# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11391493

## Case

- **Full name:** Banco Santander International v. Pamasa S.A., Barbara Mansilla Ortiz, Valerie Mansilla Ortiz, and Francisco Omar Mansilla Ortiz; Francisco Omar Mansilla Ortiz v. Pamasa S.A., Barbara Mansilla Ortiz, and Valerie Mansilla Ortiz
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-cv-23861-ALTMAN

BANCO
SANTANDER INTERNATIONAL,

Interpleader,

v.

PAMASA S.A., BARBARA MANSILLA ORTIZ,
VALERIE MANSILLA ORTIZ, and
FRANCISCO OMAR MANSILLA ORTIZ,

Interpleader-Defendants,

_____________________________________________/

FRANCISCO OMAR MANSILLA ORTIZ,

Cross-claimant,

v.

PAMASA S.A., BARBARA MANSILLA ORTIZ, and
VALERIE MANSILLA ORTIZ,

Cross-Defendants,
_____________________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

In this lawsuit, the Guatemalan heirs to a Guatemalan rum fortune are fighting over the power
to control a Guatemalan company. In doing so, the parties (all Guatemalan) accuse each other of
engaging in a years-long fraud (and some forgery) in Guatemala. Because all the parties, witnesses, and
evidence in this case are in Guatemala—and since the parties agree that Guatemalan law governs this
dispute—we now dismiss this case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC).
BACKGROUND
I. The Procedural History
This action began when Banco Santander International (“Santander”) brought a Rule 22
interpleader action to resolve a bitter dispute among Guatemalan liquor heirs. See Interpleader
Complaint [ECF No. 12]; see also November 4, 2026, Paperless Minutes [ECF No. 17]; Order after
Status Conference [ECF No. 18].1 The heirs quarrel over control of Pamasa S.A. (“Pamasa”), a

corporation that’s incorporated (and which principally operates) in Guatemala. See Interpleader
Compl. at 5. Pamasa holds and controls an account at Santander in Miami (the “Account”), where it
has deposited millions of dollars. “Due to the unresolved and competing claims of authority over
Pamasa and its Account, and the risk of multiple liability,” Santander filed the Interpleader Complaint,
asking us to decide who controls Pamasa and, consequently, who may access the Account. Id. ¶ 22.
The Interpleader Complaint names Pamasa, Francisco Mansilla Ortiz (“Francisco”), Barbara Mansilla
Ortiz, and Valerie Mansilla Oritz as Defendants.
We have federal-question jurisdiction over the Interpleader Complaint under the Edge Act of
1913. See 12 U.S.C. § 632;2 see also Arazi v. Standard Chartered Bank Int’l (Ams.) Ltd., 2013 WL 12094185,
at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013) (Graham, J.) (“Under the Edge Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 632, federal
district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over any claim that arises out of international
banking transactions or any international financial transactions.”); cf. Interpleader Compl. ¶ 7

(“Jurisdiction is proper because the action arises under Rule 22 . . . and the Edge Act[.]”).

1 “Persons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be joined as
defendants and required to interplead.” FED. R. CIV. P. 22(a)(1).
2 The Edge act provides that “the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction”
over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which any corporation organized under
the laws of the United States shall be a party, arising out of transactions involving international or
foreign banking, or banking in a dependency or insular possession of the United States, or out of other
international or foreign financial operations, either directly or through the agency, ownership, or
control of branches or local institutions in dependencies or insular possessions of the United States
or in foreign countries[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 632.
Francisco responded to the Interpleader Complaint by filing cross-claims against Barbara and Valerie
(the “Sisters”), asserting three state-law causes of action: Fraud (Count I), see Cross Complaint [ECF
No. 23] ¶¶ 71–80; Intentional Interference with Inheritance (Count II), see id. ¶¶ 81–90; and
Declaratory Judgment (Count III), see id. ¶¶ 91–93. In his Cross Complaint, Francisco alleges that the
Sisters fraudulently obtained control over Pamasa by, among other things, having their father declared
incapacitated and forging his signature—all of which (Francisco says) they accomplished in

Guatemala. The Sisters now move to dismiss the Cross Complaint. See Motion to Dismiss (the
“MTD”) [ECF No. 30].3
II. The Facts4
“Mansilla Córdova was an incredibly successful Guatemalan businessman” and a magnate of
the “Guatemalan liquor industry.” Cross Complaint ¶ 13. As relevant here, “he was 24% shareholder
of Industrias Licoreras de Guatemala (‘ILG’), a private alcohol distillery best known for producing
such world-renowned rums as Ron Zacapa and Ron Botran[.]” Ibid. Córdova’s son, Francisco, and his
daughters, Barbara and Valerie, are our Interpleader Defendants. See Interpleader Complaint ¶ 12
(“Barbara, Valerie, and Francisco are Mr. Mansilla Córdova’s children.”); see also Francisco’s Answer

