# SATNAM S. RANDHAWA v. PHILIP MARKER and MARK FOSTER

> District Court, E.D. Washington · July 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406581

## Case

- **Full name:** SATNAM S. RANDHAWA v. PHILIP MARKER and MARK FOSTER
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Washington
- **Decided:** July 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1 Jul 14, 2026
2
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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11 SATNAM S. RANDHAWA, No. 4:24-CV-05027-SAB
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER GRANTING
14 PHILIP MARKER and MARK FOSTER, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
15 Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
16
17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.
18 41. Defendants are represented by Alica Mac. Plaintiff is a prisoner at the
19 Washington State Penitentiary who is representing himself in this matter.
20 Plaintiff brings this action alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
21 of the U.S. Constitution when he was demoted while working in the Washington
22 State Penitentiary prison kitchen during his incarceration. Defendants now move
23 for summary judgment.
24 Legal Standard
25 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
26 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
27 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless
28 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
1 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
2 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a
3 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
4 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond
5 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
6 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
7 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving
8 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of
9 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled
10 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a
11 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving
12 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party
13 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact.
14 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). When considering a
15 motion for summary judgment, a court may neither weigh the evidence nor assess
16 credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
17 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
18 Facts
19 Plaintiff Satnam Randhawa began working for Correctional Industries in
20 December 2018. He worked as a food preparation worker under SOC code 35-
21 2021 until approximately September 2019 when he began working in the back
22 dock area of the kitchen under SOC code 43-9061. During his time working with
23 Correctional Industries, Plaintiff received positive behavior observations by staff.
24 On September 14, 2020, Defendant Phillip Marker recommended Plaintiff receive
25 Level IV pay under SOC code 43-9061. Plaintiff continued to work in the back
26 dock area of kitchen under SOC code 43-9061 until October 2022, when he was
27 moved to the recycle area of the kitchen under SOC code 37-2011.
28
1 On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff was working in the kitchen in the back dock
2 area with another incarcerated individual, Kenneth Linville. They were the only
3 two incarcerated workers on the back dock and they were responsible for loading
4 prepared meals on carts that were sent to the housing units to be passed out to the
5 inmates. Both Plaintiff and Linville were at Level IV pay for SOC code 43 9061 on
6 this date and both were housed in the Victor unit.
7 On that same day, Defendant Marker was working in the back dock area of
8 the kitchen where carts were being loaded. He searched the carts that day prior to
9 them being sent to the units and discovered several concealed and unauthorized
10 food items in the cart going to the Victor living unit. The cart had (1) one block of
11 sliced cheese hidden in a corn muffin box that was retaped and closed; (2) 36
12 chicken breasts in the bottom of the carts beneath the hot trays; (3) 2 blocks of
13 butter hidden in the diet tote; and (4) four salt shakers and four pepper shakers.
14 The next day, Defendant Marker met with Plaintiff and Linville. According
15 to Marker, Plaintiff denied stealing the food, but Linville stated, “It was me. He
16 had nothing to do with it.” Plaintiff then left, and Linville said he didn’t want to
17 lose his job and asked if his pay could be taken away or moved to a different
18 position.
19 Prior to this day, Plaintiff had been involved in other incidents of food theft
20 of small items and had been verbally counseled related to the incidents. On the
21 other hand, Kenneth Linville had worked in the back dock area for approximately
22 six years and had no incidents of food theft to which Defendant Marker was aware.
23 According to Linville, however, he had taken food before but had not been caught.
24 In his declaration, Defendant Marker stated that during his time working as a
25 Correctional Industries Supervisor Assistant, there were incidents where
26 individuals would steal a small item from the kitchen. When this happened, he and
27 other staff would often verbally counsel the individual and allow them a chance to
28 improve their behavior and continue their employment with Correctional
1 Industries. An individual who steals food may be infracted for either a serious
2 infraction (value is than $10) or general infraction (value is less than $10). If
3 Plaintiff or Linville were infracted for the October 6, 2022 incident, they would
4 have been terminated from their Correctional Industries employment. The decision
5 was made to not infract Plaintiff or Linville for this particular incident but rather to
6 impose a more lenient punishment.
7 Plaintiff was moved out of the back dock area of the kitchen and began
8 working in the recycling area under SOC code 37-2011 and demoted from Level
9 IV pay to Level III pay. Because he did not have the requisite number of hours in
10 this type position, he did not qualify for Level IV pay. Plaintiff voluntarily
11 resigned from his position with Correctional Industries on October 9, 2023.
12 Linville remained on the back dock and under SOC Code 43-9061. He was
13 supposed to be demoted from a Level IV to a Level III for one to two months, but
14 according to Linville, he never received a reduction in his paycheck.
15 From October 2020 to December 2023, the back dock workforce consisted
16 of a diverse group of individuals, including eight African-American individuals,
17 two white individuals (one of whom was Linville), a Chicano/Hispanic individual,
18 and Plaintiff, an Indian.
19 In December 2023, Linville was infracted for stealing food and was
20 terminated from his position.
21 Legal Framework
22 1. Equal Protection Clause
23 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state
24 from denying to “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
25 laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The central inquiry in an Equal Protection
26 Clause claim is whether a government action was motivated by a discriminatory
27 purpose.” Ballou v. McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2022). “‘Discriminatory
28 purpose’ . . .implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
1 consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . .selected or reaffirmed a
2 particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
3 adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
4 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citations omitted).
5 A plaintiff may prove an Equal Protection claim in two ways. First, a
6 plaintiff may show that a defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate
7 against the plaintiff based upon their membership in a protected class. Barren v.
8 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Second, if the action in question
9 does not involve a plaintiff's membership in a suspect class, a plaintiff may
10 establish an equal protection claim under the “class of one” theory by showing they
11 were intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated individuals
12 without a rational basis for the difference in treatment.1 Engquist v. Or. Dep't of
13 Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008).
14 2. Qualified Immunity
15 Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary
16 functions “from liability for civil damages” when “their conduct does not violate
17 clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
18 would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A right is
19 clearly established only when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear
20 [such] that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
21 that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Court must
22 decide “whether ‘the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right’ and whether
23 ‘the right was clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Alston v.
24 Read, 663 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The Court’s
25 qualified immunity analysis may proceed in any order. Id.
26

