# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · June 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11388596

## Case

- **Full name:** John Brosnan v. Contra Costa County Superior Court
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JOHN BROSNAN, No. 2:26-cv-00142-DC-SCR
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT,
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Defendant.
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17 Plaintiff John Brosnan is proceeding in this action pro se, which is referred to the
18 undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court has
19 reviewed Plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) and now recommends that this
20 action be dismissed.
21 I. Background and Procedural History
22 Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se on January 16, 2026. The Complaint named one
23 Defendant, Contra Costa County (the “County”), and alleged one count for violation of the First
24 Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleged he “made errors” in the year 2000 and was placed
25 on the vexatious litigant (“VL”) list in California state court. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleged that the
26 County knew he did not meet the requirements for the VL list, but has not removed him. Plaintiff
27 claimed this prevented him from filing a small claims lawsuit about the theft of his catalytic
28 converter. Id. at 2-3.
1 On February 20, 2026, the County appeared and filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 8. In
2 the motion, the County stated: “First, the County is a distinct entity from the Contra Costa County
3 Superior Court; only the latter entity is responsible for determining whether someone is, or is not,
4 a vexatious litigant.” ECF No. 8 at 3.
5 On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which dropped the
6 County as a defendant and instead named Contra Costa County Superior Court (“CCSC”) as a
7 Defendant. ECF No. 15 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff has not filed a return of service as to CCSC, and CCSC
8 has not filed an answer or other responsive pleading. The allegations in the FAC are quite similar
9 to the original complaint and Plaintiff alleges one count of First Amendment violation for failure
10 to remove him from the VL list. Plaintiff seeks $7 million in damages from CCSC and an order
11 directing removal from the VL list.
12 In the month between February 26, 2026, and March 27, 2026, Plaintiff also filed five
13 motions – two seeking to e-file (ECF Nos. 12 & 14) and three seeking removal from the VL list
14 (ECF Nos. 11, 20, & 22). The Court has denied the motions to e-file. ECF No. 24. On May 4,
15 2026, the Court issued an OSC directing Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be
16 dismissed because the only Defendant, CCSC, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
17 ECF No. 24. On May 13, 2026, Plaintiff timely filed a response. ECF No. 25.
18 II. Analysis
19 A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Omar v.
20 Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). A court must also consider its subject
21 matter jurisdiction sua sponte. United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 2021).
22 Plaintiff names one defendant, a superior court of the State of California. The superior
23 court has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Munoz v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 91 F.4th 977,
24 980 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that a superior court is an arm of the state and has sovereign
25 immunity). In Munoz, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and stated: “We
26 lack jurisdiction over these claims because actions against state courts and state court judges in
27 their judicial capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. at 979. In Munoz, the
28 court also discussed the Ex parte Young exception and stated that “plaintiffs can sometimes sue
1 state officials for prospective injunctive relief to prevent future statutory or constitutional harms”
2 but that the exception applies only in “narrow circumstances.” Id. at 980. The Ninth Circuit then
3 found the Ex parte Young exception “does not apply because the Superior Court cannot be sued in
4 an individual capacity.” Id.
5 Plaintiff’s response to the OSC does not show that CCSC can properly be sued in this
6 action. Plaintiff argues that immunity “does not apply when a mandatory duty is violated.” ECF
7 No. 25 at 1. Plaintiff does not explain this point, or cite any authority. Plaintiff appears to argue,
8 relying on the California Code of Civil Procedure, that he does not meet the requirements to be
9 maintained on the VL list. Plaintiff concludes his argument by stating, again without citing any
10 legal authority, that immunity does not apply because the state court is violating his civil rights by
11 not removing him from the VL list. Id. at 2.
12 The Court finds that the only named defendant in this action, CCSC, has Eleventh
13 Amendment immunity and therefore recommends this action be dismissed for the reasons stated
14 in Munoz. Even if CCSC was not entitled to immunity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation
15 of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff has previously brought unsuccessful challenges to
16 California’s VL statute. See Brosnan v. Newsom, 2:24-cv-03639-TLN-SCR (“Brosnan I”) and
17 Brosnan v. State of California, 2:25-cv-00741-DC-CSK (“Brosnan II”). In Brosnan I, Plaintiff
18 alleged that being on California’s VL list violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
19 The Court dismissed Brosnan I for failure to state a claim. ECF Nos. 9 & 12. In Brosnan II,
20 Plaintiff alleged that he was improperly on the VL list and that the State of California was
21 violating his First Amendment rights to file a lawsuit. ECF No. 4. In dismissing the action, the
22 Court found that the complaint was “without merit and that the only defendant is immune from
23 suit.” ECF No. 7 at 6.
24 The California VL statute has been challenged on “numerous constitutional grounds.” See
25 Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007). In Wolfe, the plaintiff made several
26 constitutional arguments, including that the VL statute violated his First Amendment right to
27 petition and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. Id. at 1124. The
28 Ninth Circuit began by noting that the VL statute does not preclude all in pro per litigation by a
1 VL, as it “permits” a VL to file a lawsuit “if it appears that the litigation has merit and has not
2 been filed for the purpose of harassment or delay.” Id. (quoting Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 391.7(b)).
3 The Ninth Circuit stated:

4 The California vexatious litigant statute is not unconstitutionally vague, because it
“give[s] ‘fair notice to those who might violate the statute.’” It is not overbroad, because
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there is no constitutional right to file frivolous litigation. “Just as false statements are not
6 immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, ... baseless litigation is
not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.” Under the California statute, a
7 vexatious litigant may file potentially meritorious claims not intended solely to harass or
delay, so the courthouse doors are not closed to him. Id. at 1125 (citations omitted).
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9 The Ninth Circuit also clearly addressed and rejected the Fourteenth Amendment
10 challenge: “The California statute does not violate equal protection. Frequent pro se litigants are
11 not a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny.” Id. at 1126. The Ninth Circuit additionally rejected
12 the due process argument that the VL statute created a financial barrier to accessing the courts,
13 stating, “the California vexatious litigant statute does not deprive [plaintiff] of the opportunity to
14 vindicate a fundamental right in court.” Id.
15 The Ninth Circuit has subsequently found First Amendment challenges to California’s VL
16 statute to be “foreclosed by Wolfe” and stated the argument that the statute “impermissibly chills
17 the First Amendment right to access the courts is meritless.” Sargent v. Cantil-Sakauye, 812 F.
18 App’x 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Kobayashi v. Racho, 271 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2008)
19 (“The district court properly dismissed for failure to state a claim [plaintiff’s] challenges to the
20 constitutionality of California’s vexatious litigant statutes because those statutes are
21 constitutional.”).
22 California’s state appellate courts have also upheld the VL statute. In Caron v. Cal. State
23 Board of Pharm., 2022 WL 16943036, *11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022), the Fourth District Court of
24 Appeal “reach[ed] the same conclusion numerous courts before us have reached: the vexatious
25 litigant statutes are constitutional.” (Internal quotation and citations omitted). The Caron court
26 rejected an argument that the VL statute was an unconstitutional burden on access rights for the
27 indigent, stating “there is no merit to Caron’s contention that the vexatious litigation statues
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1 impermissibly burden indigent litigants’ access to the court system or their right to petition the
2 government for redress.” Id. at *10; see also In re Marriage of Richards, 2023 WL 3243530, *9
3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023) (“State and federal courts have repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges
4 to vexatious litigant statutes.”) (discussing four such cases). The California VL statute also
5 provides a procedure for being removed from the VL list. See Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 391.8(a)
6 (“A vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order under Section 391.7 may file an application to
7 vacate the prefiling order and remove his name from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious
8 litigants subject to prefiling orders. The application shall be filed in the court that entered the
9 prefiling order . . . The application shall be made before the justice or judge who entered the
10 order[.]”).
11 Defendant CCSC is entitled to immunity, and the FAC fails to state a claim. The Court
12 finds that leave to amend would be futile.
13 III. Conclusion
14 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
15 1. This action be dismissed because Defendant Contra Costa County Superior Court is
16 entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
17 2. Plaintiff’s motions for removal from the vexatious litigant list (ECF Nos. 11, 20, &
18 22) be denied as moot because the action is being dismissed and the Court lacks
19 jurisdiction to entertain the motions.
20 3. The Clerk be directed to enter judgment against Plaintiff and close this case.
21 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
23 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
24 objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's
25 Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
26 ////
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] specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the district court’s order.
2 || Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
3 | SOORDERED.
4 | DATED: June 22, 2026

6 SEAN C. RIORDAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11388596. Public record. Not legal advice.