3 The MTD is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. See Response to MTD (“Response”) [ECF No.
40]; Reply in Support of MTD (“Reply”) [ECF No. 50]. Francisco attached to his Response the
“Expert Report of Gabriel Orellana Rojas” (“Orellana Rep.”) [ECF No. 40-1], who describes himself
as an expert on Guatemalan law, see id. at 2 (“I have been engaged as an expert on Guatemalan law,
and the scope of the opinions expressed herein pertain to issues that I have been instructed are
germane to the underlying dispute.”). But “a party cannot amend a complaint by attaching documents
to a response to a motion to dismiss.” Jallali v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 486 F. App’x 765, 767 (11th Cir.
2012). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, after all, “[t]he scope of the review must be limited to the
four corners of the complaint.” St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
Francisco thus cannot rely on the Orellana Report here.
4 We accept the allegations of the Cross Complaint as true for purposes of this Order. See Dusek v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016) (“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, but ‘legal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no
assumption of truth.’” (quoting Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up))).
to Interpleader Complaint (“Answer to Interpleader”) [ECF No. 23] (admitting this allegation). At
some point before October 2018, Córdova “had decided that his daughters’ inheritance would contain
strict conditions making it impossible for them or their husbands to ever manage the family
businesses.” Cross Compl. ¶ 15. “In apparent retaliation for those restrictions, in October 2018,” the
Sisters “attempted to usurp their aging father’s control of [his trust]” by “[f]orging his signature” and
“fraudulently amend[ing] the [trust’s] bylaws to add a provision” that allowed the Sisters, as secondary

beneficiaries, “to invoke a mechanism for having [their father] declared legally incapacitated.” Id. ¶ 16.
In July 2020, amidst a flurry of estate planning, Córdova’s trust “transferred the majority of its
assets to Pamasa,” Answer to Interpleader ¶ 20, including the Account at Santander, see id. ¶ 21.
“Following the transfer[ ], the balance of the Account was approximately $7,600,000.” Ibid. At that
time, Pamasa “did not have any current or contemplated purpose other than to hold [Córdova’s]
personal assets. The transfer was made as an estate planning transaction to make it easier to pass on
his inheritance.” Id. ¶ 23. “Córdova was appointed [the] President and Legal Representative [of
Pamasa], Franciso was appointed [the] Vice President and Legal Representative,” and the Sisters were
appointed as board members. Id. ¶ 18. Francisco and the Sisters thus each had some role in Pamasa.
The trust “was then voluntarily dissolved.” Id. ¶ 20. At this point, “the balance of the Account was
approximately $7,600,000.” Id. ¶ 21.
Here’s where things get messy. “On April 11, 2021, Valerie filed an amparo against the Board

of Directors of Pamasa[.]” Id. ¶ 28. “In her capacity as [Board] Member [ ], Valerie claimed to be in
fear of the imminent violation of [Pamasa’s] property rights—i.e., the theft of the entities’ assets—by
her father, Mansilla Córdova[.]” Id. ¶ 29. Valerie alleged that Francisco and a “dishonest notary”
enabled “this imminent theft.” Ibid. “On April 12, 2021, the Santa Lucía Court granted the amparo [(the
‘Provisional Amparo’)] on an ex parte basis.” Id. ¶ 37. “Thus, just like that, Mansilla Córdova and
Francisco were ousted from their positions” at Pamasa. Id. ¶ 39.5
Unfortunately for Santander, it landed in the crosshairs of this family saga. “On April 14, 2021,
two days after the Provisional Amparo was entered, Bárbara wrote to [Santander] and informed the
Bank of the [Provisional] Amparo, and instructed the Bank that only Valerie and herself were
authorized to provide instructions on behalf of Pamasa.” Id. ¶ 41. That same day, “Córdova wrote to

[Santander] regarding the Account and requested the cancellation of a certificate of deposit, along with
other related fees. He directed that a check for the proceeds instead be issued in his name.” Id. ¶ 42.
Then, on June 18, 2021, “Bárbara wrote a follow-up letter to [Santander] and demanded that Mansilla
Córdova and Franciso be removed as signatories on the Account.” Id. ¶ 43. “On October 14, 2021,
[Santander] responded and advised that it had placed a block on the Account because of conflicting
claims regarding who was authorized to act on behalf of Pamasa.” Id. ¶ 44. Santander “consistently
informed” the parties that the block “would not be lifted absent an order from a U.S. court instructing
the Bank to do so.” Id. ¶ 25. Santander “left the timing and manner of obtaining such an order to the
parties, given the ongoing litigation and uncertainty in the Guatemalan courts.” Ibid. The Account
remains frozen.

5 Francisco says that the “amparo suffered from blatant procedural and substantive deficiencies and
irregularities.” Cross Compl. ¶ 30. First, he claims that “Valerie filed her petition in a criminal court in
a small province in southern Guatemala with no connection to the parties or the dispute: the Court
of First Instance for Criminal Matters, Drug Activity, and Environmental Offenses of Santa Lucía
Cotzumalguapa, Escuintla[.]” Ibid. Second, he contends that “Valerie alleged a bizarre blend of deceit
and incapacitation on the part of her then-93-year-old father,” whereby he “had purposefully
orchestrated an unlawful ‘scheme’ to transfer [Pamasa’s] assets to himself . . . in violation of conflict-
of-interest provisions in the entities’ governing documents and Guatemala’s commercial code.”
Id. ¶ 31. As Francisco sees it, the amparo “was a desperate attempt to manufacture the appearance of
impropriety where none existed[.]” Id. ¶ 36. Because we dismiss this action under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, we take no position on the merits of these allegations. See Vasquez v. YII Shipping Co.,
Ltd., 692 F.3d 1192, 1199 (11th Cir. 2012) (“‘[F]orum non conveniens is nothing more or less than a
supervening venue provision’ and is ‘a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights.’”
(quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)).
Back in Guatemala, “[w]ith the Provisional Amparo in full force and effect, the underlying
proceeding was eventually transferred from the Santa Lucía Court to the Seventh Court of First
Instance for Civil Matters of Guatemala.”6 Id. ¶ 54. “On May 24, 2022, more than a year after its
issuance, the Seventh Civil Court dismissed the [Provisional] Amparo, reasoning that a constitutional
protection action was premature, as ordinary procedures had not been exhausted.” Ibid. (citing May
24, 2022, Seventh Civil Court Order [ECF No. 23-3]). “Valerie (and Bárbara, who had intervened as