27 1 In his Response, Plaintiff stated he was not alleging a class-of-one theory so the
28 Court will not address Defendants’ arguments on this theory.
1 Analysis
2 First, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff asserts
3 Defendants gave preferential treatment to a white inmate in making their
4 employment decisions. Plaintiff has not shown it is clearly established that a one-
5 time demotion of pay and movement to another area in the kitchen could violate
6 his constitutional rights. A reasonable individual would not know that making
7 discretionary personnel decisions within the prison kitchen (where they supervise
8 approximately 27 incarcerated individuals), specifically a demotion and moving an
9 individual to another position within the kitchen, as opposed to an infraction or
10 termination when theft is suspected, would amount to a constitutional violation.
11 Second, there is nothing in the record to suggest Plaintiff’s move from the
12 back dock to the recycling position was taken because of Plaintiff’s race. Notable,
13 it appears that to the extent co-Defendant Marker was involved in this decision,
14 there is nothing in the record to suggest that he harbored any racial animosity
15 toward Plaintiff. On the contrary, the record demonstrates that co-Defendant
16 Marker previously gave Plaintiff a positive review and recommended him for a pay
17 level increase. No reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was demoted on account
18 of his race.
19 And the record suggests that Plaintiff did not necessarily believe the move
20 from the back dock to the recycling position was objectionable.2 Rather, the focus
21 of Plaintiff’s challenge was his demotion from Level IV to Level III, and the
22 corresponding pay decrease. He asserts the demotion was on account of his race.
23 However, it is undisputed that the reduction in his pay level was because of
24 the move to a different position. After Plaintiff was moved to the recycling
25
26 2 During the Resolution Review process, Plaintiff stated he was not interested in
27 being on the back dock anymore. Rather, he just wanted to be at Level IV. ECF
28 No. 44-2.
1 position, he was paid at Level III, because he did not have the requisite number of
2 hours in that position to qualify for Level IV.3 And again, there is nothing in the
3 record to suggest the reduction in pay was on account of his race. No reasonable
4 jury could find that Plaintiff’s reduction in pay was on account of his race.
5 The fact that Linville never received the intended temporary decrease in pay
6 does not prove that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff.
7 Rather, it appears to be the result of a timing issue with the payroll system. Even
8 so, Plaintiff has not shown that he and Linville were similarly situated. Plaintiff
9 had prior known thefts of food and Linville did not. No reasonably jury could find
10 that Plaintiff and Linville were similarly situated or that Linville received
11 preferential treatment.
12 3. Conclusion
13 Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable jury could find that
14 Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on account of his race. Moreover,
15 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it is not clearly established
16 that a one-time employment decision based on suspected food theft would amount
17 to a constitutional violation.
18 //
19 //
20 //
21 //
22
23

24 3 According to DOC Policy 710.400, an I/I worker must accrue 1500 hours in one
25 SOC Code, among other requirements, to be eligible for a Level 4. When Plaintiff
26 was working in the back dock, he was in a clerk position. As of April 13, 2023, he
27 had 1152 hours at SOC Code as “janitor & cleaner: recycle, which did not qualify
28 him for a level 4 at that time.
1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 41, is
GRANTED.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants
5|| and against Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court Clerk is directed to enter this
Order, provide a copy to Plaintiff and counsel, and close the file.
8 DATED this 14th day of July 2026.

1 hin Cus tar
12 Chief United States District Judge
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406581. Public record. Not legal advice.