# BLANKS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · July 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11405784

## Case

- **Full name:** Tim Caesar Blanks v. Sgt. Capel, Ofc. Jasmine Brewington, Ofc. J. Rickers, and Lt. Angela Sessoms
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** July 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TIM CAESAR BLANKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV588
)
SGT. CAPEL, OFC. JASMINE )
BREWINGTON, OFC. J. RICKERS, )
and LT. ANGELA SESSOMS, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Tim Caesar Blanks alleges that, while to use hers, and failing to stop Caple
he was an inmate at Scotland from doing so; and Sessoms showed
Correctional Institution (“SCI”) in deliberate indifference to Blanks’s
February 2024, Sergeant Caple,1 on serious medical needs when she
Officer J. Ricker’s2 order, pepper instructed officers to leave him in his
sprayed him while he was handcuffed cell after the incident for ten minutes.
inside a locked cell and Lieutenant
Sessoms instructed officers to leave This matter is before the Court on the
Blanks in the cell for ten minutes after parties’ cross-motions for summary
the incident. And, according to judgment. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
Blanks, none of this would have Docket Entry 60; Def. Caple Mot. for
happened had Officer Brewington not Summ. J., Docket Entry 61; Sessoms,
reported his earlier agitated behavior. Brewington, and Ricker’s Mot. for
He now brings this Section 1983 Summ. J., Docket Entry 64.
action alleging violations of his Eighth
Amendment rights. Although Blanks characterizes his
motion as one for summary judgment,
Specifically, Blanks alleges that Caple in fact, he argues against granting
used excessive force when she summary judgment due to the
deployed the pepper spray; Ricker existence of genuine material
used excessive force by threatening to disputes. On the other hand, the
use her pepper spray, ordering Caple defendants argue that the undisputed
1 Capel’s name is spelled Caple. 2 Defendant Rickers’s name is spelled
Ricker.
evidence shows they are not liable for Brewington to call for assistance.
violating Blanks’s constitutional Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10; Dismissal
rights and that they are each entitled Ltr. at 5, Docket Entry 62-4. Ricker
to qualified immunity. and Caple responded to the unit.
Brewington Decl. ¶ 12. Ricker placed
For the reasons set forth below, the Blanks in handcuffs through the
Court should grant the defendants’ wicket door of his cell before she and
summary judgment on the official Caple escorted him to a holding cell in
capacity claims against them. The the Red Unit. Ricker Decl. ¶ 6.
Court should deny Blanks’s motion Brewington did not follow Caple,
and Caple’s motion. The Court should Ricker, or Blanks to the Red Unit, nor
grant summary judgment for did she see Blanks for the remainder
Brewington and Sessoms and grant in of her shift. Brewington Decl. ¶ 13.
part and deny in part summary
judgment for Ricker. The Court On the way to the Red Unit, Ricker
should grant qualified immunity for tried to calm Blanks by reminding
Brewington and Sessoms and deny him that he had never caused her any
qualified immunity for Caple and problems previously and just needed
Ricker. to cool off. Ricker Decl. ¶ 7.
I. FACTS Upon arrival at the Red Unit, Ricker
placed Blanks, still handcuffed, in a
The undisputed facts show that locked holding cell. Id. ¶ 8; Dismissal
Blanks was an inmate housed in the Ltr. at 5. Blanks was yelling.
mental health block/Blue Unit at SCI Dismissal Ltr. at 5. At 10:05 p.m.,
on February 6, 2024. See Def. Ricker’s Caple took out her pepper spray
Resps. to Pl.’s First Set of Reqs. for canister and administered a burst of
Admis., Docket Entry 62-7. That pepper spray through the holding cell
night, correction officer III door. Ricker Decl. ¶ 10; Incident R. at
Brewington was overseeing the unit. 2, Docket Entry 67-10.
Ricker, a correctional officer I, and
Caple, a correctional sergeant III, Lieutenant Sessoms, a correctional
were also on duty elsewhere at SCI lieutenant III at SCI supervising the
that night. See Sgt. Brewington Decl. Gray Unit that night, responded to a
¶¶ 4, 6 (Nov. 7, 2025), Docket Entry call that a use of force incident had
65-1; Officer Ricker Decl. ¶ 4 (Nov. 6, occurred in the Red Unit. Lt. Sessoms
2025), Docket Entry 65-2; Charlene Decl. ¶¶ 3-7 (Nov. 5, 2026), Docket
Nicole Caple Decl. ¶ 2 (Nov. 6, 2025), Entry 65-3.
Docket Entry 62-5.
Ricker remained in the corridor
At approximately 10:00 p.m., Blanks watching Blanks while Caple went to
was agitated because Brewington the sergeant’s office on the unit.
would not release him from his cell to Incident R. at 2. Caple told Sessoms
assist with janitorial work, prompting she had used OC pepper spray on
Blanks. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 7. One statement detailing what direct
minute later, Caple returned to the order was given twice and
cell, followed by Sessoms who kept a refused to provide a detailed
visual on Blanks. Incident R. at 2. statement. Upper management
Sessoms did not authorize any use of has been notified.
force against Blanks that day and did
not know or have reason to know that Incident R. at 4.
Caple would administer pepper spray
However, M. Parsons, the Facility
on Blanks. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 13.
Approver of the Incident Report,
At 10:09 p.m., correctional sergeant reviewed the report and concluded
III Jarred Gholston, correctional that “staff followed all policies and
sergeant III David Graham, and procedures we have in place for this
correctional sergeant III Lenwood type of incident. Only the amount of
Graham escorted Blanks from the cell force was used to get the situation
to the showers for decontamination. under control.” Id. at 5.
Witness Statements at 2, 9, 10, Docket
The North Carolina Department of
Entry 67-6. They gave him a fresh set
Adult Correction terminated Caple’s
of clothes and took him out of the Red
employment, effective July 4, 2024.
Unit at 10:25 p.m. Id. at 2, 9, 10;
Dismissal Ltr. Her dismissal was
Incident R. at 3.
related to two use-of-force incidents,
At 10:51 p.m., correctional sergeant one on November 5, 2023 and the
III Antonio Tolbert and correctional February 6, 2024 incident involving
officer III T. Nguyen escorted Blanks Blanks “while he was restrained in
from his cell to the medical exam handcuffs in a locked holding cell.”
room for assessment and back to his See id. (detailing witness statements
holding cell three minutes later. Id. at made as a part of the investigation
3; Witness Statements at 4, 12. into the February 6 incident).
As required, Sessoms investigated the The dismissal letter explained that
use of force incident, obtained witness she “administered a burst of pepper
statements, and prepared an incident spray at the offender when he was
report. Sessoms Decl. ¶ 9. She restrained in a holding cell, and he did
concluded that not otherwise pose a threat to himself
or others. Force is not allowed to be
[a]ll policies and procedures used against a properly restrained
were not followed for this type offender and the use of pepper spray
of incident due to Sergeant on Blanks was not reasonably
Caple not providing a reason necessary to carry out a proper
for administering OC Pepper
Spray, not providing the direct
order that was given. Sergeant
Caple was asked to provide a
correctional objective.” Id. at 8.3 cleared Blanks); Ricker Decl.
(describing Blanks’s erratic and
The dismissal letter also reported aggressive behavior and threatening
other correctional officers who statements to Ricker and Caple once
witnessed the February 6 incident and in the Red Unit holding cell); Incident
stated that they would not have R. (noting Blanks’s refusal to obey
sprayed Blanks because he was in Ricker’s orders); Def. Caple’s Resps.
handcuffs in a locked cell and not to Pl.’s Interrogs., Docket Entry 67-18
posing a threat to himself or staff. See (responding that Blanks refused
generally id. at 4-6. orders and verbally threatened staff).
But the parties dispute Blanks’s II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
conduct that led Brewington to call for
assistance that night, his refusal to A court “shall grant summary
obey orders once inside the cell in the judgment if the movant shows that
Red Unit, the extent of his injuries, there is no genuine dispute as to any
and Sessoms’ directions upon material fact and the movant is
learning of the incident. See entitled to judgment as a matter of
generally Brewington’s Decl. law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
(describing Blanks’s kicking, yelling, dispute of material fact exists “if the
and threat to her precipitating her call evidence is such that a reasonable jury
for assistance); Pl.’s [Verified] Br. in could return a verdict for the
Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
(“Verified Br. in Supp.”), Docket Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
Entry 70 (claiming Blanks did not (1986). In analyzing a summary
pose a threat to staff, himself, judgment motion, courts
property, or other inmates at the time “must construe all facts and
Caple administered pepper spray; reasonable inferences in the light
describing treatment for injuries he most favorable to the nonmoving
sustained, nightmares, and party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59
aggravation of PTSD; and claiming F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). The
that Sessoms instructed Ricker to moving party bears the burden of
leave him in the cell for ten minutes); establishing the absence of a genuine
Dismissal Letter (stating that Blanks dispute of material fact by
did not pose a threat to himself or “identifying those portions of ‘the
others); Def. Ricker’s Resps. to Pl.’s pleadings, depositions, answers to
First Set of Reqs. for Admis. (denying interrogatories, and admissions on
that Blanks was not acting violently or file, together with the affidavits, if any’
disruptively when Caple used force which it believes demonstrates the
against him and stating that “medical” absence of a genuine issue of material

