# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · June 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11387567

## Case

- **Full name:** Juan Daniel Santos Sagastizado v. Warden of the Golden State Annex, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 JUAN DANIEL SANTOS Case No. 1:26-cv-03798 (EJD)
SAGASTIZADO,
8 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
Petitioner, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
9
v.
10 Re: Dkt. No. 4
WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE
11 ANNEX, et al.,

Respondents.
12
13 On May 18, 2026, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
14 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by United States Immigration and Customs
15 Enforcement (“ICE”). Dkt. 1. That same day, Petitioner also filed a motion for temporary
16 restraining order requesting his immediate release. Dkt. 3. On May 19, 2026, the court set a
17 briefing schedule as to Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and ordered that
18 Petitioner be appointed counsel. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
19 through appointed counsel on May 29, 2026. For the reasons that follow, the Court converts the
20 motion for a temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction and GRANTS the motion.
21 I. BACKGROUND
22 Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States on March 14, 2019 as a
23 minor. Dkt. 15 ¶ 5. Upon entry, he was “encountered” by a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Agent “in
24 the El Paso, Texas Board Patrol Sector[]” and was “arrested and transported to the Clint, Texas Station
25 for further processing[.]” Dkt. 9-2 at 2. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then elected
26 to release Petitioner, purportedly on his own recognizance. See Dkt. 15 ¶ 20; Dkt. 9-1 at 2. Since his
27 release over seven years ago, Petitioner has received work authorization from USCIS, obtained a
1 social security number and a valid drivers license, and started a family. See Dkt. 15 ¶¶ 21–22.
2 Petitioner was re-detained by Immigrations and Customers Enforcement (“ICE”) on March
3 27, 2026 while he was driving to work. Id. ¶ 23. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner requested and was
4 granted a custody redetermination hearing pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. Dkt. 9-4. On May 6, 2026,
5 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied any form of release or bond, finding that it had no jurisdiction
6 to grant such a request. Petitioner has been detained for approximately two months at the Golden
7 State Annex in McFarland, California. See Dkt. 15 ¶ 1.
8 II. LEGAL STANDARD
9 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
10 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
11 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining
12 order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg
13 Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Respondents had
14 notice and opportunity to respond in opposition, see Dkt. 9, and neither party objected to
15 converting the motion to a motion for preliminary injunction or requested a hearing. Petitioner’s
16 motion is therefore converted to a motion for preliminary injunction.
17 To obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of
18 success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of
19 preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an
20 injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
21 III. DISCUSSION
22 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
23 Respondents make two arguments with respect to the first Winter factor. First,
24 Respondents argue that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (Dkt. 9 at 3–4), and
25 second that the petition should be dismissed as a successive petition (id. at 2). Respondents’ first
26 argument has been rejected by this Court, and many others throughout the United States. See
27 Zheng v. Warden, No. 1:26-CV-03533 (EJD), 2026 WL 1354477, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2026);
1 Perez Blas, v. California City, No. 1:26-CV-03523, at *2 (EJD), 2026 WL 1407951 (E.D. Cal.
2 May 19, 2026); Velasquez-Quevedo v. H.G., No. 1:26-CV-03751-EJD, 2026 WL 1541795, at *2
3 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2026). The Court adopts its prior reasoning in rejecting this argument again
4 here.
5 Respondents also noted that Petitioner has previously filed a petition in the Middle District
6 of Florida which was denied. Dkt. 9 at 2. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s prior petition renders
7 the instant Petition successive and request that it be denied on that basis. Id. Respondents have
8 attached to their opposition the order entered in the Middle District of Florida denying the
9 prior habeas petition. Dkt. 9-1. In that order, the court held that Petitioner was properly subject
10 to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as an “applicant for admission” despite his prior release by DHS into the
11 United States. Id. at 3–6. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s instant petition is thus barred by the
12 abuse of the writ doctrine. Dkt. 9 at 2.
13 “The statutory bar against successive habeas petitions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) applies
14 only to habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and not habeas petitions filed pursuant
15 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Rodriguez Mendoza, v. Warden, No. 1:26-CV-03785-DAD-CSK (HC),
16 2026 WL 1481759, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2026) (citing Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1111
17 (9th Cir. 2000)). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the common law doctrine of the
18 abuse of the writ doctrine may apply to successive habeas petitions challenging immigration
19 detention filed pursuant to § 2241. Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2011).
20 “Under the abuse of the writ doctrine, a successive petition that raises identical grounds for relief
21 as a prior petition must be dismissed unless the petitioner can show (1) cause for bringing
22 a successive petition and that prejudice would result or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of
23 justice would result from failure to entertain that claim.” Id.
24 Here, the Middle District of Florida found that since Petitioner was “apprehended at the
25 border” in 2019 and not formally “admitted” to the United States at that time, he was properly
26 treated as subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Shortly after this order
27 was entered, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Hernandez Alvarez v.
1 Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1266 (11th Cir. 2026) (rejecting the government’s