a party in the interim) appealed, and on July 18, 2022, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala reversed
the dismissal and reinstated the Provisional Amparo.” Id. ¶ 55. In so doing, the Constitutional Order
held as follows:
The petitioner for protection, like any individual, must be guaranteed any right such
as those established in Articles 2, 29, and 203, second paragraph of the Political
Constitution of the Republic. And to preserve the proper enjoyment of those rights,
it is determined in this judgment that subject to the final judicial decisions that must
be assumed in the different trials that must be promoted in the ordinary jurisdiction
by the interested shareholders of. . . Pamasa, Soeciedad Anonima, it it [sic] necessary
to cease the effects of the acts reported in this Constitutional Protection since there is
clear evidence that it has not yet been determined with absolute certainty who should
assume the representation of the Board of Directors of both commercial entities. . . .

It should be noted that this decision will under no circumstances affect the operation
of the aforementioned corporations, whose General Shareholders’ Meetings may
decide, taking into account that the representation of those corporations will be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of the operative part of this ruling, until
the relevant jurisdiction declares who should act as the definitive representative of the
related entities.

Constitutional Order [ECF No. 23-4]7 at 45–46. The court further noted that “all of this could be the
subject of claims before the ordinary jurisdiction through the channels provided for in the adjective

6 We’ll refer to this court as the “Seventh Civil Court.”
7 We can consider the Constitutional Order, which is attached to the Cross Complaint, without
converting the MTD into a motion for summary judgment. See Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270
(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “documents attached to a complaint or incorporated in the complaint
by reference can generally be considered by a federal district court in ruling on a motion to dismiss”);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part
of the pleading for all purposes.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (describing a “crossclaim against a coparty”
as a “pleading”); cf. Megladon, Inc. v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 661 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1224 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2023)
civil and commercial legislation[.]” Id. at 45. In other words, the Constitutional Order functioned as
an injunction against Córdova’s recent transfers and preserved the parties’ rights to seek relief through
the Guatemalan legal system.
According to Francisco, “[f]ollowing the Constitutional Court’s July 18, 2022 Order, Valerie
and Bárbara convened shareholders’ meetings in December 2022 and January 2024—failing to provide
the meeting notice required under Guatemalan law—at which they purported to personally ratify the

corporate takeover that they had fraudulently orchestrated.” Cross Compl. ¶ 63. “Today, Guatemala’s
Commercial Registry reflects that Valerie acts as the General Manager and Bárbara as the Sole
Administrator of Pamasa[.]” Id. ¶ 64.
Seeking redress, Francisco filed crossclaims against the Sisters here, seeking declaratory relief
and alleging fraud and intentional interference with his inheritance. “In short,” he says, “Mansilla
Córdova and Francisco were stripped of their rights and property—in a fraudulent scheme that is
being perpetuated to this very day—based on frivolous and conclusory allegations, and without any
court ever making any findings of wrongdoing whatsoever against either of them.” Id. ¶ 69.
THE LAW
Forum non conveniens (“FNC”) “is an ancient common law doctrine that permits a court to
decline jurisdiction over a case, even if personal jurisdiction and venue are otherwise proper, when
there is a more convenient forum for the case to be litigated.” Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d

1300, 1303 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Co., 2024 WL 940822, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 2024) (Altman, J.) (“Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (‘FNC’), a district court has the
inherent power to decline to exercise jurisdiction even when venue is proper.” (cleaned up)). To show
that a case should be dismissed under the doctrine of FNC, “the moving party must demonstrate that

(Altman, J.) (“We can consider these documents, which are attached to the SAC, without converting
the MTD into a motion for summary judgment.”).
(1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public and private interest factors weigh in favor
of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without undue
inconvenience or prejudice.” Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2001). A district
court may dismiss a case under the doctrine of FNC before resolving questions of subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (“A district
court . . . may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-

matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy
so warrant.”); id. at 425 (“In particular, a court need not resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate
the cause (subject-matter jurisdiction) or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that,
in any event, a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case.”).8
ANALYSIS
The Sisters offer a long list of arguments for dismissal. See MTD at 3 (listing fourteen reasons
for their view that “Francisco Jr.’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice”). Because we agree that
our Court isn’t the proper forum for this case, we needn’t reach their other arguments.

