# Alston

> District Court, S.D. New York · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11386657

## Case

- **Full name:** Jesse Alston v. New York City Department of Correction, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, American Airlines Group Inc., American Eagle Airlines, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Jane Doe #1 in her official capacity, Jane Doe #1 in her individual capacity, John Doe #1 in his official capacity, John Doe #1 in his official capacity, and John Does #2-5
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------X

JESSE ALSTON,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

- against – 24 Civ. 6444 (NRB)

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, AMERICAN
AIRLINES GROUP INC., AMERICAN
EAGLE AIRLINES, NEW YORK CITY
HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
CORPORATION, JANE DOE #1 in her
official capacity, JANE DOE #1
in her individual capacity,
JOHN DOE #1 in his official
capacity, JOHN DOE #1 in his
official capacity, and JOHN
DOES #2-5,

Defendants.

------------------------------X

NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Jesse Alston (“plaintiff”) brings this action
against defendants New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”),
New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
(“DOCCS”), New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”),
Jane Doe #1 in her official and individual capacities, John Doe #1
in his official and individual capacities, John Does #2-5, American
Airlines Group Inc., and American Eagle Airlines,1 seeking monetary
damages and alleging that, while being transported to and
subsequently held in custody at Rikers Island, he was deprived of
medical treatment and accommodations in violation of federal and
state law.
Presently before the Court is DOCCS’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 DOCCS contends,
inter alia, that: (i) plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and New York
common law are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity;
and (ii) even absent sovereign immunity, plaintiff’s claims under
Section 1983 fail because DOCCS is not a “person” within the

1 During an initial teleconference with the parties, the Court sought an
explanation as to why American Airlines Group Inc. and American Eagle Airlines
had not appeared in this action. At the Court’s request, plaintiff’s counsel
represented that he would follow up. The Court acknowledges that plaintiff’s
counsel filed an affidavit of service from a process server in September 2024
which neither contained the title of the individual served nor a description of
the individual’s job responsibilities. ECF No. 15. However, the absence of
any appearance by either American Airlines Group Inc. or American Eagle Airlines
raises questions as to whether the process server served an individual
authorized to accept service on behalf of those entities. In any event, there
is no indication that plaintiff’s counsel pursued his claims against those
defendants. For example, plaintiff never sought a default in the years
following the filing of this action in August 2024. Accordingly, American
Airlines Group Inc. and American Eagle Airlines are dismissed, as any further
attempt to serve them would be untimely given that more than three years have
passed since the events underlying this action occurred.
2 HHC and DOC each moved to dismiss plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. ECF
Nos. 42, 51. Separate opinions, also filed today by this Court, address the
individual motions filed by HHC and DOC.

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meaning of the statute. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
grants DOCCS’s motion to dismiss.
I. Factual Background3
a. Plaintiff’s Travel to Virginia
Plaintiff is formerly incarcerated individual who, after
being convicted of offenses including robbery, criminal possession
of a weapon, and grand larceny, was incarcerated in New York State
prisons for approximately 18 years beginning in 1998. AC ¶ 13.
On May 26, 2016, plaintiff was released from custody and placed on

parole by the New York State Division of Parole. Id. ¶ 14. While
walking on a Brooklyn sidewalk in December 2019, plaintiff, a
diabetic, stepped on a nail, resulting in a chronic infection that
eventually required the amputation of his right foot in March 2020.
Id. ¶ 15. The infection persisted despite the amputation, and in
July 2021, plaintiff traveled to Charlottesville, Virginia to
obtain medical treatment. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff was admitted
to the University Medical Center in Charlottesville on July 31,
2021, where he underwent a second amputation, resulting in the
removal of his right leg below the knee. Id. ¶ 18.

3 The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32
(“AC”), and are assumed true for purposes of resolving the instant motion.
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).

