# Jaime

> District Court, S.D. New York · March 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11387228

## Case

- **Full name:** Luis Jaime v. New York State Department of Corrections Community Supervision, Sullivan Correctional Facility, Doctor Guzman, Nurse Konkol, N.P. Ms. Armbruster
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LUIS JAIME,

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 24-CV-3763 (KMK)
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS COMMUNITY
OPINION & ORDER
SUPERVISION, SULLIVAN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DOCTOR
GUZMAN, NURSE KONKOL, N.P. MS.
ARMBRUSTER,

Defendants.

Appearances:

Luis Jaime
Stormville, NY
Pro se Plaintiff

Christopher J. Byrne, Esq.
New York State Office of the Attorney General
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Luis Jaime (“Plaintiff”), who is currently incarcerated at Green Haven
Correctional Facility, brings this Action pro se, alleging violations of his constitutional rights,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), as well as claims under state law, against: (1) the
New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”); (2)
Sullivan Correctional Facility (“Sullivan”); (3) Sullivan physician, Doctor Guzman; (4) Sullivan
Nurse Konkol; and (5) Sullivan Nurse Practitioner Armbruster (collectively the “Individual
Defendants”), seeking damages as well as injunctive relief. (See Compl. 5 (Dkt. No. 1).) Before
the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the individual capacity claims against the Individual
Defendants (the “Motion”), (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 1 (Dkt. No. 30)), as the Court previously
dismissed all other claims in this Action. (See Order (“Order”) 2 (Dkt. No. 7).)
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
I. Background

A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint and are taken as true for the
purpose of resolving the instant Motion.1
Plaintiff is an individual who, at all times relevant to this Action, was incarcerated at
Sullivan Correctional Facility (“Sullivan”) in Fallsburg, New York. (Compl. 2.)2 He claims he
was admitted to Sullivan’s infirmary on March 21, 2024, after “informing Nurse Konkol and a
doctor that he had sustained multiple injuries.” (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff’s injuries included
“multiple lacerations to [his] upper body and leg, bruising, swelling, and an inability to feel [his]
right leg.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants, who staffed the infirmary,

failed to document his injuries. (See id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff suggests the Individual Defendants
sought to “cover up” an incident with a corrections officer that was not reported. (See id. at 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges the Individual Defendants did not treat his lacerations while he was in the
infirmary. (See id.) After a ten-day stint in the infirmary, Plaintiff says that he was discharged
from the infirmary on March 31, 2024. (See id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff claims that the Individual
Defendants discontinued treatment for both his numb right leg and the sore, swollen, painful

1 For the sake of clarity, when quoting Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court will address
typographical and grammatical issues without the use of brackets.
2 When citing to court documents, the Court refers to the ECF-generated page numbers in
the upper right-hand corner of the page.
right ankle “that [he] [has] been complaining about since January of 2024” upon discharge. (See
id. at 5.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 10, 2024. (See Compl. 1.) By order dated June 11,
2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without

prepayment of fees. (Order Granting IFP Application (Dkt. No. 6).)3
By order dated June 17, 2024, the Court dismissed several of Plaintiff’s claims; namely,
the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1983 against Sullivan; Section 1983 and state
law claims against DOCCS; and claims for prospective injunctive relief brought on his own
behalf and on behalf of other individuals incarcerated at Sullivan pursuant to Section 1983. (See
Order 2.) The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims brought against the Individual Defendants
in their official capacities but allowed his claims for damages under Section 1983 brought
against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities to proceed. (See id.)
By order dated June 30, 2025, the Court granted the Defendants leave to file a motion to

dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 and adopted a briefing
schedule. (Mot. Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 27).) On July 31, 2025, Defendants moved to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that:
“(1) Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory statements devoid of factual support; (2) Plaintiff did
not plead an Eighth Amendment claim; and (3) his monetary damage claims are barred by the
doctrine of qualified immunity; and (4) any damages claims brought against Defendants in their
official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss

3 Incarcerated individuals are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they
have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(“Defs.’ Mem.”) 2 (Dkt. No. 31).)4 As Plaintiff failed to oppose the Motion, the matter was
deemed fully briefed by order dated September 16, 2025. (Memo Endorsement dated Sept. 16,
2025 (Dkt. No. 33).)5
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that while a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

4 Having previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants in
their official capacities, (see Order 2), the Court does not reach Defendants’ Eleventh
Amendment argument. See Redmon v. Zavaras, No. 09-CV-2133, 2011 WL 2728466, at *3 (D.
Colo. June 16, 2011) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 164 (1985)) (“The Eleventh
Amendment does not bar actions for damages against state officials in their individual
capacities.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2729196 (D. Colo. July 13, 2011);
Tacuban v. Hawaii, No. 06-CV-267, 2007 WL 842049, at *1 n. 2 (D. Haw. Mar. 19, 2007) (“The
court does not reach [Eleventh Amendment arguments] as . . . the federal claims are only brought
against [the defendant] in his individual capacity, and the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to
him in that capacity.”) (citations omitted); see also Matailo-Morocho v. Garland, No. 19-CV-
1877, 2022 WL 1022036, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2022) (summary order) (declining to reach non-
dispositive issues).
5 After the Court deemed briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss fully submitted,
Plaintiff sent a letter to the Clerk of Court that was received on October 15, 2025. (See Letter
from Luis Jaime to Court dated Oct. 6, 2025 (Dkt. No. 34).) This letter, bearing the docket
numbers of several cases, stated that Plaintiff was being prevented from accessing the law library
at Green Haven Correctional Facility despite “hav[ing] a deadline with the Court of Claims.”
(Id. at 1.) He therefore requested an “extension,” apparently as to the Court of Claims case,
before obliquely stating, “I was told today my special access form was denied for no legit reason.
Also all my federal claims.” (Id.) These statements appear wholly unrelated to this Action and
the Motion pending before the Court. Moreover, Plaintiff did not clearly request an extension in
this Action, and, despite approximately four months elapsing from the receipt of that letter, the
Court has received no further correspondence from Plaintiff. (See generally Dkt.) Accordingly,
this letter does not alter the Court’s previous determination to deem the Motion to Dismiss fully
briefed.
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, a complaint’s “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege
“only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570. However, if
a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ]
complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-

pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at
678–79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.”).
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam), and “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Daniel v. T&M Prot.
Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC,
699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a
district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in
documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to
matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d

99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang v.
Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). But when a plaintiff proceeds pro
se, the Court may consider “materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent
with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL
3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
including “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v. Rhea, No.
09-CV-4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) (italics omitted).
Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must “construe[ ] [his]
[complaint] liberally and interpret[ ] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].”

Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Notwithstanding a standard of review comparatively more lenient and favorable to pro
se litigants, such treatment “does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d
601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding
procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics omitted) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
B. Analysis
1. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim
The Court and Defendants construe Plaintiff’s Complaint to raise a claim under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 Defendants assert that the Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, on the basis that Plaintiff has alleged neither a

sufficiently serious injury nor the requisite mental state to support an Eighth Amendment claim.
(Defs.’ Mem. 2.) The Court agrees.
Plaintiff appears to assert a single claim arising from the events described above. (See
Compl. 3–5.) Construing Plaintiff’s allegations charitably, he seeks to assert an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim. In his Complaint, Plaintiff explains that he is
challenging “cruel and unusual punishment, medical negligence, and cruel and deliberate
indifference” in the form of an asserted failure to meet his medical needs. (Id. at 3.) As
explained above, to survive a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain enough
factual detail, taken as true, to allow the Court to infer a defendant is liable for the alleged

misconduct. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court asks whether Plaintiff has
alleged facts sufficient to support each element of that claim.
The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. It is axiomatic that this protection includes a prohibition on “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners . . . .” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr.
Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). A claim of deliberate indifference to an incarcerated