8 As we’ve explained, we only have supplemental jurisdiction over the Cross Complaint by virtue of
our jurisdiction over the Interpleader Complaint. But we may “decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim” if it “substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction” or where “there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (2). If, after examining the factors listed in § 1367(c), the district
court “decides that it has the discretion . . . to decline jurisdiction . . . [,] it should consider the
traditional rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and convenience, in deciding
whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.” Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569
(11th Cir. 1994). “[I]n some private international disputes the prudent and just action for a federal
court is to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction.” Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512,
1518 (11th Cir. 1994). In the Eleventh Circuit, we consider three “goals” in deciding whether to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over foreign disputes: “(1) a proper level of respect for the acts of our fellow
sovereign nations—a rather vague concept referred to in American jurisprudence as international
comity; (2) fairness to litigants; and (3) efficient use of scarce judicial resources.” Ibid.
So, while we’re dismissing the Cross Complaint under the doctrine of FNC, we’d very likely decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that pleading anyway, because of the extent to which it relies
on foreign law and foreign proof. See Cute v. ICC Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 2010 WL 11626589, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 18, 2010) (Conway, J.) (“Courts considering supplemental jurisdiction have declined to exercise
jurisdiction in cases in which the state claims require different or foreign elements of proof[.]”).
As we’ve suggested, the Sisters ask us to dismiss the Cross Complaint because Francisco’s
“claims belong in Guatemala, not Florida.” Id. at 14. They (correctly) tell us that we “should dismiss a
claim for forum non conveniens when ‘(1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public and
private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative
forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.’” Ibid. (quoting Leon, 251 F.3d at 1310–11). “All
three of those elements,” the Sisters continue, “are present here.” Ibid. We agree.

I. Guatemala is an adequate alternative forum
“The first prong of the forum non conveniens inquiry simply asks whether the alternative forum
is ‘adequate’ and ‘available.’” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.
2009) (quoting Membreno v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d 932, 937 (11th Cir. 2005)). “As we have
observed, availability and adequacy are separate issues.” Ibid. (citing Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311). “In order
to be available, the foreign court must be able to ‘assert jurisdiction over the litigation sought to be
transferred.’” Ibid. (quoting Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311). “As for adequacy, we have observed that it is only
in ‘rare circumstances’ where ‘the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory,’ that the
alternative forum may be regarded as inadequate.” Ibid. (quoting Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244
F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001)). “The alternative forum prong of the analysis generally ‘will be
satisfied when the defendant is amenable to process in the other jurisdiction.’” Satz, 244 F.3d at 1282
(quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has

instructed us that “a remedy is inadequate when it amounts to ‘no remedy at all.’” Id. at 1283 (quoting
Piper, 454 U.S. at 254).
Guatemala is plainly an “available” forum. The Sisters are citizens of Guatemala. See Cross
Compl. ¶ 6 (“Interpleader and Cross-Defendant Bárbara Mansilla Ortiz is a Guatemalan citizen who
upon information and belief resides in Guatemala City, Guatemala.”); id. ¶ 7 (“Interpleader and Cross-
Defendant Valerie Mansilla Ortiz is a Guatemalan citizen who upon information and belief resides in
Guatemala City, Guatemala.”). And Francisco never suggests that they wouldn’t be subject to process
there. See generally Response; Cross Compl.
Instead, Francisco argues that “Guatemala is not an adequate alternative forum” because there
is “systemic corruption in the Guatemalan judiciary.” Response at 22. To support this claim, Francisco
tells us three things. First, he says that “Judge Umaña, who issued the Provisional Amparo, is now
charged in a criminal case for collusion and abuse of authority[.]” Id. at 13; see also Cross Compl. ¶ 67

(“Guatemala’s Supreme Court of Justice lifted the presumption of judicial immunity surrounding
Judge José Wilfrido Umaña Calderón, the Santa Lucía Judge who granted the Provisional Amparo in
April 2021.”). Second, he relies on the “Expert Report of Gabriel Orellana Rojas” (“Orellana Rep.”)
[ECF No. 40-1], attached to his Response, for the proposition that, “in Guatemala’s judicial system[,]
‘litigants cannot always reliably expect proceedings to be conducted with impartiality and procedural
fairness.’” Response at 14 (quoting Orellana Rep. at 6–7); see also Cross Compl. ¶ 66 (“On December
1, 2025, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights published an extensive report on human
rights issues in Guatemala, in which it described in detail a judiciary lacking in independence and
impartiality.”). Third, Francisco believes that the Provisional Amparo proceeding was riddled with
“flagrant due process violations[.]” Response at 15; see also Cross Compl. ¶ 93 (“The purported
authorities by which Valerie and Bárbara claim to act on behalf of Pamasa are not entitled to
recognition, because inter alia, they were procured through fraud, were not rendered in a system that

provided impartiality or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law, did not
provide notice and/or an opportunity for [ ] Córdova or Francisco to defend themselves, and are
repugnant to the public policy of this state[.]”). None of these arguments undermines our view that
Guatemala is an adequate forum.
“An adequate forum need not be a perfect forum.” Satz, 244 F.3d at 1283. In this Circuit, an
alternative forum is “presumed ‘adequate’ unless the plaintiff makes some showing to the contrary.”
J.C. Renfroe & Sons, Inc. v. Renfroe Japan Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (Corrigan, J.)
(quoting Leon, 251 F.3d at 1312). To make that showing, the plaintiff can rely on “substantiated . . .
allegations of serious corruption or delay.” Leon, 251 F.3d at 1312. The Eleventh Circuit has been
clear, though, that, while defendants do have the “ultimate burden of persuasion” to establish
adequacy, they bear this burden “only where the plaintiff has substantiated his allegations of corruption
or delay.” Ibid. (emphasis added); see also ibid. (noting that, if the plaintiff offers “significant evidence

