# Laprade

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · June 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11405816

## Case

- **Full name:** Lamont Antwain Laprade v. Western Regional Jail, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** June 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HUNTINGTON DIVISION

LAMONT ANTWAIN LAPRADE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-00574

WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL, et al.,

Defendant.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Lamont Antwain Laprade (“Plaintiff”), acting pro se, filed his Complaint
in this matter on September 26, 2025, against Defendants Western Regional Jail, James
Smith, Wexford Health Sources, Austin Jordan, Dr. P. Galapon, and Boswell Pharmacy
Services LLC. Currently pending before the Court are: (1) Defendants Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., Austin Jordan, and Dr. P. Galapon’s (“Medical Defendants”) Motion to
Dismiss, (ECF No. 17); (2) Defendants West Virginia Division of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, improperly identified in the Complaint as Western Regional Jail, and
James Smith’s (“Jail Defendants”) Amended Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 24); and (3)
Defendant Boswell Pharmacy Services LLC’s (“Boswell”) Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No.
28). Plaintiff has filed a consolidated response in opposition to the motions, (ECF No.
30), and each defendant group filed a reply, (ECF Nos. 31, 32, 33).
This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States
District Judge, and by Standing Order has been referred to the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
Having thoroughly reviewed the Complaint, the parties’ memoranda, and the
attached exhibits, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motions to dismiss, (ECF Nos. 17, 24, 28), be
GRANTED; that Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF No. 2), be DISMISSED; and that this civil

action be REMOVED from the docket of the Court.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff, acting pro se and then incarcerated at the
Western Regional Jail (“WRJ”) in Barboursville, West Virginia, filed an Application to
Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and Costs and a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). Plaintiff named as defendants Western Regional Jail; James Smith;
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”); Austin Jordan; Dr. P. Galapon; and Boswell
Pharmacy Services LLC (“Boswell”). (ECF No. 2 at 1). He sought monetary damages in the
amount of $50,000. (ECF No. 2 at 5).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in August 2025, he submitted a sick-call
request concerning skin irritation and flaking affecting multiple areas of his body. (ECF

No. 2 at 4). Plaintiff states that he was evaluated by Defendant Dr. Galapon and prescribed
a tar-based shampoo. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, after using the prescribed shampoo, he
experienced redness, irritation, and burns to his skin. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff contends that
he thereafter received ointment and hydrocortisone cream, but he alleges that he suffered
permanent scarring, discoloration, and emotional distress as a result of the treatment.
(Id. at 4-6).
On October 30, 2025, Defendants Wexford, Austin Jordan, and Dr. P. Galapon
filed a Motion to Dismiss and memorandum in support. (ECF Nos. 17, 18). They argue,
among other things, that Plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly establishing deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, fails to allege personal involvement by Defendant
Jordan, and fails to state a viable claim for relief against Wexford based on any policy or
custom. (ECF No. 18 at 7-10). Defendants further contend that Plaintiff did receive
medical attention and that the allegations, even accepted as true, sound in negligence

rather than a constitutional deprivation. (ECF No. 18 at 10-11).
On November 20, 2025, Defendants West Virginia Division of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“WVDCR”), which notes it was improperly identified in the Complaint as
WRJ, and James Smith filed an amended Motion to Dismiss and memorandum in
support. (ECF Nos. 24, 25). They argue that WVDCR is not a “person” subject to suit
under § 1983 and is entitled to sovereign immunity, and that Plaintiff pleads no facts
showing James Smith’s personal involvement in the alleged events. (ECF No. 25 at 5-8).
They further assert that Plaintiff’s allegations concern medical care provided by other
defendants, that Smith cannot be held liable based solely on his supervisory role, that they
are entitled to qualified immunity, and that the Complaint therefore fails to state a
plausible claim against either Jail Defendant. (Id. at 8-14).

