# Scocozzo

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406605

## Case

- **Full name:** Anthony Scocozzo v. David W. Sunday, Jr., Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY SCOCOZZO, No. 3:24cv1748
Plaintiff
(Judge Munley)
v. (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
DAVID W. SUNDAY, JR., Attorney
General of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, et al.
Defendants
............................................................................................................
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MEMORANDUM
Before the court are objections to five (5) Reports and Recommendations
("R&Rs") filed by Plaintiff Anthony Scocozzo. Scocozzo is a pretrial detainee at
the Baker County Detention Center in Macclenny, Florida. He also faces criminal
charges in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania after allegedly making a false
written statement on a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") form
relative to his mental health. He seeks relief from a firearm prohibition which led
to the charges. He pursues claims for damages against those involved in his
commitments to a treatment facility under Section 302 of Pennsylvania's Mental
Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"), 50 PA. STAT. § 7302. He also claims that
Section 301 of the MHPA is unconstitutionally vague.

Three of the R&Rs concern motions to dismiss filed by various state and
municipal defendants. A fourth R&R addresses deficiencies in the second
amended complaint with respect to mental health providers. The fifth R&R

concerns Scocozzo’s motion for partial summary Judgment.
United States Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson issued each R&R. He
recommends that the defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted. After
separately screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the
magistrate judge also recommends dismissal of the claims against the mental
health providers. Lastly, he recommends that the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment be denied as premature.
Scocozzo responded by filing overlapping objections to the R&Rs with
briefs in support. For the reasons set forth below, the objections will be
overruled, the R&Rs will be adopted, the motions to dismiss will be granted,
claims will be dismissed under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the motion for summary
judgment will be denied, and the remaining dispositive motions will be referred to
Magistrate Judge Carlson for additional R&Rs.
Background
Scocozzo’s pro se second amended complaint asserts claims pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 925A and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' In 2009, two different police officers
from two different police departments initiated proceedings under Section 302 of

The court has jurisdiction over Scocozzo’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

the MHPA. Section 302 authorizes an involuntary emergency psychiatric
evaluation and inpatient treatment for up to 120 hours. 50 PA. STAT. § 7302(d).
Notwithstanding these two instances of involuntary mental health
treatment, Scocozzo tried to buy a firearm in 2020. The purchase was denied
after a background check. The plaintiff faces criminal charges in the
Commonwealth related to his answers on an ATF form. Six years later,
Scocozzo’s legal troubles over the attempted firearm purchase have not
resolved. In the interim, authorities charged plaintiff with other criminal offenses
in the State of Florida and he is awaiting trial there.
With this specific civil action, Scocozzo seeks to have Section 301 of the
MHPA declared unconstitutionally vague and remove inclusion of his Section 302
commitments from the National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(“NICS”) and the Pennsylvania Instant Checks System (“PICS”) He proceeds
under a federal statute which allows individuals to bring an action against the
United States and the individual states to correct “erroneous information.”” 18
U.S.C. § 925A. Additionally, Scocozzo asserts Section 1983 claims against

? Relative to the request for a declaratory judgment, Scocozzo’s amended complaint names
various defendants in their individual and official capacities, which are, after Rule 25(c)
substitutions: 1) the United States Attorney General, Todd Blanche (acting); 2) the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Kash Patel; 3) the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms, Robert Cekada; 4) the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, David W. Sunday, Jr.; and 5) the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State
Police, Lieutenant Colonel George L. Bivens (acting).

police officers who investigated his attempt to purchase a firearm in 2020 and

filed criminal charges against him. And finally, Scocozzo also advances civil

rights claims against the police officers, medical providers, and a mental health
administrator who were involved in the two involuntary commitments more than

15 years ago. *

Scocozzo’s 42-page second amended complaint is the operative pleading
in this matter. (Doc. 98). To support the above claims, Scocozzo alleges that, on

or about March 11, 2020, he attempted to purchase a firearm at a Pennsylvania
firearms dealer. Id. 91. Per the plaintiff, his application was denied without an

explanation. Id.
According to the allegations, on March 12, 2020, Scocozzo questioned
Defendant Francis McLane, a detective from the Scranton Police Department
about the denial. Id. □ 2. McLane allegedly told the plaintiff that he would be

3 Scocozzo brings Section 1983 claims against: Francis McLane, Todd Spinosi, and Tim Mayo
individually and in their official roles as officers of the Scranton Police Department. Bryan
Paulshock, a Pennsylvania State Trooper, is also named as a defendant in an individual and
official capacity with respect to those claims.
4 Relative to these claims, the defendants named in this lawsuit include individuals related to
the March 2009 commitment are: 1) the Borough of Moscow Police Department; 2) Michael
Mallick, a Moscow Borough police officer; and 3) Dr. Boriosi, the physician who signed the
certification of necessity. Plaintiff has also filed suit against individuals relative to a November
2009 commitment: 1) McLane, a City of Scranton police officer; and 2) Muhammad Rahman,
MD, the physician who signed the certification of necessity on that occasion. Also named as a
defendant is Stephen Arnone, an administrator who endorsed the involuntary commitments in
both March and November 2009.

charged with crimes if he filed an appeal and the appeal was not decided in his

favor. Id.
Scocozzo filed the appeal. Id. | 4. He received a response stating that he

was denied a firearm due to prior involuntary mental health commitments in

March and November 2009. Id. According to the plaintiff, he has no recollection

of ever being involuntarily committed. Id. 5. Rather, he alleges: “During my
stay at the hospital, | was in general population of the psych unit. | was never

secluded or restrained. | also never received medication via injection.” Id. J 13.

Simultaneously, he asserts claims against police officers, discussed in more

detail below, alleging that he was seized without consent and forced to take

mind-altering medications. Id. at ECF p. 20.° He also believes the “treatment

needed’ on his 302-related documents were only recommendations. Id. J] 13.

