# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · June 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11388103

## Case

- **Full name:** Longhui Li v. Warden, California City Correctional Center
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 LONGHUI LI (A 095-785-349) No. 1:26-cv-03405-DAD-CKD
12 Petitioner,
13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
14 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY
CORRECTIONAL CENTER
15
Respondents.
16
17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant
18 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
20 I. Factual and Procedural History
21 Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States on August 1, 2023 with
22 a visitor visa. ECF No. 7-1 at 1. On July 31, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
23 (“ICE”) officers apprehended Petitioner and discovered that he had overstayed the visa and has
24 pending charges for a May 30, 2024 arrest for possession of marijuana for sale. Id. at 2. ICE
25 detained Petitioner and initiated removal proceedings against him. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner requested
26 a bond redetermination hearing from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) but later withdrew his request.
27 ECF No. 7-2.
28 On May 4, 2026 Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for
1 temporary restraining order. ECF No. 1, 2. He seeks immediate release or a bond hearing in
2 which the government bears the burden of proof. ECF No.1 at 8. In the petition he alleges that
3 ICE is detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 but that the correct authority for his detention is §
4 1226. Id. at 7. Respondent opposed injunctive relief and moved to dismiss the petition. ECF No.
5 7. Respondent’s motion to dismiss states that Petitioner’s detention is “presumably” under §
6 1226(a) but that he “may also be” subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(A). ECF
7 No. 7 at 2. It also asserts that Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, as he
8 withdrew a bond request before the IJ. Id. at 4-5. See also ECF No. 7-2. The district court judge
9 assigned to this case, agreeing that Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies,
10 denied the motion for temporary restraining order and referred this matter to the undersigned.
11 ECF No. 8. Petitioner did not file a response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.
12 II. Legal Standards
13 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
14 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
15 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
16 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure
17 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas
18 corpus may be granted to a petitioner in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28
19 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
20 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
21 strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction
22 includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
23 In contrast to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires habeas corpus petitioners in state custody
24 to exhaust administrative remedies, § 2241 does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust
25 direct appeals. Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on
26 other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006)). The exhaustion
27 requirement under § 2241 is therefore prudential rather than jurisdictional. Id. Courts may require
28 exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
1 record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the
2 deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow
3 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. Puga v.
4 Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Where the Puga factors weigh in favor of requiring exhaustion, such requirement may be
6 waived. The Ninth Circuit has found it appropriate to waive exhaustion where administrative
7 remedies would be inadequate or pursuit of such would be futile, irreparable injury would result,
8 or the petition poses a substantial constitutional question or issue separate from the administrative
9 remedy itself. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004).
10 III. Analysis
11 This court has previously found that the Puga factors strongly weigh in favor of requiring
12 exhaustion when a petitioner requests review of an IJ’s bond determination. Fernandez Vasquez
13 v. Cruz, No. 1:26-CV-00476-DAD-EFB, 2026 WL 252055 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026),
14 citing Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-01538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27,
15 2025) (finding that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has the appropriate expertise to
16 provide a complete record, relaxation of the requirement to appeal would encourage the deliberate
17 bypass of the administrative scheme, and the BIA has the ability to correct any agency mistakes,
18 eliminating the need for judicial review). In the instant case, Petitioner has not yet requested a
19 bond determination before an IJ. In other words, Petitioner has done less to pursue administrative
20 remedies than those in cases where the court has found such actions to be required. It therefore
21 follows that the Puga factors weigh in favor of requiring Petitioner to first request a bond
22 determination before an IJ.
23 Additionally, this court has previously found that none of the Laing exceptions apply
24 when petitioners have requested review of an IJ’s bond determination. Fernandez, 2026 WL
25 252055, citing Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844. Petitioner’s statement that he is being detained
26 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and Respondent’s statement that Petitioner “may also be” subject to
27 mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(A), suggest that Petitioner believes his request for bond
28 determination would be futile. Respondent declined to confirm that Petitioner is being detained
1 |} under § 1226(a). See ECF No. 7 at 1 (“Since Petitioner entered the United States lawfully, his
2 | detention is presumably under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) (emphasis added). However, they did indicate
3 || that Petitioner “can renew his bond hearing request before an IJ and a bond hearing will be
4 | scheduled pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Id. at 4. Should Respondent assert their suggestion
5 || that Petitioner may be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) for there
6 || being a reason to believe that Petitioner could be inadmissible as a drug trafficker under 8 U.S.C.
7 || § 1182(a)(2)(C)Q), Petitioner may challenge such determination before an IJ. See Matter of
8 | Joseph, 22 I.&N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
9 As Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before an IJ, he has not exhausted his
10 | administrative remedies.
11 IV. Recommendation
12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
13 1. Respondent’s MOTION TO DISMISS be GRANTED.
14 2. Petitioner’s PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS be DENIED.
15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
16 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14)
17 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
18 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The parties are advised that failure to
19 || file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
20 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
21 | Dated: June 15, 2026 / □□ I / dle ae

23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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28 || 3Li3405.imm.far

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11388103. Public record. Not legal advice.