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Rather than returning to New York by the same means he had
used to travel to Virginia, plaintiff instead contacted DOCCS
“and/or a Magistrate Judge” in August 2021 to surrender in
connection with a parole violation arising from his failure to
notify his parole officer that he had left New York. Id. ¶ 19.
Plaintiff waived his right to contest extradition from Virginia to
New York. Id. ¶ 20. He was discharged from University Medical
Center on August 11, 2021, and detained in a Virginia jail until
August 24, 2021, when New York parole officers, defendants Jane

Doe #1 and John Doe #1, arrived to facilitate his return to New
York. Id. ¶ 21.
a. Plaintiff’s Transport to New York
Jane Doe #1 and John Doe #1 accompanied plaintiff to Richmond
International Airport, where he was to be transported to New York
on a flight operated by defendants American Airlines Group, Inc.
and American Eagle Airlines. Id. ¶ 22. Upon arrival, plaintiff
was provided with, and handcuffed to, a wheelchair. Id. ¶ 23.
Because he could not use a wheelchair inside the aircraft and was
not provided with crutches, plaintiff was required to hop down the
aisle to his seat in the last row. Id. ¶ 24. After landing at
LaGuardia Airport, plaintiff again traversed the aisle by hopping.

Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff lost his balance, fell, and landed on his

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recently amputated right leg. Id. He experienced sharp, internal
pain and heard a popping sound. Id. Plaintiff informed Jane Doe
#1 that he believed he was injured and requested medical
assistance. Id. ¶ 26. Jane Doe #1 stated that she did not see
any visible blood on his right leg. Id. Upon exiting the aircraft,
plaintiff was placed in a wheelchair and transported out of the
airport. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff, still in pain, was transferred to
a halfway house in Queens, New York for approximately four hours
before being transported to Rikers Island (“Rikers”). Id.

b. Plaintiff’s Detention at Rikers Island
Upon arrival at Rikers, plaintiff complained of severe pain
stemming from his fall. Id. ¶ 28. At some point over the next
four days, plaintiff’s recently amputated right leg became
increasingly red, swollen, and painful, and he requested to be
taken to the hospital. Id. ¶ 29. Defendants John Does #2-5, HHC
medical personnel serving inmates and pre-trial detainees at
Rikers Island, rewrapped his bandages and assured him that no
serious issue was present. Id. ¶¶ 11, 29. On August 28, 2021,
plaintiff was transferred to Bellevue Hospital, one of the
hospitals within HHC’s network. Id. ¶ 30. Three days later, on
August 31, 2021, he underwent a third amputation, this time of his

left leg, due to “extensive infection and gangrene.” Id. ¶¶ 30-

-5-
31. The surgeon, Dr. William Johnson, allegedly stated that
plaintiff’s condition worsened due to delayed medical
intervention. Id. ¶ 31.
Plaintiff remained hospitalized until September 10, 2021.
Id. ¶ 32. Diagnostic imaging revealed significant vascular issues,
including arterial occlusions that contributed to poor healing.
Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff was treated for several conditions, including
wound infections, anemia, and “complications from uncontrolled
diabetes.” Id. ¶ 32. Laboratory testing showed elevated white

blood cell counts and high C-reactive protein levels indicative of
infection and inflammation. Id. ¶ 34.
As alleged, the amputation of plaintiff’s left leg was
necessitated by advanced infection and the risk of systemic spread.
Id. ¶ 35. Upon discharge, plaintiff was prescribed medications
including gabapentin, morphine, oxycodone, and tetracycline. Id.
¶ 36. His discharge plan included follow-up care at a vascular
surgery clinic and physical therapy. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges
ongoing medical needs, as well as continuing pain, psychological
distress, and physical limitations arising from the loss of his
left leg. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff advances no allegations of any
mistreatment following the surgery at Bellevue.