documenting the partiality or delay (in years) typically associated with the adjudication of similar
claims, and these conditions are so severe as to call the adequacy of the forum into doubt, then the
defendant has the burden to persuade the [court] that the facts are otherwise,” but adding that, where
a plaintiff’s allegations are unsupported, the court may reject them “without considering any evidence
from the defendant”). As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, “the argument that the alternative forum
is too corrupt to be adequate does not enjoy a particularly impressive track record.” Id. at 1311–12
(cleaned up).
In our case, Francisco hasn’t substantiated his allegations with “significant evidence.” To begin
with, Francisco cannot rely on the expert report he attached to his Response because “a party cannot
amend a complaint by attaching documents to a response to a motion to dismiss.” Jallali v. Nova Se.
Univ., Inc., 486 F. App’x 765, 767 (11th Cir. 2012). In any event, Orellana never actually says that
Guatemala’s legal system is inadequate or that, if we were to send Francisco to Guatemala, he’d be

left without any legal remedy. Instead, after discussing the state of the Guatemalan judiciary, he writes
this:
Guatemala is undergoing a crisis in its justice system derived from systematic
interferences aimed at undermining judicial independence. These interferences
manifest in multiple ways, including political and institutional pressures affecting
judicial decision-making, irregularities in the processes for appointment and removal
of judges, and the inconsistent application of procedural safeguards. Collectively, these
factors weaken public confidence in the judiciary and create uncertainty regarding the
fairness of judicial outcomes. . . .
The cumulative effect of these conditions is a judicial environment in which litigants
cannot always reliably expect proceedings to be conducted with impartiality and
procedural fairness. While Guatemala’s legal framework formally guarantees judicial
independence and due process, the reality is that this is sometimes aspirational.
Orellana Rep. at 6–7. Indeed, far from suggesting that Francisco would be left with “no remedy at
all,” Piper, 454 U.S. at 254, Orellana concedes that, in Guatemala, Francisco could bring Count I as “[a]
civil claim for fraud” and Count II as either an “action to challenge transfers made in bad faith to
prejudice lawful successors” or “a claim for extra-contractual civil liability for intentional patrimonial
harm,” Orellana Rep. at 18. So, even according to Orellana’s assessment, while the Guatemalan judicial
system may not be perfect, it isn’t inadequate because the law is well-settled that “[a]n adequate forum
need not be a perfect forum.” Satz, 244 F.3d at 1283.
Francisco also fails to show that the irregularities he may have experienced during the
Provisional Amparo proceedings, or the fact that Judge Umaña “is now charged in a criminal case for
collusion and abuse of authority,” Response at 13, somehow render the entire Guatemalan legal system
inadequate. That some Guatemalan judges may be corrupt or inept isn’t enough to show that the
Guatemalan legal system as a whole will afford Francisco “no remedy at all.” Piper, 454 U.S. at 254; cf.
Lisa, S.A. v. Gutierrez Mayorga, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (Moore, J.), aff’d, 240 F.
App’x 822 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding an alternative forum adequate where plaintiff failed to show that
his ability to press a cause of action would be “altogether lost”). To the contrary, that Judge Umaña
has been charged with a crime and removed from office would seem to suggest that the Guatemalan
legal system condemns and punishes venality. And since Judge Umaña has been removed from the
judiciary, Francisco’s case—should he choose to file one in Guatemala—will presumably land on a
different judge’s docket. Plus, Judge Umaña was neither the final nor the sole decisionmaker in
Francisco’s case. In fact, the case went through two levels of appellate review—first by the Seventh
Civil Court and then by the Constitutional Court of Guatemala—both populated by panels of distinct
judges whom Francisco never accuses of incompetence, much less corruption. In the end, the
Constitutional Court affirmed the Provisional Amparo’s decision, and Francisco never alleges that
Judge Umaña had any involvement with that affirmance. As a result, Francisco fails to address how
Judge Umaña’s involvement at the trial court level tainted the final adjudication of his appeals.
As one of our colleagues has written, “every court that has addressed the adequacy of
Guatemala as a forum, has determined that it is an adequate forum.” Lisa, S.A., 441 F. Supp. 2d at
1238 (first citing Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1512, 1526 (D. Minn. 1996) (“Adequacy of

the alternative forum does not require equivalence of result, but merely the existence of some
meaningful remedy.”); then citing Kieswetter v. Chiquita Brands Cos. N. Am., Inc., 1992 WL 55183 (E.D.
La. Mar. 10, 1992); and then citing Bolanos v. Gulf Oil Corp., 502 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1980)); see also
Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1291 (rejecting the appellants’ argument that “Guatemala is an inadequate forum
because of alleged corruption affecting the nation’s legal system”). And, as the Eleventh Circuit
observed in refusing to find the Guatemalan court system inadequate because of a plaintiff’s
corruption allegations: “[I]t is not hard to imagine that Guatemala might regard trying this case in an
American court as a tacit acceptance of the appellants’ assertion that the Guatemalan judicial system
is too corrupt to justly resolve the dispute.” Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1299. Since Francisco doesn’t explain
why we should, twenty years later, engage in just that kind of “tacit acceptance” of his corruption
contentions, we easily conclude that Guatemala is an adequate alternative forum for this dispute.
II. The Public and Private Interests Favor Dismissal