On December 19, 2025, Defendant Boswell filed its Motion to Dismiss and
memorandum in support, asserting that Plaintiff fails to allege facts connecting Boswell
to any constitutional deprivation or otherwise stating a plausible claim for relief. (ECF
Nos. 28, 29).
On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a consolidated response in opposition to the
pending motions together with numerous exhibits. (ECF No. 30). In the response,
Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ characterization of his claims as sounding in negligence
and contends that Defendants knowingly exposed him to a harmful medical product and
failed to adequately respond after he reported worsening symptoms. (Id.). Plaintiff also
relies upon attached medical records, grievances, and product-related materials in
support of his position. (Id.).
The Medical Defendants replied on January 9, 2026, maintaining that Plaintiff’s
response attempts to introduce allegations not contained in the operative Complaint and

reiterating that the pleaded facts do not establish a constitutional violation or a basis for
liability against Wexford or Jordan. (ECF No. 31). The Jail Defendants replied on January
12, 2026, likewise arguing that Plaintiff’s response cannot amend the Complaint and
emphasizing that Plaintiff still fails to allege conduct attributable to Smith or facts
overcoming WVDCR’s immunity. (ECF No. 32). Defendant Boswell replied on January
13, 2026, similarly asserting that Plaintiff’s response and exhibits do not cure the absence
of factual allegations connecting Defendant Boswell to the alleged injury. (ECF No. 33).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a notice requesting that his response brief be construed
as his “initial complaint.” (ECF No. 34). By Order entered April 8, 2026, the Court advised
Plaintiff that if he wished to amend his pleading, he must file a motion seeking leave to
amend and attach a proposed amended complaint. (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff subsequently

informed the Court that he was not seeking leave to amend and instead wished to proceed
upon the Complaint already filed in this action. (ECF No. 36). Accordingly, the Complaint
filed at ECF No. 2 remains the operative pleading before the Court. To the extent Plaintiff
relies upon additional factual allegations contained only in his response brief, those
allegations are not part of the operative pleading before the Court. The Court therefore
considers the pending motions based upon the allegations contained in the Complaint.
The motions to dismiss are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
II. Discussion
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court has liberally construed the allegations
contained in the Complaint. Nevertheless, the Court may not act as Plaintiff's advocate or
construct claims not fairly presented by the pleading. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

The pending motions present three distinct categories of defendants: (1) the Jail
Defendants, WVDCR and James Smith; (2) the Medical Defendants, Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., Austin Jordan, and Dr. P. Galapon; and (3) Defendant Boswell Pharmacy
Services LLC. Plaintiff filed one consolidated response addressing all three motions. (ECF
No. 30). Each Defendant group filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 31, 32, 33). The Court therefore
addresses the pending motions by defendant group.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Although the Court accepts
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it need not accept legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As discussed below, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted against any Defendant. Accordingly, the undersigned
respectfully RECOMMENDS that each pending motion to dismiss be GRANTED.
A. Jail Defendants
Defendants West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“WVDCR”),
who note they are improperly identified in the Complaint as Western Regional Jail
(“WRJ”), and James Smith seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
(ECF Nos. 24, 25). They argue that WVDCR is not a “person” subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. (ECF No. 25 at
5-8). They further contend that Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing Defendant Smith’s
personal involvement in the events described in the Complaint, that neither Defendant
may be held liable for the medical treatment at issue, and that both Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 8-14). The undersigned addresses the claims

against each Defendant below.
Defendant WVDCR/WRJ
Plaintiff names Western Regional Jail (“WRJ”) as a defendant and seeks monetary
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2 at 1, 5). Defendants correctly note that WRJ
is operated by the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“WVDCR”)
and is not a legal entity separate from the State of West Virginia. (ECF No. 25 at 5–8).
Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claims against WRJ as claims asserted against
WVDCR.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under
color of state law deprived him of a federally protected right. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 60 (1989). It is well established that West Virginia regional jails