Based on answers provided in a firearm transaction record form, and after

a state and local police investigation, Scocozzo was charged in the Lackawanna

County Court of Common Pleas with two counts of violating the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code, 18 Pa. Cons. STAT. § 4904(b), related to a written false statement

on the background check form.® Id. J] 6-7. According to the plaintiff, an

5 Scocozzo’s handwritten second amended complaint switches from numbered paragraphs to
unnumbered paragraphs in the section where he asserts claims against the various
defendants.
8 Scocozzo attaches the affidavit of probable cause supporting the police criminal complaint.
In the affidavit, Detectives Todd Spinosi and Tim Mayo of the Scranton Police Department

assistant district attorney “threatened to increase the charges to felonies if [he]
pled not guilty and motioned to represent [himself].” Id. {| 8. Plaintiff continued to
represent himself. Id. 9. He alleges that authorities then filed a felony count
against him for making a materially false written statement when purchasing a
firearm in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111(g)(4). Id.
Scocozzo was released on his own recognizance pending trial on the
Pennsylvania charges. Id.
He then moved to Florida. Id. {J 10.
There, he added a second layer of criminal charges. He alleges:
Possibly irrelevant to this matter, but through the course of
trying to make friends in my new Florida community, | was
charged with aggravated stalking, written threats, and
resisting arrest without violence due to commenting on my
neighbor's friend’s public Instagram account which they did
not want me messaging them or making comments about.
Id. 11.
For the last several years, Scocozzo has been held at the Baker County
Detention Center in Northern Florida as he awaits trial on those charges. He

indicate that Scocozzo answered “No” to question 11(f) on ATF Form 4473, which asks: “Have
you ever been adjudicated mentally defective (which includes a determination by a court,
board, commission, or other lawful authority that you are a danger to yourself or to others or
are incompetent to manage your own affairs) or have you ever been committed to a mental
institution?” (Doc. 98-2, Pl. Exs. at ECF p. 4).

alleges that his Lackawanna County charges impede his ability to challenge the
legality of his pretrial detention in Florida.
In response to Scocozzo’s efforts to unwind his prohibited status and obtain

money damages through the second amended complaint, three sets of
defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Amid these motions, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary
judgment.
This pro se matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for
pretrial management and the issuance of R&Rs on case dispositive motions.
Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Carlson issued R&Rs with respect to the above
dispositive motions, each drawing objections from the plaintiff due to the nature
of the recommendations. The magistrate judge also screened the second
amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and determined that
Scocozzo failed to state a claim against the mental health providers and a mental
health administrator involved in his 2009 involuntary commitments (who have
also not been served in this matter). The screening recommendations also drew
objections from the plaintiff. Given the number of objections, the court will
conduct a full de novo review of the matters contemplated by the R&Rs. The
undersigned will also review the allegations in plaintiff's second amended
complaint, as required by law.

Standard of Review
1. Objections to Reports and Recommendations
In disposing of objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R, the district court
must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report against which
objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d
1077, 1085 (3d Cir. 1983). “[T]he court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”
Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C)). The district court judge may also receive further evidence or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id.
a. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
Three of the R&Rs concern motions to dismiss Scocozzo’s second
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must provide
‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ ” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting
Feb. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This means that a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief which is plausible on its
face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual

content is pled which allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
The court evaluates motions to dismiss using a three-step process. The
first step involves identifying the elements of each claim. Oldham v. Pennsylvania
State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 743 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). The second
step involves reviewing the operative pleading and disregarding any formulaic
recitation of the elements of a claim or other legal conclusion, as well as
allegations that are so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line
between the conclusory and factual. See Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,
LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 328 (3d Cir. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The third step evaluates the plausibility of the remaining allegations. Id. In
evaluating plausibility of the plaintiff's allegations, the court accepts all factual
allegations as true, construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. (citations
omitted). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon

these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).
Scocozzo has attached various documents as exhibits to the second amended
complaint, which may be considered. (Doc. 98-1). The dockets in Scocozzo’s
criminal cases are matters of public record and are publicly available on the
internet through the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts website and
through the Baker County, Florida Clerk of Court’s office.
One of the R&Rs reviews plaintiff's allegations under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is part of a federal statute governing in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) proceedings. It mandates that federal courts dismiss any
lawsuit filed by an IFP plaintiff if the court determines that the action is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief against an immune defendant.
The standard for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same standard for dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Herrera v. Agents of Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 132 F.4th 248, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
As discussed below, the court reaches matters not addressed in the
moving parties’ motions to dismiss or in the R&Rs, either because the moving
party asserted other grounds for dismissal or such grounds were not considered
by the magistrate judge. The IFP statute expressly provides that “the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that...the action...fails to

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state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
(emphasis added). This statute thus creates an ongoing obligation for the court
to review the plaintiffs pleadings and an independent, mandatory basis for
dismissing the plaintiff's claims if appropriate. To the extent the court strays from
the arguments raised in the parties’ motions to dismiss or the analyses from each
of the R&Rs, it is doing so pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2).
Additionally, mindful that this is Scocozzo’s second amended complaint
and that he asserts claims for violation of his civil rights, the court also considers,
in conjuction with any Rule 12(b)(6) or Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) analysis, whether
the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. “[I]n civil rights cases district
courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when
dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable
or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247,
251 (3d Cir. 2007).
Analysis
1. Defendants Mallick and Borough of Moscow Police Department’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 102)
As discussed above, Scocozzo asserts Section 1983 false arrest and due

process claims against Defendants Michael Mallick and possibly the Moscow
Police Department as the result of an involuntary commitment in March 2009
under Section 302 of the MHPA. The defendants’ motion to dismiss argues that
11

these claims are time-barred and otherwise fail on their merits. (Doc. 103, Br. in
Supp.) Magistrate Judge Carlson recommends that the motion to dismiss be
granted. (Doc. 157). Scocozzo objects on several overlapping grounds. (Doc.
172). His objections are without merit.

