# DAJUAN BERNOUDY v. ALAFA, et al.

> District Court, E.D. California · June 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11387160

## Case

- **Full name:** DAJUAN BERNOUDY v. ALAFA, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DAJUAN BERNOUDY, No. 1:26-cv-01946-SAB (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT
TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT
13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION
14 ALAFA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
15 AND DEFENDANT
Defendants.
16 (ECF No. 32)
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18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42
19 U.S.C. § 1983.
20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed May 27, 2026
21 I.
22 SCREENING ORDER
23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
25 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
26 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that
27 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
28 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
1 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
2 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
3 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate
6 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v.
7 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings
9 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d
10 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be
11 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer
12 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss
13 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant
14 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
15 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d
16 at 969.
17 II.
18 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
19 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of
20 the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
21 On September 24, 2025, Plaintiff was the victim of excessive force when Captain Alafa
22 and Lieutenant Hadda approached Plaintiff’s cell and attacked him after they told him he would
23 have to go to Salinas Valley State Prison. Captain Alafa put his hands on Plaintiff and beat him
24 up. All of the other officers jumped in and joined Alafa “beat” him up. Plaintiff has evidence on
25 the crime demonstrating that he was a victim.
26 Defendants did not follow proper protocol. Defendant punched and sprayed him with
27 pepper spray. All of the officers falsified documents and lied in reports to make it seem like
28 Plaintiff assaulted the officers.
1 III.
2 DISCUSSION
3 A. Excessive Force
4 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and
5 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
6 2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual
7 Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)
8 (citations omitted). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must
9 provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.
10 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994) (quotations omitted).
11 “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation
12 of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is...whether force was applied in a good-
13 faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
14 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. Relevant factors for this consideration include “the extent of injury... [,]
15 the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used,
16 the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the
17 severity of a forceful response.’ ” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 1078, 1085 (1986)).
18 Finally, because the use of force relates to the prison's legitimate penological interest in
19 maintaining security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials.
20 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321–22. Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
21 federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. De minimis uses of physical force do not violate the
22 constitution provided that the use of force is not of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of
23 mankind.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
24 106 (1976).
25 Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim for
26 excessive force against Defendants Haddad, Alafa, Chavez, Figueroa, Gonzalez, Flores,
27 Castellon, Rosales, and Escobedo.
28 ///
1 B. Supervisory Liability
2 Plaintiff names Warden Horn as a Defendant. Supervisory personnel are not liable under
3 section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and,
4 therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and
5 the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Fayle
6 v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
7 1978). To state a claim for relief under § 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff
8 must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either:
9 personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations
10 and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the
11 policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional
12 violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation
13 marks omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
14 Under these legal standards, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for supervisory liability against
15 Warden Horn. Plaintiff makes no allegation that the Warden was personally involved in the
16 assault. Plaintiff simply alleges that his “name was on some falsified documents.” However, as
17 stated below, the mere falsification of documents does not give rise to a constitutional claim for
18 relief. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Warden Horn instituted a policy that caused the use of force,
19 that he knew of the alleged violation but failed to prevent it, or that he failed to train or supervise
20 subordinates in a way that led to the alleged violation.
21 C. False Documents
22 To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants falsified and lied in documents to make it look
23 like he was the aggressor, prisoners do not have a right to be free from false accusations of
24 misconduct, so the mere falsification of a report does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.
25 Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Sprouse’s claims based on the falsity of
26 the charges and the impropriety of Babcock's involvement in the grievance procedure, standing
27 alone, do not state constitutional claims.”); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir.
28 1986) (“The prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or
1 wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”);
2 Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[A]n allegation that a prison guard
3 planted false evidence which implicates an inmate in a disciplinary infraction fails to state a claim
4 for which relief can be granted where the procedural due process protections ... are provided.”).
5 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim and such claim should be
6 dismissed.
7 D. California Department of Corrections (CDCR) as Defendant
8 Plaintiff names CDCR as a Defendant. Under the Eleventh Amendment, CDCR is
9 immune from federal claims under section 1983. See Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of
10 Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars
11 suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief.”); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d
12 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1999) (the State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
13 immunity for federal claims under section 1983); Brown v. California Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d
14 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (a suit against CDCR is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.); Alabama
15 v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (a state’s agency responsible for incarceration and
16 correction of prisoners is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.). Additionally,
17 only “person[s]” may be sued for depriving civil rights under § 1983, and states are not
18 “person[s]” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65
19 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against CDCR.
20 E. Violation of Prison Policy
21 To the extent plaintiff attempts to state a claim against Defendants for violating prison
22 policy, he fails to state a claim. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff must allege that
23 defendants violated his federal rights, not state regulations such as prison policies. The violation
24 of prison policies or state regulations does not necessarily violate the federal constitution.
25 F. Further Leave to Amend
26 Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint
27 could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th
28 Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, a district court may deny leave to amend for “repeated failure to
1 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed[.]” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub.,
2 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008); see also In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1097–
3 98 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad
4 where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”) (internal quotations and citation
5 omitted).
6 Because Plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and his second amended
7 complaint states only a cognizable excessive force claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot cure
8 his pleadings and, thus, that further leave to amend would be futile. See Hartman v. CDCR, 707
9 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of first amended complaint and finding
10 leave to amend futile where complaint’s allegations belied plaintiff’s entitlement to relief).
11 IV.
12 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS
13 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly
14 assign a District Judge to this action.
15 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
16 1. This action proceed only on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against
17 Defendants Haddad, Alafa, Chavez, Figueroa, Gonzalez, Flores, Castellon, Rosales, and
18 Escobedo; and
19 2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed from the action.
20 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
21 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
22 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written
23 objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should
24 be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is
25 advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights
26 ///
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1 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v.
2 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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4 IT IS SO ORDERED. tf (Sc
5 | Dated: _ June 2, 2026 OF
STANLEY A. BOONE
6 United States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11387160. Public record. Not legal advice.