and the state agencies that operate them are arms of the State and therefore are not
“persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Roach v. Burch, 825 F. Supp. 116, 118 (N.D.W.
Va. 1993); Cantley v. W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth., 728 F. Supp. 2d 803, 818
(S.D.W. Va. 2010). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action for damages
against WRJ or WVDCR.
Moreover, as an arm of the State of West Virginia, WVDCR is entitled to sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment protects states and
their agencies from suit in federal court absent waiver or valid congressional abrogation.
See Will, 491 U.S. at 66; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
Plaintiff has identified no waiver of immunity applicable to his claims, nor is the Court
aware of any. Accordingly, WVDCR is immune from Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief.
Plaintiff’s response does not meaningfully address these arguments. Rather,
Plaintiff focuses on the circumstances surrounding his medical treatment and the injuries

he allegedly sustained. (ECF No. 30). However, those allegations do not alter the settled
law that WVDCR is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and is immune from suit
in this action.
Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim
against WVDCR and further FINDS that WVDCR is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. The undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Jail
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 24), be GRANTED as to WVDCR.
Defendant Smith
Plaintiff also names James Smith as a defendant. (ECF No. 2 at 1). However,
beyond identifying Smith by name, Plaintiff pleads no facts describing Smith’s
involvement in Plaintiff’s medical treatment, his alleged injuries, or any related decision-

making. The Complaint does not allege that Smith personally participated in prescribing
or providing medical care, denied Plaintiff access to treatment, or otherwise engaged in
conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims.
Liability under § 1983 is personal in nature. A plaintiff must affirmatively show
that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. See
Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018). Naming a supervisory official,
without factual allegations linking that official to the alleged constitutional violation, is
insufficient to state a claim. Id. ("[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.")
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
In his response, Plaintiff attempts to attribute broader responsibility to Smith.
(ECF No. 30). He asserts that Smith was responsible for inmate safety and oversight at
the facility and failed to intervene or otherwise protect Plaintiff from the alleged harm

arising from his medical treatment. (Id. at 2, 5). Plaintiff further suggests that Smith
should be held accountable based upon his supervisory position within the jail and
responsibility for facility operations. (Id.). Even assuming those assertions were properly
before the Court, they do not establish Smith's personal involvement in Plaintiff's medical
care or the treatment decisions at issue. The operative Complaint contains no factual
allegations showing Smith's personal involvement in Plaintiff's alleged constitutional
deprivation. Rather, Plaintiff's assertions regarding Smith are based upon Smith's
supervisory position within the facility. Such allegations are insufficient to state a § 1983
claim because, as stated herein, liability under § 1983 is personal in nature, and a
supervisory official may not be held liable solely based upon his position of authority or
the actions of subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[E]ach

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977).
Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly
establishing a claim against Defendant Smith. Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a
constitutional violation by Defendant Smith, the Court need not address Defendants'
qualified-immunity argument. The undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the
Jail Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 24), be GRANTED as to Defendant Smith.
B. Medical Defendants
Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), Austin Jordan, and Dr. P.
Galapon seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 17, 18).
They argue that Plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly establishing deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need, does not plead any personal involvement by Defendant Jordan,
and fails to allege a basis for corporate liability against Wexford. (ECF No. 18). They

further contend that Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that he received medical
treatment and, at most, describe negligence or disagreement with treatment rather than
a constitutional deprivation. (Id.). The undersigned addresses each Defendant in turn.
Defendant Austin Jordan
Plaintiff names Austin Jordan as a defendant but alleges no facts describing
Jordan’s involvement in Plaintiff’s medical treatment or the events giving rise to this
action. (ECF No. 2 at 1, 4-5). The Complaint does not allege that Jordan evaluated
Plaintiff, prescribed medication, denied treatment, or otherwise participated in the
conduct at issue.
As noted above, liability under § 1983 is personal in nature. See Williamson v.
Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff must allege facts affirmatively