a. Defendant Mallick Will Be Dismissed
Defendant Mallick is the municipal police officer who committed the plaintiff
under Section 302 of the MHPA in March 2009. Plaintiff alleges that Mallick
initiated the 302 commitment “without due process, probable cause, or sufficient
reason[.]” (Doc. 98, Sec. Am. Compl. at ECF p. 20). Plaintiff also includes
Mallick’s application for involuntary emergency examination and treatment as an
exhibit to the operative pleading. (Doc. 98-1 at ECF pp. 29-35).
Upon consideration of Defendant Mallick’s arguments in his motion to
dismiss, the R&R recommends dismissal of these claims under Rule 12(b)(6) as
time-barred and additionally for failure to state any viable Section 1983 claims.
Scocozzo filed suit on October 15, 2024 related to the March 2009 mental
health commitment. (Doc. 1). Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, apparent timeliness issues may be considered at this posture. See
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Bethel v. Jendoco
Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir.1978); Hanna v. U.S. Veterans'
Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975)). By the calendar, more than

12

fifteen years passed between Mallick’s commitment of the plaintiff and this
lawsuit. That raises an apparent timeliness issue on the face of the plaintiff's
second amended complaint.
The R&R notes Scocozzo’s efforts to get around any timeliness issues by
asserting that he was not specifically aware of his involuntary commitment at the
time of the events in March 2009. (Doc. 157 at 13). Nonetheless, the R&R also
concludes that the plaintiff's own allegations establish that he knew of this
involuntary commitment no later than March 2020 but did not file this lawsuit until
October 2024. Id. Accordingly, the R&R recommends dismissal of the claims
against Mallick.
Scocozzo responded to the R&R with a multitude of objections. Among the
objections is a complaint that the magistrate judge did not permit sur-reply
briefing so that plaintiff could argue that “equitable tolling applies in addition to
the discovery doctrine.” (Doc. 172 at 2).
Upon review, the court reaches the same conclusions as the R&R for the

same and additional reasons. Scocozzo’s second amended complaint alleges
that he “had no recollection of ever being involuntarily committed.” (Doc. 98, □□ 5).
At the same time, he alleges that he was seized without consent for a mental
evaluation and forced to take mind-altering medication. (Id., unnumbered
paragraph at ECF p. 20). Due to the nature of the allegations, both cannot be

13

true for consideration of the statute of limitations. Sur-reply briefing is a matter of
the court’s discretion and would have served no substantive purpose in this case.
The law is well-settled with respect to the claims against Defendant Mallick
for the March 2009 events:
The length of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is
governed by the personal injury tort law of the state where
the cause of action arose. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). The statute
of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is
two years. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(2); see also Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189-90 (3d Cir.1993). Federal
law governs a cause of action's accrual date. Genty v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).
Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the
statute of limitations begins to run, “when the plaintiff knew
or should have known of the injury upon which its action is
based.” Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d
582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir.
1998). The determination of the time at which a claim
accrues is an objective inquiry; we ask not what the plaintiff
actually knew but what a reasonable person should have
known. Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir.
1988), As a general matter, a cause of action accrues at
the time of the last event necessary to complete the tort,
usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury. See United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62
L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). “The cause of action accrues even
though the full extent of the injury is not then Known or
predictable. Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to
run only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been
harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in
the sole hands of the party seeking relief.” Wallace, 549
U.S. at 391, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

14

Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634—35 (3d Cir. 2009).
After review of allegations that the plaintiff was seized without consent for

a mental evaluation and forced to take mind-altering medications, the claims for
false arrest and for due process violations accrued when the defendant
involuntarily committed the plaintiff on March 10, 2009, the date that the plaintiff
allegedly sustained an arrest without legal process. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at
388. The claims did not accrue later, when the plaintiff became subjectively
aware of any gun-buying restrictions as the result of the commitment.
In objecting to the R&R, Scocozzo seems to jumble the nature of his
injuries, equitable tolling, and the discovery rule. Although accrual is a matter of
federal law, state law tolling principles govern Section 1983 with exceptions that

are not relevant here. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 639. Pennsylvania law considers
the discovery rule under the umbrella concept of equitable tolling. Gunn v.
Cornell Abraxas Grp., LLC, 751 F. Supp. 3d 530, 538 (W.D. Pa. 2024) (citing
Riad v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 22-1757, 2023 WL 8676234, *3 (3d Cir. Mar. 23,
2023 and Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 248 n.3 (Pa.
2021)). In Pennsylvania, the discovery rule applies when critical information
about an injury eludes detection through no lack of diligence on the plaintiff's
part. Reibenstein v. Barax, 286 A.3d 222, 234 (Pa. 2022).

15

Plaintiff argues for the application of the discovery rule because, as he
alleges, he did not discover the full implications of the involuntary commitments
until just before he filed suit. His brief in support of the objections lays out a
timeline where he: 1) was verbally denied a gun purchase in March 2020; 2)
learned the denial was due to prior involuntary commitment in April or May 2020;
and 3) then did not learn the actual dates of his commitments until December
2023 when he obtained the 302 applications in discovery during his Florida
criminal case. (Doc. 172-1, Pl. Br. in Supp. of Obj. at 8-9).
This timeline ignores the allegations where the plaintiff sets forth that he

was taken to a hospital by Defendant Mallick for involuntary mental health
treatment in 2009. Any constitutional injury would be apparent to a reasonable

person on the date these events occurred, not more than a decade later. This
timeline even ignores a key point in September 2020, where Scranton Police
Detectives charged the plaintiff relative to statements he made in the background
check process earlier that year and the plaintiff proceeded in that case pro se.
(Doc. 98, Sec. Am. Compl. Jf] 7-9; Doc. 98-1, Pl. Ex., Police Crim. Compl. at
ECF pp. 1-4). The magistrate judge did not err when he stated: “On these facts,
by March 2020, Scocozzo plainly had sufficient knowledge of his injury and its
cause[.]” (Doc. 157 at 13).