3 “Not every violation of prison policy is a
violation of the constitution.” King v.
Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2023).
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 personal knowledge”). Cf. Jones v.
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule Harrell, No. 7:21-cv-541, 2025 WL
56). 2712429, at *2 n.3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 23,
2025) (not permitting pro se plaintiff
“An affidavit or declaration used to to rely on his brief to oppose summary
support [summary judgment] must judgment because it was not verified);
be made on personal knowledge, set McAllister v. Johnson, No. 1:10-CV-
out facts that would be admissible in 13, 2023 WL 8604205, at *1
evidence, and show that the affiant or (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2023) (“To the
declarant is competent to testify on extent his brief contains factual
the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. assertions, those assertions are not
56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. verified and have no evidentiary
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, value.”).
962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v.
Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. “‘When faced with cross-motions for
1991)). summary judgment, the court must
review each motion separately on its
A party generally cannot rely on own merits to determine whether
statements in a brief to support a either of the parties deserves
motion for summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law.’” TC
because they are not evidence. City of Heartland LLC v. Schiffman, No.
Greensboro v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of 1:23-CV-665, 2026 WL 1785093, at *1
Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL (M.D.N.C. June 22, 2026) (quoting
11488724, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516,
2017) (collecting cases); see also Hill 523 (4th Cir. 2003)), appeal
v. Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 docketed, No. 26-1912 (4th Cir. July
WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 16, 2026). “‘When considering each
2022). individual motion, the court must
take care to resolve all factual disputes
However, persuasive authority
and any competing, rational
supports consideration of a pro se
inferences in the light most favorable
party’s verified submissions to the
to the party opposing that motion.’”
court, including briefs, at the
Id. (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at
summary judgment stage. See, e.g.,
523).
Jones v. Perry, No. 9:21CV1822, 2022
WL 16952240, at *5 n.4 (D.S.C. Oct. III. GOVERNING LAW
27, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL
16951990 (Nov. 15, 2022) (stating Title 42, United States Code, Section
that “a pro se litigant’s . . . verified 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy
submission must be considered as an available to those deprived of rights
affidavit and may, standing alone, secured to them by the Constitution
defeat a motion for summary and, in a more sharply limited way,
judgment when the allegations the statutory laws of the United
contained therein are based on States” by persons acting under color
of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l “The more demanding . . . subjective
Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. component . . . asks a single question:
2009). A plaintiff bringing suit whether the officers acted with a
pursuant to § 1983 must show that a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’”
person acting under color of state law Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (quoting
violated a Constitutional or other Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756,
federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487 761 (4th Cir. 1996)), that is,
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “wantonness in the infliction of pain,”
id. “In contrast to the objective
A. Excessive Force component, this is a demanding
standard.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112-13.
Here, as against Caple, Rickers, and
The plaintiff must establish that the
Brewington, the constitutional right
officer applied force “maliciously and
at issue is the right to be free from an
sadistically for the very purpose of
officer’s use of excessive force, derived
causing harm” rather than “in a good-
from the Eighth Amendment. Whitley
faith effort to maintain or restore
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986);
discipline.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302.
see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
For example, an officer acts in good
386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“The Eighth
faith when confronting “immediate
Amendment . . . serves as the primary
risks to physical safety” and
source of substantive protection to
“compelling compliance with prison
convicted prisoners in cases . . . where
rules and procedures” to “preserve
the deliberate use of force [by prison
internal order.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at
officials] is challenged as excessive
113 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503
and unjustified.”).
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Bailey v. Turner,
736 F.2d 963, 970 (4th Cir. 1984)
A claim for the use of excessive force
(“rejecting rule that use of mace
“involves both an objective and a
against recalcitrant inmate may be
subjective component.” Dean v.
justified only by threat to physical
Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir.
safety”)).
2021).

