# Culver

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · July 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406006

## Case

- **Full name:** Derek K. Culver, Sr. v. Latoya Hughes et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DEREK K. CULVER, SR., )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-3291
)
LATOYA HUGHES et al., )
Defendants. )

ORDER
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed by Plaintiff Derek K. Culver, Senior,
an inmate at Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”). Plaintiff has also filed Motions for
Counsel (Doc. 4) and Status (Docs. 8, 9).
I. Complaint
A. Screening Standard
Plaintiff’s Complaint is before the Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which requires the Court to “screen” the pleading and identify and dismiss any legally
insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in his
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff names Physician Assistant Timothy Adesanya, Nurse Practitioner
Lindsay Boehm, former Graham Warden Steven Campbell, Director of Nursing Lucas
Emerick, Illinois Department of Corrections (”IDOC”) Director Latoya Hughes, John and
Jane Healthcare Unit Nursing Staff Members, IDOC, and Wexford Health Sources,
Incorporated (“Wexford”) as Defendants.

Plaintiff’s factual account outlines his attempts to receive medical care for his
pulmonary condition, which causes him difficulty breathing. Plaintiff claims that he has
explained his breathing difficulties to Defendants Adesanya, Boehm, and unidentified
members of the nursing staff multiple times to no avail. (Doc. 1 at 6-7.)
C. Analysis

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an

objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under
the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical condition is
sufficiently serious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective
component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. In the medical care context, a “deliberate indifference” standard is used. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 104. A plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference by showing that a

defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). A defendant “must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Treatment decisions made by medical professionals are presumptively valid.
Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998). “A medical professional

is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally competent
professional would have so responded under those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512
F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989
(7th Cir. 1998)). Thus, to be deliberately indifferent, a medical professional’s decision
must be “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir.
1998) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against Defendants Adesanya, Boehm, and John and Jane Doe Nursing

Staff Members. However, Plaintiff does not state plausible claims against the remaining
Defendants.
Defendant Wexford can be held liable under § 1983 if an unconstitutional act is
caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a
governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread
and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cty.

Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill.,
Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability
in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to corporations as
well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the
municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphases in original).
Plaintiff does not allege facts that establish or permit the Court to infer an official
policy or custom under any of the three conditions mentioned above. Thus, Plaintiff fails
to state a Monell claim against Wexford. Plaintiff also does not state a plausible claim
against IDOC. A building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be sued under §

1983. Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012); see also White v. Knight, 710
F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is owned by a corporate entity
or a government agency does not make the building a suable person under § 1983.”).
“For a defendant to be liable under section 1983, she must be personally
responsible for the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Mitchell v.

Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir.
2017) (“[I]n order to hold an individual defendant liable under § 1983 for a violation of
an inmate’s constitutional rights, the inmate must show that the defendant was
personally responsible for that violation.”). “The personal-involvement requirement is
satisfied if the constitutional violation occurs at a defendant’s direction or with her
knowledge or consent.” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Estate

of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 452 (7th Cir. 2017) (“To establish [a] § 1983 claim, [the
plaintiff] must demonstrate that the individual defendants: (1) acted under the color of
state law; and (2) deprived him of a constitutional right.”) (emphasis added).
Although Plaintiff identifies Defendants Campbell, Emerick, and Hughes, he does
not provide any facts that state a plausible constitutional deprivation. See Collins v. Kibort,
143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by

including the defendant’s name in the caption.”).
The Court infers that Plaintiff’s rationale for suing Defendants Campbell, Emerick,
and Hughes is based on their respective supervisory responsibilities, which cannot
impose § 1983 liability. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The
doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to impose § 1983 liability on a supervisor

for the conduct of a subordinate violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to § 1983 suits, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”);
Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To show personal

involvement, the supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it,
condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Campbell, Emerick,
and Hughes.
II. Counsel
Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an
attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask

for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a
district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in
certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask
two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,
does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654
(7th Cir. 2007).
The Court concludes that the recruitment of counsel at this early stage of the
proceedings is not warranted. As explained below, entry of the Court’s Merit Review

Order begins the service phase. After Defendants have been served and have filed their
answers to Plaintiff’s complaint, which usually takes sixty days, the Court will enter a
scheduling order that provides guidance and deadlines to assist Plaintiff during the
discovery process. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motions for Counsel (Doc. 4),
with leave to renew on a more developed record.

Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 8, 9) are moot given the Court’s Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 8, 9) are MOOT.
3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim against Defendants Adesanya, Boehm, and John and Jane
Doe Nursing Staff Members. Plaintiff’s claim proceeds in Defendants’ respective
individual capacities only. Additional claims shall not be included in the case,
except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Steven Campbell, Lucas
Emerick, Latoya Hughes, IDOC, and Wexford as Defendants.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until
counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff
need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed
by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.
Defendants have sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not
filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of this
order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and
dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If a Defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity
where that Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk said
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s forwarding
address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and
shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file their respective Answers within sixty days of the date the
Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should
include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this order. In
general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on
the merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore,
no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic
notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does
not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed
with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to discovery
requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the
Clerk of the Court. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses
directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk
will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to
compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel files an appearance
and the Court enters a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process
in more detail.

10) The Court grants Defendants’ counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of
confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a
change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit
with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty
days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal
service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will require that
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard
procedures.

ENTERED July 16, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless
____________________________________
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11406006. Public record. Not legal advice.