“The second part of the forum non conveniens analysis—the balancing of the private and public
factors—is a comparative inquiry that requires the district court to weigh the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each respective forum.” Fresh Results, LLC v. ASF Holland, B.V., 921 F.3d 1043,
1049 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Both sets of factors favor dismissal here.
a. Private Interests
“The private factors ‘pertain to the interests of the participants in the litigation.’” Ibid. (quoting
Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011)). In assessing this factor, we consider “‘the
relative ease of access to sources of proof,’ which includes the ‘availability of compulsory process for
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses,” as well as “‘all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.’” Ibid. (quoting

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). Although “there is normally a strong presumption
that the plaintiff has chosen a sufficiently convenient forum,” this presumption “weakens” when, as
in our case, “the plaintiff is a foreigner litigating far from home.” Leon, 251 F.3d at 1314–15.
Our case, litigated by exclusively Guatemalan parties, is governed by Guatemalan law and is
about control of a Guatemalan company. In these circumstances, the private interest factors weigh
decisively in favor of dismissal. We’ll start by noting that Francisco doesn’t address any of these factors
specifically. He, instead, simply claims, in the most general and conclusory way, that “the private
interest factors do not weigh in favor of dismissal, as the relevant parties, and thus the relevant
evidence, are before the Court as a result of the Sisters’ own claims.” Response at 23. That’s no way
to preserve an argument. See Sappupo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references
to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”); Hamilton v.

Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he failure to make arguments
and cite authorities in support of an issue waives it.”). Besides, the Interpleader Complaint is the only
mechanism under which we could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over either the Cross Complaint
or the Sisters’ claims. Without the Interpleader Complaint, in other words, we’d lack any subject-
matter jurisdiction over any part of this dispute. So, Francisco is simply wrong to suggest that the
parties are before us on “the Sisters’ own claims.”
In any event, “the relative ease of access to sources of proof” and “all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive” favor Guatemala. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
As we’ve said, the parties are all Guatemalan citizens who reside in Guatemala, see Cross Compl. ¶¶ 4–
6 (stating that Francisco and the Sisters are “Guatemalan citizen[s] who reside[ ] in Guatemala City,
Guatemala”); the company in question (Pamasa) is a Guatemalan entity, incorporated under the laws
of (and with its principal of business in) Guatemala, see id. ¶ 7 (“Pamasa, S.A. is a Guatemalan entity

incorporated in Guatemala City, Guatemala in March 1990.”); Interpleader Compl.¶ 3 (“Pamasa is
. . . incorporated in Guatemala with its principal place of business located [in] . . . Guatemala City,
Guatemala[.]”); and the witnesses and evidence at the heart of this dispute are all in Guatemala. Plus,
every salient event in this case happened in Guatemala, which makes sense, since the question of who
controls Pamasa—the crux of this case—necessarily turns on whether the Sisters first “usurp[ed] their
aging father’s control” by “[f]orging his signature,” and whether they then, using Córdova’s forged
signature, “fraudulently amended [his trust’s] bylaws to add a provision” that allowed the Sisters “to
invoke a mechanism for having [their father] declared legally incapacitated.” Cross Compl. ¶ 16. All
these things happened (if they happened at all) in Guatemala.
Even Valerie’s claims (which formed the basis of the Provisional Amparo) hinge on whether
Córdova, her father, “had purposefully orchestrated an unlawful ‘scheme’ to transfer the entities’
assets to himself during the July 1, 2020 General Shareholders’ Meetings,” in violation of the “conflict-

of-interest provisions in the entities’ governing documents and Guatemala’s commercial code.” Id.
¶ 31. And these claims center around the personal knowledge of witnesses in Guatemala, who could
testify about whether “her father had kept these Meetings a secret from the rest of the Board members
in order to prevent their opposition to his scheme” and whether Francisco “had been authorized to
carry out acts that would help his father steal the entities’ assets.” Id. ¶¶ 31–32. A Guatemalan court
presumably also has all the documents at the heart of the Provisional Amparo: including the allegedly
“defective meeting minutes” that “reflected the impossible circumstance of the meetings having taken
place on the same date and at the same time.” Id. ¶ 32.9 Whether these were products of “forgery and
fraud,” as Valerie claimed during the Guatemalan proceedings, or simple “notarial errors that had
already been cured,” as Francisco now argues, is a question only the Guatemalan witnesses,
documents, and evidence can answer. Ibid.
As this summation makes plain, all the witnesses and evidence bearing on Córdova’s mental

