# Jones

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · July 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406537

## Case

- **Full name:** Jerome Jones v. State of Louisiana, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406537

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JEROME JONES CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. NO. 24-00363-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. 26). Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on all twelve of Defendants’
affirmative defenses. Defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion. (Doc. 30).
Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motion. (Doc. 32).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary, facility employee Defendant Sergeant Joseph Davis (“Defendant”)
violated state and federal law by using unreasonable force against him.! (Doc. 1-2 at
10). Plaintiff alleges that on October 19, 2022, while he was “standing against the
wall in front of his cell” “in full restraints and not resisting[,]” Defendant “grabbed”
him and “forcefully threw him to the concrete on his head.” (Doc. 26-2 at 3). He further
alleges that as a result, he suffered bruising and a lump and gash to his head that

Parties recently filed a joint pretrial order stating that they are only in agreement over
two facts: (1) that “at all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was an inmate housed at
Louisiana State Penitentiary[,]” and (2) that “[o]n October 19, 2022, Msgt. Joseph Davis was
employed by DPSC at Louisiana State Penitentiary[.|” Indeed, “[a]ll] other facts asserted by
Plaintiff are in dispute.” (Doc. 26-5 9 5, 6; Doc. 44 at 4). Therefore, the Court primarily
makes reference to Plaintiffs allegations, not undisputed facts, in this section.

required staples. (/d.). Plaintiffs medical records indicate that on the date of the
altercation, he had a 3 centimeter laceration to the right side of his head that required
6 staples, and that he told medical personnel that he was thrown to the ground by
security and hit his head on the floor. (Doc. 26-3 at 5-6). Plaintiff then alleges that
the altercation was recorded on surveillance video taken at the penitentiary, which
he finally alleges that he “requested in his [Administrative Remedy Procedure].”2
(Doc. 26-2 at 8).
Plaintiffs Petition for Damages requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for
violations of the Eighth Amendment and state law claims of battery and negligence.
Plaintiff also alleges that Louisiana is vicariously liable for the state law torts of
Defendant Davis. Ud. at 11-12). Defendants asserted twelve affirmative defenses,
which Plaintiff now challenges with the instant Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
“A partial summary judgment order [] is not a final judgment but is merely a
pre-trial adjudication that certain issues are established for trial of the case.”
Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 737 (5th Cir. 2000). Partial summary judgment exists
to “root out, narrow, and focus the issues” for trial. See Calpetco 1981 v.
Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir. 1998).

2 It is not clear from the ARP that Plaintiff “requested” his video, as his Motion for Summary
Judgment claims. Though his ARP is hand-written and thus a bit hard to read, it appears
that he stated: “reviewed the tier, camera footage show[s] what happened on the tier between
Set. Davis and Jerome Jones.” (Doe. 26-4 at 2).

A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fep. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funches v.
Progressive Tractor & Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This
occurs when a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.”).
For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they “must
come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the
evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Intl Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,
939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the
motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material
fact, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade
the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at
1265.
Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must
offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of
evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan _ v.
Natl Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Darden v.
City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on all twelve affirmative
defenses asserted by Defendants:
1. That Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants assert that
their conduct did not violate any of Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional
or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. (Doc. 8
q 1).
2. Defendants deny any and all liability unto Plaintiff in this matter.
Ud. □ 2).
3. That Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary relief, or any other relief asserted
and/or inferred in the petition for damages. Ud. { 3).
4. That Plaintiffs damages, if any, are not of the nature or extent alleged. The
Defendants also aver that Plaintiff failed to mitigate any damages which he
claims to have incurred. (/d. § 4).
5. That any and all claims seeking monetary damages from Defendants in their
official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (/d. { 5).
6. That Defendants did not use any force. (/d. § 6).
7. That Defendants did not use any force which was unnecessary or excessive
under the circumstances, or which rises to the level of a constitutional
violation. (Id. § 7).