16

After the court’s own review of this matter, the statute of limitations had run

on plaintiffs Section 1983 claims against Mallick in March 2011. Despite
plaintiff's arguments, the facts set forth in the second amended complaint cannot
toll the statute. The claims against Defendant Mallick are time-barred. Based on
the allegations in this case, leave to amend would not cure any timeliness issue.
Magistrate Judge Carlson also recommends dismissal of the claims against
Mallick on their merits. Scocozzo, through his myriad of objections, believes he

can prevail on hypertechnical arguments. As discussed next, the R&R reaches
the correct conclusion.
Scocozzo’s second amended complaint asserts Section 1983 claims
against Mallick for “due process or false arrest.” (Doc. 98 at 20). These claims
implicate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, “a state, in conformity
with the Due Process Clause, may confine mentally ill individuals if it shows by
clear and convincing evidence that the individuals are ill and dangerous to
themselves or others.” Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 870 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, (1992) (emphasis removed)).
Section 302 of the MHPA was created to allow for emergency situations and it
“may be reasonable, therefore, for a state to omit a provision for notice and a
hearing in a statute created to deal with emergencies, particularly where the

17

deprivation at issue, in this case detention for a maximum of several hours to
permit an examination, continues for only a short period of time.” Id.
Scocozzo’s second amended complaint does not delineate whether he is
asserting a substantive or a procedural due process claim. As previously
observed by the Third Circuit, the MHPA authorizes seizures that are reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, which establishes that it meets the rationality test
imposed by a substantive due process analysis. Id. at 871 n.4. Additionally,
under the more-specific amendment rule, the constitutionality of arrests by state
officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than any due process
analysis. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir.
2010); Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). Therefore,
the court, like the R&R, only considers Scocozzo’s Fourth Amendment claim.
An involuntary commitment under Section 302 of the MHPA is a civil, not
criminal proceeding. The Fourth Amendment applies to both, so the court will
construe plaintiff's claim as one for unlawful seizure. See Doby, 171 F.3d at 877.
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Its touchstone is reasonableness. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Under the law, “the temporary involuntary commitment of
those deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a ‘special need’
permitting the state to act without a warrant.” Doby, 171 F.3d at 871.

18

“[I]t is not unreasonable to temporarily detain an individual who is
dangerous to [himself] or others.” Cole v. Town of Morristown, 627 F. App'x 102,
106 (3d Cir. 2015). Although non-precedential, Cole considered whether the
police and mental health screeners had probable cause to believe that the

person was dangerous and whether they reasonably took that individual for a
mental health evaluation. Id. (applying Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102
(6th Cir.1997) (“The Fourth Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining
a person for a psychiatric evaluation to have probable cause to believe that the

person is dangerous to himself or others.”)). The court will thus review
Scocozzo’s allegations for a lack of probable cause.
“The probable cause inquiry is ‘commonsense,’ ‘practical,’ and
‘nontechnical’ and it is based on the totality of the circumstances and is judged
by the standard of ‘reasonable and prudent men.’ ” United States v. Donahue,
764 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31
(1983)). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances
within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by
the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482
(3d Cir. 1995). The existence of probable cause is generally a factual issue in a
Section 1983 action. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir.

19

1995). But a court “may conclude in the appropriate case, however, that
probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the evidence, viewed most
favorably to [the plaintiff], reasonably would not support a contrary factual
finding.” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote
omitted).
In the operative second amended complaint, Scocozzo alleges that Mallick
had an insufficient reason to initiate the involuntary commitment process and
withheld a basis for checking certain boxes on the commitment form relative to
risk of harm and reasonable probability of suicide. (Doc. 98, Am. Compl. at ECF

p. 20). Yet, at the same time, he has supplied a form completed by Mallick
demonstrating that commitment was supported.
Specifically, the application form quotes the plaintiff directly. Per Mallick’s
application, the plaintiff expressed a desire to kill himself by deliberately
overdosing on prescription medication. (Doc. 98-1, PI. Exhs. at ECF p. 31).
According to the commitment form, the plaintiff stated, am going to take 50
[Ambien] and 90 [Xanax] and kill myself. | can’t take this anymore. | am going to
kill myself.” Id. Plaintiff made such comments in response to a traffic stop. Id.
Thus, even when this application form is viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, among his allegations that he does not recollect the involuntary
commitments, Defendant Mallick had probable cause to seize the plaintiff on an

20

emergency basis, without a formal warrant, because the plaintiff made specific
threats to commit suicide by prescription medication in response to a police
encounter.
Scocozzo’s objections are wordy, but those words do not persuade. For
example, he argues that Section 302 of the MHPA authorizes “involuntary
examinations, not commitments.” To the extent that plaintiff's arguments are

even relevant to a Fourth Amendment claim, those arguments get too fixated on
verbiage.
The MHPA authorizes involuntary emergency examinations and treatment
“[w]henever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.
50 PA. STAT. § 7301(a). “A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result
of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in
the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal
needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others

or to himself[.]’ Id. “Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by
establishing that within the past 30 days... the person has made threats to
commit suicide and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to □
commit suicide.” 50 PA. STAT. § 7301(b)(2)(ii).
Emergency examinations may be undertaken at a treatment facility without

a warrant by an “authorized person who has personally observed conduct

21

showing the need for such examination,” 50 PA. STAT. § 7302(a), that is,
“personal observation of the conduct of a person constituting reasonable grounds
to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment[,]” 50 PA. STAT. § 7302(a)(2). Authorized persons include a “peace
officer.” Id. Persons subject to Section 302 are taken to a facility for examination
by a physician to determine whether they are “severely mentally disabled...and in
need of immediate treatment. 50 PA. STAT. § 7302(b). By statute, treatment is to
begin immediately upon such a finding, id., and the statue authorizes up to 120
hours of treatment. 50 PA. STAT. § 7302(d).
The statute might not refer to these provisions as an “involuntary
commitment,” but it affords a process for the state to provide inpatient emergency
mental health treatment to nonconsenting individuals (or those unable to legally
consent) for up to five days. Dozens of Pennsylvania cases refer to a Section
302 commitment as an involuntary commitment because it is one. See e.g.,
Leight v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Physicians, 243 A.3d 126, 140 (Pa. 2020); In re
R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 551 (1999).
The above review of the relevant MHPA provisions also discredits
Scocozzo’s objections that the probable cause analysis should be more nuanced

or that that Mallick’s application should have been supported with more
information or different information or that Mallick should have considered

