the community,” and (2) “a favorable judgment would not
necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentences.”
Skinner [v. Switzer], 562 U.S. [521] at 533–34 [(2011)] . . .
(cleaned up).

Kitchen, id. (emphasis in original).
Further refinement followed, which has particular applicability to Plaintiff’s
lawsuit.
The Supreme Court most recently summarized it this way: The
“simplest cases” for when a claim must be brought through habeas
“arise when an inmate, alleging a flaw in his conviction or
sentence, seeks immediate or speedier release from prison,” but the
“[s]lightly less obvious” cases occur “when the relief he seeks
would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence.’ ” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 168 . . . (2022) (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 481, 487 . . .). These less obvious cases
nevertheless “lie within the core of habeas corpus.” Id. at 167 . . .
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Kitchen, id. “In other words, a complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not
a permissible alternative to a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the Plaintiff
essentially challenges the legality of his conviction.” Smith v. Ohio, slip op., 2010 WL
3369831, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2010) (citations omitted).
The facts in Heck involved a state prisoner’s efforts to litigate under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Since Heck, courts have applied its holding to cases brought by federal

prisoners as well as to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and Bivens. See, e.g.,
Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1002, 1005-06 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district
court’s application of Heck by denying federal prisoner’s motion to amend his
complaint and recognizing other jurisdictions that have extended Heck to claims under
§ 1985); Robinson v. Jones, 142 F.3d 905, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the rule
in Heck applies equally to Bivens actions). See also Cook v. Fatheree, slip op., 2025

WL 2977704 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2025) (dismissing federal prisoner’s pro se lawsuit
under § 1983 pursuant to Heck due to a failure to state a claim).
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s position to the contrary, all eight causes of action in
the amended complaint “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. What Plaintiff alleges in his causes of action are

integral to his criminal convictions. In fact, the allegations Plaintiff makes in his
amended complaint and other filings constitute nothing less than a full-frontal assault
on his federal criminal convictions from 2014 and 2024. Plaintiff’s own words
illustrate why the Heck rule bars these proceedings in their entirety.
Plaintiff begins his amended complaint by asserting, in bold no less, that his

lawsuit “is not about guilt or innocence,” and that “[t]he injuries are complete and
compensable regardless of the outcome of the underlying criminal proceedings.”
(Doc. 2, PageID #19) The causes of action tell a different story.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges in part abuse of process and challenges
the legality of his arrest in 2014 and the legality of the searches carried out by law
enforcement officers in 2024. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Sgt. Dugan and

defendant Deputy Centa, among other defendants, obtained warrants with “no federal
authority” and therefore arrested Plaintiff and carried out the searches related to his
federal criminal cases without authority to do so. (Id., PageID #25)
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges coordinated abuse of process by both
state and federal prosecutors “across both prosecutions” with defendant “Deputy
Centa’s participation in both without lawful authority,” thus establishing “a

coordinated pattern of abuse of state and federal legal process against Plaintiff across
a decade.” (Id., PageID #26)
Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action alleges abuse of process by defendant SA
Gardner by asserting that in part she abused the “federal investigative process” and
“the federal prosecutorial apparatus” by interviewing Plaintiff’s co-defendant in the

second criminal case purportedly using “suggestive questioning, without factual basis,
to imply that Plaintiff’s sisters . . . may be involved in criminal activity.” (Id., PageID
#27) This cause of action goes on to allege that the home of one of the sisters was
searched and found to contain no contraband. Plaintiff alleges that this unauthorized
conduct harmed him “by implicating his family in the criminal conduct of which he is

accused.” (Id., PageID #28)
In all three causes of action, Plaintiff claims certain law enforcement officers
named as defendants in his amended complaint lacked legal authority to investigate
the two federal criminal cases involving Plaintiff, to apprehend him, and to gather
evidence of criminal activity. Without the investigation, evidence, and arrest, the
prosecution would not have been able to charge or convict Plaintiff of any crimes. In