8. That if Defendants are found by the Court to have violated Plaintiffs civil
rights, then Defendants are immune from a judgment for damages because
they acted at all times reasonably and in good faith and in accordance with the
laws and institutional rules and regulations. (Ud. {| 8).
9. That if Defendants are found to have violated Plaintiffs rights, and are not
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, then Plaintiff, through
intentional and negligent acts and failure to act as a reasonable person,
contributed to his own injuries or damages. (Id. § 9).
10. The petition for damages fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(Id. {| 10).
11. An inmate confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility cannot

recover for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Ud. § 11).
12. Finally, Defendants assert their right to any affirmative defense delineated in
Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not specifically enumerated
herein. (/d. § 12).
A. General Denials of Liability and Good Faith.
Plaintiff first argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’
second, third, sixth, seventh, and eighth affirmative defenses, which are, respectively:
a general denial of liability, that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief, that Defendants did
not use any force, that Defendants did not use an unnecessary or unconstitutional

amount of force, and that Defendants acted in good faith. (Doc. 26-2 at 4-5). Plaintiff
argues he is entitled to summary judgment because “[a]n affirmative defense is not
raised through a general denial. As a matter of law, the affirmative defenses are
actually not affirmative defenses.” (Id. at 5).
Defendants, in turn, “acknowledge that it was inartful pleading when previous
counsel [representing] Defendants asserted broad denials as affirmative defenses.”
(Doc. 30 at 3). However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be entitled to

summary judgment on these defenses. In Sam v. Byrd, a recent Middle District of
Louisiana decision, Defendants similarly asserted a general denial of liability as an
affirmative defense. The court there noted that while “Defendants technically erred
in describing this as an affirmative defense, [Plaintiff] suffers no prejudice, and
granting summary judgment on this issue [of liability] merely invites confusion for
trial, where Defendants will be allowed to offer evidence contesting liability.” Sam v.
Byrd, No. CV 23-1485-JWD-EWD, 2025 WL 3144744, at *8 (M.D. La. Nov. 10, 2025).
Other courts have held the same with respect to motions to strike affirmative
defenses. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corps., 756 F. Supp. 2d 421, 481 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (denying a motion to strike similar affirmative defenses because while the
“Plaintiffs are correct that the [] defenses are ‘nothing more than mere denials’ of
liability[,] the inclusion of these defenses, although redundant, does not prejudice
Plaintiffs.”); Nickens v. State Emps. Credit Union, Inc., No. CIV.A. RDB-13-1430,
2014 WL 3846060, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2014) (denying a motion to strike similar
affirmative defenses because “[g]iven [that] all of these issues will continue[] to be

litigated, are logically related to the proceedings, and Plaintiff has experienced no
measurable prejudice, [a motion is strike] is clearly unnecessary.”).
Similarly, the Sam court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
with respect to the good faith defense because, in its view, the defense was “simply
redundant to the qualified immunity defense asserted by Plaintiff. In that respect,
the inclusion of this redundant defense [was] harmless, and granting summary
judgment on it merely invites confusion.” Sam, 2025 WL 3144744, at *8. Plaintiff
replies that the six assertions are not legally cognizable affirmative defenses. (Doc.
32 at 1-8).
While Plaintiff correctly asserts that Defendants’ general denials of liability
and good faith defenses are not true affirmative defenses, because the Parties will
dispute issues of liability and qualified immunity at trial, the Court agrees that
granting summary judgment on these defenses may cause confusion at trial. Thus,
the Court rules-in line with this Court’s previous ruling and denies Plaintiffs motion
with respect to these six affirmative defenses.
B. Sovereign Immunity.
Plaintiff next argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’
fifth affirmative defense: that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Defendants.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity was waived when
Defendants removed the case to federal court. (Doc. 26-2 at 5-6). In response,
Defendants concede that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply.

As the Fifth Circuit has ruled, “[a] state’s voluntary appearance in federal
court, including through removal, constitutes [a] waiver [of Eleventh Amendment
immunity].” Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer, L.L.C., 16 F.4th 427, 436
(5th Cir. 2021). Because Defendants removed this matter to federal court in May
2024, Plaintiffs Motion is granted with respect to Defendants’ affirmative defense of
sovereign immunity.
C. Qualified Immunity.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’
first and ninth affirmative defenses: that Defendants are shielded by qualified
immunity. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity does not apply to
Defendants’ state law claims because qualified immunity applies to federal
constitutional claims. Plaintiff also argues that qualified immunity does not apply to
his federal law claim, analogizing to the facts in Wingard v. Louisiana through Dep't
of Pub. Safety & Corr., 594 F. Supp. 3d 704, 722-23 (M.D. La. 2022) and Aucoin v.
Ellis, No. 16-CV-00064-BAJ-EWD, 2019 WL 919010 (M.D. La. Feb. 25, 2019).
With respect to the state law claims, Defendants respond that “[t]his is not a
contested issue in this case. While the pleading of the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity could, perhaps, have been more clearly stated that it was addressed to the
federal law claims to which it applies, this argument from Plaintiff is a moot point as
‘Plaintiff seeks summary judgment regarding a state law affirmative defense that
Defendants are not asserting.” (Doc. 30 at 4). Thus, Defendants concede that
qualified immunity does not apply to the state law claims. Because Defendants aver