22

whether the plaintiff was “expressing frustration over a perceived harassing and
illegal traffic stop.” (Doc. 172-1, Pl. Br. in Supp. of Objs. at 7). Probable cause
need not be supported by the granular detail that the plaintiff would require if he
set the standard. Rather, based on the exhibits to Scocozzo’s amended
complaint, Defendant Mallick provided an explanation in support of an involuntary
commitment that would support the requisite reasonable person standard. In

response to a traffic stop, plaintiff stated he wanted to kill himself and described
how he would do it.
Accordingly, Scocozzo’s objections to this R&R will be overruled and the
motion to dismiss will be granted. The claims against Defendant Mallick will be
dismissed with prejudice.
b. The Moscow Police Department Will Be Dismissed
The R&R also recommends dismissal of the Moscow Police Department as

an improper Section 1983 defendant. (Doc. 157 at 9-10). Magistrate Judge
Carlson’s statement of the law is correct. The Moscow Police Department is
merely an administrative arm of the local municipality and is not a separate
judicial entity. See Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App'x 272, 278 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp. 2d 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).
Alternatively, the court may treat the police department and the municipality as a

23

single entity for the purposes of Section 1983 liability. Bonenberger v. Plymouth
Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997).
Even if the court construes the pro se plaintiff's allegations to encompass
claims against the Borough of Moscow, Pennsylvania and not the Moscow Police
Department, the second amended complaint fails to state a claim. Plaintiff has
failed to identify a municipal policy or custom behind the alleged constitutional
violations. This is insufficient to state a municipal liability claim. See Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
As for Scocozzo’s position, he “objects to dismissal of the Moscow Police
Department as a defendant in this case because plaintiff [] never named [the
department] as a defendant, nor is the department listed as a defendant in the
court file.” (Doc. 172-1 Pl. Br. in Supp. of Objs. at 3). Thus, he asserts “dismissal
of the Moscow Police Department as a defendant is un-needed.” Id. At the same
time, he also references the Monell standard for municipal liability claims and

argues that discovery is necessary to determine whether the department had an
unconstitutional policy or custom. Id. Winning arguments are never this
contradictory. Therefore, to the extent that Moscow Police Department is a
defendant in this case, it will be dismissed with prejudice, as any amendment
would not cure plaintiffs failure to plead timely, meritorious claims for violation of
his constitutional rights.

24

2. Defendants McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
108)
Scocozzo also filed suit against three City of Scranton police officers,
Defendants Francis McLane, Todd Spinosi, and Tim Mayo. Those officers also
filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint with prejudice. (Doc.
108). The R&R recommends that the court dismiss some claims and abstain
from hearing others. (Doc. 166).
The claims against McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo each differ and the
allegations vary. The court begins with the allegations against Defendant
McLane. Per the exhibits to plaintiff's second amended complaint, this defendant
filed an application for involuntary commitment after encountering the plaintiff in
November 2009. (Doc. 98-1, PI. Exs. at ECF p. 36-41). Per McLane’s
application, Scocozzo allegedly told the officer that he wished to kill himself
“more than 5 times.” Id. at ECF p. 38. Plaintiff also allegedly told McLane that
he “wished to jump off the Nay Aug Park treehouse into the gorge’ if he was
released from the psychiatric ward of a nearby hospital. According to the
application, the plaintiff told McLane that he had been committed multiple times
in the past. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that he crossed paths with McLane more than a
decade later under different circumstances after the plaintiff's failed purchase of

a firearm at a city gun shop in 2020. The second amended complaint alleges
25

that McLane told Scocozzo that he would prosecute the plaintiff if the plaintiff
filed an administrative appeal of the firearm purchase denial. (Doc. 98 {[ 2).
McLane also allegedly contacted Defendant Bryan Paulshock, a member of the
Pennsylvania State Police, “and conspired to immediately close plaintiff's PICS
challenge without giving plaintiff an [opportunity] or a heads up to investigate and
submit documents in an appeal.” Id. at ECF p. 27. Per the plaintiff, McLane also
“indirectly caused” him to be seized in Florida “due to [the] false charges.” Id. at
ECF p. 30.
As for Defendants Spinosi and Mayo, the plaintiff's second amended
complaint attaches their police criminal complaint, which was used to pursue
criminal charges for the alleged false statements on the ATF form. (Doc. 98-1 at
ECF p. 1-4). Plaintiff asserts that Spinosi and Mayo had no basis to charge him
with the pending offenses and lacked jurisdiction to press charges.
Based on these allegations, the second amended complaint includes at
least six Section 1983 claims. Claim 4 asserts that McLane is liable for false
arrest for the 2009 involuntary commitment. Claim 6 alleges that McLane is
liable for First Amendment interference. Claim 7 advances that McLane, Spinosi,
and Mayo (and Paulshock) conspired to commit First Amendment retaliation.
Claim 8 is a claim for First Amendment retaliation against these same police
defendants. Claim 9 asserts that McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo are liable for false

26

arrest due to the plaintiff's pretrial detention in Florida for unrelated charges.
Finally, Claim 10 asserts that Spinosi and Mayo are liable for malicious
prosecution.
McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 108). The
R&R recommends that this motion also be granted. (Doc. 166). Scocozzo
objected to the R&R. (Doc. 175). The court will address each claim, disposing of
the plaintiff's objections along the way. The court will also review plaintiff's
allegations against these defendants under Section 1915(e)(2)(B).
Claim 4 asserts false arrest and due process claims against Defendant
McLane for the November 2009 involuntary commitment. Like the claims against
Defendant Mallick from the Moscow Police Department, the R&R recommends
that the false arrest claim be dismissed as time-barred and for failure to state a
claim.
The R&R and Scocozzo’s objections cover much of the same ground
discussed above with respect to Defendant Mallick. The court will not retrace
those steps. For the substantially the same reasons set forth above, the false
arrest and due process claims against McLane are time-barred. Based on the
allegations and exhibits to the second amended complaint, those claims also lack
merit. The second involuntary commitment application, from November 2009,
demonstrates McLane’s probable cause to seize the plaintiff on an emergency