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II. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on August 26, 2024.
ECF No. 1. HHC answered on September 24, 2024. ECF No. 20. That
same day, DOC requested an extension until November 7, 2024, to
answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s complaint, which the
Court granted. ECF Nos. 22, 25. On September 25, 2024, DOCCS
requested a pre-motion conference for a proposed motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint, and DOC made a similar request on November
7, 2024. ECF Nos. 24, 29. Plaintiff responded to the requests

from DOCCS and DOC on November 13, 2024. ECF No. 30. On December
17, 2024, HHC also requested a pre-motion conference for a proposed
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 31.
On January 9, 2025, the Court held a teleconference with the
parties, permitting DOCCS, DOC, and HHC to make their motions and
granting plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by February
6, 2025. The Court also directed the parties to propose a briefing
schedule in which no more than 60 days would elapse between motions
and replies.
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on February 5, 2025,
asserting the following causes of action: (i) violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (ii) deliberate

indifference to his medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth

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Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; (iii)
negligent hiring and retention; (iv) violations of his
constitutional rights as guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (v) failure to
intervene. ECF No. 32. After the parties failed to agree on a
briefing schedule, ECF Nos. 36, 37, the Court set one on February
24, 2025. ECF No. 39. In accordance with that schedule, HHC filed
its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 42, along with an accompanying
memorandum of law, ECF No. 47 (“HHC Mot.”), and declaration in

support thereof, ECF No. 43, on March 17, 2025. DOCCS filed its
motion to dismiss, ECF No. 48, and accompanying memorandum of law,
ECF No. 49 (“DOCCS Mot.”), on March 24, 2025. The next day, DOC
filed its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 51, and accompanying
memorandum of law, ECF No. 53 (“DOC Mot.”). Plaintiff opposed the
motions filed by DOCCS and DOC on May 6, 2025. ECF Nos. 56 (“Pl.
DOCCS Opp.”), 57 (“Pl. DOC Opp.”). DOCCS and DOC filed reply
memoranda in support of their respective motions on May 22, 2025.
ECF Nos. 58 (“DOCCS Reply”), 59 (“DOC Reply”).
On December 19, 2025, after realizing that plaintiff had never
filed an opposition to HHC’s motion, originally due in May 2025,
the Court directed plaintiff to do by January 6, 2026. ECF No.

62. Plaintiff complied with that direction. ECF No. 64 (“Pl. HHC

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Opp.”). HHC filed its reply on January 16, 2026. ECF No. 70 (“HHC
Reply”).
This opinion addresses only DOCCS’s motion.
III. Legal Standard
a. Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) must be granted
when a district court lacks the constitutional or statutory power
to adjudicate a claim. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547
F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). A plaintiff has the burden of

establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000). While the Court “must accept as true all material factual
allegations in the complaint,” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent.
Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004), “jurisdiction must be
shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from
the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it,”
Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.
1998).
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations “to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). While the Court accepts the truth of the pleaded
facts, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Brown v. Daikin Am., Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 225 (2d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
DOCCS moves to dismiss plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Before proceeding to the merits of that motion, the
Court makes two preliminary observations. First, the Amended
Complaint largely fails to plead claims on a defendant-specific
basis. In particular, the first, second, and fourth causes of
action – asserting violations of the ADA, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – are directed broadly at “Defendants” and do
not reference problematic conduct attributable to any particular

defendant. Second, DOCCS’s motion seeks only its own dismissal

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and does not specifically address claims as asserted against
unidentified defendants Jane Doe #1 and John Doe #1, alleged to be
state parole officers employed by DOCCS.
DOCCS argues that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars
each of the following categories of plaintiff’s claims against it:
(i) those arising under Section 1983; (ii) those arising under the
ADA; and (iii) those arising under New York common law.
Accordingly, the Court addresses each category of claim in turn.4
I. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff’s second and fourth causes of action assert claims
pursuant to Section 1983 and allege that defendants deprived
plaintiff of his federal constitutional rights by denying him
medical treatment and accommodations. AC ¶¶ 44-49, 54-55.
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action asserts a failure to intervene
claim against all defendants. Id. ¶¶ 56-57. DOCCS maintains that

4 Whether sovereign immunity arguments are properly brought under Rule
12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1) remains unsettled in this Circuit. See Ripa v. Stony Brook
Univ., 808 F. App’x 50, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Whether Eleventh Amendment
immunity constitutes a true issue of subject matter jurisdiction or is more
appropriately viewed as an affirmative defense has not been decided by the
Supreme Court or [the Second Circuit].”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). DOCCS invokes Rule 12(b)(1) as the sole ground for dismissal in its
notice of motion but also cites Rule 12(b)(6) in the accompanying memorandum.
DOCCS Mot. at 5. Practically, the distinction is without a difference: under
either subdivision, the Court considers “only the pleadings and the relevant
state and federal law and has drawn all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.”
Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 313 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).