that they never asserted qualified immunity for the state law claims to begin with,
the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion in this respect.
With respect to the federal law claim, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. “In determining whether an
official enjoys immunity, [courts] ask (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
violation of a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right and (2)
whether the official’s actions violated that right to the extent that an objectively
reasonable person would have known.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th
Cir. 2006) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)).
This inquiry is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad, general proposition. Berry v. Sanders, No. CV 17-318-BAJ-EWD,
2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV 17-00318-BAJ-EWD, 2020 WL 1033654 (M.D. La. Mar. 3, 2020). This
Court has emphasized: “Corrections officers are faced with myriad situations where
they must exercise discretion, including situations where they must choose whether
to exercise force against a prisoner. When force is used, a corrections officer must also
exercise discretion to determine the appropriate amount of force.’ Id. (internal
citations omitted).
Force is considered excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution ifit is applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose
of causing harm rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.
Berry, 2020 WL 10384627, at *2 (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010);

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “An inmate who is gratuitously beaten
by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because
he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Berry, 2020 WL 1034627,
at *2 (citing Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, however, necessarily excludes from constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such force is not
“repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10).
Factors to be considered in determining whether an alleged use of force is
excessive include the extent of injury sustained, if any; the need for the application
of force; the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force utilized;
the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response. Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). The law governing excessive force is clearly
established; thus, whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity turns on the
reasonableness of his conduct. See Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2.
Given this body of law, it is a violation of clearly established law for a prison
official to use excessive force against a compliant and restrained prison inmate who

poses no threat. See Wingard at 724 (“it was clearly established that an officer may
not use force on a restrained, compliant inmate”) and Aucoin at *3 (“Defendants are
also not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of the incident, it was
clearly established that inmates have a constitutional right to be free from the use of

10

excessive force, and it is objectively unreasonable to assault a compliant and
restrained inmate.”). If Plaintiffs version of events is true—that he was thrown onto
the ground while he was in full restraints, not resisting, and not a threat—Plaintiff
will have suffered a violation of his clearly established law sufficient to overcome
qualified immunity.
However, after reviewing the record before the Court, the Court finds that a
genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity. While Plaintiff describes the altercation between himself and Defendant
in his Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (see Doc. 26-5 {§ 5, 6), it is clear that
these facts are not actually undisputed. Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs
rendition of the altercation in their Opposition, and, as previously noted, the Parties
recently filed a joint pretrial order indicating that they are only in agreement over
two facts: (1) that “at all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was an inmate housed
at Louisiana State Penitentiary[,]” and (2) that “[o]n October 19, 2022, Msgt. Joseph
Davis was employed by DPSC at Louisiana State Penitentiary[.]” Indeed, “[a]ll other
facts asserted by Plaintiff are in dispute.” (Doc. 26-5 {{ 5, 6; Doc. 44 at 4).
Based on the Parties’ conflicting descriptions of the altercation, the Court
cannot determine whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of
law. It will be for the finder of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses to determine
the reasonableness of Defendant’s actions at the time of the physical altercation at
issue. See Cole v. Carson, 985 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019)
(affirming the district court’s denial of summary judgment on an excessive force

11

claim, finding that “genuine disputes of fact regarding . . . entitlement to qualified
immunity remain.”); see also Kelly v. Stassi, 587 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426 (M.D. La. 2022)
(Dick, C.J.) (As in Cole, the existence of competing factual narratives in this case

means that “the full reach of qualified immunity gives way to a trial, the first point
at which its application is determinable.”); Rios v. Perez, 777 F. Supp. 3d 727, 749
(W.D. Tex. 2025) (“Based on . . . parties’ conflicting testimony about the events that
preceded the recordings, the Court cannot determine qualified immunity as a matter
of law.”).
Given the discrepancies between Plaintiff and Defendants’ rendition of the
altercation, the Court will deny Plaintiffs Motion with respect to Defendants’ federal
law qualified immunity affirmative defense.’ This will allow the evidentiary record
to develop for the jury at trial, and the Court will consider including a qualified
immunity jury instruction.
D. Failure to Mitigate.
Plaintiff next seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ fourth affirmative
defense: failure to mitigate. Plaintiff argues that he was unable to obtain medical
treatment at any other location because he was incarcerated, and so a failure to
mitigate defense is inapplicable. Defendants respond that “Plaintiff's medical records