“The objective component measures The United States Supreme Court
the nature of the force employed, recognized long ago that “corrections
asking whether that force ‘was officials must make their decisions ‘in
sufficiently serious to establish a haste, under pressure, and frequently
cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Brooks without the luxury of a second
v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. chance.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6
2019)). “This is not a high bar; de (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
minimis or trivial force is not enough, They “must balance the need ‘to
but anything more will suffice.” Id. maintain or restore discipline’
(citing Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). through force against the risk of
injury to inmates.” Id. Accordingly,
“‘[p]rison administrators . . . should
be accorded wide-ranging deference Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 and stating
in the adoption and execution of that the phrase “or other chemical
policies and practices that in their agents” “plainly reaches the use of
judgment are needed to preserve pepper spray”) (emphasis in original).
internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security.’” Id. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). inmate is one factor that may suggest
See also N.C. Dep’t of Adult ‘whether the use of force could
Correction, Use of Force Policy (Aug. plausibly have been thought
30, 2018) (authorizing the use of necessary’ in a particular situation.”
pepper spray as a “first level of Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37
response” “[t]o control or deter (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at
violent, threatening or aggressive 7). However, “[a]n inmate who is
acting offenders . . .”), Docket Entry gratuitously beaten by guards does
65-5. not lose his ability to pursue an
excessive force claim merely because
But an officer crosses the line and acts he has the good fortune to escape
maliciously and sadistically, for without serious injury.” Id. at 38.
example, “when [she] inflict[s] pain
. . . to punish an inmate for To determine the nature of the force,
intransigence or to retaliate for courts assess “[1] the need for
insubordination,” Brooks, 924 F.3d application of force, [2] the
at 113-14, n.4 (citing cases finding a relationship between that need and
reasonable jury could infer the officer the amount of force used, [3] the
used excessive force in response to the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the
inmate’s use of profanity and threats responsible officials,’ and [4] ‘any
of violence and other similar efforts made to temper the severity of
statements directed at officers), or “to a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503
punish or retaliate against an inmate U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at
for his prior conduct,” Dean, 984 F.3d 321).
at 302, and possibly when the officer
“If a reasonable jury could find, based
“use[s] force on an inmate who is
on the inferences drawn under the
restrained and compliant and posing
Whitley factors or other evidence,
no physical threat,” id. (noting this
that correctional officers used force
conduct “raises the specter of such an
maliciously to punish or retaliate
impermissible motive”). “[I]t is a
against an inmate, then summary
violation of the Eighth Amendment
judgment [in favor of the officers] is
for prison officials to use mace, tear
not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at
gas or other chemical agents in
303-02.
quantities greater than necessary or
for the sole purpose of infliction of
pain.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,
240 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
B. Deliberate Indifference of Prison officials may act with
Serious Medical Needs deliberate indifference by
“intentionally denying or delaying
Here, as against Sessoms, the access to medical care . . . .” Estelle,
constitutional right at issue once 429 U.S. at 105. But “[m]ere delay is
again derives from the Eighth not enough.” Moskos v. Hardee, 24
Amendment, but it involves alleged F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). “A
deliberate indifference to Blanks’s commonplace medical delay such as
serious medical needs. that experienced in everyday life will
only rarely suffice to constitute an
“Claims that prison officials failed to Eighth Amendment violation, absent
provide adequate medical care to an unusual circumstances where the
inmate, like excessive force claims, delay itself places the prisoner at
sound in the Eighth Amendment.” ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such
Iko, 535 F.3d at 241. A plaintiff must as where the prisoner’s condition
show that the officer “acted with deteriorates markedly or the ailment
‘deliberate indifference’ (subjective) is of an urgent nature.” Id.
to the inmate’s ‘serious medical needs’
(objective).” Id. (quoting Estelle v. IV. DISCUSSION
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
A. The Court should grant
A serious medical need is “‘one that summary judgment to the
has been diagnosed by a physician as defendants in their official
mandating treatment or one that is so capacity on the basis of
obvious that even a lay person would sovereign immunity.
easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting At the time of the incident, each of the
Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, defendants was an employee of the
846 (7th Cir. 1999)). North Carolina Department of Adult
Corrections (“the Department”). See
An officer acts with deliberate Caple Decl. ¶ 2; Ricker’s Resps. to Pl.’s
indifference when she has “actual Interrogs. ¶ 2 (responding to question
knowledge of the risk of harm to the about “DPS” employment), Docket
inmate” and also “‘recognize[s] that Entry 67-17; Brewington’s Resps. to
[her] actions were insufficient’ to Pl.’s 1st Set of Interrogs. ¶ 2 (same),
mitigate the risk of harm to the Docket Entry 67-15; Sessoms’s Resps.
inmate arising from his medical to Pl.’s Interrogs. ¶ 2 (same), Docket
needs.” Id. (quoting Parrish ex rel. Entry 67-20.
Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303
(4th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in The Department “is a North Carolina
original). agency.” Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 953 F..3d 236, 241 (4th Cir.
2020); see also Dade v. FNU
Carlineo, No. 1:22-cv-00125-MR, Congress has not abrogated a state’s
2023 WL 2386777, at *2 n.3 immunity from suits arising under
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2023) (“The § 1983. Biggs, 953 F.3d at 241. And
NCDPS is now known as the North “North Carolina has not consented to
Carolina Department of Adult being sued under § 1983 and therefore
Corrections (NCDAC).”). has not waived sovereign immunity in
that context.” Singh v. Univ. of N.C. at
“[A] suit against a state official in his Chapel Hill, 659 F. Supp. 3d 659, 669
or her official capacity is not a suit (M.D.N.C. 2023). Therefore, Blanks
against the official but rather is a suit cannot seek damages against the
against the official’s office,” and, thus, defendants in their official capacities.
“is no different from a suit against the And Blanks only requests money
State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of damages against the defendants. See
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Compl. § VI. For these reasons, the
Cf. id. at 71 n.10 (recognizing, though, Court should grant summary
that “‘official-capacity actions for judgment for the defendants on the
prospective relief are not treated as official capacity claims.
actions against the State’”) (quoting
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, B. The Court should deny Blanks’s
167 n.14 (1985)). motion for summary judgment.

