# Bunten

> District Court, S.D. New York · June 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11391230

## Case

- **Full name:** Bunten v. Donat
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATEFILED: 6/8/2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PATRICIA BUNTEN ET AL,
Plaintiffs,
7:21 CV 4588 (NSR)
-against-
OPINION & ORDER
JOSEPH DONAT ET AL,
Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Maritza Wilson (“Wilson”) and five other employees of Defendant City of
Newburgh (the “City”) allege employment discrimination claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, which
this Court granted with respect to all Plaintiffs except Wilson. See Bunten v. Donat, 2024 WL
1640054 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2024). Defendant Joseph Donat (“Donat”) then filed an interlocutory
appeal before the Second Circuit, which ruled by Summary Order that Wilson had failed to
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. See
Brown v. Donat, No. 24-1344-CV, 2025 WL 1430572 (2d Cir. May 19, 2025). After entry of the
Mandate in the District Court, the City requested that Wilson stipulate to the voluntary
discontinuance of her claim against the City. When she declined to do so, the City moved for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (ECF No. 83.) For
the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

'Tn opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed with prejudice any claims against Defendant
George Garrison. See Bunten, 2024 WL 1640054, at *1 n.1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural
history of the case. The following facts are drawn from the Complaint, together with the Opinion
and Order and the Summary Order issued by this Court and the Second Circuit, respectively.

Wilson and five other City employees commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by filing a Complaint wherein each alleged that various adverse employment actions had been
taken against them on the basis of their race, gender and/or national origin in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Wilson alleged that,
in 2021, she was bypassed for a promotion to Recreation Director based upon her gender. (Id., ¶
107.)
Wilson began working for the City’s Department of Parks and Recreation as a bilingual
clerk in 1984. Brown, 2025 WL 1430572, at *1. Beginning in 2007, and continuing until 2021, the
City Manager periodically asked Wilson to perform the duties of Recreation Director when the
position became vacant. (Id.) After each stint as interim director, Wilson reverted to her bilingual

clerk position. (Id.) Although Wilson expressed interest in a permanent appointment to Recreation
Director, the City’s Civil Service Commissioner advised her in 2007 that she was ineligible for the
promotion because she did not have a college degree. (Id.) In 2015, the City’s Civil Service
Commission officially revised the minimum qualifications for the Recreation Director role,
making a college degree a mandatory requirement. (Id.)
In September 2020, Wilson emailed Donat, then the City Manager, and Michelle Kelson,
the City’s Corporate Counsel, to formally inquire about applying for the Recreation Director
position. (Id. at 2.) Wilson acknowledged that although her lack of a college degree prevented her
from applying for the recently vacated director position, she believed that her years of experience
within the City’s Parks and Recreation, including as interim director, were equivalent to a college
degree and qualified her for the role. (Id.) In her email, Wilson also stated that, in a May 15, 2020,
conversation, Donat informed her that the City would hold a conference prior to the position’s
posting to revise the job qualifications and remove the college degree requirement, such that

Wilson could apply for the role. (Id.) Wilson alleges that, several months later, in August 2020,
Donat relayed to her the City Council’s desire to hire a “younger male” for the Recreation Director
position. (Id.)
In December 2020, the City uploaded a job posting for the position of Recreation Director
that included, inter alia, the minimum qualification that the applicant have a college degree. (Id.)
Despite expressing interest in the role, Wilson did not formally apply for it. (Id.) In April 2021,
Donat appointed an African-American male with a college degree, Sam Sutton, to the position.
(Id.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wilson commenced this action on May 21, 2021 with the filing of the Complaint wherein

she asserts a single cause of action alleging that “[b]y intentionally failing to promote [her] on the
basis of her gender, defendants Donat and the City of Newburgh denied her equal protection of
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as made actionable by and through 42 U.S.C.
section 1983.” (Complaint, ¶ 107).
Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment. By Opinion and Order
entered on April 16, 2024, this Court granted the motion with respect to all Plaintiffs except
Wilson. See Bunten, 2024 WL 1640054, at *7–14. Wilson’s gender discrimination claim survived
dismissal based upon this Court’s determination that she had established a prima facie case
pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas standard and presented enough evidence to create an issue of
fact. Id. at *12–13. Donat appealed from that portion of the Opinion and Order that denied his
motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. By Summary Order dated May 19,
2025, the Second Circuit ruled that Wilson had failed to establish a prima facie case of gender
discrimination pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. See Brown, 2025 WL 1430572, at *3–4.

