# Angeli

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · July 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406496

## Case

- **Full name:** Thomas Angeli v. Echo Beekman, Latoya Hughes, Holly Hooks, and Kim Smith
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

rriday, 1/7 JUIY, 2UZ0 □□□□□□□ |
Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
THOMAS ANGELI, )
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) Case No. 25-cv-3258
)
ECHO BEEKMAN, LATOYA HUGHES, )
HOLLY HOOKS, and KIM SMITH, )
Defendants. )
OPINION
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff's Complaint brings two counts against four IDOC employees
(“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming Defendants unlawfully suspended and
discharged him in retaliation for his speech (Count I) and his race (Count II).
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following relevant facts. On July 6, 2024, Sonya
Massey, a Black woman, was shot and killed by a police officer in her home.! (Doc. 1 at J
10). Massey’s death drew national attention with the President, Vice President, and
Governor of Illinois all commenting. (Id. at § 11). Many in the public expressed the view
that Massey’s killing was racially motivated. (Id. at { 13). The phrase “Sonya Massey, say
her name” became a rallying cry amongst civil rights protesters. (Id.). The incident was
widely discussed on social media. (Id. at { 12). Plaintiff Thomas Angeli, who was a

1 A jury later found the police officer guilty of second-degree murder. People v. Grayson, 2025 IL 131279, §
3 (per curiam).
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correctional officer for the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) at the time, made
three Facebook posts about the incident:
[1] “say her name” wtf does that even mean?? If I say it 3x in a mirror will
she appear behind me with a boiling pot of water lol like candyman?
[2] Saw the body cam footage, obviously no need for the premature
shooting but that chick was high as shit and couldn’t follow simple requests
... and I couldn’t hear what she said right b4 he did shoot?? Anyone else
hear what she said??
[3] Sara Smith I’ve been in corrections for almost 10 years and her body
language the way she was acting tells me something weird was going on.
(Id. at J{ 1, 14). Sometime after these posts, the IDOC suspended and later discharged
Plaintiff. (Id. at § 18).
I. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of a complaint. Christensen
v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences
in his favor. Id. at 458. To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only provide a short and
plain statement of the claim showing he is entitled to relief and giving defendants fair
notice of the claim. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the
complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual content
from which the Court can reasonably infer that defendants are liable for the misconduct
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alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause
of action or supporting a claim with conclusory allegations is insufficient to state a claim.
complaint must do more than assert a right to relief that is
“speculative.” Virnich v. Vonvald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
(1) Documents Outside the Complaint
The Court must first determine what materials it may consider when assessing the
sufficiency of Plaintiff's Complaint as Defendants attach 105 pages of documents to their
motion to dismiss (collectively, “Attachments”). The Attachments seemingly include
internal IDOC documents on Plaintiff's suspension, termination, and past discipline; a
copy of the IDOC’s standards of conduct; news stories covering Massey’s killing;
screenshots of social media posts; and documents indicating Plaintiff's posts prompted
significant public backlash including threats against IDOC staff, property, and
employees. Defendants advance no argument on how the Attachments meet the standard
governing when courts may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss.
Defendants did not seek leave to file a reply to address Plaintiff’s challenge to the
Attachments.
At the pleadings stage, “a court may consider, in addition to the allegations set
forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the complaint, documents
that are central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is properly
subject to judicial notice.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013). Aside
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from screenshots of Plaintiff’s Facebook posts, none of the documents in the Attachments
are referred to in the Complaint or subject to judicial notice. A court may “take judicial
notice of an adjudicative fact that is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ because it: (1) is
generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
In re Lisse, 905 F.3d 495, 496 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)).
Judicial notice “is an adjudicative device that substitutes the acceptance of a
universal truth for the conventional method of introducing evidence.” GE Capital Corp.,
128 F.3d at 1081; see, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12, 213
F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 2000) (judicial decisions); Owens v. Duncan, 781 F.3d 360, 362 (7th
Cir. 2015) (weather data); Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 205 (7th Cir. 1970) (distance
between two places); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993)
(allowing courts to take notice of “theories that are so firmly established as to have
attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics”).
Here, Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of a trove of unverified,
contested documents without any argument as to how the Attachments represent a
“aniversal truth” or are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” GE Capital Corp., 128 F.3d at 1081. As
such, the Court only takes judicial notice of the screenshots of Plaintiff's Facebook posts
that are referenced in and central to the Complaint. The Court also declines to convert
Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment because Plaintiff requests more
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discovery and for the reasons detailed below. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th
Cir. 1998) (courts have discretion to decide whether to convert a motion to dismiss into
one for summary judgment).
(2) First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count I)
As a public employee during the relevant period, Plaintiff was subject to more
relaxed speech protections than a private citizen: “Public employees do not sign away
their free speech rights when answering the call to public service; at the same time, public
employees’ rights to free speech are not absolute.” Hicks v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 109 F.4th
895, 900 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004)). “[T]he
government, as employer, has greater leeway to control the speech of its employees to
ensure discipline and harmony in government operation.” Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill,
511 US. 661, 671-72 (1994)). For a public employee to establish a First Amendment
violation for retaliation, she “first must prove that her speech is constitutionally
protected.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016).
To determine whether Plaintiff's speech is protected by the First Amendment, the
Court first asks whether Plaintiff “spoke as a citizen upon a matter of public concern.”2
Id. Defendants do not contest this predicate issue. Rather, Defendants contest whether
Plaintiff's “interests in speaking on a matter of public concern outweigh the government's