Generally, the Eleventh Amendment As the moving party seeking summary
bars actions against a state unless the judgment, Blanks bears the initial
state consents or Congress properly burden of demonstrating the absence
abrogates immunity. Va. Office for of a genuine issue of material fact. See
Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. Celotex, 477 at 325. But he has, by his
247, 254 (2011). Cf. Alden v. Maine, own admission, failed to do so.
527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999) (“We have
sometimes referred to the States’ In his verified brief in support of his
immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh motion, Blanks describes the
Amendment immunity[,] . . . [a] defendants’ responses to
convenient shorthand but something interrogatories and requests for
of a misnomer, for the sovereign admissions as “squarely
immunity of the States neither derives contradictory” to his declaration and
from, nor is limited by, the terms of affirmatively states that “[t]here is
the Eleventh Amendment. . . . [T]he clearly a genuine issue of fact” and
States’ immunity from suit is a this “factual dispute is also material.”
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty See Verified Br. in Supp. at 5-6.
which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and Indeed, the evidence does not permit
which they retain today . . . .”). the Court to determine as a matter of
law that any of the defendants has
violated Blanks’s constitutional
rights. Therefore, Court should deny “permitted to take measures,
Blanks’s motion. including the use of appropriate force,
intended to secure his cooperation.”
C. The Court should deny Id. at 118.
summary judgment to Caple in
her individual capacity. Caple further contends that the
photographs of Blanks taken shortly
Caple does “not contest that the use of after the incident, as well as his
pepper spray was non-trivial,” Def. medical assessments, “blatantly
Caple Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. contradict[]” Blanks’s alleged injuries
for Summ. J. (“Caple’s Mem. in from the pepper spray. Id. at 18-19
Supp.”), Docket Entry 62 at 15, and, (citing Ex. 2).
instead, argues that Blanks has not
put forth evidence that she used force There is evidence to support Caple’s
maliciously and sadistically. position that the force was not
malicious and sadistic, that is, it was
To meet her burden as the moving “needed to preserve internal order
party, Caple points out that multiple and discipline,” see Hudson, 503 U.S.
witnesses observed that Blanks had at 6: Blanks himself admitted that he
been “kicking his cell door, was openly was agitated and yelling for
hostile to staff, [and] was Brewington to open his cell door when
communicating threats to staff.” Id. at she would not let him out of his cell in
16 (citing Ex. 1, Offender Disciplinary the Blue Unit to help her clean. See,
Infraction; Ex. 2, Incident R.). And e.g., Dismissal Letter at 5 (Blanks’s
once in the holding cell in the Red witness statement). And, according to
Unit, he refused orders. Id. at 16-17 Ricker, once in the Red Unit holding
(citing Ex. 2; Ex. 4, Dismissal Letter; cell, Blanks refused to follow her
Ex. 5, Caple Decl.). In response to his orders to turn around to allow her to
refusal, she administered “a single remove his handcuffs and told her,
short blast of OC peppery spray.” Id. “Fuck you, I’m not giving you shit.”
at 17-18 (citing Ex. 2; Ex. 4). See, e.g., Ricker Decl. ¶¶ 8-9;
Dismissal Letter at 4.
Thus, Caple argues that her tempered

