# CHAMBERS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · July 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11405869

## Case

- **Full name:** Dustin Chambers v. Lieutenant Mr. Couzzi, Corporal Mr. T. Kluk, Sergeant Mr. Rodgers, and Nurse Ms. Jo
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** July 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DUSTIN CHAMBERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV562
)
LIEUTENANT MR. COUZZI, )
CORPORAL MR. T. KLUK, )
SERGEANT MR. RODGERS, and )
NURSE MS. JO, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dustin Chambers’ cellmate at present evidence of his claims.
Rockingham County Jail had a Accordingly, the defendants are
medical emergency on May 1, 2024, entitled to judgment as a matter of
and Chambers called for help. When law. The Court should grant their
officers responded to the cell, motions for summary judgment.
Lieutenant Mr. Couzzi, Corporal Mr.
T. Kluk, and Sergeant Mr. Rodgers Peach also moved to seal portions of
allegedly used excessive force against her brief and affidavit in support of
Chambers, and “Nurse Ms. Jo” was her motion for summary judgment, as
allegedly deliberately indifferent to well as all of Exhibit 1 to her affidavit,
the injuries he sustained. Chambers which contain excerpts of Chambers’
brings this action against the medical records. Docket Entry 38.
defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Because the public’s First
§ 1983 for violating his Eighth Amendment right of access outweighs
Amendment rights. Chambers’ privacy interest, the
motion to seal is denied.
This matter is now before the Court on
Joanna Peach’s motion for summary I. FAILURE TO RESPOND
judgment, Docket Entry 35, and her
Upon the defendants’ filing of their
co-defendants’ (“the Officers’”)
respective motions for summary
motion for summary judgment,
judgment, on October 9, 2025, the
Docket Entry 39. Chambers did not
Clerk of Court mailed Chambers the
respond to either motion, failing to
standard Roseboro letter informing although Chambers’ failure to
him of the motions and his right to respond may leave the defendants’
respond. The letter warned Chambers facts uncontroverted, they “must still
that if he failed to respond to the show that the uncontroverted facts
motions, the Court may “conclude entitle [them] to ‘a judgment as a
that the defendant(s)’ contentions are matter of law.’” Id. See also Campbell
undisputed and/or that you no longer v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21
wish to pursue the matter” and grant F.3d 52, 55-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting
judgment in favor of the defendants. that, even in the absence of a
Docket Entry 41. See also M.D.N.C. response, “the court should look at the
Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (“If no response brief movant’s own papers . . . [and]
is filed within the time required by determine if the record of filed
this rule, the motion will be depositions, answers to
considered and decided as an interrogatories, admissions, and
uncontested motion, and ordinarily affidavits[] demonstrates that a
will be granted without further genuine issue exists as to any material
notice.”). Despite the Court’s fact”).
warning, Chambers has not
responded to either motion,1 nor did The uncontroverted facts do show just
he verify the factual allegations in his that, as set forth in further detail
Complaint, see Docket Entry 2, such below.
that they could be considered as more
II. FACTS
than mere allegations, see Gowen v.
Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 175-76 (4th
On May 1, 2024, Chambers was an
Cir. 2025).
inmate at the Rockingham County
Detention Center (“Jail”) when, at
Nevertheless, the Court cannot
approximately 7:20 a.m., his cellmate
summarily grant the defendants’
suffered a medical emergency.
motions because Chambers’ failure to
Windell Brown Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3, Docket
respond “does not fulfill the burdens
Entry 32-1. Someone in Chambers’
imposed on moving parties by Rule 56
cell pressed the intercom, and Officers
[of the Federal Rules of Civil
Couzzi, Rodgers, and Kluk, among
Procedure].” Custer v. Pan Am. Life
others, others responded. Id. ¶ 4.
Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir.
1993). When officers arrived, “Chambers
exited his cell in an aggressive manner
“Rule 56 requires that the moving
and confronted the responding
party establish, in addition to the
officers.” Id. ¶ 5. They told him to
absence of a dispute over any material
move aside so his cellmate could
fact, that it is ‘entitled to a judgment
receive medical attention. Id. But
as a matter of law.’” Id. Thus,
Chambers began arguing “so he was