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these claims are all barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. DOCCS
Mot. at 5-8.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by individuals against a
state or state agency in federal court without that state’s
consent. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,
267-68 (1997); Caruso v. Zugibe, 646 F. App’x 101, 104 (2d Cir.
2016). The Eleventh Amendment likewise bars suits for damages
against state officials acting in their official capacities.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Accordingly, a state

may not be sued in federal court unless: (i) it waived its
immunity; (ii) Congress has validly abrogated that immunity
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; or (iii) a
plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief against a state
official in his or her official capacity for an ongoing
constitutional violation. See Gollump v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355,
366 (2d Cir. 2009); Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys.,
707 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).
None of those exceptions is applicable here. New York has
not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal
court, and it is well-established that Congress did not abrogate
that immunity through Section 1983. Trotman v. Palisades

Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); Will v.

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Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Congress,
in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity[.]”); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
338-39 (1979). As an arm of the state, DOCCS “stands in the same
position as the state of New York” and shares New York’s immunity.
Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 28
n.1 (2d Cir. 1991).
Conceding that he is not entitled to monetary relief on his
Section 1983 claims,5 plaintiff nevertheless attempts to avoid

dismissal by invoking the exception for prospective equitable
relief. Plaintiff argues that the Amended Complaint “seeks
equitable relief” and that state parole officers “should never
again treat a disabled person that is in their custody, in the
same manner they treated Plaintiff.” Pl. DOCCS Opp. at 12-14.
That argument fails. The Amended Complaint does not seek any form
of prospective injunctive relief. The word “injunctive” appears
only once, in the boilerplate request that the Court “[g]rant
injunctive relief as the Court deems just and proper.”6 AC at 12.
The pleading otherwise contains no allegations supporting a

5 See Pl. DOCCS Opp. at 13 (admitting that “Plaintiff may not be entitled
on his non-ADA claims to money damages from the DOCCS[.]”).
6 The words “injunction,” “enjoin,” or “equitable” do not appear anywhere
in the Amended Complaint.

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request for prospective relief, nor does it identify any ongoing
violation. Plaintiff may not cure this glaring deficiency through
his opposition brief. Ciment v. TransUnion, LLC, 2025 WL 307871,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2025) (“[I]t is well-settled that a
plaintiff cannot amend [his] complaint by asserting new facts or
theories for the first time in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s second, fourth, and fifth causes of
action against DOCCS, explicitly or implicitly brought pursuant to

Section 1983, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.7
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the ADA
Plaintiff’s first cause of action arises under Title II of
the ADA. AC ¶¶ 39-43. Plaintiff alleges that despite being aware
of his disability, DOCCS failed to provide appropriate
accommodations during his transport from Virginia to New York.
Id. DOCCS argues that sovereign immunity bars this claim and that,

7 The Court notes that Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but
provides “only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established
elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993). To state a
cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (i) a person
deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, and (ii) that person acted under
color of state law. Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). As a state
agency, DOCCS is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983 and therefore
may not be sued under that statute. Purnell v. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 2018 WL 6435901, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018). Accordingly, even
if DOCCS were not entitled to sovereign immunity, plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims against it would nonetheless fail.