use of force was necessary because
Likewise, there is evidence that the
Blanks “was not docile and was
extent of injury Blanks suffered
refusing multiple lawful orders,” a
suggests Caple plausibly thought the
situation in which “corrections
force exerted was necessary, see
officers could reasonably perceive a
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Ricker
danger . . . .” Id. at 22-23. The law
reported as part of the incident
recognizes that “inmates cannot be
investigation that, in response to
permitted to decide which orders they
Blanks’s refusal, Caple administered
will obey, and when they will obey
one burst of pepper spray through the
them.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 117. When
wicket door at waist level. See, e.g.,
an inmate resists, the officer is
Dismissal Letter at 5. Blanks even although Blanks was angry and
states that it is undisputed that Caple yelling, he was secure and did not
sprayed him at waist level. Pl.’s pose a threat to anyone. See, e.g.,
Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 6, Dismissal Letter at 5. Gholston, who
Docket Entry 71. The color was standing fifteen feet away from
photographs of Blanks taken shortly the holding cell at the time of the
after the incident show discoloration incident, reported that Blanks was
of the back of Blanks’ shirt and his mad but did not kick the holding cell
arms which were in handcuffs behind door and was not a security risk at the
his back. Incident R. at 15-18. time of the incident. Id. Similarly,
Gholston and David Graham reported David Graham, who was standing six
that the spray hit Blanks in the back, feet away from the cell at the time of
which Blanks also acknowledged. See, the incident, reported that Blanks
e.g., Dismissal Letter at 5. “did not kick the cell,” was in
handcuffs in a locked cell, and “was
The nurse who completed the medical not posing a threat to himself or staff.”
assessment saw no injuries. See, e.g., Id.
id. at 6. Blanks also admitted during
the incident investigation that he As for where Blanks was hit with the
suffered no injuries as a result of the spray, as part of the Unit Response
incident. See, e.g., id. at 5. investigation, Caple said she sprayed
Blanks in “his facial area.” Grievance
However, despite her argument Resp. at 1, Docket Entry 67-5. In his
otherwise, other evidence suggests verified brief, Blanks claims that he
there are genuine issues of material was “summarily maced starting below
fact regarding the “malicious and his waist to his back and upper body,”
sadistic” component. For example, despite “offer[ing] no resistance” to
after the incident, according to officers immediately preceding the
Correctional Captain Revels, Caple deployment of pepper spray. Blanks’s
initially told her that she did not know Verified Br. in Supp. at 2.
why she sprayed Blanks. See
Dismissal Letter at 4. Revels reported On February 6, during a clinic
that Caple then told her that she encounter after the incident, Blanks
sprayed Blanks because he refused to reported that his hands burned a little
“give the handcuffs back.” Id. bit and he had pain in his right hand.
Lenwood Graham reported that Caple See Med. Recs. at 21, Docket Entry 68.
also told him that she sprayed Blanks Blanks contends he told the nurse that
“because he would not give [her] the “his body felt like it was fire,” he
handcuffs.” Id. at 5. “couldn’t move, see,” and he “had
trouble breathing.” Verified Br. in
Furthermore, Ricker reported as part Opp’n at ¶ 22, Docket Entry 72.
of the incident investigation that she
did not use her pepper spray because,
On February 9, Blanks wrote his
therapist at SCI and explained that Cason had become “belligerent and
Caple deployed the pepper spray argumentative” when an officer told
“start[ing] at my male body parts and him he was not on the recreation list
worked her way up to my eyes and and had to return to his cell. Id. Once
head,” although he closed his eyes at in his cell, he refused to allow the
the time. Med. Recs. at 13. The next officers to remove his handcuffs. Id.
day, he submitted a request to see his This is where the similarities end.
therapist, noting that his PTSD
“kicked in” during the incident and he Three officers arrived at Cason’s cell
“suffered a panic attack” and could to assist in removing his handcuffs.
not breathe. Id. at 14. During a Id. They attached an extension tether
February 28 mental health to the handcuffs and pulled Cason
appointment, Blanks reported having towards the door which he initially
about three flashbacks and prevented from closing. Id. After the
nightmares about the incident. Id. at door closed, officers removed the
9. handcuffs from Cason. Id. Once his
hands were free, Cason reached out of
In March, Blanks twice requested a the slot in his cell door and grabbed
medical appointment because he was the officer’s duty belt and refused to
having “problems out of left ear, due let go of the officer. Id. Another
to where I got sprayed by Officer SGT officer then administered the burst of
Caple Scotland CI never had problems pepper spray through the cell door. Id.
with my left ear until that incident
happened” and “problems out of left Unsurprisingly, the court found that
ear where O/C pepper spray got down the evidence “did not support an
inside it.” Id. at 7, 11. He reported the inference that the defendants acted
same during his associated clinical maliciously and sadistically with the
encounter. See Med. Recs. at 23, intent to cause harm to Cason.” Id. at
Docket Entry 62-6. *7. For obvious reasons, the facts of
Cason differ from the facts here, most
Caple contends that Cason v. notably Cason’s grabbing the officer’s
Lodgson, No. ELH-11-3089, 2012 WL duty belt and refusing to let the officer
3144633 (D. Md. July 27, 2012), go. No such evidence has been
where the Court granted summary proffered here.
judgment in favor of the pepper
spraying officer, is “[a] factually After a thorough review of the
similar” case. Caple’s Mem. in Supp. evidence, Blanks’s story is not
at 21-22. Cason was an inmate in a “blatantly contradicted by the
Maryland prison when an officer record.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 230 (“When
administered one burst of pepper opposing parties tell two different
spray through the slot in his cell door. stories, one of which is blatantly
2012 WL 3144633, at *2. contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonably jury could believe it, a irresponsibly, and the need to shield
court should not adopt that version of officials who perform their duties
the facts for purposes of ruling on a responsibly from ‘harassment,
motion for summary judgment.”). distraction, and liability.’” Byers v.
Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir.
There is evidence from which a 2026) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,
reasonable jury could find that Caple 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
did not deploy the pepper spray to
restore order or the like but, instead, Qualified immunity shields
did so in response to intransigence or government officials from civil
in retaliation for Blanks’s earlier liability unless a plaintiff shows both
behavior towards Brewington, use of (1) that the official violated a
vulgarity, and insolence. There is also constitutional right and (2) that the
evidence from which a reasonable right was clearly established at the
jury could find that Blanks did not time of the violation. Pearson, 55 U.S.
pose a threat to the corrections at 232.
officers or himself, and, thus, there
was no need for this use of force. “In resolving whether to award
There is also evidence from which a qualified immunity at summary
reasonable jury could determine that judgment, courts are to engage in a
Blanks suffered injuries from the ‘two-pronged inquiry.’” Nazario v.
pepper spray. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 213, 230 (4th Cir.
2024) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572
In sum, construing the facts and U.S. 650, 655 (2014)). First, the court
inferences therefrom in Blanks’s determines whether “in a light most
favor, a reasonable jury could return a favorable to the injured party – ‘the
verdict in his favor on his § 1983 claim officer’s conduct violated a
against Caple. Genuine disputes of constitutional right.’” Id. (quoting
material fact exist regarding Caple’s Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
state of mind when she administered (2001)). Next, the court asks
the pepper spray that preclude “whether the right at issue in the first
summary judgment. prong was ‘clearly established at the
time’ of the contested action.” Id.
The Court should deny Caple’s motion (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227).
for summary judgment. “Accordingly, a court may award
qualified immunity to an official if
D. The Court should deny Caple either (1) there is no violation of a
qualified immunity. constitutional right, or (2) the
constitutional right was not clearly
“The doctrine of qualified immunity established.” Id. (citing Pearson, 555
‘balances two important interests,’ U.S. at 227).
namely, the need to hold accountable
public officials who exercise power
The court is required to define the right of an inmate particularly one
constitutional right at a “‘high level of who is restrained in handcuffs in a
particularity’” because “[t]he way in locked cell to be free from the use of
which an alleged right is described excessive force. See id. (explaining
matters.” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 that “the clearly established right
F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2024) must be viewed with reference to the
(quoting Ewards v. City of particular facts of the case”).
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th
Cir. 1999)). “Although a case directly Where, as here, genuine disputes of
on point is not required, existing material fact “preclude summary
precedent ‘must have placed the judgment on [the plaintiff’s] claim of
statutory or constitutional question [the use of excessive force], [t]hese
beyond debate.’” Id. at 505-06 disputes necessarily also preclude
(quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. summary judgment on the first step of
100, 104 (2018)). the qualified immunity inquiry.”
Bolick v. Anderson, 169 F.4th 528,
In the context of a violation of the 540 (4th Cir. 2026); see also
Eighth Amendment, the Fourth Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347,
Circuit Court of Appeals requires less 359-360 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
specificity in defining the right than in omitted) (“If a plaintiff has alleged a
cases involving the Fourth clearly established right, summary
Amendment, but “the unlawfulness judgment on qualified immunity
must still be ‘apparent’ based on pre- grounds is improper as long as there
existing law.” See King v. Riley, 76 F. remains any material factual dispute
4th 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing regarding the actual conduct.”);
Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F. 4th 436, Vathekan v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
453 (4th Cir. 2022) and quoting Hope 154 F.3d 173, 179 (4th Cir. 1998)
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). (“When resolution of a case depends
“In the end, the key inquiry is whether on determining what actually
‘the law provided “fair warning” that happened, ‘the issue is inappropriate
[the officer’s] conduct was for resolution by summary
unconstitutional.’” Atkinson, 100 judgment.’” (quoting Rainey v.
F.4th at 506. (quoting Booker v. S.C. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir.
Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th 1992))).
Cir. 2017) (alteration in Booker)). To
answer that question, courts look to As previously discussed, there exist
precedent of the United States genuine disputes of material facts
Supreme Court and, in this district, regarding whether Caple violated
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Blanks’s Eighth Amendment right
Id. when she administered pepper spray.
Therefore, the Court “proceed[s] to
In relation to Caple’s conduct, the the second step: whether the right was
constitutional right at issue is the
clearly established.” Bolick, 169 F.4th CV-166-M, 2025 WL 77897, at *9
at 540. (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2025) (quoting
Martin v. Short, No. 23-1588, 2024
At the time of the incident, “it was WL 3200715, at *4 (4th Cir. June 27,
clearly established that a corrections 2024)).
officer’s use of force in bad faith – not
to preserve order or induce Further, though not dispositive, the
compliance, but to punish through the NCDAC Policies and Procedures
‘wanton infliction of pain’ – violates clearly state that “[a]n officer is
an inmate’s Eight Amendment right.” prohibited from using force solely as a
Brooks, 924 F.3d at 119. “That result of verbal provocation. An
principle applies with particular officer shall not use force against an
clarity to cases . . . where the victim is offender . . . who is effectively
restrained, compliant, and incapable restrained.” Use of Force Policy,
of resisting or protecting himself, and Docket Entry 65-5 at 3.
otherwise presents no physical threat
in any way.” Thompson v. Commonw. Because genuine disputes of material
of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 105 (4th Cir. facts exist about Caple’s use of force
2017). and the right of an inmate handcuffed
inside a locked cell to be free from the
More than three decades ago, the
use of excessive force was clearly
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
established at the time of the incident,
recognized “‘that it is a violation of the
summary judgment on Caple’s
Eighth Amendment for prison
defense of qualified immunity is not
officials to use mace, tear gas or other
appropriate. The Court should not
chemical agents in quantities greater
grant it at this stage.
than necessary or for the sole purpose