1 There is also no entry on the docket of undeliverable. Therefore, it is presumed
the Roseboro letter being returned as that Chambers received it.
placed on the floor and restrained and injury and no limited rotation of
handcuffed.” Id. Officers then moved movement. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 16).
him from the area to booking where
he stayed for the remainder of the As a result of the Sick Call visit, Peach
medical emergency response. Id. ¶ 6. placed Chambers on the list for the
Chambers had no obvious injuries doctor to see next time he was at the
and did not complain of any neck or Jail. Id. ¶ 17 (citing Ex. 1 at 16). The
back pain at the time. Id. ¶ 8. None of one doctor contracted to provide
the detention officers took him to the services at the Jail generally went
medical unit to be evaluated after the there once a week to review charts and
incident. Joanna Peach Aff. ¶ 10 evaluate patients, although he was
(Sept. 10, 2025), Docket Entry 37-1. available 24 hours a day for
consultation and to make verbal
At the time of the incident, Joanna orders for patients. Id. ¶ 5.
Peach (Nurse Jo) was a licensed
practical nurse employed with Nursing staff, including Peach, could
Southern Health Partners, Inc. which not independently make medical
contracted with the Jail to provide decisions for inmates, nor could they
nursing care to inmates. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. unilaterally order prescriptions for
There was one nurse on-site at the Jail any inmate. Id. ¶ 7.
14 hours a day, seven days a week. Id.
¶ 4. An off-site on-call registered On May 9, Chambers submitted a Sick
nurse was available 24 hours a day, Call request following up on the May 1
seven days a week. Id. incident. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Ex. 1 at 21).
In it, he complained that he could not
On May 2, Peach saw Chambers in turn his neck and could not bend over.
response to an April 30 Sick Call Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 21). He asked why
request. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Ex. 1 at 12, 14, it was taking so long for a doctor to see
19). During the examination, “someone in pain” for “something
Chambers did not mention the May 1 that[’]s an emergency.” Id. (citing Ex.
altercation, and Peach did not 1 at 21). Peach responded to the Sick
otherwise know of Chambers’ Sick Call request and let Chambers know
Call request related to the May 1 that he was on the list for the doctor to
altercation. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Ex. 1 at 16). see and he was already receiving pain
medication. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 21).
On May 3, Peach saw Chambers for
the May 1 Sick Call request. Id. ¶ 16 Due to a personal emergency, the
(citing Ex. 1 at 15-16). She recorded doctor could not go to the Jail until
his vital signs, his complaint that he May 11. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Ex. 1 at 12).
could not move his neck in either That day, he examined Chambers who
direction, and his pain rating of a 7 complained of stiffness, pain, and a
out of 10. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 15-16). decreased rotation of movement in
She also noted no bruising or visible his neck. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Ex. 1 at 12).
The doctor prescribed Chambers with III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
another pain medication, muscle
reliever, and a hot pack. Id. (citing Ex. A court “shall grant summary
1 at 3, 12). judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any
Approximately one month later, on material fact and the movant is
June 13, Chambers submitted his next entitled to judgment as a matter of
Sick Call request, this time reporting law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
slight pains shooting down from his dispute of material fact exists “if the
neck to his spine. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Ex. 1 evidence is such that a reasonable jury
at 22). Peach placed him on the sick could return a verdict for the
call list for the doctor to see. Id. nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
In the meantime, Peach saw (1986). In analyzing a summary
Chambers on June 18. Id. ¶ 27. He judgment motion, courts
complained that his pain had “must construe all facts and
continued since May 1 and was reasonable inferences in the light
currently at a 6 out of 10. Id. (citing most favorable to the nonmoving
Ex. 1 at 17-18). The doctor prescribed party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59
him additional pain medicine. Id. F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).
(citing Ex. 1 at 4, 7, 18).
The moving party bears the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine
When the doctor saw Chambers on
dispute of material fact by
June 30, he noted that Chambers’
“identifying those portions of ‘the
cervical pain had improved but he still
pleadings, depositions, answers to
had neck pain radiating to his back.
interrogatories, and admissions on
Id. ¶ 28 (citing Ex. 1 at 12). The doctor
file, together with the affidavits, if any’
discontinued the medication and
which it believes demonstrates the
ordered a corticosteroid sequence and
absence of a genuine issue of material
an x-ray of Chambers’ cervical spine.
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 4, 9, 28).
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule

56).
On July 2, Chambers received the x-
ray which revealed that his cervical
“Where, as here, the nonmoving party
spine was normal. Id. ¶ 29 (citing Ex.
bears the ultimate burden of proof at
1 at 10-11). The doctor did not order
trial, the moving party may discharge
any further treatment. Id. ¶ 30 (citing
its initial burden at summary
Ex. 1 at 4, 9).
judgment by ‘showing – that is,

pointing out to the . . . court – that
Chambers was transferred out of the
there is an absence of evidence to
Jail on or about October 23, 2024. Id.
support the nonmoving party’s case.’”
¶ 36.
Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp.,
LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at other federal legal right. West v.
325). “If the moving party carries this Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
initial burden, the burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go A. The Court should grant the
beyond the pleadings and by [his] Officers’ motion for
own affidavits, or by the depositions, summary judgment.
answers to interrogatories, and
Chambers alleges that Couzzi, Kluk,
admissions on file, designate specific
and Rodgers used excessive force
facts showing that there is a genuine
when he was exiting his cell to allow
issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex
access to his cellmate who needed
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
medical assistance. Specifically, he
A party cannot rely on statements in a contends that Couzzi and Kluk
brief to support a motion for slammed him to the ground for no
summary judgment, because they are reason and Rodgers placed his knee
not evidence. City of Greensboro v. and weight on Chambers’ neck. As a
Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. result, he sustained neck and back
15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 injuries.
n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017)
An inmate’s right to be free from the
(collecting cases); see also Hill v.
use of excessive force derives from the
Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022
Eighth Amendment. Whitley v.
WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23,
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); see
2022).
also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
IV. ANALYSIS 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“The Eighth
Amendment . . . serves as the primary
Title 42, United States Code, Section source of substantive protection to
1983 “is a federal statutory remedy convicted prisoners in cases . . . where
available to those deprived of rights the deliberate use of force [by prison
secured to them by the Constitution officials] is challenged as excessive
and, in a more sharply limited way, and unjustified.”).
the statutory laws of the United
States” by persons acting under color A claim for the use of excessive force
of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. “involves both an objective and a
Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th subjective component.” Dean v.
Cir. 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir.
pursuant to Section 1983 must show 2021). “The objective component
that a person acting under color of measures the nature of the force
state law violated a Constitutional or employed, asking whether that force
‘was sufficiently serious to establish a
cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Brooks
v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir.
2019)). “This is not a high bar; de
minimis or trivial force is not enough,
but anything more will suffice.” Id. maintain institutional security.’” Id.
(citing Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22).

“The more demanding . . . subjective
But an officer crosses the line and acts
component . . . asks a single question:
maliciously and sadistically, for
whether the officers acted with a
example, “when [he] inflict[s] pain . . .
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’”
to punish an inmate for intransigence
id. (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77
or to retaliate for insubordination,”
F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)), that is,
Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113-14, n.4 (citing
“wantonness in the infliction of pain,”
cases finding a reasonable jury could
id. The plaintiff must establish that
infer the officer used excessive force
the officer applied force “maliciously
in response to the inmate’s use of
and sadistically for the very purpose
profanity and threats of violence and
of causing harm” rather than “in a
other similar statements directed at
good-faith effort to maintain or
officers), or “to punish or retaliate
restore discipline.” Dean, 984 F.3d at
against an inmate for his prior
302.
conduct,” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302, and

possibly when the officer “use[s] force
For example, an officer acts in good
on an inmate who is restrained and
faith when confronting “immediate
compliant and posing no physical
risks to physical safety” and
threat,” id. (noting this conduct
“compelling compliance with prison
“raises the specter of such an
rules and procedures” to “preserve
impermissible motive”).
internal order.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at

113 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503
“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)).
inmate is one factor that may suggest

‘whether the use of force could
The United States Supreme Court
plausibly have been thought
recognized long ago that “corrections
necessary’ in a particular situation.”
officials must make their decisions ‘in
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37
haste, under pressure, and frequently
(2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at
without the luxury of a second
7).
chance.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To determine the nature of the force,
They “must balance the need ‘to courts assess “[1] the need for
maintain or restore discipline’ application of force, [2] the
through force against the risk of relationship between that need and
injury to inmates.” Id. Accordingly, the amount of force used, [3] the
“‘[p]rison administrators . . . should threat ‘reasonably perceived by the
be accorded wide-ranging deference responsible officials,’ and [4] ‘any
in the adoption and execution of efforts made to temper the severity of
policies and practices that in their a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503
judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to
U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at doctor did not order any further
321). treatment.
“If a reasonable jury could find, based The law permits officers to use means
on the inferences drawn under the to maintain order and discipline. The
Whitley factors or other evidence, force used here – placing Chambers
that correctional officers used force on the floor to handcuff him – was in
maliciously to punish or retaliate response to Chambers’ aggressive,
against an inmate, then summary confrontational, and argumentative
judgment [in favor of the officers] is behavior when officers and medical
not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at personnel needed to access his cell.
303-02. Balancing the Whitley factors, the
nature of this force was not excessive.
Here, the only evidence before the And the evidence does not show that
Court shows that Chambers was any of the officers acted maliciously or
aggressive and confrontational sadistically.
towards the officers who responded to
assist his cellmate. When officers told Chambers, who has the burden at trial
him to move aside, he began to argue, of proving these officers used
at which time “he was placed on the excessive force, did not respond or
floor and restrained and handcuffed.” otherwise provide evidence to the
There is no evidence that anyone contrary. In sum, he has failed to
placed a knee or any weight on proffer evidence of the essential
Chambers’ neck. elements of his excessive force claim.