After entry of the Mandate in the District Court, the City requested that Wilson stipulate to
the voluntary discontinuance of her claim against the City. When she declined to do so, the City
filed the instant motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Rule 12(c) Judgment on the Pleadings
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early
enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
“To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.
2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The standard for analyzing

a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is identical to the standard for a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d
518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
However, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation,” or to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). It is not necessary for the
complaint to assert “detailed factual allegations,” but it must allege “more than labels and
conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The critical inquiry is whether the Plaintiff has pled

sufficient facts to nudge the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570. A
motion to dismiss will be denied where the allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Wilson brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in relevant
part, that: “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive
rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United

States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144
n.3 (1979); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). To state a claim under Section
1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: “(1) that the defendants deprived him of a
right ‘secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States’; and (2) that they did so ‘under
color of state law.’” Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)).
DISCUSSION
Wilson alleges that Donat and the City failed to promote her because of her gender thereby
denying her equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Complaint,
¶ 107.) Because the Second Circuit addressed Wilson’s claim against Donat, the remaining

question before this Court is whether Wilson has sufficiently pled a claim against the City.
I. Claim Against Donat
In its Summary Order, the Second Circuit reversed this Court’s ruling and held that Wilson
failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
Specifically, the court concluded that Donat could not have been personally involved in any
alleged constitutional violation because he lacked authority to alter the college-degree requirement
for the Recreation Director position; that authority rested exclusively with the Civil Service
Commission. Brown v. Donat, 2025 WL 1430572, at *3. The Second Circuit explained that it was
undisputed that “Wilson did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position she sought”
because “[b]y her own admission, Wilson does not possess a college degree, which was a

mandatory requirement for the Recreation Director position as set by the Newburgh Civil Service
Commission.” Id. Thus, it was therefore “immaterial” that Wilson had performed the duties of the
position for years as Interim Director and that Donat had allegedly promised that the qualifications
would be modified so that she could apply. Id. As the court explained:
Donat lacked the authority to unilaterally amend the qualifications for the Recreation
Director position.... [T]he ultimate decision on whether to revise the minimum job criteria
rested exclusively with the Newburgh Civil Service Commission, and there is no evidence
that the Commission, which is not a party to this lawsuit, imposed the college degree
requirement for the Recreation Director position (which had been a requirement since at
least 2015), or refused to alter it, because of discriminatory animus.

Id.
The Second Circuit also rejected Wilson’s contention that Donat’s alleged statement that
“the city council wanted a younger male for the job” constituted direct evidence of discrimination.
The court reasoned that Donat “was not the decisionmaker regarding any potential changes to the
job requirements” and merely conveyed his belief regarding the City Council’s intent “without

providing a basis for that conclusion.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded:
[E]ven construing the evidence most favorably to Wilson, she has failed to demonstrate a
prima facie case of gender discrimination against Donat because Wilson did not meet the
required qualifications for the position, and Donat was neither personally involved in
setting those qualifications nor capable of hiring Wilson in contravention of them.

Id.

II. Monell Claim Against the City

Under Monell, “[i]n order to prevail on a claim against a municipality under section 1983
based on acts of a public official, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) actions taken under color of
law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that
an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury,
542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
658, 690–91 (1978)). Thus, a municipality, such as the City of Newburgh, may be sued under
Section 1983 only “when execution of [the] government’s policy or custom…inflicts the injury.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Therefore, any Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity must “show
that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.” Patterson v.
County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004). A plaintiff may satisfy the “policy or custom”
requirement by alleging one of the following: “(1) a formal policy officially adopted by the
municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by municipal officials with final policymaking
authority that caused the alleged deprivation; (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it
constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law; or (4) a failure to properly train or supervise
employees that amounts to deliberate indifference to individuals’ constitutional rights.” White v.
Westchester County, No. 18-CV-730 (KMK), 2018 WL 6726555, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018)
(quoting Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
As discussed supra, the Second Circuit held that Wilson failed to establish a prima facie

case of gender discrimination against Donat and remanded this action for further proceedings
consistent with its Summary Order. Wilson did not assert any other claim or theory of relief as
against the City. Thus, Wilson’s inability to establish a prima facie case means that, as a threshold
matter, she has not “alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009); see also Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2009). Simply, “there
can be no Monell liability where there has not been an underlying constitutional violation;” thus,
Wilson’s claim against the City fails. Dorsey v. Gannon, No. 22-2735, 2024 WL 1338772, at *3
(2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2024).
In her opposition to the City’s motion, Wilson argues that: (1) the City’s motion is
procedurally defective; (2) the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the City’s motion; and (3) a

