# FEGGINS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11407978

## Case

- **Full name:** Kyle E. Feggins v. Township of Montclair, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KYLE E. FEGGINS Civil Action No. 26-4049

Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
v.

July 13, 2026
TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR, et al.,

Defendants.

SEMPER, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Kyle E. Feggins’s (“Plaintiff”) filing of a
complaint, (ECF 1, “Complaint” or “Compl.”), and an application to proceed in forma pauperis,
(ECF 1-2, “IFP Application”), on April 16, 2026. Plaintiff files suit against municipal defendants
Township of Montclair, Township of Nutley, and Township of Bloomfield; Montclair Police
Department defendants Sgt. Travis Davis, Officer Scott McGrath, Officer Stephen Seifried,
Officer Glenda Rivera, Capt. James Romito, Officer Brionna Gippiti, Officer Jorge Martinez,
Officer Ryan Martinez, and Sgt. Davis Osborne; Nutley Police Department defendants Det./Lt.
Eric Stabinski, Lt. Richard Schwarz, Det. Dominic Argentieri, Det. Daniel Thumm, Officer Frank
Caputo, Ptl. Richard Rempusheski, Det. Dominic Scioscia, and Officer Rizzuto; Bloomfield Police
Department defendants Sgt. Salvatore Cordi and Officer Jonathan Heussler; and ten John or Jane
Doe defendants representing unknown law enforcement officers (collectively, “Defendants”).
(Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his civil rights under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
and 1986. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds leave to proceed in forma
pauperis is warranted and GRANTS the application. Additionally, having sua sponte reviewed
Plaintiff’s submissions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a), this Court DISMISSES Counts I and III-VIII of the Complaint without prejudice. Count II
of the Complaint alleging a Fourth Amendment claim may proceed against Officer Rivera and
Officer Gippiti regarding the alleged unwarranted entry at 14 Baldwin. (Id. ¶ 15.) Count II of the
Complaint alleging false arrest may proceed against Officer Scott McGrath and Sgt. Travis Davis

regarding the alleged June 24, 2022 arrest. (Id. ¶ 12.)
WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without
paying the filing fee—that is, in forma pauperis—so long as the plaintiff submits an affidavit
demonstrating he or she is “unable to pay such fees,” but must dismiss a case that is insufficient.
A case is insufficient if the claims (1) are “frivolous or malicious”; (2) “fail[] to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted”; or (3)“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), e(2)(B); see Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374
(3d Cir. 2021). A district court construes a pro se plaintiff’s papers liberally and holds them to a
less stringent standard than the standard applied to papers filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, need not credit a pro se party’s “‘bald assertions’
or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)); and
WHEREAS in Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a malicious prosecution claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all individually named defendants. (Compl. ¶ 31.) To state a claim
for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal

proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the
proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with
the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood,
407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specifically allege which police
officer initiated criminal proceedings against him in bad faith. Plaintiff alleges the Denville Police
Department and Assistant Prosecutor Kennedy filed charges against him despite them finding he
did not violate the law. (Compl. ¶ 13.) However, neither the Denville Police Department nor
Assistant Prosecutor Kennedy are parties to this lawsuit. Plaintiff also claims that on June 20,
2025, Nutley Police officers engaged in a “mission” to arrest him, but he does not allege that a