state, the Sisters’ intentions, and whether the Sisters forged their father’s signature are in Guatemala
because that’s where this family drama played out. Crucially, Francisco never disputes any of this. See
MTD at 15 (noting that “all the evidence is in Guatemala”); id. at 19 (“[A]ll of the alleged conduct in
the Crossclaim purportedly occurred in Guatemala.”); Response at 10 (admitting that the dispute
implicates “Guatemalan parties, witnesses, evidence, court proceedings, and assets”); see generally id.
(failing to identify any witnesses or evidence outside Guatemala).
We therefore conclude that the private interest factors overwhelmingly favor dismissal here.
See, e.g., Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1294 (“[T]he plaintiffs’ choice of forum was the only private interest factor
weighing in the appellants’ favor, whereas each of the other private interest factors—i.e., the relative
ease of access to sources of proof, which in this case were located predominately in Guatemala; the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, who in this case were also almost entirely in
Guatemala; the ability to compel the unwilling witnesses, which in this case was lacking for the

witnesses who lived in Guatemala; and additional practical and logistical issues, which in this case
included the need to translate documents, and other linguistic barriers—favored a forum non conveniens
dismissal.”); Lisa, 441 F. Supp 2d at 1239–40 (finding that the private interests favored dismissal
because the “the costs associated with any potential litigation would be far greater if this action were

9 And all these documents, which are presumably in Spanish, would need to be translated into
English—a great (and needless) cost in both time and money.
to proceed in Florida. As discussed above, the vast majority of potential witnesses and documents are
located in Guatemala. Both parties intend on calling several witnesses that are not under Defendants’
control, who reside in Guatemala and are not subject to this Court’s process. Most, if not all of the
witnesses Plaintiff must call to prove the alleged fraud are located in Guatemala. . . . Finally, the
language barrier in this case favors dismissal. Nearly all of the witnesses that will be called at trial would
testify in Spanish, and a majority of the relevant documents are in Spanish” (cleaned up)); Tazoe, 631

F.3d at 1331 (holding that “[t]he superior access that Brazil offers to sources of proof favors dismissal”
because “the vast majority of evidence appears to be in Brazil and France” (cleaned up)).
b. The Public Interest Factors
Where, as here, the private interest factors favor dismissal, we needn’t consider the public
interest factors at all. See Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1298 (“It is only when the private interest factors are ‘at
or near equipoise’ that a district court is obliged to consider the public interests at stake in a suit.”
(cleaned up)). Still, in the interest of completeness, we’ll explain why the public interest factors likewise
support dismissal here.
“Relevant public interest factors include the sovereigns’ interests in deciding the dispute, the
administrative burdens posed by trial, and the need to apply foreign law.” Satz, 244 F.3d at 1284
(quoting Pan. v. BBCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 953 (11th Cir. 1997)) (cleaned up)). For two
reasons, these public interest factors unambiguously favor dismissal here. First, the parties agree that

Guatemalan law governs this dispute. See Response at 23 (“Francisco Jr. agrees that Guatemalan law
governs his tort claims.”); MTD at 16 (“Guatemalan law plainly controls Francisco Jr.’s claims.”). The
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “the need to resolve and apply foreign law should ‘point the
trial court towards dismissal[.]’” Sigalas v. Lido Mar., Inc., 776 F.2d 1512, 1519 (cleaned up) (quoting
Piper, 454 U.S. at 263); see also Warter v. Bos. Sec., S.A., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(Ryskamp, J.) (“Even the possibility that foreign law applies to a dispute is sufficient to warrant
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.”); Magnin v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1430 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“Far better that the case be tried in France by one or more jurists as familiar with French
law as we are unfamiliar with it.”); Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1310 n.24 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]ort
law . . . is rife with nuances that are not consistently found throughout all jurisdictions. Therefore, the
foreign country is ordinarily the best place to litigate a dispute revolving around a foreign rule of
decision.”).10

Second, “the fact that the fraud occurred in Guatemala, the conduct causing the injury occurred
in Guatemala, the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
nearly all of the parties is Guatemala, and the place where the relationship between the parties is
centered is Guatemala,” Lisa, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1240, renders this dispute “quintessentially
Guatemalan,” Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1298 (finding that the public interest factors strongly favored
dismissal where the dispute was “‘quintessentially Guatemalan,’ since it involved one of Guatemala’s
largest private employers in one of Guatemala’s most important economic sectors and one of
Guatemala’s most influential labor unions” (cleaned up)); see also Chinetti v. Ferrari S.p.A., 2012 WL
13013131, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2012) (Williams, J.) (holding that, because the dispute was
“quintessentially Italian,” “Italy has an undeniably strong interest in this dispute, and its courts are in
a better position to resolve it”).
Our case’s only connection to the United States is the Account, which is held in Miami with

our Interpleader, Santander, whom we’ve already dismissed. See Lisa, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (finding
that the public interest factors favored dismissal where the only connection to Miami was that the

10 Demonstrating admirable faith in us, Francisco says that “[t]he application of foreign law . . . is not
a sufficient basis for dismissal, as the Court is perfectly capable of applying foreign law—and routinely
does so.” Response at 23. Even if that’s true, the Supreme Court has been clear that “the need to
apply foreign law point[s] towards dismissal.” Piper, 454 U.S. at 260. In any event, in our case, all the
public interest factors—e.g., judicial economy, the interests of each jurisdiction, and the applicable
law—favor Guatemala.
defendants “moved [cash] from the Guatemalan bank accounts to bank accounts in Miami”). In short,
“the sovereigns’ interests in deciding the dispute[ ] [and] the administrative burdens posed by trial”
favor adjudication of this case in Guatemala. Satz, 244 F.3d at 1284.
III. Francisco Can Reinstate his Lawsuit in Guatemala
“The final element of an analysis under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is whether the
plaintiff can reinstate the lawsuit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.”