linking each defendant to the claimed constitutional deprivation. Id. Merely identifying
an individual by name, without factual allegations describing the individual's conduct, is
insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
In his response, Plaintiff appears to contend that Jordan held a supervisory role
within the medical department and bore responsibility for the treatment decisions made
in response to Plaintiff's complaints, including the prescription and dispensing of the tar-
based shampoo and the alleged failure to intervene after Plaintiff reported continuing
irritation and injury. (ECF No. 30 at 2, 6).
Even assuming those assertions were properly before the Court, they do not
plausibly establish Jordan's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. As with Defendant Smith, the operative Complaint contains no factual
allegations showing that Jordan participated in Plaintiff's medical care, directed the
treatment decisions at issue, or otherwise engaged in conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's

claims. Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to impose liability based upon Jordan's
supervisory position, § 1983 does not permit liability based solely upon a defendant's role
or authority. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Because the Complaint pleads no facts connecting Jordan to Plaintiff's alleged
injuries, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against
Defendant Jordan. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the
Medical Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 17), be GRANTED as to Defendant
Jordan.
Defendant Dr. P. Galapon
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Galapon evaluated him after he submitted a sick-call
request for skin irritation and prescribed a tar-based shampoo. (ECF No. 2 at 4). Plaintiff

contends that after using the shampoo, he experienced redness, irritation, and burns and
later received ointment and hydrocortisone. (ECF No. 2 at 4-5). Plaintiff asserts that the
treatment resulted in permanent scarring and emotional distress. (Id. at 5).
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time, his medical-care
claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See
Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 609–10 (4th Cir. 2023). To state such a claim, Plaintiff
must allege facts plausibly showing that the challenged conduct was objectively
unreasonable in light of a serious medical need. See id. at 611–12. Mere negligence,
inadvertent error, or disagreement with the course of treatment is insufficient to establish
a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Nothing in the Complaint plausibly alleges that Dr. Galapon knew the prescribed
shampoo posed an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff, that the medication was
contraindicated for Plaintiff, or that Dr. Galapon knowingly disregarded such a risk.

Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Galapon evaluated him, prescribed treatment for his
reported symptoms, and that Plaintiff subsequently experienced an adverse reaction.
(ECF No. 2 at 4-5). Even accepting those allegations as true, the Complaint alleges, at
most, that the prescribed treatment was ineffective or caused unintended harm. Such
allegations sound in negligence or medical malpractice, which are insufficient to establish
a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Jackson
v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014).
Further, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Complaint also reflects that
after Plaintiff reported continued irritation, he was provided with additional ointment
and hydrocortisone. (ECF No. 2 at 4-5). These allegations demonstrate that Plaintiff
received medical attention. While Plaintiff plainly disagrees with the effectiveness of the

prescribed treatment and believes the medication harmed him, the facts alleged do not
plausibly establish that Dr. Galapon acted in an objectively unreasonable manner rising
to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
In his response, Plaintiff appears to dispute Defendants’ characterization of his
allegations and contends that the treatment posed a known danger. (ECF No. 30).
However, Plaintiff's response does not cure the deficiencies discussed above. Even
liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations do not establish that Dr. Galapon acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner or otherwise violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Thus, the operative Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim.
Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a viable
constitutional claim against Defendant Galapon and respectfully RECOMMENDS that
the Medical Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 17), be GRANTED as to Defendant

Galapon.
Defendant Wexford
Plaintiff also names Wexford as a defendant. (ECF No. 2 at 1). However, the
Complaint contains no factual allegations concerning any Wexford policy, custom, or
practice connected to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
A private corporation performing medical services at a correctional facility may be
liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional
deprivation. See Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1982). A corporation
may not be held liable solely because it employs individuals involved in the underlying
events. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Powell, 678 F.2d 504 (4th
Cir. 1982).

