# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. New York · June 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11392058

## Case

- **Full name:** FrontPoint Australian Opportunities Trust et al. v. UBS AG, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11392058

## Opinion text

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The Honorable P. Kevin Castel Shen of
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New York, NY 10007-1312 ae CO ROGKED
Re: — FrontPoint Australian Opportunities Trust et al. v. UBS AG,et i a pa (S.D.N.Y.)
Dear Judge Castel: 9-DE’
Pursuant to Rules 1(C) and 3(B) of the Court’s Individual Practices in Civil Cases, we
write on behalf of Defendants in the above-captioned action, to respectfully request a stay of
discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint,
See Dkt. 661 at 3. Defendants are also available for a conference, should the Court find it useful.
Defendants have not previously asked the Court for an extension or adjournment of the schedule,
Dkt. 611, and there are no upcoming conferences. The parties have conferred in good faith, and
CalSTRS does not consent to Defendants’ request for a stay of discovery, citing its preference for
the existing schedule.
Following remand, Defendants have diligently advanced discovery in accordance with the
scheduling order, Dkt. 611, and sought dismissal of all claims at the first opportunity, see id. □ 2.
On April 17, 2026, Defendants filed a letter-brief, Dkt. 642, explaining why all of CalSTRS’s
claims merit immediate dismissal based on the AG Release and the Allianz Release. Not only
does the text of the AG Release unambiguously bar CalSTRS from bringing “any and all claims
that have been or could be asserted” against UBS in this very lawsuit by name, but it also bars
CalSTRS from serving as a named plaintiff against any defendant, See id. at 11-20; Dkt. 659 at
7-13. On top of that, the A//ianz Release bars CalSTRS’s claims related to FX forwards, See Dkt.
640 at 20-23; Dkt. 658 at 13-15. In its opposition, Dkt, 655, CalSTRS failed to rebut Defendants’
arguinents; it did not dispute that it elected to enter settlements concerning the conduct at issue in
this litigation, see id. at 10, 18. Instead, CalSTRS insisted that the Court could not consider two
legal documents without a “full evidentiary record,” id. at 1-2—a claim the Court has since
rejected by authorizing Defendants to file a motion to dismiss premised on the releases, which will
be fully briefed by August 28, 2026, see Dkt. 661 at 2-3. Despite the release of its claims,
CalSTRS continues to pursue expansive discovery, including cross-border depositions, that will
impose a substantial burden on not only Defendants, but also its non-party former employees.
This discovery is not necessary—as the Court recognized, “the enforcement of a release may
properly be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Dkt. 661 at 2 n.1. Because it is now clear
that Defendants’ dispositive motion will likely render discovery unnecessary, the Court should
stay discovery until it has an opportunity to adjudicate the motion.

! Capitalized terms share the same meaning as those defined in Defendants’ letter-brief, Dkt. 642.