reasonable jury could find the City liable under Monell. None of these arguments has merit. First,
the City’s motion is neither procedurally defective nor one that must be converted into a motion
for summary judgment. In any event, conversion would serve no purpose because it would yield
the same result. This action has already been the subject of extensive summary judgment motion
practice following the completion of discovery, and there is no additional discovery—more than
five years into this litigation and more than three years after the close of discovery—that could
alter the dispositive fact before the Court: Wilson lacked the minimum qualifications for the
Recreation Director position because she did not possess the required college degree.
Although this Court previously denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning
that Wilson’s demonstrated ability to perform the duties of the position as Interim Director,
coupled with Donat’s alleged statement that the City wanted to fill the position with a man, could
permit a reasonable jury to infer gender discrimination, the Second Circuit has since rejected that

reasoning. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that “Wilson failed to demonstrate a prima facie
case of gender discrimination against Donat because Wilson did not meet the required
qualifications for the position, and Donat was neither personally involved in setting those
qualifications nor capable of hiring Wilson in contravention of them.” Brown v. Donat, 2025 WL
1430572, at *4. Thus, there is no underlying constitutional violation for which the City could be
held liable.
Further, Wilson’s reliance on Lugo v. City of Troy, New York, 114 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2024),
is misplaced. In Lugo, after the close of discovery, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
and the city moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing or, alternatively, for summary
judgment. The district court dismissed the complaint on standing grounds based solely on the

pleadings, without considering the summary judgment record developed during discovery. On
appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred by resolving the standing issue on the
pleadings rather than on the full evidentiary record. This case bears no procedural resemblance to
Lugo. Here, the Court is not being asked to resolve a factual issue based solely on the pleadings
while disregarding a developed evidentiary record. To the contrary, discovery closed years ago,
the parties have already engaged in summary judgment motion practice, and the relevant factual
record is complete. Moreover, the dispositive issue is not one that requires further factual
development. The Second Circuit has already held that Wilson lacked the minimum qualifications
for the Recreation Director position because she did not possess the required college degree.
Accordingly, unlike in Lugo, there is no additional evidentiary record that could alter the outcome.
Similarly, in light of the Second Circuit’s decision, the law of the case doctrine does not
bar the City’s motion. If that were the case, the appellate process in our judicial system would be

moot and appellate courts would never be able to remand cases for further proceedings consistent
with their opinions. In this case, the logical outcome that follows from the Second Circuit’s holding
that Wilson failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination is that there has been no
constitutional violation of Wilson’s rights and, therefore, there can be no Monell liability.
See Dorsey, 2024 WL 1338772, at *3 (“[T]here can be no Monell liability where there has not
been an underlying constitutional violation.”).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could find the City liable under Monell
because municipal liability does not depend on a finding of individual liability and because
Wilson’s failure to obtain the promotion resulted from the City’s unconstitutional policies and
practices. While it is true that municipal liability is not dependent upon a finding of individual

liability, it is dependent upon a finding of an underlying constitutional violation. See Segal v. City
of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the district court properly found no
underlying constitutional violation, its decision not to address the municipal defendants' liability
under Monell [v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] was entirely correct”);
Lenzo v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-306 (JMF), 2022 WL 656831, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2022) (“The Court need not, and does not, address that [Monell] argument because Lenzo’s claims
fail for a more basic reason: He fails to plausibly allege any underlying constitutional violation at
all”); Case v. City of New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d 313, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“As the Court finds
no underlying constitutional violation, it need not reach the question of causation for municipal
liability”). The Second Circuit’s determination that Donat did not violate Wilson’s constitutional
rights does not eliminate the requirement that Plaintiff establish the existence of a constitutional
violation to sustain a Monell claim. Plaintiff attempts to accomplish this by arguing that the City
had adopted unconstitutional policies and practices but this argument is wholly unsupported by

the evidentiary record. Accordingly, because there is no underlying constitutional violation, the
City cannot be liable under Monell.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.
All other claims having been previously resolved on summary judgment, the Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 83 and to terminate this action.

Dated: June 8, 2026
White Plains, New York _________________________________________________________ ____
NELSON S. ROMÁN
U.S. District Court Judge, S.D.N.Y.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11391230. Public record. Not legal advice.