Once handcuffed, Chambers then Because there is no evidence that any
waited in booking until the emergency of the officers violated Chambers’
ended. At the time, he did not constitutional right to be free from the
complain of any neck or back pain and use of excessive force, they are
had no obvious injuries. entitled to qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th
Two days later, Peach assessed 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[A] court
Chambers for reported pain in his may award qualified immunity to an
neck and back and administered official if either (1) there is no
medications as the doctor ordered. violation of a constitutional right, or
Ultimately, an x-ray of his cervical (2) the constitutional right was not
spine showed normal results, and the clearly established.”).

Therefore, the Court should grant the
Officers’ motion for summary
judgment.2

2 In their brief, the Officers conclude that to Officers Brown, Stultz, Couzzi, Kluk,
“summary judgment should be granted and Rodgers.” Defs. Couzzi, Kluk and
B. The Court should grant knowledge of the risk of harm to the
Peach’s motion for inmate” and also “‘recognize[s] that
summary judgment. his actions were insufficient’ to
mitigate the risk of harm to the
Chambers alleges that Peach was inmate arising from his medical
deliberately indifferent to his serious needs.” Id. (quoting Parrish ex rel.
medical needs. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303
(4th Cir. 2004)).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

has long held that an inmate is due
Prison officials may act with
“reasonable medical treatment.” See
deliberate indifference by
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47
“intentionally denying or delaying
(4th Cir. 1977). “Claims that prison
access to medical care . . . .” Estelle,
officials failed to provide adequate
429 U.S. at 105. But “[m]ere delay is
medical care to an inmate, like
not enough.” Moskos v. Hardee, 24
excessive force claims, sound in the
F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). “A
Eighth Amendment.” Iko v. Shreve,
commonplace medical delay such as
535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). A
that experienced in everyday life will
plaintiff must show that the officer
only rarely suffice to constitute an
“acted with ‘deliberate indifference’
Eighth Amendment violation, absent
(subjective) to the inmate’s ‘serious
unusual circumstances where the
medical needs’ (objective).” Id.
delay itself places the prisoner at
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such
97, 104 (1976)).
as where the prisoner’s condition

deteriorates markedly or the ailment
A serious medical need is “‘one that
is of an urgent nature.” Id.
has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so
An inmate’s disagreement with
obvious that even a lay person would
medical staff about his treatment is
easily recognize the necessity for a
insufficient absent exceptional
doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting
circumstances. See Hixson v. Moran,
Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839,
1 F.4th 297, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2021)
846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
(citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d

841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing
An officer acts with deliberate
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6
indifference when he has “actual

Rodgers’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for indifference and conditions of
Summ. J. at 8, Docket Entry 40 confinement. See Officers’ Mem. at 11-15.
(“Officers’ Mem.”). But the Court In its August 9, 2024 Order, the Court
dismissed all claims against Brown and only permitted the excessive force claim
Stultz in its August 9, 2024 Order, to proceed against the Officers, while the
Docket Entry 5. Similarly, the Officers deliberate indifference to serious medical
argue that they are entitled to summary needs claim could proceed against Nurse
judgment on claims of deliberate Jo.
(3rd Cir. 1970) (noting that Chambers access to treatment. The
exceptional circumstances are those delay was due to unforeseen personal
in which medical care is “so grossly circumstances of the doctor who was
incompetent, inadequate or excessive on-site on May 11 and evaluated
as to shock the general conscience or Chambers. When Chambers later
to be intolerable to fundamental returned to see Peach with continued
fairness”))); see also Bowring, 551 complaints of pain, she once again
F.2d at 47-48 (“The right to treatment placed him on the list to see the doctor
is, of course, limited to that which who ordered a cervical x-ray, the
may be provided upon a reasonable results of which were normal. Thus,
cost and time basis and the essential there is no evidence that any delay,
test is one of medical necessity and assuming Peach were somehow
not simply that which may be responsible for it, placed Chambers at
considered merely desirable.”); substantial risk of harm or caused his
Moorehead v. Stover, No. 5:13-CT- condition to deteriorate noticeably.
3144-F, 2016 WL 8667807, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2016), aff’d, 671 F. As above, Chambers did not respond
App’x 221 (granting summary or otherwise provide evidence to the
judgment where the “claims contrary. He has failed to proffer
essentially amount to a disagreement evidence of the essential elements of
in the course of treatment prescribed his deliberate indifference claim
by Defendant”). against Peach.