of infliction of pain.” Iko, 535 F.3d at
E. The Court should grant in part
240 (emphasis in original) (quoting
and deny in part Ricker’s
Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 and stating
motion for summary judgment.
that the phrase “or other chemical

agents” “plainly reaches the use of
Next, Blanks asserts that Ricker
pepper spray”).
threatened to spray him by pulling out

her pepper spray and then ordering
A “‘reasonable officer would have
Caple to deploy her own spray. See
understood that’” “(without warning)
Compl. § IV.D.; Verified Br. in Supp.
pepper spray[ing] a prisoner who was
at 15.
fully restrained inside of a locked cell

because that prisoner was kicking the
As to the first allegation, Ricker
door seeking the help of an officer”
herself reported that she “pulled [her]
“‘was unlawful, whether by then-
spray but then saw 3 sergeants
existing precedent or by the otherwise
standing behind [her].” Witness
obvious illegality of that outrageous
Statements at 6. See also Caple Resps.
conduct.’” Ransom v. Page, No. 7:23-
to Admis. ¶ 11 (stating the same). But “In a § 1983 suit . . . the term
appellate courts have agreed that ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.”
threats alone cannot provide a basis Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677
for a § 1983 suit. See Henslee v. Lewis, (2009). A supervisor can only be
153 F. App’x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2005) liable under § 1983 for “their personal
(unpublished) (“Mere threats or wrongdoing or supervisory actions
verbal abuse by prison officials, that violated constitutional norms.”
without more, do not state a Timpson v. Anderson Cnty.
cognizable claim under § 1983.”) Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31
(citing Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022)
825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)); Fischl v. (emphasis added). The supervisor’s
Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. “‘indifference or tacit authorization’”
1997) (“[M]ere allegations of verbal of “a constitutional violation
abuse, threats or defamations by a committed by a subordinate state or
correctional officer to a prisoner are local government official” must be “‘a
not cognizable in a Section 1983 causative factor’ in enabling the
action . . . .”); King v. Olmsted County, violation.” Bolick, 169 F.4th at 541
117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,
(“[A] threat constitutes an actionable 798-99 (4th Cir. 1994)). To determine
constitutional violation only when the if a supervisor is liable, courts “must
threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as consider whether the supervisor’s
to shock the conscience . . . or if the own ‘deliberate indifference
threat exerts coercive pressure on the permitted the constitutional abuses to
plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the continue unchecked.’” Id. (quoting
deprivation of a constitutional Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373
right.”); Robertson v. City of Plano, (4th Cir. 1984)).
70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[M]ere
threatening language or gestures of a A plaintiff must show
custodial office[r] do not, even if true,
amount to constitutional violations.”) (1) that the supervisor had
(citation omitted). actual or constructive
knowledge that [her]
This case is lacking the “something subordinate was engaged in
more.” Ricker’s threat to pepper conduct that posed a
spray Blanks was just that: she pervasive and unreasonable
stopped short of carrying out that risk of constitutional [or
threat. other legal] injury to citizens
like the plaintiff;
As for Ricker’s order for Caple to
deploy her pepper spray, the (2) that the supervisor’s
undisputed facts foreclose the claim, response to that knowledge
which sounds in supervisory liability. was so inadequate as to
show deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203
the alleged offensive (4th Cir. 2002)).
practices; and
An officer can be liable under this
(3) that there was an affirmative theory when she “(1) knows that a
causal link between the fellow officer is violating an
supervisor’s inaction and individual’s constitutional rights; (2)
the particular constitutional has a reasonable opportunity to
[or other legal] injury prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not
suffered by the plaintiff. to act.” Randall, 302 F.3d at 204.
“The ‘bystanding officer must know of
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. [her] fellow officer’s misconduct . . . .
If the bystander lacks such
This claim of supervisor liability knowledge, [she] cannot be a
against Ricker fails from the start. participant in the unlawful acts, and
The undisputed evidence shows that the imposition of personal liability is
Ricker was not Caple’s supervisor. impermissible.’” Johnson, 105 F.4th
Caple was also a higher rank than at 124 (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at
Ricker and Ricker’s superior. See 204 n.24).
Ricker Decl. ¶ 13; Ricker’s Resps. to
Despite Ricker’s argument otherwise,
Pl.’s Interrogs. ¶¶ 12, 20. Blanks
there are genuine disputes of material
presents no evidence otherwise.
facts about her knowledge of a