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in any event, plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting
discriminatory animus or ill will based on plaintiff’s disability.
DOCCS Mot. at 9-11. Plaintiff responds that Congress validly
abrogated DOCCS’s sovereign immunity under the ADA, permitting
monetary relief. Pl. DOCCS Opp. at 7-12.
As discussed, a state (and by extension, DOCCS) cannot be
sued in federal court unless the state has waived its immunity or
Congress has validly abrogated that immunity. See, e.g., Gollump,
568 F.3d at 366. Congress may abrogate a state’s sovereign

immunity if it seeks to enforce the “substantive guarantees” of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518
(2004). With respect to the ADA, the Supreme Court has held that
“insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages
against the States for conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
Under that framework, the Court considers: (i) which aspects of
DOCCS’s alleged conduct violate the ADA; (ii) the extent to which
that conduct also violates the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii)
insofar as the conduct violates the ADA but not the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign

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immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. Id.
at 159.
If plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a claim for monetary damages under the ADA
against DOCCS. If, however, plaintiff alleges ADA violations that
do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court proceeds to the
third prong. See, e.g., Colón v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. &
Cmty. Supervision, 2017 WL 4157372, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2017)
(explaining that a plaintiff must show a violation of the ADA and

a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or satisfaction of the
third Georgia prong to overcome sovereign immunity). Thus,
although Eleventh Amendment issues are typically resolved at the
outset, where a plaintiff “fails to allege an actionable ADA
violation,” questions of sovereign immunity are irrelevant and
need not be reached. Id. The Court therefore turns to the merits
of plaintiff’s ADA claim against DOCCS.
To state a prima facie ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff
must allege that: (i) the plaintiff is a qualified individual with
a disability; (ii) defendant is a public entity subject to the
ADA; and (iii) the plaintiff is being excluded from participation
in, or being denied the benefits of, a service, program, or

activity offered by defendant, or was otherwise discriminated

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against by reason of his or her disability. Wright v. New York
State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016). To determine
whether a plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability,
the ADA defines disability to include, inter alia, “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 92 (2d
Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). A plaintiff may proceed under
theories of intentional discrimination (disparate treatment),
disparate impact, or failure to make a reasonable accommodation.

Brooklyn Ctr. for Psychotherapy Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co.,
955 F.3d 305, 311 (2d Cir. 2020). Under Title II, a defendant
discriminates when it fails to make a reasonable accommodation
that would permit a qualified disabled individual “to have access
to and take a meaningful part in public services and public
accommodations.” Powell v. Nat’l Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d
79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
As alleged here, when DOCCS became involved in his transport
from Virginia to New York, plaintiff was an amputee, clearly and
substantially impairing his ability to walk. AC ¶ 22.
Unquestionably, walking constitutes a major life activity, and
plaintiff has plausibly alleged the first element of a claim under

Title II. Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d

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144, 155 (2d. Cir. 1998) (holding that “seeing, hearing, or
walking” are treated by Second Circuit precedents as “major life
activities per se[.]”). Likewise, it is well-established that
DOCCS is a public entity subject to the ADA. Wright, 831 F.3d at
72. The Court accordingly focuses on the third element of
plaintiff’s prima facie case: whether he was denied the opportunity
to participate in or benefit from defendant’s services, programs,
or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by defendant
because of his disability. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d

261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
The Amended Complaint’s ADA theory rests on a single, narrow
allegation: that DOCCS, through Jane Doe #1 and John Doe #1, failed
to provide plaintiff with a wheelchair or crutches on the flight
from Virginia to New York, requiring him to hop up and down the
aisle while boarding and deplaning. AC ¶ 42. That allegation
fails to state a claim under Title II. To begin, the Amended
Complaint contains no allegations that plaintiff was excluded
from, denied access to, or otherwise deprived of any “service[],
program[], or activit[y]” provided by DOCCS, as required by the
ADA. Wright, 831 F.3d at 72. Nor does plaintiff allege that he
sought to participate in any such service, program, or activity,

or that he was otherwise denied access to one by reason of his

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disability. Id.; see also Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 273-75
(requiring denial of meaningful access to public service).
Instead, plaintiff alleges only that he was not provided a
particular assistive service, namely a wheelchair or crutches,
during a discrete aspect of his transport. That allegation,
without more, does not plausibly plead exclusion from or denial of
any identifiable DOCCS program or service, nor does it support a
reasonable inference that any such denial occurred “by reason of”
plaintiff’s disability. McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635,