6 As Plaintiff meets the definition of a “prisoner” as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the
Court construes his complaint as arising under the Eighth Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 5.)
person’s medical needs by those overseeing his care is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment
because it is an allegation that the “conditions of confinement [are] a form of punishment” and
thus constitute a “violation of [the] Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishments.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017). To state a claim of deliberate
indifference, Plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) “that he suffered a sufficiently serious

constitutional deprivation,” and (2) that Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference.”
Feliciano v. Anderson, No. 15-CV-4106, 2017 WL 1189747, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017).
“The first requirement is objective: the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must
be sufficiently serious.” Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In other words, “the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in
combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Walker v. Schult, 717
F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Analyzing this
objective requirement involves two inquiries: “whether the prisoner was actually deprived of
adequate medical care,” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006), overruled in

part on other grounds by Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023), and “whether the
inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious,” which in turn “requires the [C]ourt to
examine how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has
caused or will likely cause the prisoner,” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (citation omitted). “There
is no settled, precise metric to guide a court in its estimation of the seriousness of a prisoner’s
medical condition.” Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Mallet v. New
York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 126 F.4th 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2025) (noting “there
is no single metric” to determine the severity of a prisoner’s medical condition); Rodriguez v.
Manenti, 606 F. App’x 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) (“[T]here is no settled, precise metric to guide a court in its estimation of the
seriousness of a prisoner's medical condition[.]”). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has
suggested the following non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when evaluating an inmate's
medical condition: “(1) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the medical need
in question as important and worthy of comment or treatment, (2) whether the medical condition

significantly affects daily activities, and (3) the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id.
(quoting Brock, 315 F.3d at 162).
“The second requirement is subjective: the charged officials must be subjectively reckless
in their denial of medical care.” Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138. This means that defendants must
“appreciate the risk to which a prisoner was subjected,” and have a “subjective awareness of the
harmfulness associated with those conditions.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35; see also Nielsen v.
Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted )
(“Deliberate indifference is a mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness,” and it “requires
that the charged official act or fail to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that serious

inmate harm will result.” (footnote and quotation marks omitted)). A defendant’s awareness of
the risk of serious harm can be established through “inference from circumstantial evidence,”
including “from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842
(1994); see also Labossiere v. Baxter, No. 21-CV-10538, 2025 WL 887623, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 2025) (same); Upson v. Wilson, No. 22-2698, 2025 WL 547455, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 19,
2025) (summary order) (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial
risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence, and . . . the very fact that the risk was obvious.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); J.V. v. Lake, No. 23-CV-3419, 2024 WL 3236823, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 28, 2024) (“A defendant’s knowledge can be established through inference from
circumstantial evidence, including from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). However, “mere negligence” is insufficient to state a claim
for deliberate indifference. Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (quotation marks omitted).
Taken as true, liberally construed, and interpreted to raise the strongest possible

argument, the Complaint fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff alleges,
in part, that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the Individual Defendants’ failure to
document his injuries. (See Compl. 3.) Plaintiff implies he was injured during an unreported
incident with a corrections officer and alleges the failure to document was an attempted cover-
up. (See id. at 5.) A failure to document alone is not a constitutional violation. See Walton v.
Lee, No. 15-CV-3080, 2019 WL 1437912, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (dismissing the
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against prison officials premised upon their alleged failure
to “properly document his injuries”); see also Perez v. Does, 209 F. Supp. 3d 594, 599
(W.D.N.Y. 2016) (“A [prison official]’s failure to document an inmate’s injuries is not a