2 position that all persons who entered the United States unlawfully and are present are “applicants
3 for admission” who are “seeking admission” as being contrary to the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and
4 the structure of the INA). This intervening controlling authority within the Eleventh Circuit
5 renders reconsideration of the order from the Middle District of Florida appropriate as a
6 fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failing to entertain Petitioner’s claims. The
7 Petition is therefore not barred as successive.
8 Considering the merits of the Petition, Respondents fail to identify any other statutory
9 framework which would justify the continued detention of Petitioner, aside from § 1225(b)(2),
10 notably failing to argue that Petitioner may be lawfully detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
11 Accordingly, the Court finds there is a strong likelihood of success that Petitioner will prevail on
12 his claim that his continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Cardenas
13 v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:26-cv-02073-DAD-SCR (HC), 2026 WL 785871, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
14 20, 2026) (granting habeas petition and ordering release where Respondents failed to articulate
15 lawful basis for detention); J.P.C. v. Chestnut, et al., 1:26-cv-02108-DAD-JDP, 2026 WL 788129,
16 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026) (same).
17 There is also a strong likelihood that Petitioner will prevail on his due process claim. As
18 Petitioner was previously detained and released by ICE on his own recognizance in 2019, he
19 retains a strong liberty interest in his continued freedom. See, e.g., Oliveros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-
20 07117-BLF, 2026 WL 1162724, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2026); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp.
21 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a
22 liberty interest, so too does [the noncitizen] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on
23 bond.”); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F.Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[E]ven when ICE has the
24 initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that
25 individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of
26 custody.”); He v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-10639-JSC, 2026 WL 280074, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026)
27 (“Courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have concluded individuals released from immigration
1 custody on bond have a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”). As
2 courts throughout this district have found on similar facts, where an individual is previously
3 released by the government, due process requires that the government show changed
4 circumstances at a pre-deprivation hearing prior to re-detention. See Zepeda Perez v. Santacruz,
5 No. 2:26-CV-01749-DMG-AYP, 2026 WL 980492, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2026) (“in the context
6 of immigration re-detention: once the government has made a prior release determination, it
7 cannot later re-detain the individual without evidence of materially changed circumstances and
8 without providing prompt, adequate process before depriving the person of liberty.”). Respondents
9 failure to provide such a hearing here likely violated Petitioner’s due process rights.
10 B. Irreparable Harm
11 “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably
12 constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
13 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994–95 (9th
14 Cir. 2017) (recognizing the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration
15 detention” and holding that plaintiffs had “established a likelihood of irreparable harm by virtue of
16 the fact that they are likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time”).
17 Where the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further
18 showing of irreparable injury is necessary. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02
19 (9th Cir. 2005). Given that Petitioner has been detained for over two months without a lawful
20 basis for his continued detention or the opportunity to challenge it, the court finds that he would be
21 irreparably harmed by the continued deprivation of his liberty in violation of his due process
22 rights.
23 C. Balance of the Equities
24 As for the balance of equities and the public interest factors of the inquiry, these factors
25 merge when the government is the opposing party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This
26 inquiry favors Petitioner. Although the Government has a strong interest in enforcing the
27 immigration laws, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without appropriate statutory
] authority and in violation of his due process rights is low. In immigration court, custody hearings
2 || are routine and impose a “minimal” cost. Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal.
3 2025). As such, the equities lean towards Petitioner.
4 || Iv. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
5 1. Petitioner’s Motion for a temporary restraining order is converted to a motion for a
6 || preliminary injunction and is GRANTED.
7 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner from custody.
8 3. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on Petitioner, unless they
9 || are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation and/or custody hearing.
10 4. If the Government seeks to re-detain Petitioner, it must provide no less than seven
11 (7) days’ notice to Petitioner and must hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter

12 || pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, at which Petitioner’s eligibility for
E 13 || bond must be considered. This Order does not address the circumstances in which Respondents
14 || may detain Petitioner in the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of
3 15 || removal.
16 5. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not enter
5 17 || final judgment on the merits of Petitioner’s Amended Habeas Petition. Respondents shall file
a 18 || responsive papers by June 29, 2026. Petitioner may file a reply by July 6, 2026. The matter is not
19 || set for a hearing, though the Court may set one should it later be determined that a hearing is
20 || necessary.
21 6. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts
22 || regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.
23 |} 2011).
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 Dated: June 8, 2026
26 ae
EDWARD J. DAVILA
27 United States District Judge
Case No.: 1:26-cv-03798-EJD

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11387567. Public record. Not legal advice.