constitutional violation, opportunity
In addition to sounding in supervisory
to stop Caple, and choice not to act.
liability, this claim could be one based
For example, Ricker reported that she
on the theory of bystander liability
would not have administered pepper
against Ricker. See Verified Br. in
spray under these circumstances
Opp’n at 2 (stating “[t]he officers who
because Blanks “was secured at the
were present failed to protect Plaintiff
time, and even though he was angry
Blanks from certain doom”); id. at 16
and yelling, he did not pose a threat to
(“Ricker . . . stood there and watched
anyone,” Dismissal Letter at 4,
Caple [administer] pepper to Plaintiff
implying she knew doing so would be
Blanks.”); see generally also Tim
excessive force. On the other hand, as
Caesar Blanks’ Decl. in Opp’n, Docket
described above, there are genuine
Entry 73 (stating the same).
disputes of material fact about

whether Caple violated Blanks’s
Such a claim is “premised on an
constitutional rights as a threshold
officer’s ‘affirmative duty to intervene
matter. In addition, as part of the
to protect the constitutional rights of
incident investigation, Ricker stated
citizens from infringement by other
that she told Caple, Gholston, and
law enforcement officers.’” Johnson v.
Graham, “I’m not sure if I can spray
Robinette, 105 F.4th 90, 123-24 (4th
him but you’re three sergeants, you
Cir. 2024) (quoting Randall v. Prince
decide,” id. at 4-5, implying Ricker did
not know if the administration of Brewington, and Ricker’s Mot. for
pepper spray would be excessive Summ. J. at 11, Docket Entry 65. But
under those circumstances. the cases she cites for support,
Hamilton v. Roederer Corr. Complex,
Similarly, there is evidence from No. 3:20-CV-P160-DJH, 2020 WL
which a jury could find that Ricker did 4587524 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 10, 2020)
not have a reasonable opportunity to and Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App’x
stop Caple. Ricker averred that 723 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished),
“Caple took out her pepper spray are distinguishable. The Hamilton
canister and administered a burst of court dismissed the complaint on 28
pepper spray” “[w]ithout warning.” U.S.C. § 1915A review because the
Ricker Decl. ¶ 10. Further, she stated plaintiff alleged no injury, and the
that “[a]t no time before or during the Jennings court affirmed summary
use of force incident did [she] know or judgment for the correction officer
even suspect that Sergeant Caple because the undisputed evidence
would use pepper spray against” showed lawful use of pepper spray
Blanks, the “incident happened and no respiratory distress. Here,
quickly and surprised [her]” such that genuine issues of material fact remain
she “did not have time to react before regarding Caple’s actions’ legality.
Sergeant Caple had already finished
Accordingly, the Court should grant in
administering pepper spray.” Id. ¶ 14.
part Ricker’s motion for summary
Gholston similarly described Caple’s
judgment as to the § 1983 claims
administration of the pepper spray as
based on threats and supervisory
“immediate[].” Dismissal Letter at 5.
liability and deny in part Ricker’s
Under these circumstances, Ricker
motion for summary judgment as to
would not have had a reasonable
the § 1983 claim of bystander liability.
opportunity to stop Caple or make the

choice not to act. On the other hand,
F. The Court should deny Ricker
her telling Caple, Graham, and
qualified immunity.
Gholston to decide what to do implies

she had time to stop the
The constitutional right of an inmate
administration of pepper spray and
in handcuffs inside a locked cell to be
chose not to do so.
free from excessive force was clearly

established on February 6, 2024, as
Considering all inferences in Blanks’s
previously explained. The material
favor, a reasonable jury could find
disputes surrounding Caple’s
Ricker liable for bystander liability.
conduct, as well as Ricker’s, foreclose

the award of qualified immunity to
Ricker disputes liability, albeit for
Ricker at this stage. See Bolick, 169
general use of excessive force, because
F.4th at 541.
there is evidence that Blanks did not

suffer injuries from the pepper spray.
The Court should deny Ricker
See Mem. in Supp. of Sessoms,
qualified immunity.
the witness statements from the
G. The Court should grant incident, including Blanks’s
Brewington’s motion for statement, place Brewington there.
summary judgment. See, e.g. Dismissal Letter at 4-6. The
summary of the video footage of the
Blanks’s primary claim against incident does not mention
Brewington is that she instigated the Brewington at all. See, e.g., id. at 6.
excessive force by reporting his
disruptive behavior. Compl. § IV.D. Although Blanks did not place
(“Brewington started the whole Brewington at the incident when he
situation by saying I made threats and gave his witness statement, he does
was kicking door, she lied”); Verified state in his verified brief in opposition
Br. in Supp. at 15 (“Brewington gave to the defendants’ motions that
false information, that the Plaintiff Brewington “stood there” when
was kicking his assigned cell door, Ricker and then Caple pulled out their
shouting threats, which started the pepper spray. See Verified Br. in
whole incident.”).4 Opp’n at 16. But the record evidence
blatantly contradicts this statement
In § 1983 suits, liability will only lie such that no reasonable jury would
where the official charged acted believe Brewington was present for
personally in the deprivation of the the use of force incident; therefore,
plaintiff’s rights. Wilcox v. Brown, the Court will “not adopt that version
877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) of the facts for purposes of ruling on
(emphasis added) (quotations [the] motion for summary judgment.”
omitted). See Iko, 535 F.3d at 230.