27

basis for mental health treatment. In context, the gorge at Nay Aug Park is a
short walk from a psychiatric floor at a Scranton hospital, which the plaintiff
allegedly referenced in his interaction with McLane. Scocozzo allegedly told
McLane that he would kill himself once released from that hospital’s care and
custody. As with Officer Mallick, the plaintiff told Officer McLane that he was
going to kill himself and expressed how he would do it. In this instance, the
plaintiff also allegedly implied that he would kill himself despite any efforts at
treatment. With such statements, McLane had probable cause to seize the
plaintiff under the MHPA and seek involuntary examination and treatment. Claim
4 will thus be dismissed with prejudice.
With respect to the remaining claims against these defendants, the R&R
concludes that they are time-barred, lack merit, and seek to interfere ina □□□□□ _
prosecution. The court reaches substantially the same conclusions.
First, the false arrest allegations against McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo in
Claim 9 fail to state a claim even when the proposed theory of recovery is
deemed viable. Specifically, Claim 9 is liberally construed as an effort to hold
three Scranton police officers liable for plaintiff's arrest and extradition hold in
Baker County, Florida beginning at some point after September 2020 on a date
uncertain to the pleadings.’ Per plaintiff, these defendants “indirectly caused”

? Scocozzo confirms this theory of liability in his brief in opposition. (Doc. 133 at 15-17).
28

him to be seized by the Baker County Sheriff's Department “due to their false
charges being a reasor].]’ (Doc. 98, Sec. Am. Compl. at ECF p. 30). He argues
“if it were not for Spinosi and Mayo’s unjustified false statement charges, and the
resulting extradition hold for those charges, [his] Florida lawyers would file a
successful petition for writ of habeas corpus and [his] Florida pre-trial release
would be reinstated.” (Doc. 133, P. Br. in Opp. at 16).
To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must allege that there was an arrest made without probable cause. James v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995); Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d
136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)). Although this particular false arrest claim seems
attenuated and the court’s research has not uncovered any in-circuit decisions
with similar facts, the court will assume that a plaintiff can make indirect claims
for false arrest and false imprisonment arising out of the extradition process.
Assuming that such claims would be recognized, the plaintiff must allege that
there was no probable cause for the extradition hold in the first place, i.e., no
probable cause for the underlying out-of-state charges.

29

Based on the standard set forth above, plaintiff fails to allege a lack of
probable cause for the Pennsylvania charges that formed the basis of part of the
plaintiff's Florida arrest. According to the affidavit of probable cause supplied by
plaintiff, Defendants Spinosi and Mayo supported the false information charges
under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4904(b) and § 6111(g)(4) with the following:
On 06/11/2020, Detectives Todd M Spinosi and Tim Mayo of the Scrantan Police
Department received a Request for Criminal Investigation #20-1-0032546 from PSP. The
investigatign concerned one ANTHONY J SCOCOZZO who had attempted/to purchase a
firearm from Roll Call LLC on 03/11/2020. At the time of the attempted purchase, SCOCOZZO
completed the BATF Form 4473 and the Pennsylvania State Police Application/Record of Sale
form. SCOCOZZO provided his PA Driver's License A@3@RS™D, as Identification. SCOCOZZO
was checked through the PA PiCs Instant Check and the purchase was denied. The reason
for the denial was subsequently determined by PSP. On 03/10/2009 and 11/07/2009
SCOCOZZQ was the subject of an involuntary Mental Health Committal filed at the
Community Medical Center in Scranton, Pa.
When caqmpleting the BATF Form 4473 at the time of the attempted pur¢hase, SCOCOZZO
checked "No" to Question 11(f) which asks "Have you ever been adjudicated mentally
defective (which includes a determination by a court, board, commission or other lawful
authority that you are a danger to yourself or to others or are incompetent! to manage your
own affairs) or have you ever been committed to a mental institution?". |!
SCOCO4ZO challenged the Denial with PSP. The challenge was denied by PSP due to
SCOCOZZQ'S mental health record on 04/03/2020.
(Doc. 98-1, PI. Exs. at ECF p. 4).
Upon review of the affidavit, the facts and circumstances within Spinosi and
Mayo’s knowledge were sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person
to believe that Scocozzo had made false statements about his mental health
condition in an effort to purchase a gun from a city dealer. See Orsatti, 71 F.3d at
482. Scocozzo’s issues with the extradition process are the result of moving to
Florida from Pennsylvania where criminal charges were pending against him and
then allegedly engaging in conduct which led to a second layer of charges in

30

Florida. Therefore, to the extent plaintiff's indirect claim for false arrest is even
cognizable, that claim, Claim 9, will be dismissed with prejudice.
Claims 6, 7, and 8 assert First Amendment claims against McLane,
Spinosi, and Mayo. The R&R does not address these claims directly, which
triggered an objection from the plaintiff. (Doc. 175 at 3). Nonetheless, the R&R
recommends dismissal of the claims against McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo, due to
timeliness issues. (Doc. 166 at 9-10). That is, the First Amendment claims arise
from events occurring in 2020. Upon review of the plaintiff's prior pleadings,
these claims were not asserted in October 2024 when plaintiff filed his initial
complaint. (Doc. 1). They were not asserted in February 2025 when Scocozzo
filed an amended complaint. Rather, the First Amendment claims appeared for
the first time when Scocozzo filed a proposed second amended complaint in May
2025 with a motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 72-1). He later added to those
allegations in the version of the second amended complaint recognized by the
magistrate judge in June 2025. (Doc. 98).
As for Defendant McLane, any Section 1983 First Amendment claim
against that officer accrued on March 12, 2020 when the officer allegedly told the
plaintiff he would press charges for making false statements if the plaintiff
challenged the denial of the firearm purchase in an administrative appeal. This