2 “(W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 481 (emphasis added). And “public
concern” means a “legitimate news interest” or “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public at the time of publication.” Id. at 482 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interest in promoting effective and efficient public services” —if so, Plaintiff's speech is
constitutionally protected. Hicks, 109 F.4th at 900. This analysis, often called the “ Pickering
balancing test,” is fact intensive. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).3
For that reason, Pickering is usually applied at summary judgment because courts need
evidence often only producible during discovery in order to conduct the appropriate
balancing. Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Normally, application
of the Pickering balancing test will be possible only after the parties have had an
opportunity to conduct some discovery.”). The Seventh Circuit said in Gustafson that it
would be “a rare case indeed” where a Court could find against a plaintiff under the
Pickering test at the pleadings stage.* Id.
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint does not include much beyond a short and plain
statement of the claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The allegations do not discuss any subsequent
fallout or employer justifications for Plaintiff's termination. As such, Plaintiff’s case is not
the “rare case” where the Court may conduct a Pickering balancing on the pleadings,
because Defendants’ arguments frequently rely on the Attachments, not the Complaint.
Defendants’ arguments are not ripe for consideration at this phase of the litigation.

3 Under Pickering, the Seventh Circuit considers “(1) whether the speech would create problems in
maintaining discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) whether the employment relationship is one in
which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; (3) whether the speech impeded the employee's
ability to perform her responsibilities; (4) the time, place and manner of the speech; (5) the context in which
the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed
decisionmaking; and (7) whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public.”
Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785, 796 (7th Cir. 2016).
4 Of note, the case Defendants heavily rely on for Pickering balancing, Hedgepeth v. Britton, No. 21 CV 3790,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28510 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2024), is a summary judgment case.
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Accordingly, construing the allegations in light favorable to Plaintiff, his First
Amendment claim stands.°
(3) Fourteenth Amendment Claim (Count II)
Defendants argue the official-capacity charges fail to state a Fourteenth
Amendment claim because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Indeed, those sued in their official capacity are not “persons” for § 1983 purposes,
but this principle is only relevant to the extent that those sued in their official capacities
cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983. Hearne v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,
185 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). A § 1983 official-capacity suit is
permissible when the claim is for equitable relief. Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 580-
81 (7th Cir. 2003); Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the Complaint
explicitly states Defendants are sued in their official capacity “for the limited purpose of
implementing equitable relief.” (Doc. 1 at 3-6). As such, Plaintiff's official capacity
claims survive dismissal. Defendants only make this argument as to Count II, but the
Court's official-capacity reasoning is equally applicable to Count I as both claims are
brought under § 1983.

5 The Court’s conclusion would remain the same if it considered the IDOC’s social media policy, which is
included in the Attachments and appears to be undisputed by Plaintiff.
6 Defendants state “[a]ll defendants named in the Plaintiff's complaint are state officials acting in their
official duties in IDOC, a state agency.” (Doc. 9 at 11). But each defendant is named in both their individual
and official capacities. To the extent that Defendants also take issue with personal liability, they fail to
address how each defendant did not personally “cause[] or participate[] in [the] alleged constitutional
deprivation[s],” Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983), and so have waived the issue.
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II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is DENIED.
ENTER: July 17, 2026 ZEB?
ZOWU_EEN K: YAWLESS
NITEDSTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406496. Public record. Not legal advice.