other words, these causes of action “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence.”
Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice bears out this conclusion. In Plaintiff’s
own word: “The governing statutes, regulations, and constitutional limitations
identified in Plaintiff’s Opposition confirm that no lawful evidence was presented to
the grand jury to obtain the indictment.” (Doc. 25, PageID #180) Challenging the

presentment of the charges to the grand jury strikes at the heart of Plaintiff’s federal
convictions. There, of course, can be no felony convictions without an indictment.
Further, again in his own words: “Federal criminal jurisdiction over the charged
conduct required a constitutional and statutory basis that the record does not supply.”
(Id., PageID #181) Alleging that there was no federal criminal jurisdiction over the

conduct that put Plaintiff behind bars is just another way of saying, “I’m challenging
my federal convictions.” In its simplest formulation, the Heck rule prohibits using a
tort action to do this.
Further, again in his own words: “The authority defect spans two federal
prosecutions—the 2014-2015 and the 2024 prosecutions under the Controlled

Substances Act—each initiated by TFO Centa, a Portage County Sheriff’s detective
by his own admission in multiple affidavits, and each conducted without the authority
identified above. The docket of this District reflects that, across these proceedings, the
search and data-location warrants, the conviction, the sentence, and the post-conviction
rulings—including the denial of habeas relief—proceeded notwithstanding the
documented absence of authority.” (Id., PageID #181) Without authority to convict

or sentence, Plaintiff would not be in prison. His amended complaint, therefore,
directly and in multiple ways implies the invalidity of both his convictions and his
sentences that he received in both federal criminal cases.
Lest there be any doubt about Plaintiff’s intentions in bringing this tort action,
again in his own words: “The records identified above and in the related-matters list
span a single, continuing course of conduct across all related proceedings—the 2014-

2015 and 2024 prosecutions, the post-conviction and appellate matters, and the related
civil action. Because the same authority defect and the same participants ran through
each, judicial notice of the entire record across those proceedings is necessary to a full
and fair adjudication of the Defendants’ motion.” (Id., PageID #182)
Plaintiff is even more strident in his opposition to defendant Summit County’s

motion to dismiss. He accuses defendant Summit County of acting in concert with the
Portage County Defendants, and alleges that it “actively participated in a scheme to
bypass Ohio’s strict jurisdictional protections, manufacture federal jurisdiction where
none existed, and shield their unlawful conduct from adversarial and judicial scrutiny.”
(Doc. 28, PageID #218)

Plaintiff asserts that a defense under the Heck rule “is a legal impossibility under
the facts of this case.” (Id., PageID #225) Plaintiff argues that Heck “presupposes the
existence of a *legally valid* criminal judgment issued by a court and executed by
officers possessing lawful, colorable jurisdiction. It does not—and cannot—protect
proceedings that are a complete structural nullity from the very first step.” (Id.)
Plaintiff contends that defendant Deputy Centa acted outside of his statutory and

territorial jurisdiction and was without authority in Plaintiff’s cases. “As a matter of
law, Centa and the conspiring Summit County Defendants acted as private citizens
masquerading as federal agents.” (Id.) Claiming that the federal judgments against
him are void ab initio and a legal nullity, Plaintiff concludes, “Because the defendants
acted entirely without jurisdiction from the inception, they cannot claim the protections
of qualified immunity or the Heck v. Humphrey bar.” (Doc. 28, PageID #226)

By his own words, Plaintiff in effect tells us that his amended complaint is
another avenue for challenging the federal convictions and sentences that followed
from his plea agreement in the first federal criminal case and from a guilty verdict in
the second federal criminal case. Under Heck, Plaintiff cannot make a cognizable
claim under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused

by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless
he shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The same holds true for the

claims Plaintiff asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Bivens.
Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his federal convictions have been
invalidated or called into question in any of the ways articulated in Heck, his causes of
action have not yet accrued. Accordingly, he has failed to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted. Dismissal is warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