Courts exercise “considerable discretion” to stay discovery while a motion to dismiss is
pending, Gross v. Madison Square Garden Ent. Corp., 2023 WL 6815052, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
17, 2023), or where a party has “sought leave to file a dispositive motion,” Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996) (citation modified); see Cartica
Memt., LLC v. CorpBanca S.A., 2014 WL 12788656, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2014) (where this
Court recognized its “broad discretion to grant a stay’). In deciding whether there is “good cause”
to stay discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), courts consider: (1) “the strength
of the motion to dismiss,” (2) “the breadth of the discovery being sought and the burden of
responding to the discovery requests,” and (3) “the prejudice to the party opposing the stay.”
Burns v. City of New York, 2025 WL 3456671, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2025). Each of these
factors weighs in favor of staying discovery while the Court considers Defendants’ motion. See
Amron v. 3M Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co,, 2024 WL 263010, at *3 (E.D.NLY. Jan.
24, 2024) (staying discovery pending motion to dismiss based on release); Bah v. Apple Inc., No.
19-CV-3539 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021), Dkt. 133 (Castel, J.) (staying discovery pending resolution
of defendants’ motion to dismiss a third amended complaint).
1. Defendants’ Forthcoming Motion Exposes Fatal Deficiencies In This Case.
A stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss is appropriate where the underlying
“motion is not unfounded in the law.” London v. Sony Music Publ’g, 2025 WL 3172392, at *2
(S.D.N.Y, Nov. 13, 2025) (citation modified). Defendants’ forthcoming motion clears that low
bar because it raises “substantial arguments for dismissal of many, if not all, of the claims asserted
in this lawsuit,” obviating the need for discovery. Richardson v. City of New York, 2022 WL
2003340, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022). As previewed in Defendants’ letter-bricfing, see Dkts.
642, 659, by signing the AG Release, CalSTRS not only settled the very claims it asserts against
UBS, but it bargained away its ability to bring this class action against any defendant, including
UBS and NatWest. Further, CalSTRS entered another settlement, the A/anz Release, that bars
its claims related to its FX forward transactions. See Dkt. 640 at 20-23; Dkt. 658 at 13-15.
CalSTRS cannot cure this fatal deficiency because it already recovered with respect to the alleged
conduct. In authorizing Defendants to move to dismiss over CalSTRS’s objection, the Court
recognized that Judge Daniels granted a motion to dismiss based on the very same AG Release in
Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. UBS AG, 2022 WL 3904556, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022),
finding the AG Release “unambiguous.” See Dkt. 661 at 2 & n.2; Dkt. 659 at 2, 6, 8. A stay is
particularly warranted here, where, “the costs of modern federal antitrust litigation... counsel
against sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs
can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.” Bell Ati Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citation modified).
Further, Defendants’ anticipated motion presents a straightforward question of law
whether CaiSTRS may proceed in the face of the undisputed releases, In Amron, a court stayed
discovery in a similar situation, finding defendants made “a strong showing that Plaintiff's claims
are barred by [a] Settlement Agreement release provision.” 2024 WL 263010, at *3. Where “there
are no factual issues in need of further immediate exploration, and the issues before the Court are
purely questions of law that are potentially dispositive,” a stay of discovery is warranted. Sharma
v. Open Door N¥ Home Care Servs., Inc., 345 F.R.D. 565, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (citation
modified).
Moreover, regardless of how the Court rules on Defendants’ motion, the Court’s decision
is likely to significantly shape the contours of discovery moving forward. CalSTRS itself has
Gibson, Bunn & Crutcher LLP