640 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring that exclusion be “by reason of” a
disability). Further, the Amended Complaint does not allege that
plaintiff was denied access to a wheelchair or assistive device
because of his disability, or that such equipment was removed or
withheld for discriminatory reasons. To the contrary, plaintiff
alleges that he used a wheelchair outside the aircraft, both before
boarding and after deplaning. AC ¶ ¶ 23, 27. These allegations
further undermine any inference of discriminatory exclusion or
denial of access within the meaning of the ADA. Shomo v. Dep’t of
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 2022 WL 1406726, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May
4, 2022) (“[T]hese claims fail because Plaintiff does not allege

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that he was discriminated against because of his disability, as is
required by [the ADA].”).
Courts routinely dismiss ADA claims premised on alleged
deficiencies in the manner in which services were provided, rather
than the denial of access to those services, where, as here,
plaintiff does not identify any program or activity from which he
was excluded. See, e.g., Elbert v. New York State Dep’t of Corr.
Servs., 751 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (distinguishing
between inadequate medical treatment and actionable ADA

discrimination). At most, plaintiff’s allegations concern the
adequacy of accommodations provided during transport, which is
not, without more, actionable under Title II. Accordingly,
plaintiff fails to state a claim against DOCCS under the ADA.
III. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Negligent Hiring and
Retention Claim

Plaintiff’s third cause of action asserts that DOCCS was
negligent in retaining and hiring employees who were unfit for
their positions, leading to plaintiff’s injuries. AC ¶¶ 50-53.
DOCCS maintains that this claim is likewise barred Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. DOCCS Mot. at 7-8. Plaintiff does
not address this argument in his opposition papers. In any event,
because sovereign immunity “absolutely bars a federal court from
reviewing any state law claim . . . against state agencies and

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officials,” absent waiver or abrogation, plaintiff’s negligent
hiring and retention claim is dismissed. Roddini v. City
University of New York, 2003 WL 435981, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2003).
IV. Because Plaintiff Cannot Amend His Amended Complaint to
Add the Names of Jane Doe #1 and John Doe #1, Any Claims
Against Them Are Dismissed

Largely without specifics, the Amended Complaint names Jane
Doe #1 and John Doe #1, allegedly state parole officers employed
by DOCCS, as defendants in their individual and official
capacities. AC at 1; ¶¶ 7-8. In New York, claims under Section
1983 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2015).
The misconduct alleged by plaintiff occurred in 2021. AC ¶ 22.
Five years later, plaintiff has neither identified nor served the
state parole officers who allegedly facilitated his transport from
Virginia to New York. Because a failure to “identify and serve
John Doe defendants within the statute of limitations is fatal to
claims against them,” plaintiff’s claims against Jane Doe #1 and
John Doe #1 are time-barred as a matter of law. Aniades v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 2023 WL 4421877, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July
10, 2023) (citing Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d
466, 468 (2d Cir. 1995)).

-21-
Leave to amend would be futile. Any second amended complaint
naming the Doe defendants would not relate back because plaintiff
has not shown that the Doe defendants received notice of the action
or knew, or should have known, that the action would have been
brought against them but for a mistake concerning identity. See
Fed R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also Barrow, 66 F.3d at 468
(holding that lack of knowledge of a defendant’s identity, as in
case of Doe defendants, is not a “mistake” for purposes of Rule
15). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against Jane Doe #1 and John
Doe #1, to the extent they are asserted in their individual and
official capacities, are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, DOCCS’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s claims is granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to terminate the motion pending at ECF No. 48. Further,
given that the motions pending at ECF Nos. 42 and 51 will also be
terminated, and given that defendants American Airlines Group Inc.
and American Eagle Airlines are dismissed, the Clerk of Court is
also directed to close this case.
Dated: March 17, 2026
New York, New York 2 |
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD wl
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

af Se

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11386657. Public record. Not legal advice.