proceeding began or ended based on these events. (Id. ¶ 16.) The Complaint references no other
instances where Defendants in this matter initiated a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff that can
sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. Furthermore, courts in this Circuit have found that a
malicious prosecution claim brought against police officers requires a showing of intent to provide
false information to a prosecutor, which Plaintiff fails to allege with any specific facts. See
Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, 853 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518-19 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“[A]n officer
may be held to have initiated criminal proceedings if he knowingly provided false information to
the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s decision[.]”). Thus, Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim brought in Count I is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice; and
WHEREAS in Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the individually named
Defendants subjected Plaintiff “to unreasonable seizures and false arrests in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) The Court construes this Count as alleging both unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, Plaintiff fails to name defendants with specificity in this
paragraph as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and instead engages in conclusory
group pleading by naming nineteen law enforcement defendants collectively. (Id.); see Freeman
v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 24-8181, 2025 WL1248935, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2025)
(dismissing an amended complaint because it “fail[ed] to specify any of Defendants’ misconduct
with enough specificity … [i]nstead, the Amended Complaint exclusively feature[ed] group
pleading”). However, in construing Plaintiff’s claims liberally in accordance with the pro se
pleading standard, the Court examined the entire Complaint to determine if Plaintiff presented
facts in support of Count II; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges several occasions where he claims his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officer Rivera “violently busted open Plaintiff’s
door” at 14 Baldwin without his consent. (Compl. ¶ 15.) He also alleges Defendant Officer Gippiti
“escorted … armed civilian investigators directly to Plaintiff’s backdoor” to facilitate a custody
exchange. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that at the address 8 Maple Ave, officers created a “perimeter
while Officer Barrett narrated a sham investigation of Plaintiff’s daughter eating dinner.” (Id.)
The Third Circuit has held that “[w]arrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home … are
presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” Chey v. LaBruno, 680 F. Supp. 3d 161, 182 (3d Cir.
2022); and
WHEREAS, as an initial matter, Plaintiff stated in his Complaint that he does not reside
at 8 Maple. (Compl. ¶ 25.) He also fails to allege that he was an overnight guest at 8 Maple at
any point. (See generally id.) Therefore, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy at 8 Maple
and state actions taken at that residence cannot support his Fourth Amendment claim. See United
States v. Rose, 613 F. App’x 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding the protections of the Fourth
Amendment do not apply to guests with no possessory interest in the property). Regarding 14
Baldwin, Plaintiff claims “Officer Rivera violently busted open [his] door.” (Compl. ¶ 15.)
Accepting this fact as true, the Court determines Plaintiff has stated a claim for a potential Fourth
Amendment violation for unwarranted entry at 14 Baldwin.1 The allegations against Officer
Gippiti arise out of the same facts and questions of law as the claim against Officer Baldwin,
therefore she may be joined as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a). See
Wilson v. Piazza, No. 10-3356, 2011 WL 765806, at * 3 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2022). Therefore, Count
II of the Complaint may PROCEED against Officer Rivera and Officer Gippiti regarding only the
events that occurred at 14 Baldwin. However, the claims are DISMISSED without prejudice
against all other individually named defendants because Plaintiff fails to attribute specific conduct
to any other officers in support of this Count. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding “a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution”); and
WHEREAS, to present a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show the arresting officers
lacked probable cause to believe the person arrested committed the alleged offense. See Wheeler
v. Wheeler, 639 F. App’x 147, 150 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To state a claim for false arrest under the
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest
was made without probable cause.” (quoting James v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680
(3d Cir. 2012))). The Complaint alleges that on June 24, 2022, Officer Scott McGrath and Sgt.
Travis Davis arrested Plaintiff at a graduation ceremony. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff also alleges that
he was found not guilty in Essex County Superior Court as to the charges brought. (Id.) Plaintiff
has therefore demonstrated that the defendants effectuated an arrest, and the Court concludes the
probable cause determination is fit for a later stage of this litigation. Groman v. Twp. of

1 Whether the Defendants possessed probable cause or exigent circumstances existed at the time
of the alleged offense is to be decided by this Court at a later stage. See Lane v. New Jersey, No.
22-4239, 2022 WL 17829431, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2002) (deciding issue of probable cause at
the motion to dismiss stage); see also Gurvey v. Twp. of Montclair New Jersey, No. 19-17525,
2022 WL 970303, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2022) (deciding whether probable cause existed for police
to perform a wellness check at the summary judgment stage).
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding probable cause is generally a factual issue).
Therefore, the Court holds Plaintiff’s false arrest claim made under Count II may PROCEED
against Officer Scott McGrath and Sgt. Travis Davis regarding the alleged June 24, 2022 arrest;
and
WHEREAS in Count III of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Det. Dominic
Argentieri violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures by

submitting him to “an invasive, unconstitutional search that amounted to a sexual assault.”
(Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff uses vague and conclusory language in support of this Count, describing
the alleged incident as “invasive” “unconstitutional” and claiming it “amounted to a sexual
assault.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges a date the alleged assault took place, but he does not state facts
describing how he believes Defendant Det. Dominic Argentieri violated him. (Id. ¶ 17.) Simply
stating that Defendant “committed a sexual assault against Plaintiff under the guise of an invasive
search” does not satisfy the Rule 8(a) pleading standard because it does not give the Court or the
defendant sufficient notice of the exact conduct that at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s alleged claim in Count III of the Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a deprivation of property and unreasonable seizure claim
against the Nutley Police officer defendants in Count IV. (Compl. ¶ 34.) The Court construes this
claim as brought against the Township of Nutley since no individual defendants are named.
Plaintiff claims Nutley officers seized his prescription medication and the contents of his
impounded work vehicle. (Id. ¶ 34.) The law is clear in this Circuit that adequate post-deprivation
remedies defeat claims for deprivation of property. Vanderpool v. Christie, No. 10-2030, 2010
WL 2758709, at *9 (D.N.J. July 12, 2010). Plaintiff states that he “served a municipal judicial

order mandating the return of these items upon Nutley Police Lieutenant Richard Schwarz.”
(Compl. ¶ 27.) The fact that Plaintiff received a judicial order mandating the return of his items is
evidence that sufficient post-deprivation remedies are available to Plaintiff. Therefore, Count IV
of the Complaint fails as a matter of law and is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against
“[a]ll Individual Defendants, Lt. Schwartz, and Court administrators” in Count V. (Compl. ¶ 35.)
First, the Court dismisses the claims alleged against Lt. Schwartz and “Court administrators”

because they are not named as parties in this action. To state a claim for conspiracy under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)
whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983)).
To prove a conspiracy, “it is insufficient for [p]laintiff to show merely that [d]efendants had a
common goal or acted in concert; rather, [p]laintiff must show through specific facts that
[d]efendants reached an understanding or agreement to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights.” Rife v.
Borough of Dauphin, 647 F. Supp. 2d 431, 450 (M.D. Pa. 2009); see also Jonson v. Zagori, No.
09-4934, 2011 WL 2634044, at *6 (D.N.J. June 30, 2011) (“The plaintiff must point to specific
facts showing that the defendants reached and understanding or agreement to violate Plaintiff’s
civil rights.” (internal quotations omitted)). Even “when evidence shows communications which
provided an opportunity for agreement, a plaintiff must still produce evidence permitting an
inference that an agreement in fact existed.” Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d
996, 1013 (3d Cir. 1994); and