Here, the undisputed evidence shows Because there is no evidence that
that Peach provided Chambers with Peach violated Chambers’
adequate medical treatment for his constitutional right to receive
alleged injuries. When she assessed adequate medical treatment, she is
him on May 2 for an unrelated earlier entitled to qualified immunity. See,
Sick Call request, he did not mention e.g., Nazario, 103 F.4th at 230 (“[A]
the May 1 incident, and she did not court may award qualified immunity
otherwise know about it. After to an official if either (1) there is no
learning of his related Sick Call violation of a constitutional right, or
request, she saw him on May 3, noted (2) the constitutional right was not
his complaints of neck and back pain, clearly established.”).
and placed him on the list to see the
doctor. Although Chambers Therefore, the Court should grant
complained of the delay in seeing the Peach’s motion for summary
doctor, there is no evidence that judgment.3
Peach intentionally delayed

3 Although Peach includes in her brief an dismissed the official capacity claim
argument that the Court should also against her in its August 9, 2024 Order,
grant summary judgment in her favor on Docket Entry 5.
the official capacity claim, the Court
V. SEALING STANDARD involving claims of inadequate
medical treatment) (citing Press-
Peach also moves to seal portions of Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S.
her summary judgment brief and 501, 510 (1984); Rushford v. New
supporting affidavit, and the entirety Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253
of the accompanying exhibit, which (4th Cir. 1988)).
contain excerpts from Chambers’
medical records. In support of her As did the defendants in Musgrove,
motion, she merely relies on the Peach refers to state and federal
Court’s express authority to seal statutes and regulations governing
materials pursuant to Local Rule 5.4 confidentiality, but “[t]he Court does
and requests that they be sealed “so not understand [Peach] to say that
that the parties may present them to these statutes and regulations
the Court without violating applicable prohibit courts from making such
North Carolina or federal statutes records available on the court docket.
concerning the confidentiality of Rather, reading between the lines, it
medical records, such as the Health appears [she is] saying that [she is]
Insurance Portability and required to keep such records
Accountability Act Privacy Rule, 45 confidential pursuant to state and
CFR Part 160 and 164.” Mot. to Seal federal laws and regulations. But that
¶¶ 4, 5. does not establish that any law
prohibits or restricts disclosure of
This argument does not address the such records by courts when the
legal standards that govern the records are filed and used in pending
public’s right of access to documents, cases.” Id. at *2.
especially those upon which the Court
relies when ruling on a motion for Nevertheless, “the Court will still
summary judgment. weigh the public’s right of access
against the defendants’ interest in
The public has a First Amendment of sealing.” Id. Like the Musgrove
access to these judicial records. See, defendants, Peach has “not addressed
e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d the public’s interest in access at all,
246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014). Therefore, much less explained why it is
Peach “must show a compelling outweighed by a governmental
governmental interest or other higher interest in secrecy.” Id.
value to justify sealing, and the
limitation on public access must be “While the Court recognizes that
narrowly tailored to serve that medical records are ordinarily kept
interest.” Musgrove v. Moore, No. confidential, that is not always the
1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL 19977408, at case when those records are
*1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (denying important to a lawsuit the patient
the defendants’ motion to seal himself has brought.” Id.
medical records in a § 1983 case
Although Peach filed her motion to VI. CONCLUSION
seal on October 8, 2025, Chambers
has not joined the motion. See IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
generally Docket. Furthermore, in Joanna Peach’s motion to seal is
his complaint, Chambers described DENIED;
his alleged injuries, statements about
his medical condition that he made to IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
Peach, and care he received from the Joanna Peach refile Docket Entries
doctor. See Statement of Claim, 37, 37-1, and 37-2 as_ publicly
Compl. The Court discerns no accessible documents that also
interest here that outweighs the comply with Federal Rule of Civil
public’s right of access to these Procedure 5.2;
materials.
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED
Accordingly, Peach’s motion to seal is that the Court GRANT Defendants
denied. Couzzi, Kluk, and Rodgers’ motion for
summary judgment and dismiss the
claim against them with prejudice;
and
IT IS FURTHER
RECOMMENDED that the Court
GRANT Defendant Joanna Peach’s
motion for summary judgment and
dismiss the claim against her with
prejudice.

Gibson McFadden
United States Magistrate Judge
July 23, 2026

11

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11405869. Public record. Not legal advice.