constitutional deprivation”); Evans v. Murphy, No. 12-CV-365, 2013 WL 2250709, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. May 22, 2013) (holding the plaintiff’s allegation that a defendant failed to document
his injuries as part of an effort to cover-up an alleged assault did not state a cognizable
constitutional claim).
Plaintiff further alleges the Individual Defendants failed to treat his lacerations during his
10 days in the infirmary. (See Compl. 5.) When a plaintiff alleges prison officials failed to
provide any treatment for their medical condition, the Court must examine the seriousness of the
plaintiff’s medical condition. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (citation omitted). Plaintiff provides
no details regarding the size of his lacerations, their impact on his daily life, or the pain they
cause. (See Compl. 3–5.) This information is highly relevant, as courts in the Second Circuit
routinely hold lacerations alone do not satisfy the deliberate indifference analysis’s objective
prong. See, e.g., Morris v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-9314, 2021 WL 4461994, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2021) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff suffered
lacerations to his face and scalp); Brown v. Annucci, No. 19-CV-9048, 2021 WL 860189, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (“District courts in the Second Circuit have consistently held that
bruises, lacerations, cuts, black eyes, and other superficial injuries are not sufficiently serious to
support a deliberate indifference claim.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Goodwin v.
Kennedy, No. 13-CV-1774, 2015 WL 1040663, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2015) (determining
that several lacerations to arms and legs, even alongside other injuries, did not constitute a
serious medical condition). Without any allegations about the indica of severity of the
lacerations, the failure to treat alleged them does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
See Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because the Eighth Amendment is
not a vehicle for bringing medical malpractice claims, nor a substitute for state tort law, not

every lapse in prison medical care will rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); see also
Daniels v. Mandalaywala, No. 23-CV-1001, 2026 WL 575511, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2026)
(“[N]ot every injury a prisoner suffers translates into constitutional liability for prison officials.”
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279 (“Not every lapse in
medical care is a constitutional wrong.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[A]
complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does
not state a valid . . . Eighth Amendment [claim].”).
Plaintiff further alleges the Individual Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by discontinuing treatment of his right leg and his right ankle upon discharge from the infirmary.
(See Compl. 5.) When a plaintiff alleges only inadequate medical treatment, the Court’s analysis
shifts towards examining “the particular risk of harm the plaintiff faced as a result of the
deprivation, rather than the severity of the plaintiff’s underlying medical condition.” See Daniels
v. Mueller, No. 23-CV-5654, 2025 WL 949842, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025) (quoting Smith,
316 F.3d at 186) (quotation marks omitted, alterations adopted). “[I]n most cases, the actual

medical consequences that flow from the alleged denial of care will be highly relevant to
whether the denial of treatment subjected the prisoner to a significant risk of serious harm.”
Byng v. Wright, No. 09-CV-9924, 2012 WL 967430, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2012) (quoting
Smith, 316 F.3d at 187) (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). So long as “the treatment
provided is responsive to the prisoner’s condition, the fact that a prisoner might prefer different
treatment does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Gibson v. Mount Vernon Montefiore
Hosp. Exec. Dir., No. 22-CV-4213, 2024 WL 1217528, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2024)
(citation and quotation marks omitted, alterations adopted). Plaintiff pleads no specific facts
describing the treatment he originally received nor the downstream consequences arising from its