Here, Plaintiff alleges only a single course of treatment involving his own medical
care. The Complaint contains no factual allegations identifying a Wexford policy or
widespread custom and no allegations plausibly connecting Wexford itself to a
constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s response does not cure these deficiencies, and, as
stated herein, Plaintiff expressly declined to amend the operative Complaint. (ECF No.
36). Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an
underlying constitutional violation arising from his medical treatment. Absent a
constitutional deprivation, there can be no corporate liability under § 1983.
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to
state a plausible claim for relief against Wexford. Having concluded that dismissal is
warranted under Rule 12(b)(6), the undersigned declines to address Wexford's alternative
arguments concerning service of process and compliance with Rule 8(a)(2). Accordingly,
the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Medical Defendants' motion to

dismiss, (ECF No. 17), be GRANTED as to Defendant Wexford.
C. Defendant Boswell
Defendant Boswell Pharmacy Services LLC (“Defendant Boswell”) seeks dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege facts connecting Defendant
Boswell to the conduct described in the Complaint or otherwise state a plausible claim for
relief under § 1983. (ECF Nos. 28, 29). The undersigned agrees.
Although Plaintiff names Defendant Boswell as a defendant, the Complaint
contains no factual allegations describing Defendant Boswell’s involvement in Plaintiff’s
medical treatment. (ECF No. 2 at 1, 4-5). Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a sick-call
request, was evaluated by Dr. Galapon, received a tar-based shampoo, and later
experienced irritation and burns requiring additional treatment. (Id.). However, the

Complaint does not allege that Defendant Boswell evaluated Plaintiff, prescribed
medication, dispensed the shampoo at issue, provided instructions concerning its use, or
otherwise participated in the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly connecting each
defendant to the claimed constitutional deprivation. Conclusory assertions unsupported
by factual allegations are insufficient to survive dismissal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In his response, Plaintiff attempts to connect Defendant Boswell to the alleged
injury through exhibits attached to his filing and argues that Defendant Boswell bore
responsibility for the product he received. (ECF No. 30 at 3-4, 8, 10-12). Specifically,
Plaintiff relies on product labeling and related materials to support his contention that
Defendant Boswell was involved in dispensing the tar-based shampoo and that the

product contributed to his injuries. (Id.). Defendant Boswell replies that Plaintiff’s
response cannot amend the operative Complaint and further disputes Plaintiff’s
characterization of the attached materials. (ECF No. 33). Whether the attached materials
support Plaintiff's characterization is ultimately immaterial because the Court evaluates
the pending motions based upon the allegations contained in the operative Complaint,
and Plaintiff has expressly clarified that he was not seeking leave to amend his Complaint.
(ECF No. 36). On the face of the operative Complaint, Plaintiff alleges no facts plausibly
connecting Defendant Boswell to a constitutional deprivation.
Moreover, even assuming Defendant Boswell supplied or dispensed the shampoo
prescribed to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has provided no factual allegations showing that
Defendant Boswell knew the product posed a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff,

disregarded such a risk, or otherwise engaged in objectively unreasonable conduct. As
discussed above, Plaintiff's allegations concerning the shampoo amount, at most, to an
adverse treatment outcome rather than a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim
against Defendant Boswell. The undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that
Defendant Boswell’s motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 28), be GRANTED.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned respectfully PROPOSES that the
District Court confirm and accept the foregoing findings and RECOMMENDS that: (1)
Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Austin Jordan, and Dr. P. Galapon’s Motion to
Dismiss, (ECF No. 17), be GRANTED; (2) Defendants West Virginia Division of

Corrections and Rehabilitation and James Smith’s Amended Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No.
24), be GRANTED; (3) Defendant Boswell Pharmacy Services LLC’s Motion to Dismiss,
(ECF No. 28), be GRANTED; (4) Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED; and (5) this civil
action be REMOVED from the docket of the Court.
Plaintiff is notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” is hereby
FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States
District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section
636(b)(1)(B), and Rules 6(d) and 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff
shall have fourteen days (filing of objections) and then an additional three days (if served
by mail) from the date of filing of this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” within
which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the

portions of the “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” to which objection is made
and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good
cause shown.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de
novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727
F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be provided to Judge Chambers
and Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn.
The Clerk is instructed to provide a copy of this “Proposed Findings and
Recommendation” to Plaintiff and counsel of record.
FILED: June 15, 2026

GQ Ger! bathe.
ne United States Magistrate Judge

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11405816. Public record. Not legal advice.