31

claim was time-barred after March 12, 2022. Claim 6 against McLane for First
Amendment interference will be dismissed with prejudice.
Similarly, the First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy to retaliate claims
accrued in September 2020 when criminal charges were filed against the plaintiff
by Defendants Spinosi and Mayo. This is so despite plaintiff's efforts to allege a
continuing violation theory due to his Florida charges preventing the resolution of
his Pennsylvania charges. First Amendment retaliation claims are always
individually actionable under the law, and a cause of action is supplied “by all but
truly de minimis violations.” O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127-28
(3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The filing of criminal charges was a discrete
act. The filing of criminal charges would also be the object of any alleged
conspiracy to chill plaintiff's speech through retaliation. Plaintiff had two years to
make his retaliation and conspiracy claims from the moment he was criminally
charged in Pennsylvania for making false statements on a firearm background
check form. He failed to do so. Claims 7 and 8 will be dismissed with prejudice.
Claim 10 alleges that Spinosi and Mayo are liable for malicious
prosecution. To prove a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate, among other things, that the criminal case ended in his favor.
Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2022). The Pennsylvania criminal
charges filed by those officers have not been resolved yet. At a minimum,

32

plaintiff cannot establish this element of a malicious prosecution claim. Claim 10
will thus be dismissed without prejudice pending the outcome of the
Pennsylvania prosecution. .
3. Screening of Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Rahman,
Boriosi, and Arnone (Doc. 159)
The court turns to a similarly situated group of defendants who did not file a
motion to dismiss. That is, Scocozzo’s second amended complaint also asserts
false arrest and due process claims against the mental health professionals who
participated in his 2009 involuntary commitments, Dr. Muhammed Rahman and
Dr. Boriosi. He also asserts similar claims against Stephen Arnone, a mental
health administrator. In a separate R&R, Magistrate Judge Carlson concluded
that the operative pleading failed to state a claim against these defendants upon
screening the second amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(Doc. 159). He offers three grounds in the applicable R&R: the timeliness and
merits issues discussed above, as well as Scocozzo’s failure to make timely and

proper service on these defendants.
As for the first two grounds, the court will not explore the same territory it
did with the officers’ motions to dismiss. With respect to the mental health
defendants, Scocozzo complains of events that occurred approximately 15 years
before he filed suit. Any claims for false arrest or for violation of due process
accrued on the dates the involuntary commitments occurred. Scocozzo’s failure
33

to pursue those claims until he was staring down criminal charges many years
later does not toll any limitations period. Despite the defendant's objections, this
is as true of the claims against Dr. Rahman, Dr. Boriosi, and Arnone as it is
against Officer Mallick and Officer McLane, who initiated the Section 302
commitments.
The court will also not revisit the applications for Section 302 commitments
filed by Mallick and McLane or any probable cause analysis. Given Scocozzo’s
repeated statements to kill himself relayed by the officers, Dr. Rahman and Dr.
Boriosi had a legal and professional obligation to provide care to the plaintiff.
Arnone had an obligation to complete the documentation required by the Section
302 process. Their actions do not give rise to false arrest or due process claims.
Finally, the R&R addresses service issues against these defendants.
Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi were never served. The magistrate
judge gave plaintiff notice early in this litigation that his claims against them may
be dismissed due to lack of service. (Doc. 53). Plaintiff did not make service.
This action has been pending for more than two years. Reading the objections
filed by the plaintiff, he has not asserted any reason for his failure to serve these
defendants other than his own incarceration out of state. But, the court need not
dismiss without prejudice solely on this service defect. Upon review, the court

agrees that Scocozzo’s second amended complaint fails to state plausible, viable

34

claims against Dr. Rahman, Dr. Boriosi, and Arnone. They will be dismissed
from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
4. Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 124)
Scocozzo also named three state defendants in his second amended
complaint: 1) the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, now David W. Sunday, Jr.;
2) the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, now Lieutenant Colonel
George L. Bivens; and 3) Lieutenant Bryan R. Paulshock of the State Police.
Paulshock is included as a defendant in conjunction with the First Amendment
retaliation and conspiracy claims raised against the Scranton police officers
under Section 1983. Sunday and Bivens are named as defendants with respect
to plaintiff's cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 925A. Sunday and Bivens are
also named as defendants with respect to plaintiff's constitutional challenge to
Section 701 of the MHPA.
The court will begin with the Section 1983 claims against Paulshock.
Those claims will be dismissed with prejudice for the same reasons the claims
against Defendants McLane, Spinosi, and Mayo were dismissed above.
Turning to the claim against Sunday and Bivens under Section 925A, that
statute provides:
Any person denied a firearm pursuant to subsection
(s) or (t) of section 922—

35

(1) due to the provision of erroneous information relating to
the person by any State or political subdivision thereof,
or by the national instant criminal background check
system established under section 103 of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act; or
(2) who was not prohibited from receipt of a firearm
pursuant to subsection (g) or (n) of section 922,
may bring an action against the State or political
subdivision responsible for providing the erroneous
information, or responsible for denying the transfer, or
against the United States, as the case may be, for an order
directing that the erroneous information be corrected or
that the transfer be approved, as the case may be. In any
action under this section, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs.
18 U.S.C. § 925A.
Scocozzo’s second amended complaint takes matters one step further. He
seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the United States
Attorney General and Pennsylvania Attorney General from prosecuting him for

any attempt to purchase or possess a firearm. (Doc. 98, Sec. Am. Compl. at 19).
The court cannot issue such an injunction, given the criminal proceedings
pending in Pennsylvania and in Florida. Practically speaking, Scocozzo has
been charged with felony offenses in Florida, i.e., offenses punishable by more
than one year in prison. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(3) (aggravated stalking,
rated as a third-degree felony in Florida); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.082(3)(e) (third-degree felonies are punishable by a term of imprisonment
36

not exceeding five years). If convicted, Scocozzo would face other federal and
state restrictions on firearm possession and ownership unrelated to any mental
health commitments. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105
(felony conviction prohibitions).
Separately, the court cannot enjoin Pennsylvania law from being applied to
the plaintiff, particularly when he is presently being prosecuted by the
Commonwealth That request is barred by the abstention doctrine set forth in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. Younger abstention is

an exception to the general rule that federal courts have a virtually unflagging
obligation to hear and decide a case. See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm'r New Jersey
Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Sprint
Comme'ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) and Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Younger applies
when certain types of state proceedings are ongoing at the time a federal case is
commenced, including underlying state criminal prosecutions. Sprint Commce'ns,
Inc., 571 U.S. at 78. The underlying charges against Scocozzo remain pending
in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas and have been pending
since September 2020. A proceeding is “ongoing” for Younger purposes so long
as it was pending at the time the federal complaint was filed, even if “stayed” due