3 While Plaintiff briefed Defendants’ ninth affirmative defense as a qualified immunity
defense, this affirmative defense states that if Defendants are not entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity, then Plaintiff contributed to his own injuries or damages. Because
Plaintiff did not brief this issue, the Court will not grant the Motion in Plaintiffs favor on
this defense. “[F]ailure to brief an argument in the district court waives that argument in
that court.” JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634
(M.D. La. 2018).
12

show that several times in the days following the alleged use of excessive force,
Plaintiff refused treatment and was involved in subsequent altercations,” citing to
Plaintiff medical records passim. (Doc. 30 at 5). Plaintiff replies summarily that
“Defendants offer no evidence to support their affirmative defense of failure to
mitigate.” (Doc. 32 at 4). Because Defendants have pointed to record evidence that
creates a genuine dispute as to material fact, the Court finds the issue of failure to
mitigate will be more appropriately decided by a jury, denying Plaintiffs Motion with
respect to this affirmative defense.
E. Failure to State a Claim.
Next, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ tenth affirmative
defense: failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff notes that the Rule 12(b)(6) defense is untimely because it was asserted after
Defendants filed their Answer. Defendants respond that while the framing of the
affirmative defense pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) would be more
appropriate than pursuant to 12(b)(6), “[c]ourts usually recast a post-answer Rule
12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings[,]” citing
Robinson v. ADM Gromark River Sys., Inc., CIV. A. 96-0410, 1996 WL 162077, at *1
(E.D. La. Apr. 4, 1996) and Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp.,
833 F. Supp. 587, 588 (W.D. La. 1998). Plaintiff summarily replies “[D]efendants offer

no evidence or argument to support their claim that the petition removed to this court
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” (Doc. 32 at 4).

13

Even if the Court were to recast the Rule 12(b)(6) affirmative defense as a Rule
12(c) defense, the Court will grant Plaintiffs Motion with respect to this affirmative
defense for another reason. Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the
pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed,” “but early enough not to delay trial[.]” A
Rule 12(c) Motion would delay trial at this point in time and thus is inapplicable.
Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion with respect to this affirmative defense is granted.
F. Showing of Injury.
Plaintiff further seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ eleventh affirmative
defense: that an inmate cannot recover for injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of a physical injury. Defendants note that it is “a correct statement that
Plaintiff appears to have suffered an injury as a result of the incident between himself
and Defendant Davis[,]” and that the Parties do not contest that point.” (Doc. 30 at
6). “Rather, the issue that will remain for trial are whether the injury was the result
of an excessive use of force.” (Id.). Because Defendants concede that a physical injury
occurred and that this affirmative defense is inapplicable, the Court will grant
Plaintiff's Motion with respect to this affirmative defense.
G. Preservation of Affirmative Defenses.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Defendants’ twelfth affirmative
defense: that Defendants assert their right to any affirmative defense delineated in
Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not specifically enumerated in any
of the other affirmative defenses. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he deadline to amend the

answer has run. Summary [j]udgment on this affirmative defense should be granted

14

as a matter of law.” (Doc. 26-2 at 15). Defendants respond that “Plaintiffs argument
is moot.” They clarify that this affirmative defense “is commonly used to preserve the
right to amend an Answer to include any applicable affirmative defense that may be
deemed applicable over the course of litigation[,]” and “[a]s Defendants have not
amended to assert any of these defenses, Plaintiff is seeking summary judgment
as to Defenses that Defendants are not actually asserting.” (Doc. 30 at 6). The Court
finds this to be an irrelevant dispute with no real bearing on the litigation in this
matter. But because this affirmative defense is not a true affirmative defense, and
granting the Motion in Plaintiffs favor will not create confusion at trial, the Court
will grant it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. 26) is DENIED IN PART with respect to Defendants’ first through fourth and
sixth through ninth affirmative defenses and GRANTED IN PART with respect to
Defendants’ fifth affirmative defense and tenth through twelfth affirmative defenses.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 2 of July, 2026
fa. Qa.
bea f—
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

15

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406537. Public record. Not legal advice.