To meet her burden as the moving Because it is undisputed that
party, Brewington avers: she told Brewington did not act personally in
Blanks he would not be released from the alleged deprivation of Blanks’s
his cell to help her clean the unit; she rights, the Court should grant
told him to stop kicking his cell door; Brewington summary judgment.
and she called for assistance.
Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 6-12. That was H. The Court should grant
the extent of her interaction with Brewington qualified
Blanks on February 6. After Caple and immunity.
Ricker removed him from the holding
cell on her unit, she did not see Blanks Because the undisputed evidence
again that shift. Id. ¶ 13. Therefore, shows that Brewington did not violate
she was not present during the Blanks’s rights, she is entitled to
incident. Id. Furthermore, none of qualified immunity. See Bolick, 169

4 Likely out of an abundance of caution, supervisory liability. The Court does not
Brewington argues that she cannot be read Blanks’ complaint to allege such
liable under the theories of bystander or theories against Brewington.
F.4th at 540 (“Answering either Sessoms did not remember Ricker
question [of the two-step qualified asking her what to do with Blanks or
immunity inquiry] in the negative what she told Ricker in response. See
warrants granting qualified Sessoms’s Resps. to Pl.’s Interrogs.
immunity.”). ¶ 24. “After reviewing his control
actions and the incident report, I
I. The Court should grant probably told her to place him in the
Sessoms’ motion for summary holding cell.” Id. She did “not
judgment. remember saying to leave [Blanks]
inside the holding cell for any period
Finally, Blanks alleges that Sessoms of time.” Id. ¶ 23. Sessoms also did
violated his constitutional rights by not remember “the scene after SGT.
telling officers to leave him in the David D. Graham stat[ed], ‘I’ve had
holding cell for ten minutes after enough of this crap!,’ before freeing
Caple deployed her pepper spray. Plaintiff Blanks from the locked
Verified Br. at 2, 15. Essentially, holding cell . . . .” Id. ¶ 25.
Blanks claims she was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical Policy required the officers to give
needs.5 Blanks “an immediate opportunity to
flush his or her eyes with water once
More specifically, Blanks contends control has been restored.” See
that “when Ricker asked Sessoms, NCDAC Use of Force Policy at 5. And
what do you want us to do with him? Gholston, David Graham, and
Sessoms replied, ‘leave him in there Lenwood Graham escorted Blanks to
for 10 minutes!’” Id. at 2. “[T]hats the showers to be decontaminated
when SGT David D Graham finally minutes after Caple sprayed him.
spoke up and said, ‘Alright, I’ve had Statements of Witnesses at 2, 9, 10.
enough of this crap!’ SGT David
Graham made his way through to Afterwards, at approximately 10:50
unlock the holding cell and begged p.m., Toni Nguyen and Antonio
Plaintiff Blanks to take a cold Tolbert took Blanks from his cell in
shower.” Id. According to the the Blue Unit for a medical
undisputed summary of the video assessment. Id. at 4, 11, 23. Blanks
footage of the incident, David Graham complained of his “hands burning a
removed Blanks from the cell little bit” and his eyes burning. Med.
approximately four minutes after Recs. at 21-22, Docket Entry 68. The
Sessoms arrived in the holding cell nurse assessed him, reported “no
area. See Dismissal Letter at 6. visible sign of OC spray” on his face
and “no skin swelling, redness, or
blistering anywhere” on his body, and

5 Likely out of an abundance of caution, or supervisory liability. The Court does
Sessoms argues that she cannot be liable not read Blanks’ complaint to allege
under the theories of bystander liability either of these theories against Sessoms.
saw no other injuries. Dismissal of law on the inmate’s deliberate
Letter at 6. Officers also “kept a indifference to serious medical needs
visual” on Blanks for one hour. E.g., claim:
Statements of Witnesses at 4.
Moskos experienced the usual
Days following the incident, Blanks transitory effects of pepper
wrote to his therapist requesting a spray for a period of, at most,
mental health visit and explaining 90 to 120 minutes. He did not
that as a result of the incident, his testify to a serious medical
PTSD “kicked in,” he “suffered a panic reaction or to any pain beyond
attack,” “couldn’t breathe,” and was the normal discomfort of
“having flash backs.” Med. Recs. at 14. pepper spray: even by his own
In addition, he sought medical account, he simply expressed
treatment to address “problems with that his eyes were burning, not
[his] left ear” that developed after that he was experiencing more
“that incident happened.” Id. at 7, 11. serious medical issues. In
circumstances such as these,
The undisputed evidence shows that, involving a short delay in
no matter what Sessoms said to do decontamination, without any
with Blanks after Caple sprayed him, aggravating factors such as a
David Graham removed him from the serious medical reaction, courts
cell approximately three minutes after have consistently found that
Sessoms was seen outside of the cell the objective prong is not
and approximately five minutes after satisfied.
Caple sprayed him. David Graham
and other officers then escorted Id. at 298.
Blanks to the showers to
decontaminate. Approximately forty- Here, as in Moskos, there is no
five minutes after Caple sprayed him, evidence that any delay in
officers took Blanks for a medical decontamination or medical
assessment. This delay, without treatment stemming from Sessoms’
more, is not enough to show a orders “put him at a ‘substantial risk’
constitutional violation. See Moskos, of ‘serious harm,’” as is required for a
24 F.4th at 298. deliberate indifference claim. Id. The
mental health harm Blanks reported
In Moskos, the inmate claimed that arose from the incident itself, not any
prison officials were deliberately delay in treatment for the pepper
indifferent to his serious medical spray.
needs “because they delayed
decontaminating him after he was Accordingly, the Court should grant
sprayed with pepper spray.” Id. at Sessoms summary judgment on the
297. As the Moskos court recognized deliberate indifference claim.
when it affirmed judgment as a matter
J. The Court should — grant Sessoms’ Motion for Summary
Sessoms qualified immunity. Judgment as follows:
Because the undisputed evidence i. GRANT IN PART as to
shows that Sessoms did not violate the official capacity claim
Blanks’s rights, she is entitled to and the portions of the
qualified immunity. See Bolick, 169 §1983 claim based on
F.4th at 540 (“Answering either threats and supervisory
question [of the two-step qualified liability against Jessica
immunity inquiry] in the negative Ricker, and DENY IN
warrants granting qualified PART the remainder of
immunity.”). her motion,
ii. GRANT Jasmine
V. CONCLUSION Brewington’s motion, and
IT IS HEREY ORDERED that the iiii GRANT Angela Sessoms’
Clerk redact Tim Caesar Blanks’s date motion.
of birth from pages 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 21,
and 22 of Docket Entry 68 and refile
those pages as publicly available; SALMLL
J fy na Gibso#) McFadden
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that United States Magistrate Judge
the Clerk seal Docket Entry 62-6,
redact Tim Caesar Blanks’s date of July 24, 2026
birth from page 23 of Docket Entry
62-6, and refile that page as publicly
available;
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED
that the Court:
1. DENY Tim Caesar _Blanks’s
Motion for Summary Judgment,
2. GRANT IN PART Charlene
Nicole Caple’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the
official capacity claim against her,
and DENY IN PART the
remainder of her motion,
3. GRANT IN PART AND DENY
IN PART Jessica’ Ricker’s,
Jasmine Brewington’s, and Angela
22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11405784. Public record. Not legal advice.