already conceded that the AG Release bars its individual claims against UBS for 96% of the
proposed class period, Dkt. 655 at 2, and it appears to concede that it cannot serve as a named
plaintiff against UBS for that time period, id, at 17, Consistent with that admission, the Court has
already recognized that “(t]he release applies to claims alleging misconduct as to interbank
offering rates from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010.” Dkt. 661 at 2. The Court
explained that the AG Release “‘releases [UBS] from all civil claims . . . with respect to other
IBORS,’ specifically citing to this action,” and it also “preclude[s] [CalSTRS] from... serving as
a named plaintiff in a class action concerning the Relevant Conduct ....” Jd, (quoting Dkt. 643-1
10-11). Further, the Court recognized that the Allianz Release “contains a release provision
govemning CALSTRS’s FX forward claims.” Dkt. 661 at 2-3, Accordingly, at a minimum,
Defendants’ “motion to dismiss has the capacity to prune substantially the volume of worthy
discovery,” and thus “such a stay may meaningfully conserve the parties’ resources.” Gastineau
v. ESPN Inc., 2025 WL 2733155, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2025). Given the strength of
Defendants’ motion based on the threshold issue of the releases—which have the potential to
“dispose of the entire case,” or at the very least, substantially narrow the claims and attendant
discovery——-a stay of discovery is appropriate. Thrower v. Pozzi, 2002 WL 91612, at *7(S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2002); see Maddix v. City of New York, 2025 WL 1530648, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 29,
2025) (staying discovery where a motion raised “substantial” arguments based on “gating issues”).
2. Responding To The Discovery Sought Is Unduly Burdensome.
In deciding whether to stay discovery, courts also consider “the breadth of discovery
sought and the burden of responding to it.” Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. RPost
Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Even where (as here) discovery is already
underway, “it [is] prudent to defer the rest of discovery until the pending motion to dismiss is
adjudicated,” especially when discovery is “quite substantial” and “will require a significant
expenditure of time and energy on Defendants’ part.” Psychic Readers Network, Inc, vy, A&E
Television Networks LLC, 2025 WL 1380956, at *1 (S.D.N.Y, May 13, 2025); Moore v. Johnson
& Johnson, 2025 WL 1569669, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2025) (same). Responding to the
discovery sought here will require Defendants to devote a substantial amount of time and energy
for several reasons.
To start, this action concerns sprawling allegations—an alleged six-year conspiracy with
at least 12 co-conspirators—and the discovery at issue mimics the expansive pleading. For
example, CalSTRS demands “A//” documents related to 23 topics, based on its 233-page pleading,
from a six-year period; this discovery will inevitably be voluminous and complex. See Exs. 1-2;
Dkt. 625-1. Courts have recognized that, where the “breadth of the discovery sought... will
cover a six-year period,” a stay may be warranted. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell
Int’l, Inc., 2009 WL 2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009); see Sharma, Ine., 345 F.R.D, at 569.
Defendants object to the overly broad discovery sought, but even if the Court “limit[ed] the
boundaries of discovery,” the allegations “go back decades in time,” O'Sullivan v, Deutsche Bank
AG, 2018 WL 1989585, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2018), and the “search for such old records” is
“time-consuming and expensive,” Maddix, 2025 WL 1530648, at *3. Defendants have already
logged hundreds of hours and significant resources advancing document discovery. Completing
it will require Defendants to spend hundreds of hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars more—
including reviewing tens of thousands of documents, many of which are more than 20 years old
and/or implicate sensitive information that must be carefully reviewed under foreign data privacy
laws. That level of expenditure makes a stay appropriate. Accord In re Term Commodities Cotion
Futures Litig., 2013 WL 1907738, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (staying discovery where it could
Gibson, Bunn & Crutcher LLP
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“take over 1000 attorney hours” and “cost at least $250,000 in attorney fees”),
In addition, because the alleged conduct in this case occurred abroad, it requires
Defendants to engage in discovery outside of the U.S., which will be complex and resource-
intensive. UBS will need to engage Swiss counsel, engage a Swiss eDiscovery firm, and likely
send New York-based counsel to Switzerland. UBS cannot use artificial intelligence to ease this
burden, as Swiss law carries the threat of criminal penalties for certain breaches, and thus UBS
requires manual review and redaction of every responsive document. As for NatWest, discovery
will require retrieving data from a legacy system outside of the U.S. Considering “the complexity
of the issues that discovery will present,” Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC, 2025 WL 698287, at
*] (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2025), and “that it would be very burdensome for Defendants to search for
and produce” the requested material, Burns, 2025 WL 3456671, at *1, a stay is warranted,
And beyond document discovery, CalSTRS has expressed interest in deposing 23
individuals, ail of whom reside outside the U.S. Defendants do not agree that so many depositions
are remotely warranted, but given Defendants’ motion, it would be “wasteful” to subject any of
“defendants’ principals [or former employees] to wide-ranging depositions in the absence of a
pleading that has withstood scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6).” Jn re Currency Conversion Fee
Antitrust Litig., 2002 WL 88278, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002). The discussions concerning the
logistics and availability of witnesses alone are “time consuming and frequently cumbersome,”
due in part to the likely need to proceed via The Hague Convention for some or all witnesses. Star
Colbert v. Dougan, 724 F. Supp. 3d 304, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). Indeed, for NatWest, CalSTRS
seeks to depose 12 former employees believed to be located in the Netherlands, France, and/or
Scotland. For UBS, nine proposed deponents are believed to be located in Switzerland, which
means that Plaintiffs may have no choice but to take depositions in Swiss court, under the
supervision of a Swiss judge. Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code limits the ability of CalSTRS
to compel individuals in Switzerland to participate in the collection of evidence for foreign
proceedings outside of judicial or administrative assistance. Specifically, Chapter I of the Hague
Convention applies to a potential witness who is unwilling to voluntarily participate in formal
questioning in Switzerland. See Fed, Dep’t of Just. & Police, International Judicial Assistance in
Civil Matters: Guidelines, 10, 30, 32-36 (Jan. 1, 2026) (Switz.). Rather than a traditional U.S.-
style deposition, under Chapter I, a Swiss judge poses questions to the witness in court; while
counsel may proffer questions, “[t}he Swiss judge . . . remains the master of the proceedings.” Id.
at 42,?
3, A Temporary Stay Of Discovery Will Not Prejudice CalSTRS.
Finally, courts consider whether a stay would prejudice the non-moying party. But courts
do not credit “general and unsubstantiated” claims of prejudice. Gastineau, 2025 WL 2733155,
at *2. Where, as here, a “new Complaint” remains “unresolved, a delay in discovery, without
more, does not amount to unfair prejudice,” Borjas v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 2025 WL 3227476,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y, Nov. 19, 2025). Instead, CalSTRS must identify the “specific harm” it will incur
“from waiting for the adjudication of Defendants’ motion.” Sigma Lithium Corp. v. Gardner,
2024 WL 2867504, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2024).