WHEREAS here, Plaintiff’s allegations merely establish the opportunity for agreement.
Plaintiff’s assertion that police departments in different counties used “inter-departmental
databases to adopt and ratify the prior malicious acts of their co-conspirators,” (Compl. ¶ 35), fails
to meet the specificity required in Rule 8(a). Plaintiff’s assertions regarding the utilization of non-
party individuals as “the central communication hub” to transmit intelligence, (id. ¶ 11), and
“police reports explicitly documenting direct communications between Nutley, Bloomfield, and
Montclair officers,” (id. ¶ 35), only demonstrate the opportunity for an agreement to be made.
Plaintiff’s allegation that officers engaged in a “bad-faith ‘mission’ to effectuate an arrest,” (id. ¶
16), constitutes mere labeling by failing to provide any facts that would color his allegation of a

conspiracy. Finally, Plaintiff’s attempt to use an officer’s unilateral remark regarding the need for
“more manpower,” (id. ¶ 18), is excessively vague and cannot be construed to support the inference
of an agreement between parties. Accordingly, Count V of the Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a failure to prevent conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against
the supervisory Defendants in Count VI. (Compl. ¶¶ 37.) A claim brought under § 1986 “by
definition depend[s] on a preexisting violation of § 1985, if the claimant does not set forth a cause
of action under the latter, its claim under the former necessarily must fail also.” Rogin v. Bensalem,
616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff does not have a viable cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), therefore Count VI of the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Townships
of Montclair, Nutley, and Bloomfield in Count VII. (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Court determines this
claim to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A case may be dismissed as frivolous if
it is based upon a “meritless legal theory or … completely baseless factual contentions.” Young v.
Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991). Plaintiff attempts to sustain his Monell claim by

arguing that Defendant’s alleged failure to respond to his email demands and Open Public Records
Act requests constitutes, “deliberate indifference transform[ing] these isolated unconstitutional
acts into official municipal policy.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Court declines to hold that Plaintiff has
made the necessary showing of a relevant custom or policy. “To satisfy the [Monell] pleading
standard, [plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or
policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 649 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the
“[m]ere assertion of an entitlement to relief, without some factual showing, is insufficient
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff lists Police Chief
Thomas J. Strumolo, Jr (who is not a party) and Lt. Eric Stabinski as policymakers, (Compl. ¶ 38),

but he does not allege specific facts showing they had knowledge of Plaintiff’s emails or requests.
McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658 (“Custom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by the
decisionmaker[.]”). The Court determines that Plaintiff’s argument that the Townships of
Montclair, Nutley, and Bloomfield orchestrated a policy “to ignore the constitutional violations
and orchestrate administrative cover-ups,” (Compl. ¶ 27), is grounded on “clearly baseless factual
contentions” and is therefore suitable for dismissal under § 1915(e). Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d
772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Count VII of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice; and
WHEREAS Count VIII of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a First Amendment Retaliation
claim against all individual law enforcement defendants. (Compl. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff asserts this claim
on the grounds he “engaged in constitutionally protected speech by filing formal Internal Affairs
complaints” and Defendants retaliated against him by engaging in “a multi-jurisdictional campaign
of harassment … to chill [his] First Amendment rights.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s allegation fails to meet
Rule 8(a) pleading standard as it engages in impermissible group pleading. See Freeman, 2025
WL 1248935, at *3. To sustain a claim against the individually named Defendants, Plaintiff must
assert with specificity how each individually engaged in the conduct giving rise to the claim. Id.
Plaintiff’s argument also relies on a finding that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy, (Compl. ¶
39), which the Court has already declined to find at this stage. Therefore, Count VIII of Plaintiff’s
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For the reasons stated above,
IT IS on this 13th day of July, 2026 hereby:

1. ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED;
and it is
2. ORDERED that Counts I, III-VI, and VIII of Plaintiff’s Complaint are DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and it is
3. ORDERED that Count VII of Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice on the grounds it is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); and it is
4. ORDERED that Count II of the Complaint alleging Fourth Amendment claims against
Officer Rivera and Officer Gippiti based on the events alleged to have occurred at 14
Baldwin shall PROCEED; and it is
5. ORDERED that Count II of the Complaint alleging false arrest against Officer Scott
McGrath and Sgt. Travis Davis shall PROCEED; and it is finally
6. ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies
identified above within forty-five (45) days of this Opinion and Order.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jamel K. Semper
HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Orig: Clerk
cc: José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11407978. Public record. Not legal advice.