III.
Motions by Plaintiff. As noted above, in one of his motions, Plaintiff seeks to
stay all proceedings in this case pending resolution of his federal criminal proceedings.
(Doc. 3, PageID #31) Arguing for a stay of all proceedings does not help Plaintiff’s

cause. He bases his motion on the Court’s inherent authority and Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384 (2007). (Doc. 3, 5/29/26, PageID #31; see also Doc. 2, PageID #20) Plaintiff
is in certain respects asking for a similarly “bizarre extension” of Heck that the
Supreme Court rejected in Wallace. 549 U.S. at 393. There, the plaintiff wanted to
apply the Heck rule to an anticipated future criminal conviction not yet in existence.

Where the prosecution has not yet obtained a conviction, the district court could “stay
the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394.
But that’s not the situation here. As to the first federal criminal case, Plaintiff’s
conviction is already over a decade old. His convictions in the second federal criminal

case occurred last year. They are extant, not anticipated in the future. That means the
Heck rule applies to Plaintiff’s amended complaint as to both of his federal criminal
cases.
Again, to simplify things, the Heck rule “delays what would otherwise be the
accrual date of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success

in that tort action would impugn.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393 (emphasis in original).
That means Plaintiff’s causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and under
Bivens have not yet accrued. Because they have not accrued, and may never accrue,

the Court must grant the motion to dismiss and deny Plaintiff’s motion to stay all
proceedings.
Plaintiff has also moved that I recuse myself from this case, citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 455(a) and 455(b)(1). (Doc. 6, 6/1/26, PageID #85) Although Plaintiff lists a
number of reasons in support of his motion, they boil down to his fifth and final reason:
because I “presided over the criminal trial in Case No. 5:24-cr-00295-JRA that

produced the conviction whose foundational investigation is now challenged in this
civil rights action.” (Id.) Under Plaintiff’s reasoning, every district judge would need
to recuse himself or herself every time a defendant from a criminal case previously
before the judge made some sort of substantive post-conviction filing. That is not the
law.

Even where a judge denies a petition for habeas relief and concludes that the
prisoner may have indeed committed offenses repugnant to ordered society, the judge
is not disqualified from considering subsequent petitions from the same prisoner.
Browing v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1988). “A bias sufficient to justify
recusal must be a personal bias ‘as distinguished from a judicial one,’ arising ‘out of

the judge’s background and association’ and not from the ‘judge’s view of the law.’ ”
United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1090 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Oliver v. Michigan
State Bd. of Ed., 508 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d
458, 466 (6th Cir. 1956))). Plaintiff may be dissatisfied with the Court’s previous
rulings. But his dissatisfaction, regardless how legitimate in his view, does not warrant
recusal.

Plaintiff also moved for an order under Fed. R. Evid. 201 taking judicial notice
of 13 documents or groups of documents and statements made in them which
purportedly relate to Plaintiff’s second federal criminal case previously before the
Court; of nine proceedings of record that relate to Plaintiff’s two prior federal criminal
cases; and of the fact that testimony was given and of its contents in six instances
involving six different witnesses. (Doc. 25, 7/6/26, PageID #174, 175-79) Plaintiff’s

motion misreads the scope and breadth of Rule 201.
While parties must normally submit admissible evidence to
support the factual allegations in their case, sometimes a fact is so
obvious that federal courts will allow a shortcut around these
procedures. This shortcut—judicial notice—is governed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which allows courts to “judicially
notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1)
is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction;
or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.
201(b).

Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider, 954 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir. 2020). “[C]ourts do not take
judicial notice of documents, they take judicial notice of facts.” Id. (citing United
States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834-35 (6th Cir. 2012), and Davis v. City of
Clarksville, 492 F. App’x 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiff’s motion way exceeds this relatively narrow purpose for judicial notice.
Moreover, the purpose for which he seeks to use Rule 201 is very similar to one that
the Court of Appeals has already rejected. That Court’s explanation is worth repeating
because it bears such a close resemblance to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice:
[The plaintiff] asks us to take judicial notice of additional excerpts
from the deposition of Chief Ansley as well as his complaint from
the 2006 suit and numerous depositions and affidavits taken from
other litigation. . . . Certainly, we could take judicial notice of the
existence of these documents as evidence that a complaint was in
fact filed or a deposition was in fact taken. See United States v.
Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834 (6th Cir. 2012). But it is not the
existence of these documents that [the plaintiff] seeks for us to
acknowledge; rather, he seeks to rely on the substantive facts
within those exhibits, many of which are disputed, to support his
appeal. His motion is therefore more properly viewed as yet
another attempt to supplement the record and is denied for the
reasons set forth in our earlier order. See Molnar v. Care House,
359 Fed.Appx. 623, 625 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion)
(construing motion for judicial notice on appeal as motion to
supplement the record), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 188,
178 L.Ed.2d 43 (2010).

Davis, 492 F. App’x at 578.
There are, of course, certain facts within the materials Plaintiff identifies in his
motion that meet one of the requirements of Rule 201, namely, they can be accurately
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
For example, the existence of warrant applications associated with Plaintiff’s second
federal criminal case, the name of the affiant who requested the warrants, the existence
of a certain memorandum of understanding regarding a law enforcement officer’s
authority, previously filed motions, the existence and pendency of certain cases, or the
fact that certain individuals provided testimony in Plaintiff’s prior cases. None of this
is what Plaintiff really wants notice of, though. After all, if a certain individual
previously testified under oath and Plaintiff wanted to use that testimony to support a
particular argument, he could simply attach the transcript to his filing and then
incorporate it by reference.
What Plaintiff wants is judicial notice of the contents as well (Doc. 25, PageID

#174, 175, 177, 178), probably intending to use excerpts from the noticed documents,
cases, and transcripts to support the allegations in his amended complaint. In fact, his
motion summarizes the points he intends to support with the materials he requests
judicial notice of. (Doc. 25, PageID #179-83)
The law does not allow judicial notice to be used in this way. To be sure,
Plaintiff may have difficulty as a federal prisoner obtaining documents from prior and

pending cases without funds of his own or easy access to court databases and filing
systems. (Doc. 25, PageID #175) His current situation, however, does not alter the
law or the scope of Rule 201 even when his pro se status is taken into account.
Motions by Defendants. As noted above, the Portage County Defendants—
Deputy Eric Centa, Portage County, and the Portage County Sheriff’s Office—filed a

motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. 15, 6/17/26) Defendant Summit
County also filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 26, PageID #184) Another group of
defendants—Sgt. Dugan, the City of Akron, Akron Safer Streets Task Force, and the
Summit Narcotics Unit Division—filed an answer in which they assert numerous

defenses, including the Heck rule. (Doc. 19, PageID #146) SA Elizabeth Gardner has
not yet answered the amended complaint or moved in response to it. Nor has the
unnamed John Doe Summit Narcotics Unit Division officer or the other unnamed John
Doe defendants.
Applying the Heck rule in this case means that Plaintiff’s causes of action for
damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence “do[] not

accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 490
(footnote omitted). Because Plaintiff’s convictions and sentences remain valid, all
eight causes of action have not accrued. Consequently, all causes of action are barred
as to all defendants. This outcome obviates the need to address the other grounds for
dismissal presented in the two motions to dismiss.

* * * * * *
In sum, Plaintiff’s causes of action are barred by Heck unless and until his
federal criminal convictions and sentences have been invalidated. Because those
convictions and sentences have not yet been invalidated, Plaintiff’s tort claims have
not yet accrued.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Portage County
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) and defendant Summit County’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 26) Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, whether those claims are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985
or Bivens. Further, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay all proceedings (Doc.
3), his motion for recusal (Doc. 6), and his motion for judicial notice (Doc. 25).
Because the causes of action Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint have not yet

accrued, the amended complaint is dismissed in its entirety and this case is terminated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 17, 2026 /s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11407996. Public record. Not legal advice.