2 Given Plaintiffs’ burdensome and complex requests, discovery motions may be unavoidable, and thus a “waste of
precious resources” “could be entirely avoided , , by staying discovery until the motion to dismiss has been decided.”
Amron, 2024 WL 263010, at *3; see Davidoff v. Verifimd Holdings, Inc., 2026 WL 391412, at *! (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12,
2026) (where a motion to dismiss “could end the case,” a stay of discovery was warranted).
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
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CalSTRS cannot “articulate[] any compelling reason why” it will incur prejudice from a
stay of discovery “while the motion to dismiss is pending.” Gross, 2023 WL 6815052, at *2.
There is no need for immediate discovery here because “[t]here is no need to resolve any contested
factual issues to decide Defendant[s’] pending motion to dismiss.” London, 2025 WL 3172392,
at *2. Further, CalSTRS’s claims are not “inherently time sensitive”; they are “based upon
allegations as to what allegedly occurred decades ago.” Amron, 2024 WL 263010, at *3. Indeed,
given that this case has been pending for more than 13 years, it would not be credible for CalSTRS
to claim that it will suffer prejudice if it is required to wait for the Court’s decision on Defendants’
motion, to seek discovery above and beyond the tremendous amount of discovery it already has
in its possession, Moreover, if the Court prefers, Defendants would be happy to expedite the
motion to dismiss briefing.
If the Court grants a stay of discovery during the pendency of the motion to dismiss, this
case will not come to a crashing halt. During any stay, CalSTRS would remain “busy with
document discovery from the other parties,” as well as the hundreds of thousands of documents
and tens of millions of trading records already in its possession. Lively, 2025 WL 698287, at *2;
see Harrison v. Loc. One, No, 24-cv-8619 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2025 Order) (“Plaintiffs already
have a significant amount of evidence related to their claims”); Maddix, 2025 WL 15306489585,
at *3 (plaintiff “already appears to have a lot of relevant evidence”). In addition to CalSTRS’s
ongoing document review, the parties could take the opportunity to brief the motion to dismiss
during a stay, as well. In other words, a stay will not inhibit CalSTRS’s ability to make its case;
a stay will simply promote efficiency as the Court determines if any part of this case should move
forward.
Where, as here, Defendants have “a dispositive motion, the stay is for a short period of
time, and the opposing party will not be prejudiced by the stay,” a stay of discovery is appropriate,
Spencer Trask Software, 206 F.R.D. at 368. We appreciate the Court’s consideration of this matter.

Respectfully submitted,
Jefferson E. Bell
Jefferson E. Bell
Attorney for Defendant UBS AG
cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11392058. Public record. Not legal advice.