Popescu v. CMA CGM, 2009 WL 5606131, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2009) (Altonaga, J.), aff’d, 384 F.
App’x 902 (11th Cir. 2010). In the Sisters’ view, Guatemala is an adequate alternative forum because
“the Guatemalan courts . . . could [ ] now consider Francisco Jr.’s fraud claim.” MTD at 15. “The
same,” they say, “goes for the tortious interference with inheritance claim.” Ibid.
Francisco disagrees. He claims that he cannot reinstate this action in Guatemala because “there
are no live, parallel proceedings in Guatemalan probate court.” Response at 23. And, he adds,
“Guatemala’s probate forum is structurally incapable of resolving the claims being asserted here, as
[s]uccession courts in Guatemala determine heirship and administer estate distribution; they generally
do not adjudicate third-party fraud claims.” Id. at 23–24 (quoting Orellana Rep. at 17–18). But our
issue here isn’t whether there are ongoing parallel proceedings in Guatemala—that’s a red herring. The
question, rather, is whether Francisco “can reinstate the lawsuit” in Guatemala, Popescu, 2009 WL
5606131, at *13—i.e., whether he may assert future claims. And Francisco’s Response is notably silent

on this crucial question.
Plus, Francisco’s claim that Guatemalan courts would be incapable of hearing his fraud claims
is belied by his own expert, who was clear that Francisco could bring Count I in Guatemala as “[a] civil
claim for fraud” and Count II as either an “action to challenge transfers made in bad faith to prejudice
lawful successors” or “a claim for extra-contractual civil liability for intentional patrimonial harm.”
Orellana Report at 18. Even disregarding the Orellana Report, the Constitutional Order declared that
the Provisional Amparo was “subject to the final judicial decisions that must be assumed in the
different trials that must be promoted in the ordinary jurisdiction by the interested shareholders of . . .
Pamasa, Soeciedad Anonima[.]” Constitutional Order at 45. And it allowed Pamasa’s shareholders to
retain control of the company “until the relevant jurisdiction declares who should act as the definitive
representative of the related entities.” Id. at 46. In other words, the Constitutional Order simply
maintained the status quo until Francisco’s fraud claims could be resolved “in the ordinary

jurisdiction,” i.e. through a civil fraud claim. Id. at 45. Against all this, Francico never even suggests
that his cause of action doesn’t exist in Guatemala or that he would be barred from bringing a civil
fraud claim there. He, instead, says only that “the Guatemalan judiciary . . . lacks guarantees of
impartiality or procedural fairness, and thus lacks the safeguards necessary for Guatemala to be
deemed an adequate forum.” Response at 8. But, again, for all the reasons we’ve outlined, his
corruption allegations simply aren’t sufficient for us to declare Guatemala an inadequate forum. This
final prong thus likewise favors dismissal.
***
One last thing. The operative complaint in this action is the Interpleader Complaint. See Order
after Status Conference ¶ 1 (“The Interpleader Complaint [ECF No. 12] is now the operative
Complaint in this case.”). “Interpleader is the means by which an innocent stakeholder, who typically
claims no interest in an asset and does not know the asset’s rightful owner, avoids multiple liability by

asking the court to determine the asset’s rightful owner.” In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Hous. Ass’n Inc.,
21 F.3d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1994); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (governing interpleader). An “Interpleader
action proceeds in two stages. At the first stage, the court determines whether interpleader is proper
and whether to discharge the stakeholder from further liability to the claimants. At the second stage,
the court evaluates the respective rights of the claimants to the interpleaded funds.” Ohio Nat’l Life
Assurance Corp. v. Langkau, 353 F. App’x 244, 248 (11th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “When the court
decides that interpleader 1s available, it may issue an order discharging the stakeholder, if the
stakeholder 1s disinterested.” [bzd.
We’re now at this second stage. See Order after Status Conference (dismissing Santander); see
also November 4, 2026, Paperless Minutes (finding interpleader proper and discharging Santander
from further lability to the claimants). So, we'll resolve the respective rights of the claimants to the
interpleaded funds at summary judgment. Under the Amended Scheduling Order [ECF No. 59], the
parties must file their motions for summary judgment by September 23, 2026. See Amended
Scheduling Order at 2. In the meantime, we'll schedule a status conference to discuss how best to
proceed with the balance of this case.
CONCLUSION
Because this is a dispute over a Guatemalan company between Guatemalan citizens under
Guatemalan law, we dismiss Francisco’s Cross Complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
After careful review, therefore, we ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:
1. ‘The Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 30] is GRANTED.
2. ‘The Cross Complaint [ECF No. 23] is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. We SCHEDULE a status conference for August 11, 2026, at 1:00 p.m.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on July 7, 2026.
ROYK.ALTMAN ——™
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ce: counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11391493. Public record. Not legal advice.