discontinuation. (See generally Compl.) Accordingly, as plead, the Complaint alleges no facts
that suggest the treatment Plaintiff received was so inadequate as to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Romano v. Laskowski, No. 18-CV-0479, 2018 WL 10579846, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. June 1, 2018) (dismissing claim where the plaintiff failed to allege “a substantial
deprivation of treatments withheld and particular risks attributed to the missed treatments”); cf.
Jahad v. Holder, No. 19-CV-4066, 2021 WL 3855445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2021) (holding
the defendant’s premature cessation of treatment for the plaintiff’s painful and swollen knee
despite him to continuing to “struggle[] to walk, stand, and sleep” was “sufficiently serious”);
Walker v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 15-CV-4794, 2016 WL 11481725, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,
2016), (holding the defendant’s failure to provide continuing treatment leading to “constant[]
swelling, burning, tingling, [and] aching” in the plaintiff’s leg that “prevent[ed] him from being
able to walk, sit, or lie down without excruciating pain” satisfied the deliberate indifference
analysis’s objective prong), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5338546 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2016); Poole v. Armor Corr. Health Servs., No. 15-CV-2927, 2016 WL 1089350, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2016) (“Taken as true, plaintiff’s knee pain, which he alleges was so severe
that he could barely walk[,] and subsequently, could not walk at all[,] provides a plausible claim
that is sufficiently serious to meet the objective requirement of a deliberate indifference claim”).
Furthermore, as plead, the Complaint alleges no facts satisfying the deliberate
indifference analysis’s subjective prong. The subjective test requires “something more than
mere negligence; but proof of intent is not required[.]” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106–
07 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard can be met with a showing
of criminal recklessness, where the prison “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Lara-Grimaldi v. Cnty. of Putnam, 132 F.4th 614, 631
(2d Cir. 2025) (“For a prisoner to establish an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs he would have to make a showing that the official was
subjectively aware of the risk.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The standard is also met where the official’s actions involve “the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, Plaintiff has pled no facts that plausibly
establish the Individual Defendants acted with a culpable mental state. (See Compl. 3–5.)
Instead, Plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations that Defendants failed to treat his injuries and
were deliberately indifferent. (See id. at 4–5 (asserting that neither “Doctor Guzman nor Nurse
Konkol . . . cared or showed any sense of medical care” even though Plaintiff “told both . . .
multiple times about injuries [he] sustained”).) The facts alleged do not plausibly establish that

the Individual Defendants “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health or
safety” by discontinuing treatment, nor suggest doing so involved the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. Cf. Mallet, 126 F.4th at 137 (reversing the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against his primary care provider supported by allegations
said provider encouraged medical staff to provide the plaintiff with “the minimum treatment the
[s]tate will allow” and his Eighth Amendment claim against a specialist who forewent further
testing after a diagnostic procedure revealed the plaintiff may have [had] prostate cancer);
Ceparano v. Suffolk Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 485 F. App’x 505, 508 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary
order) (holding allegations that the defendant refused to prescribe pain medication, pursue a

required surgery, or abandon a conservative treatment plan despite the plaintiff’s repeated visits
and continued reports his condition was worsening were sufficient to survive motion to dismiss).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support either prong of a
deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment.7

7 As none of Plaintiff’s allegations states a plausible Eighth Amendment claim, the Court
does not reach the Qualified Immunity argument raised in Defendants’ Memorandum, (Defs.’
Mem. 2.) See Ransom v. Banks, No. 20-CV-10232, 2022 WL 769344, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14,
2022) (“Since the [c]ourt dismisses [the p]laintiff’s Section 1983 claims for failure to state a
claim, the [c]ourt does not reach the question of qualified immunity.”); Rodriguez v. Cnty. of
Westchester, No. 15-CV-9626, 2017 WL 118027, at *11 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017) (“Because
the [c]ourt grants [the defendant]’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim
Il. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Individual Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
However, because this is the first adjudication of Plaintiffs claims against the Individual
Defendants on the merits, the dismissal is without prejudice. Should Plaintiff choose to file an
amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified above, he must do so within 30 days of
the date of this Opinion & Order. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the
complaint currently before the Court. It therefore must contain a// of the claims and factual
allegations Plaintiff wishes the Court to consider. The Court will not consider factual allegations
raised in supplemental declarations, affidavits, or letters. If Plaintiff fails to abide by the 30-day
deadline, the claims could be dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motion at Dkt.
No. 30, and to mail a copy of this Opinion to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026 sgh
White Plains, New York {
-KENNETHM.KARAS
United States District Judge

against him for failure to state a claim, the [c]ourt does not reach [the defendant]’s argument that
he is protected by qualified immunity.”).
15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11387228. Public record. Not legal advice.