37

to criminal charges in another state. See PDX .N., Inc., 978 F.3d at 885 (citation
omitted).
Second, all three factors from Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), are satisfied here. That is,
there is an ongoing judicial proceeding, the state criminal case. There is also an
important state interest: the Commonwealth's interest in enforcing its criminal
laws and controlling its own criminal prosecutions. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at
432. Furthermore, Scocozzo is free to raise his objections to probable cause,
his First Amendment retaliation theories, and every other constitutional argument
as defenses or motions within the state criminal proceeding itself. Nothing in
state law or procedure forecloses those avenues, and plaintiff has not alleged
otherwise. Accordingly, this court will abstain under Younger and dismiss
Scocozzo’s request for an injunction against the current state court prosecution.®
Plaintiff also seeks an order demanding that Bivens remove him from the
PICS database. Neither the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss nor the R&R

8 To the extent that Scocozzo seeks injunction of a future criminal prosecution, he has not
satisfied the threshold requirement of alleging an actual case or controversy to make this issue
justiciable. Scocozzo must show that he had sustained or was immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat
of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged facts
demonstrating that any future prosecution is imminent rather than hypothetical. Consequently,
he has no standing to obtain injunctive relief against state proceedings not yet commenced.
38

address this request for relief, which can be construed as a request “for an order
directing that the erroneous information be corrected.” 18 U.S.C. § 925A. In the
court’s discretion, that portion of Claim 1 will not be dismissed. Rather, it must
be stayed pending disposition of the Florida charges. Scocozzo’s action under
18 U.S.C. § 925A is dependent on whether he is convicted of the felony
aggravated stalking charges in Florida. If he is convicted, he will be prohibited
from receipt of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Thus, by the text of
the statute, he will be unable to bring an action under Section 925A if he is
subject to a felon firearm prohibition.°
Count 11 of Scocozzo’s second amended complaint challenges Section
301 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 PA. STAT. § 7301, naming Sunday
and Bivens in their respective roles. '° He challenges the words “as a result of
mental illness” or “mental illness” as vague. His allegations take the form of

° Consequently, as the result of this analysis, Scocozzo’s motions expedited for injunctive
relief, (Docs, 151, 160, 164), will also be denied.
10 Scocozzo’s second amended complaint invokes Wilborn v. Barr, 401 F. Supp. 3d 501 (E.D.
Pa. 2019). In Wilborn, which is an Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision, the court
determined that Section 302 of the MHPA does not meet 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)'s permanent
restriction on an individual's ability to acquire, possess, or use a firearm. Id. at 511.
Notwithstanding the fact that Wilborn is a district court decision, Scocozzo also overlooks the
fact that Pennsylvania law separately prohibits those who have been involuntarily committed
under Section 302 from possessing a firearm. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105(c)(4). Scocozzo has
not raised a constitutional challenge to this statute. That challenge has already been made
without success. Doe | v. Governor of Pennsylvania, 977 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 2020) (“once a
person has been involuntarily committed under MHPA § 302, that person has joined the class
of those historically without Second Amendment rights.”).
39

argument. His arguments reference the Flying Spaghetti Monster, his
observations of fellow detainees at the Baker County Detention Center, other life
anecdotes, and YouTube mukbang creators. (Doc. 98 at 38-42).
The court liberally construes Scocozzo’s insouciant allegations to trigger a
void for vagueness challenge to the statute on its face. “Under federal
constitutional law, ‘[i]t is a basic principle of due process that an enactment Is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Dailey v. City of
Philadelphia, 417 F. Supp. 3d 597, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2019), affid, 819 F. App'x 71
(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
The doctrine addresses two due process concerns: 1) that parties regulated by
the statute should know what is required by them so they may act accordingly;
and 2) that the statute carries enough precision and guidance so that those
enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. F.C.C. v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at
108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294). Further, to lodge a successful facial challenge to a
legislative act, the challenger must establish that there is no set of circumstances
under which the act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987).
Upon review of plaintiff's specific challenge to the language of Section 301,
the phrase “as a result of mental illness” and the words “mental illness” need not

40

be specifically defined to implicate the mechanisms of the other MHPA sections,
as plaintiff appears to assert is necessary. That is, as discussed earlier in this
memorandum, the language triggering the statute’s involuntary emergency
examination and treatment provisions is not “mental illness,” but a determination
that the individual “poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to
himself[.]” That definition is outlined by clear terms. See 50 PA. STAT. § 7301(b).
The points raised by plaintiff in his pleadings are better suited for other contexts,
not for a constitutional challenge. Claim 11 will thus be dismissed.
Consequently, after reviewing the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, the R&R, and plaintiff's objections to the R&R, and screening the
second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court
will reach a mixed decision. That is, the motion will be largely granted with the
exception of plaintiff's claim under 18 U.S.C. § 925A against Sunday and Bivens
in their official roles. That claim will be stayed pending disposition of the
plaintiff's felony charges in the State of Florida.
5. Scocozzo’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 153)
The final R&R concerns the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.
(Doc. 159). The R&R recommends that the motion be dismissed without
prejudice to renewal at the close of discovery. This recommendation is sound

41

considering the conclusions reached by the court above. This R&R will be
adopted.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's objections to the five R&Rs will
be overruled with the exception of any objection related to his 18 U.S.C. § 925A
claim against the Commonwealth through its Attorney General and its
Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police. The R&Rs will be adopted with
that caveat. The motions to dismiss will be granted with the exception of the
Section 925A claim against the Commonwealth. However, plaintiff's Section
925A claim against the Commonwealth will be stayed pending disposition of his
Florida criminal charges. Other than the claim for malicious prosecution against
Defendants Spinosi and Mayo, the remaining claims will be dismissed with
prejudice. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will also be denied without
prejudice. An appropriate order follows.

Date: _ LD ; “J 4 | )

[ in JULIA K. MUNLEY \
Unite States piste coun
oes

42

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406605. Public record. Not legal advice.